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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Nepal  is  one  of  the  world’s  richest  biodiversity  hotspots  with  varied  climate, 
geography and ecosystems. The majority of people in Nepal’s hills and mountains 
still  depend  heavily  on  forest  resources  for  their  livelihood  and  wellbeing. 
However, since the breakdown of the traditional system of forest management and 
the  nationalization  of  forests  in  the  mid  1950s,  Nepal's  forests  had  undergone 
severe  degradation  and  deforestation.  In  addition,  political  instability,  illegal 
clearing,  expansion  of  agricultural  land  and  resettlement  policy  were  also 
responsible for degradation. The deforestation was so rapid that between the period 
of 1964 and 1975, 2.3 million hectares of forests were lost and the livelihoods of 
people in the hills and mountains of Nepal were on the verge of collapse. Since the 
popularization  of  the  theory  of  Himalayan  Environmental  Degradation  and 
realization on the part of government of the urgency of restoring and improving the 
condition of Nepal's forests, a number of conservation projects were launched.  
In  1978,  the  government  of  Nepal  initiated  the  community  forestry  program 
through  the  enactment  of  the  Panchayat  Forest  and  Panchayat  Protected  Forest 
Rules.  These were further strengthened by the endorsement of the 1989 Master 
Plan for the Forestry Sector (MPFS) and enactment of the1993 Forest Act and 1995 
Forest Regulation. The community-based forest co-management initiatives in Nepal 
transferred forest management authority to local community user groups. However, 
since the onset of the Maoist insurgency in 1996 and subsequent armed conflicts 
over the next decade, the community forestry program in Nepal was under threat. It 
was  not  known  what  happened  to  the  community-based  forest  co-management 
arrangements  during  the  period  of  insurgency  due  to  restricted  access  to  the 
countryside. 
 
Through  a  comparative  case  studies  of  three  Community  Forest  User  Groups 
(CFUGs) with three different conflict settings (the first controlled by neither of the 
contending parties, the second under the control of security forces and the third 
under the control of the Maoists) in Kavrepalanchok district in the Middle Hills iv 
 
region  of  Nepal,  this  research  investigates  the  effectiveness  of  CBFCM  in 
strengthening  local  forest  governance  processes  and  outcomes.  It  focuses 
particularly on equity in access and benefit sharing, the participation of different 
socio-economic  strata  in  forest  governance,  and  the  provision  of  environmental 
services within these communities during pre/early and late conflict periods. 
 
This  research  shows  that  the  community  forestry  program  has  provided  a 
significant space to local communities for collective action that enabled them to 
reverse the trend of forest degradation, improving the environmental condition of 
the  forests  and  the  supply  of  forest  products.  Over  time,  the  community  forest 
program  has  been  successful  in  gradually  building  the  capacity  of  CFUG 
institutions and has increased the involvement of women and other marginalized 
sections of the community. Through the expanded networks among CFUGs and 
with the assistance of outside organizations, these communities have now attained 
considerable influence in national forest policy formulation. This study confirms 
that  although  the  governing  mechanisms  of  state  agencies,  including  the 
Department of Forests (DoF), became dysfunctional during the period of armed 
insurgency, governance structures of the local CFUGs in the case study villages 
were largely stable and most forest management activities were carried out during 
the period of armed conflict. The CFUGs have survived as vibrant self-governing 
institutions and have maintained reasonable access to forest resources to satisfy the 
subsistence needs of local people within the community. These findings suggest 
that community-based forest governing institutions had the bargaining capacity and 
ability to overcome the pressures arising from the armed conflict because of the 
resilience and adaptive capacities of the CFUGs.  
 
Key  words:  Co-management  (CM),  community-based  natural  resource  management 
(CBNRM),  Community-based  forest  co-management  (CBFCM),  governance,  and 
community forest user groups (CFUGs). v 
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
1.1.  Introduction  
 
This dissertation concerns the impact of the decade-long (1996 – 2006) political 
conflict  (commonly  known  as  the  Maoist  insurgency)  on  community-based 
forest  management (CBFM) in  the Middle-hills  of Nepal.  It  focuses on case 
studies  of  three  community  forest  user  groups  (CFUGs),  and  examines  the 
following dimensions of resource management outcomes: resource governance, 
livelihood security, and environmental sustainability at local level.  
 
Common- pool resources (CPR) in the hills of Nepal, especially forest resources, 
are important for supporting local livelihoods as well as providing environmental 
services of global as well as local significance. It has become more and more 
clear that global and local common-pool resources are interconnected (Ostrom et 
al. 2002), and for this reason an increasing number of international interventions 
are  aimed  at  addressing  resource  degradation  issues.  The  community-based 
management approach to natural resource management has been advocated as a 
viable resource management policy for some decades (Berkes 1995, 375; Menon 
et al. 2007, 293-298; Kellert et al. 2000, 705; Persoon and van Est 2003, 1; Ellen 
2003, 296). At the same time, understanding the dynamics of community-based 
forest governance (CBFG) processes and the resulting outcomes remains a key 
challenge  for  all  concerned.  The  long-term  implications  of  these  initiatives, 
especially in a society in which there are entrenched caste, ethnicity, gender and 
socio-economic  differences  that  have  spawned  political  conflict,  is  not  fully 
understood.  
 
Community  forests  occupy  an  important  place  in  local  people‘s  livelihoods, 
particularly  since  the  introduction  of  the  program  in  1978  in  rural  Nepal. 
Considerable agreement exists among researchers about the positive impact of 
the community forestry program in Nepal with respect to the improvement of the 2 
 
bio-physical condition of the forest (Bhattarai and Khanal 2005, 65; Adhikari, 
Nagata, and Adhikari 2004, 44; Dangal 2002; Upreti 2001; Acharya et al. 2006; 
Acharya 2005; Agrawal 2001; Kanel, Poudyal, and Baral 2005; Acharya 2002; 
Dev et al.  2003).  With the onset of the Maoist insurgency in 1996,  and the 
subsequent political conflict over the following decade, there was great concern 
among academics, the donor community, government, and planners about the 
impact of the armed conflict on the community forestry program in Nepal. Many 
studies  have  been  carried  out  on  different  aspects  of  community  forestry  in 
Nepal (Kanel 2008; Dahal and Chapagain 2008; Arnold and Campbell 1985; 
Bajracharya  1983a,  1983b;  Schreckenberg  and  Luttrell  2009;  Agrawal  and 
Ostrom  2001;  Gautam  and  Shivakoti  2008;  Adhikari,  Williams,  and  Lovett 
2007; Acharya 2002). It is argued that robust common-pool resource institutions 
have promoted  greater fairness  in  the distribution of benefits,  more effective 
management  of  resources,  and  greater  accountability  towards  resource  users 
(Agrawal  2002,  71).  However,  very  few  studies  have  studied  in  depth  the 
performance of common-pool resource governing institutions (CFUGs in this 
case) in the context of the political conflict of the last decade (Karna, Shivakoti, 
and Webb 2010; B.K et al. 2009).  
 
The Maoist People‘s War began in 1996 in the Mid- Western Hill region of 
Nepal. The armed conflict did not have significant impact on socio-economic 
spheres,  livelihoods  of  people  and  community  forestry  activities  until  2000. 
However, the armed conflict reached in an intense stage and the impact on every 
sphere has been felt throughout the country especially after the formation of 
―People‘s Government‖ by the Maoist on October, 2001, launching of  large-
scale assault on military installations on 23
rd of November 2001 and declaration 
of  state  of  emergency  by  the  government  on  26
th  of  November  2001.  After 
discussion with community forestry users, Department of Forest (DoF) officials, 
for the purpose of this research, the period between 1995/96 to 2000/01 has been 
considered as pre/early conflict periods and the between 2001/02 to 2006/07 has 
been  ‗considered‘  as  late  periods  of  conflict.  Using  three  case  studies,  and 
relying primarily on field data,  I examine the outcomes  of community-based 
forest  management  in  terms  of  resource  governance,  livelihood  security  and 
environmental  sustainability  during  the  pre/early  and  late  periods  of  armed 3 
 
conflict.  Not  only  does  this  study  offer  insights  into  the  role  of  community 
forests in providing livelihood security among forest dependent communities, 
and  the  dynamics  of  community  forest  governance  through  CFUGs,  it  also 
enables us to assess the effectiveness of these institutions in a period of intense 
political upheaval. The conclusions derived from this study may help to devise 
future policy on community-based forest governance in Nepal and elsewhere. 
 
1.2.  Background and Context of Study 
 
In  the  past  few  decades,  the  theme  of  ―governing  common-pool  resources 
(CPRs)‖ has attracted remarkable interest both in academia as well as in policy 
circles (Ostrom 1990). Among the CPRs, the issue of governing forest commons 
more  equitably,  efficiently  and  in  a  more  sustainable  way  remains  a  key 
challenge (Agrawal 2007, 111). Understanding how effective resource governing 
institutions can be crafted for the sustainable use and equitable distribution of 
scarce natural resources, and how the institutional arrangements of community-
based forest management (CBFM) can shape resource-related outcomes, have 
become  matters  of  great  academic  interest  (Warren  and  McCarthy  2009,  8; 
Agrawal 2007, 112; Mansuri and Rao 2004). The focus on governance of the 
commons has emerged mainly due to the widespread problems of environmental 
degradation  through  pollution  of  water  bodies,  depleting  timber  and  fishery 
stocks, dwindling biodiversity, soil erosion, desertification, and more recently 
recognition of the impact of forest policies on climate change. Thus, formulating 
a  better  resource  governance  system  for  the  sustainable  management  of 
common-pool resources is one of the major issues in the 21
st century (Gibson, 
McKean,  and  Ostrom  2000,  1;  Ostrom  et  al.  2002;  Haynes  2008,  136; 
McMichael 2000, 244). It is often argued that  the primary cause of resource 
degradation is the absence of clear property rights, and it is advocated that the 
problem  of  resource  degradation  can  be  reversed  by  establishing  appropriate 
institutional frameworks for proper governance (Acheson 2006, 118). There is 
argument among scholars regarding the most effective property regime to deal 
with protection of natural resources. Economists are in favour of solving the 
problem  of  resource  degradation  through  the  institutions  of  private  property, 
others  view  state  control  as  the  only  solution,  while  much  of  the  social 4 
 
anthropological literature argues that community control over resources in the 
best solution (Acheson  2006, 117). There is an emerging field of economics 
called ―new institutional economics‖ that combines concepts from various social 
science disciplines including economics, organization theory, political science, 
sociology,  law  and  anthropology.  It  primarily  looks  at  various  aspects  of 
institutions such as how they emerge and evolve, how well they serve, and how 
they should be reformed. Moreover, it focuses on property rights, transaction 
cost,  modes  of  governance  and  governing  rules  (Williamson  1971;  Ostrom 
2005b; Williamson 2000; Klein 1999). These scholars analyze open access and 
common  property  resource  systems  from  new  institutional  economics 
perspectives,  especially  property  rights  theory  and  policy  analysis.    The 
emerging knowledge in the field indicates that local communities devise formal 
and  informal  institutions  on  common  property  resource  (CPR)  management 
under common property regimes  that serve a number of important  economic 
functions in managing the local commons, especially in designing appropriate 
forms of governance structure for natural resource management (Adhikari 2003).  
 
Three  different  schools  of  thought  have  emerged  on  the  institutional 
arrangements needed to avert the tragedy of the commons. The property rights 
school argues that only creating and enforcing private property rights can avoid 
the problem of over- exploitation of the commons. The main thesis behind this 
approach  is  that  private  property  is  the  most  efficient  way  to  internalize  the 
externalities that arise in other forms of resource regimes (Lloyds, 1833: 14 cited 
in  Baland  and  Platteau,  1996).  Since  open  access  and  unregulated  common 
property  do  not  give  individuals  the  proper  incentives  to  act  in  a  socially 
efficient way (Baland and Platteau 1996), the property rights school contends 
that  private  property  rights  will  spontaneously  emerge  to  increase  economic 
efficiency (Demsetz 1967). The second school of thought advocates that only the 
allocation of full authority to regulate the common pool resources to an external 
agency can reduce over- exploitation of CPRs. As a consequence scholars have 
long questioned the efficiency of CPRs under common property arrangements 
(Gordon 1954; Scott 1955; Hardin 1968) and solutions have been proposed, such 
as state control and management (Hardin, 1968) or privatization of the commons 
(Demsetz 1964). The third school of thought advocated that institution building 5 
 
at the community level for managing CPRs is another possibility. Emphasis on 
the community-based approach arises from the wisdom that local communities 
not  only  understand  their  problems,  but  also  have  solutions  because  their 
livelihoods depend on these resources and are assumed to have greater incentives 
to  manage  resources  sustainably  over  time  (Ostrom  1992;  McKean  1992). 
Furthermore, they argue that privatization of CPRs may cause problems related 
to  distributional  or  ecological  concerns  or  to  the  reoccurrence  of  negative 
externalities due to imperfect or absent markets. Moreover, in some ecological 
settings, the transaction costs associated with assigning private property rights 
are greater than the value of potential benefits due to spatial scale involved in 
natural resource management. An increasing number of scholars advocate that 
decentralized  collective  management  of  CPRs  by  their  users  could  be  an 
appropriate system for overcoming the 'tragedy of the commons' (Ostrom 1990; 
Berkes and Farvar 1989; Wade 1988; Jodha 1986; Baland and Platteau 1996). 
 
In  the  changed  global  context  it  is  unlikely  that  resolution  of  these  serious 
environmental problems could be accomplished entirely by local communities, 
market mechanisms or through the bureaucracy alone (Lockwood et al. 2009, 3; 
Korten 1987, 1; Dietz et al. 2002, 25). Furthermore, it is argued that sustainable 
management  of  common-pool  resources  depends  on  the  characteristics  of 
resources  and  of  the  users.  Essentially,  it  requires  considerable  ingenuity  to 
devise multiple institutional strategies to cope effectively with the complexity of 
protecting  endangered  bio-physical  resources  within  existing  political,  socio-
cultural and economic institutions in which resource-use is embedded (Ostrom et 
al. 2002). 
 
After  many  years  of  empirical  research  new  knowledge  is  emerging  in  the 
management  of  commons  that  challenges  conventional  interpretations  of 
Hardin‘s metaphor of the ―tragedy of the commons‖ (Hardin 1968), and argues 
that in many cases, especially in the small scale resource management systems, 
local users are capable of self-organizing and have often succeeded in devising 
rules and norms for governing the use and management of natural resources in a 
sustainable manner (Ostrom et al. 2002).   
 6 
 
Property rights
1 over natural resources have important effects on the outcomes of 
resource management because they empower resource users to make operational 
rules on resource use and exclusion  (Agrawal and Ostrom 2001, 508). Tenure 
over resources governs access to, use and management of natural resources, 
through which local communities are able to derive benefits and support their 
livelihoods (WRI 2005, 56; Meinzen-Dick et al. 1997, 1303). Scholars argued 
that property rights over natural resources play a central role in establishing the 
patterns of governance, distribution of benefits, and sustainability of the resource 
base (Meinzen-Dick et al. 1997, 1303; Lawrence 200 0, 3) Devising a clear cut 
property right and enforcement mechanism is the first step in securing the proper 
management  of  common -pool  resources.  Secondly,  crafting  rules  for  the 
appropriation of resources and limiting the amount of harvest, equipment type , 
time and place are important to limit levels of exploitation  (Rose 2002, 241; 
Acheson and Wilson 1996, 582). Based on the analysis of diverse case studies, 
Elinor Ostrom has suggested eight design principles (see chapter 2) which she 
refers to  as  essenti al  for  the success  of  CPR  governing  institutions in  the 
sustainable management of common-pool resources.  
 
There is growing interest in the study of common property institutions, as 
indicated by the award of the Nobel Prize in Economics to Ostrom in 2009 f or 
her work in this field.
2  She has consistently argued that common property 
institutions are a viable mechanism for the sustainable management of resources 
and have a significant role in shaping the patterns of human behaviour and the 
outcomes that enable  individuals to benefit from the resource more or less 
sustainably (Ostrom 1992, 24). Institutions define the rights and duties of users 
with respect to particular common resources (Dietz et al. 2002, 24).  
 
Increasingly today developing countries have begun to focus their attention on 
community-led local institutions by decentralizing the governance of natural 
resources  (Agrawal 2002, 41). There is a debate among researchers, policy 
makers and practitioners of CPR management regarding the appropriate roles of 
                                                 
1 A property right is defined as ―the capacity to call upon the collective to stand behind one‘s claim to a 
benefit stream‖ (Bromley 1991:15). 
2 The Prize was awarded to Ostrom "for her analysis of economic governance, especially the commons" 
<http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/2009/> accessed 15 September, 2010. 7 
 
government, community and the private sector in the management of the global 
commons,  more  specifically  in  the  face  of  failure  of  centralized  resource 
management systems (Dietz et al. 2002, 24) and the inequities and uncertainties 
of private property solutions (Warren and McCarthy 2009). These failures have 
forced planners, development practitioners and academics to reconsider the role 
of community in local resource management (Agrawal and Gibson 1999, 629). 
However, there is also a realization that it is unlikely that problems caused by 
growing pressure on the finite natural resource base can be resolved entirely by 
local  communities,  any  more  than  through  the  bureaucracy  or  market 
mechanisms alone (Lockwood et al. 2009, 3; Korten 1987, 1; Dietz et al. 2002, 
25).  
 
After the failure of conventional governance structures in solving the issue of 
resource degradation on the one hand and the demand for greater control and 
autonomy over natural resources by local people on the other, community-based 
natural  resource  management  (CBNRM)  via  decentralized  institutional 
arrangements was initiated to formally incorporate local communities in resource 
management (Menon et al. 2007, 4; Persoon and van Est 2003, 1; Agrawal and 
Ribot 1999). Restructuring of CPR governing institutions has been initiated with 
the  introduction  of  different  modes  of  co-management  and  community-based 
arrangements involving both state and non-state actors (Meynen and Doornbos 
2004, 235).   
 
By  the  1990s,  various  co-management  (CM)  and  community  based  natural 
resource management (CBNRM) approaches were adopted in the Asian region 
for  dealing  with  CPR  issues  associated  with  forests,  water  management,  and 
fisheries  (Menon  et  al.  2007,  1;  Kumar  2005,  275).  These  revived  or  newly 
established community-based governance initiatives have opened up an avenue 
of opportunities for collaboration between citizens and the government to further 
their respective interests (Brunner and Steelman 2005, 19). The advocates of 
community-based approaches argued that CBNRM brings transparency to the 
decision-making  process  and  promotes  public  vigilance  and  accountability 
(Warren  and  McCarthy  2009,  234),  ensures  effectiveness  of  development, 
promotes social justice and environmental sustainability (Menon et al. 2007, 1-8 
 
2),  and  enhances  efficiency  and  equity  while  enabling  development  that  is 
socially and environmentally more equitable and sustainable (Ribot, Agrawal, 
and Larson 2006, 1865). Due to the participatory features of the community-
based approach, it is asserted that community-based governance will be cheaper, 
more  effective  and  responsive  to  the  needs  of  local  people  (Carlsson  and 
Sandström  2008,  37;  Colfer,  Dahal,  and  Moeliono  2008).  Ideally  it  would 
increase  accountability  and  societal  participation,  while  reinforcing 
empowerment and democratisation of the local community (Menon et al. 2007, 
4).   
 
The  community-based  forest  management  (CBFM)  approach  was  adopted  in 
Nepal in the late 1970s, after the failure of the centralized forest management 
regime  had  become  apparent  (see  chapter  four),  by  delegating  some  central 
government forest management authorities to local institutions. In 1988, for the 
first  time  in  Nepal  the  devolution  of  authority  over  forest  management  was 
initiated by handing over some state controlled forest  to  local  community in 
Kavrepalanchok  district  (DFO  2007).  This  policy  shift  reflected  a  new 
recognition of the importance of local management of forests, and its potential 
for  greater effectiveness than the former  centralized regime  (Agrawal  2001a, 
1650). After the restoration of democracy in 1990, the government of Nepal 
introduced  the  1993  Forest  Act  and  the  1995  Forest  Regulation,  which 
incorporated various community friendly provisions and recognized the people 
as  the  ultimate  users  and  managers  of  the  forests.  The  1993  Forest  Act  has 
recognized  Community  Forest  User  Groups  (CFUGs)  as  independent  self-
governing institutions. As of July 2008, 14,439 Community Forests (CF) have 
been  handed  over  to  communities  throughout  the  country  (covering  22%  of 
Nepal‘s total forests and 35% of the potential community forest area). Donor 
agencies  such  as  the  World  Bank,  United  States  Agency  for  International 
Development  (USAID),  Australian  Agency  for  International  Development 
(AusAID)  and  Britain‘s  Overseas  Development  Agency  (ODA),  have  been 
involved  in  assisting  the  government  of  Nepal  in  implementing  community 
forestry programs (Kanel 1998). Nepal is considered to be a global leader in the 
community forestry sector having experimented with CF programs for more than 
30  years.  It  is  acknowledged  as  exemplifying  good  practice  in  participatory 9 
 
forestry, and especially for its efforts in dealing with the problem of resource 
degradation (Pokharel et al. 2008, 55; IUCN 2000, 57). Local control over forest 
resources  has  significantly  improved  the  bio-physical  environment,  and  the 
fulfilment of basic needs of rural communities for forest products and services 
(Acharya 2002, 152; Bhattarai and Khanal 2005, 65; Kanel, Poudyal, and Baral 
2005;  Adhikari,  Nagata,  and  Adhikari  2004,  44;  Dangal  2002;  Agrawal  and 
Ostrom 2001; Upreti 2001; Dev et al. 2003; Acharya et al. 2006; Acharya 2005; 
Adhikari, Williams, and Lovett 2007, 476). 
 
Although Nepal has been in the forefront of experiments with community-based 
forest  management,  the  sustainability  of  the  CF  program  in  Nepal  was  in 
question after the onset of the Maoist insurgency in 1996 and continuing armed 
conflict over the following decade. During the ten year period of armed conflict 
(1996-2006), the main targets of the Maoists were not only the Nepalese Army 
and  Police,  but  also  forest  guards  (both  armed  and  unarmed)  and  security 
personnel (mainly army) deployed for the protection of national parks. Since law 
and order was largely absent in the countryside with the Maoists controlling an 
overwhelming majority of hill districts (where most of the community forests are 
located), district level forest employees were targeted and forestry infrastructure 
(offices, equipment and field stations) were often destroyed (Uprety, 150-151). 
 
The social and economic costs of the decade long conflict were immense. Over 
13,382 people were killed, 300,000–400,000 rural families were displaced and 
injured and educational institutions were badly disrupted (NGO Federation of 
Nepal 2003: xiv-xiv; ADB 2004). GDP also declined sharply to -0.4% in Fiscal 
Year 2002. Economic growth was drastically reduced from an average rate of 
4.8%  in  the  1990s  to  2.8%  during  the  2002/03  –  2006/07  periods,  severely 
curtailing public expenditure (UNDP 2009, 22). Due to the worsening law and 
order situation in the country, and limited mobility in rural areas, only sketchy 
reports have been available on the impact of the armed conflict on the natural 
resource base in Nepal.  
 
Most reporting during the armed conflict period concerned illegal poaching of 
endangered  one-horned  rhinos,  taxation  of  Non  Timber  Forest  Products 10 
 
(NTFPs), displacement of households, damage to conservation infrastructure and 
public access to forest resources. During the insurgency period Maoist forces 
captured  a  number  of  national  parks  throughout  the  country  and  prohibited 
government officials and employees from entering the parks. For example, the 
offices of the Kanchanjunga Conservation Area, Mannaslu Conservation Area, 
Dhorpatan  Hunting  Reserve,  Makalu  Barun  National  Park,  and  Langtang 
National Park were captured and staffs were forced to move to their respective 
district headquarters, putting local conservation efforts at risk (Budhathoki 2003, 
73). In other instances national park offices were taken over by Nepalese forces, 
as  in  the  case  of  Sagarmatha  National  Park,  in  order  to  carry  out  security 
operations. Due to lack of security and the risk of encounters with insurgents, 
many senior park staffs were removed from their field offices (Budhathoki 2003, 
73; Upreti 2006, 272). In addition, 30 District Forest Offices (DFO) buildings, 
52 Illaka Ban Karyalaya (Area Forest Offices), 235 Range Posts, 2 Forestry 
Training Centres, and 3 Armed Guard Quarters were partially or fully destroyed, 
amounting  to  a  total  loss  of  NRS  311.7  million
3  Nepali rupees
4. During the 
insurgency period, encroachment into forests, illegal felling, poaching, hunting, 
and smuggling of medical plants and timber were widely reported (Upreti 2006, 
271). As security forces were diverted and deployed against the insurgents, there 
was an increase in illegal hunting of protected wildlife species. 
 
The Maoist insurgency affected every walk of Nepalese life  - social, economic, 
cultural and environmental (ADB/ICIMOD 2006: 169-170). Several studies have 
been carried out in recent years on Nepal‘s armed conflict, especially focussing 
on the socio-economic and political aspects of the conflict (Do and Iyer 2007; 
Murshed and Gates 2005; Parwez 2006; Pyakurel 2007; NGO Federation 2003), 
to  some  extent  including  resource  conflict  perspectives  (Upreti  2004,  2002). 
However,  none  of  the  studies  that  have  been  conducted  so  far  focus  on  the 
impact  of  armed  conflict  on  community-based  governance  of  the  forest 
commons  at  local  level.  The  armed  conflict  engulfed  the  whole  country  and 
affected every section of Nepalese society. However, the impact of the conflict 
                                                 
3 1 US$ equivalent to 70 Nepali Rupees 
4 The data on damage to forestry infrastructures was received on July 20, 2008, from Mr. Ram Bhakta 
Malla, Under Secretary (Technical), National Forest Division, Department of Forest, Babarmahal, 
Kathmandu, Nepal. 
 11 
 
on  the  natural  resource  base  -  rural  people‘s  livelihoods  and  governance 
processes (specifically with respect to community forestry programs) are neither 
well understood nor well documented. There have also been a number of studies 
of the Nepalese community forestry program (Adhikari, Williams, and Lovett 
2007; Bhattarai and Khanal 2005; Kanel, Poudyal, and Baral 2005; Adhikari, 
Nagata, and Adhikari 2004; Dangal 2002; Agrawal and Ostrom 2001; Upreti 
2001;  Dev  et  al.  2003;  Acharya  et  al.  2006;  Acharya  2005).(Upreti  2001; 
Adhikari, Williams, and Lovett 2007, 476; Acharya 2002, 152; Bhattarai and 
Khanal  2005,  65;  Kanel,  Poudyal,  and  Baral  2005;  Adhikari,  Nagata,  and 
Adhikari 2004, 44; Dangal 2002; Agrawal and Ostrom 2001; Dev et al. 2003; 
Acharya  et  al.  2006;  Acharya  2005;  Adhikari,  Williams,  and  Lovett  2007). 
However, there have been no studies available so far specifically investigating 
the governance processes, livelihood security and environmental services of the 
community  forestry  program  during  the  late  period  of  armed  conflict  and 
comparing these with the pre/early conflict period. There is a need to understand 
the impacts of conflict on the sustainable management of forest resources, and 
compare  governance  processes  of  community  forest  management  during 
pre/early and late conflict periods in order to assess the resilience of CBNRM 
programs  and  to  develop  appropriate  policies  and  plans  in  the  post-conflict 
period. 12 
 
1.3.  Research Questions 
 
The main aim of this dissertation is to investigate the impact of the decade-long 
political conflict (commonly known as the Maoist insurgency) on community-
based forest governance, livelihood security and environmental sustainability of 
forest dependent rural communities in Nepal. More specifically, the dissertation 
will  investigate  the  extent  to  which  community-based  forest  co-management 
(CBFCM) and utilization programmes contributed livelihood support to the rural 
poor before the emergence of conflict, and how prolonged armed conflict (PAC) 
affected the sustainable use and local management of forests in Nepalese rural 
communities. The research was concerned to trace community forest user group 
(CFUG) governance practices and the various coping strategies and portfolio 
diversifications that rural households adopted in trying to secure livelihood and 
wellbeing in the midst of armed conflict. 
 
This thesis seeks to address the following questions: 
 
i.  To what extent was community-based management of forest resources 
sustainable  and  effective  in  providing  livelihood  support  prior  to  the 
outbreak  of  armed  conflict?  To  what  extent  did  the  different  socio-
economic strata within these communities participate in and benefit from 
the management of community forests? 
ii.  How did prolonged armed conflict affect access to and sustainable use of 
natural resources by rural communities? Were existing institutions for the 
management of community forests adversely affected or broken down by 
the conflict? What overall impact did the prolonged conflict have on the 
livelihoods  of  rural  households  in  forest  dependent  communities, 
particularly the poorest sectors? 
iii.  What alternative coping strategies (institutions) did households adopt and 
what  effect  did  this  have  on  the  long  term  sustainability  of  their 
livelihood strategies and the environment, particularly the environmental 
services associated with community forests? 
iv.  What  are  the  implications  for  post-conflict  policy  toward  community 
forestry and its contribution to livelihood security in rural Nepal? 13 
 
 
The research questions addressed by this thesis are informed by the literature on 
common  property,  decentralized  governance  and  community-based  forest 
management (CBFM). They ask whether these initiatives in Nepal created the 
space  for  local  populations  to  accommodate  their  livelihood  needs  with 
conservation  goals.  At  three  case  study  sites,  community-based  forest  co-
management (CBFCM) is examined, comparing several indicators for assessing 
the  continuity  and  effectiveness  of  forest  resource  governance  for  livelihood 
security  and  environmental  sustainability  during  pre/early  and  late  conflict 
periods. Indicators assessing processes of decision making in Community Forest 
User  Groups  (CFUGs)  include  representation  of  CFUG  members  (especially 
women and marginalized sections of the community) in decision making forums, 
frequency of CFUG meetings, equity, access and benefit sharing mechanisms 
through  expenditures  of  CFUG  income.  Community  forest  contributions  to 
household basic needs, community development and employment opportunity 
are  examined.  Environmental  sustainability  outcomes  were  assessed  using 
indicators such as the status of wildlife in the community forest, status of forest 
regeneration and condition of the watershed. 
 
1.4. Selection of Case Study District and Study Sites 
 
Kavrepalanchok district is located in the middle-hill zone to the south east of 
Kathmandu, and was heavily affected by the armed conflict (see map 1.1). It 
consists  of  terrain  and  topography  typical  of  the  middle  hills  region  with 
elevations ranging from 318 to over 3,000 meters above sea level. The total area 
of the district is 1396 sq. km. The Mahabharat
5 range, which extends east-west, 
divides the district into two parts. The northern part is relatively accessible and 
densely populated whereas the southern part is relatively remote and sparsely 
populated. The climate varies considerably, from sub-tropical to warm temperate 
and cool temperate. The annual temperature range is 10  – 31 
o C and average 
annual precipitation is 1650 mm. The district headquarters, Dhulikhel, is situated 
                                                 
5 The Mahabharat Range is a major east-west mountain range also called the 'Lesser Himalaya' and Lower 
Himalayan Range. It parallels the much higher Himalaya range which lies about 100 kilometers to the 
north, and the lower Siwalik or Churia Range (Outer Himalaya) to the south. 14 
 
30  km  east  of  Kathmandu  and  Kavrepalanchok  district  is  one  of  the  major 
suppliers of milk to the capital city. 
 
Map 1.1: Map of Nepal Showing Study District 
 
Source: (UN 2000)  
 
An indigenous system of forest management was in existence in Kavrepalanchok 
district for centuries (see chapter five) (Fisher 1988). The state forest governance 
system in Kavrepalanchok district began in 1960 after the establishment of the 
Chautara  Forest  Division.  From  1960  to  1982,  forest  governance  in 
Kavrepalanchok district was administered through the Chautara Forest Division, 
Sindhupalcok.  In  1983,  the  District  Forest  Office,  Kavrepalanchok  was 
established, which has one Regional (Ilaka) Forest Office and eight Range Posts 
offices  responsible  for  forest  administration  and  support  of  the  now  well-
established  CF  programmes  in  the  district.  The  Nepal-Australia  Community 
Forestry Project (NACFP) carried out a large scale re-forestation program from 
1973  on  degraded  and  denuded  land  in  the  districts  of  Kavrepalanchok  and 
Sindhupalchok. During this four decade long (1966-2006) partnership, 27,000 ha 
of  forest  were  handed  over  to  nearly  700  community  forest  user  groups  to 
implement  community forestry and resource management programs  (AusAID 15 
 
2006). The project launched extension programs and training for forestry staff 
and forest users in order to increase skills and awareness on the conservation and 
sustainable management of forest resources.  
 
Kabhrepalanchok district has been selected for this study because it falls under 
the  Middle-hills  region  of  Nepal  and  also  because  it  has  been  a  pioneering 
district in piloting the community forestry programme.   In addition, the Middle-
hills region, which covers 41% of Nepal‘s total land area and harbors 45.5% of 
its population, has been the main focus of the community forestry programme 
(Springate-Baginski  et  al.  2003,  6).    Since  the  inception  of  the  community 
forestry progam, this district has played a pioneering role in the development of 
CF in the country. It was in this district that the first community forest in Nepal, 
―Sano Ban Pandey Gaon” was handed over to the community on July 12, 1988, 
marking a significant transformation in the official recognition of community 
rights and responsibilities for forest management.  
 
Kavrepalanchok  district  experienced  a  high  level  of  conflict,  killings  and 
displacement during the period of insurgency (Hatlebakk 2007, 4). As the main 
focus of this study is to investigate the impact of prolonged armed conflict on 
community-based forest governance mechanisms and livelihood security, this is 
an ideal district in terms of representativeness which has over 18 years history of 
implementing  community  forestry  in  Nepal.  Furthermore,  my  PhD  study  is 
supported by the South Asia Research Facility which is funded by Australian 
Aid for International Development (AusAID) with a particular aim to enhance 
the skills and knowledge of researchers working in South Asia. As a resident of 
Nepal, being well versed in the local language, and also with experience working 
in the environment and natural resource management sector as an officer in the 
Ministry of Forest and Soil Conservation for more than two decades (in the case 
study districts from 1998 through 2001), I considered Kavrepalanchok district to 
be an ideal focus for this study.  
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Map 1.2: Location Map of Kavrepalanchok District Showing Study Locations* 
(shaded) 
 
Source: District Development Committee, Kavrepalanchok, 2008  
 
Three Community Forest User Groups (CFUGs) were selected for the study, all 
situated within the Middle-Hills region of central Nepal. The selected groups 
were  Hile  Jaljale  (Ka)  CFUG  at  Tukucha  Village  Development  Committee 
(VDC);  Sharada  Devi  CFUG  at  Ugratara  Janagal  VDC;  and  Lakuri  Rukh 
Bhulbhule CFUG at  Chaubas  VDC. The CFUGs  were selected based on the 
following criteria: i) distance to district centre; ii) degree of influence of the 
armed conflict (representing an area controlled by Maoists, an area controlled by 
security forces and an area without control by either of the contending parties); 
iii) maturity of CF governance; and iv) degree of local people‘s dependence on 
the  community  forest.  Among  the  three  CFUGs,  Sharada  Devi  Community 
Forest User Group (SDCFUG), located near the district centre and market, was 
not directly affected by either of the opposing parties during the late conflict 
periods, and the degree of economic dependence on the CF was less compared to 
the other two locations. The second case study, Hile Jalajle (Ka), is located at an 
intermediate  distance  from  the  district  centre  and  market.  This  CFUG  was 
heavily influenced by the security forces during the late conflict periods and the 17 
 
user group had a relatively greater dependence on the forest. Finally the third 
case  study,  the  Lakuri  Rukh  Community  Forest  User  Group  (LRCFUG),  is 
remote and located farthest from the district capital with limited access to the 
market, and was dominated by Maoist insurgents during the period of armed 
conflict.  
 
1.5. Research Methodology 
 
For this particular research, I have adopted a case study approach (Yin 2009, 2).  
The case study research method has been used commonly in various disciplines 
with the aim of investigating the complexity of social phenomena (Yin 2009, 4). 
It  is  argued  that  the  case  study  approach  is  particularly  suitable  under  three 
conditions: firstly, when the research questions are concerned to answer ―how‖ 
and ―why‖; secondly, when the researcher has little control over events; and 
finally when the research is conducted on contemporary phenomena and in a real 
life situations (Yin 2009). Case study research is a complex task as it has to deal 
with  the richness  of phenomena in  real  life contexts,  thus  requiring multiple 
sources of evidence and the triangulation of data. In the field of collective action 
and commons studies, multiple methods are typically applied in the research. 
Among them, the case study approach has been widely used for empirical field-
based research. This approach focuses intensively on one or more representative 
cases in order to draw inferences about the large population (Poteete, Janssen, 
and Ostrom 2010, 33), investigating in depth the particularity and complexity of 
each case in order to understand its dynamics in context (Stake 1995, 4). It is 
argued  that  the  case  study  research  approach  is  better  able  to  deal  with  the 
complexity of processes (Poteete, Janssen, and Ostrom 2010, 33). The case study 
is defined as ―an intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of understanding 
a larger class of (similar) units‖ (Gerring 2004, 342). Case study research allows 
holistic and detailed analysis and  cross-case  comparison  (Bennett and  Elman 
2006,  259).  In  order  to  obtain  multiple  perspectives  on  the  case,  researchers 
using the case study approach and obtain descriptions and interpretations from 
others, seeking primarily to discover and portray the multiple views of others 
through interviews (Stake 1995, 64).  
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Case study field research involves a range of data collection methods, including: 
semi-structured  interviews  with  key  informants;  focus  group  discussion; 
household surveys: and observation and collection of secondary data (Poteete, 
Janssen,  and  Ostrom  2010,  34),  and  is  aimed  at  uncovering  the  dynamic 
processes  at  work.  In  this  research  both  qualitative  and  quantitative  data 
collection methods were employed to generate data for the cases to be compared. 
Purposive sampling was used for the selection of case study communities, as it is 
appropriate to select specialized populations to identify particular types of case 
for in-depth analysis (Newman, 2003, 138-139). As indicated above, selection of 
the three Community Forest User Groups was made in view of a range of key 
characteristics:  influence  of  the  conflicting  parties  (one  area  dominated  by 
security  forces,  another  dominated  by  the  Maoists,  and  the  last  without  the 
influence of either of the conflicting parties); incidence of violence during the 
conflict; distance to district centre; maturity of the Community Forest program; 
and the relative dependency of these rural communities on forest resources. After 
the purposive selection of three CFUGs, the population living in the particular 
communities was divided into sub-groups (strata) using stratified sampling on 
the basis of a participatory wealth ranking, in which the criteria for dividing the 
population  into  three  different  socio-economic  categories  were  based  on  the 
perspective and evaluation of villagers themselves (Richards et al. 1999; Zeller, 
Feulefack,  and  Neef  2006;  Adams  et  al.  1997;  Adhikari  and  Lovett  2006; 
Hargreaves et al. 2007). Newman (2003) argues that stratified sampling is useful 
and  effective  in  producing  samples  more  representative  of  the  population  of 
particular  strata  of  interest,  which  could  be  missed  in  a  random  process.  It 
guarantees that each group is represented in the sample. 
 
The  population  was  divided  into  three  sub-groups,  namely  upper-income
6, 
middle-income
7,  and  lower -income  households
8.  Once  the  population  was 
                                                 
6 Upper-income households supplement their income from farming, local businesses, and service/overseas 
employment. They often have land outside the village, have irrigated as well as un-irrigated land holdings, 
and larger areas of kharbari (private forest and pasture land). Generally they are self reliant and have food 
sufficiency.   
7  Middle-income  households  commonly  have  land -holdings  and  cattle,  but  only  modest  kharbari. 
Significant household income is earned from animal husbandry (including dairying) and vegetable farming 
(depending on the fertility of the soil and distance to the market). They tend to be heavily dependent on 
inputs to their farming systems from community forests. Off-farm employment is also important for their 
income. 19 
 
divided into sub-groups, a random sampling was applied to select respondents 
from each stratum (Lind, Marchal, and Wathen 2010, 262). According to the 
central limit theorem
9 (Lind, Marchal, and Wathen 2010, 271), a sample of 30 
selected from a population will be representative if the phenomena of interest is 
normally  distributed.  Randomization  generally  increases  the  likelihood  of 
selecting  a  representative  sample  if  the  population  is  normally  distributed 
(Poteete, Janssen, and Ostrom 2010, 76). A total sample of 45 households from 
each community with 15 households from each of the three income groups has 
been selected randomly for a detailed household survey from the complete list of 
the CFUG members (see household survey questionnaire in the Appendix) . In 
addition to the structured household survey, primary data were collected using 
Participatory  Rural  Appraisal  (PRA)  methods  including  key  informant 
interviews, focus group discussions, wealth ranking, semi-structured interviews, 
and  transect  walks  to  enable  triangulation  (Chambers  1994a,  1253).  
Participatory rural appraisal (PRA) as a qualitative assessment tool has gained 
mainstream acceptance as one of the tools for including the voice of the poor and 
trying  to  understand  realities  at  the  local  level  through  local  people‘s  own 
analysis (deGraft Agyarko 2002). A number of methods are used in PRA that 
include: participatory mapping, time lines and trends,  change analysis, seasonal 
calendars,  key informant interviews, focus group discussions, wealth ranking, 
semi-structured interviews, and transect walks to enable triangulation (Laderchi 
2001, 6-7; Chambers 1994a). Timelines are used for assessing migration patterns 
and  environmental  changes,  while  trend  analysis  is  used  for  income  and 
expenditure,  and  focus  group  discussions  are  used  to  investigate  access  to 
services,  access  to  common  property  resources  and  other  natural  resources 
including soil and water conservation, forestry, agriculture and fisheries among 
others  (deGraft  Agyarko  2002;  Chambers  1994a,  1253).  Key  informant 
                                                                                                                                    
8 Lower income households (including landless households) have small or no land holdings, are mostly 
dependent  on  off-farm  activities,  such  as  labouring,  artisan  work  (blacksmithing,  tailoring,  mason, 
carpentry) and non timber forest product collection. To pursue these livelihoods they have specific needs 
from the forest distinct from the other wealth-rank groups, such as charcoal for blacksmithing, and fuel-
wood and medicinal plants for sale. 
9 The central limit theorem is based on the theory of probability. The theorem states that if all samples of a 
particular size are selected from any population h aving the same distribution has, under certain general 
conditions,  the distribution of the sample mean is approximately a normal distribution. Moreover, the 
approximation steadily improves as the number of observations increases . (Lind, Marchal, and Wathen  
2010, : 271).  
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interviews  were  conducted  with  CFUG  committee  members,  village  leaders, 
social workers, representatives from women‘s groups, and forestry technicians. 
Before the interview a semi-structured questionnaire was developed to guide the 
interview. Information available from the Nepal-Australia Community Resource 
Management and Livelihood Project (NACRMLP), at the District Forest Office 
and Department of Forest (DoF) was used as far as possible.  
 
It  has  been  argued  that  the  case  study  approach  poses  problems  of  limited 
external  validity,  and  difficulty  of  replication  (Poteete,  Janssen,  and  Ostrom 
2010, 33). It is useful to select cases which are typical and representative of other 
cases. For the analysis of collective action on the commons, the main unit of 
analysis in the case study research can be natural resource systems, villages, 
community forest user groups, or other social groups. Case study research has 
proved useful in conceptual development and testing of theory, especially in the 
study of commons. However, researchers should be careful in selecting, cases, 
and should endeavour to control the pattern of variation and comparability in 
such a way that it leverages analytical strength (Poteete, Janssen, and Ostrom 
2010,  34,  76).  For  the  study  of  community-based  forest  governance 
arrangements and livelihoods, a combination of both documentary analysis and 
field research is necessary (Ellis 2000, 198). However, the mix of data collection 
methods is often dictated by the resources available and time factors. Field based 
research  demands  substantial  time  and  financial  resources,  which  poses 
particular challenges for student researchers (Poteete, Janssen, and Ostrom 2010, 
74). For this particular research, a six-month field survey was undertaken from 
February  9  through  July  30,  2008.  During  my  field  visit  the  comprehensive 
peace agreement between the Nepalese government and the Maoist was signed. 
In the countryside the uncertain security situation still made it difficult to collect 
data and interact with people. However, being well known to the local area I 
managed to collect the data required despite these challenges. 
 
1.6. Chapter outline 
 
This  thesis  is  organized  in  nine  chapters.  The  first  chapter  has  provided  the 
background  and  context  of  the  research  and  identifies  the  issues,  research 21 
 
questions  and  conceptual  framework  that  informed  the  research  plan.  It  also 
presented  a  methodological  overview,  explaining  the  criteria  for  selection  of 
study sites, the methodological approaches adopted, and sampling criteria for 
selection of survey households. 
 
Chapter  two  explores  the  existing  theoretical  debates  on  common  property 
resource governance, collective action, and property rights in the management of 
natural resources. This chapter specifically deals with the different approaches to 
resource governance, focusing on particular debates and recent findings on co-
management and community-based forest governance.  
 
The third chapter discusses in detail the political conflict in Nepal. It begins with 
an historical overview of political development, socio-economic conditions, and 
the struggle for democracy in Nepal. This chapter also outlines the evolution of 
the communist movement in Nepal, the causes of the recent armed conflict (1996 
– 2006) launched by the Communist Party of Nepal – Maoist (CPN-M), and the 
historical peace agreement between government and CPN-M, signed in 2008. It 
also assesses the dynamics of armed conflict, its socio-economic implications 
and  impacts  on  the  environment  and  the  community  forestry  program  in 
particular. 
 
Chapter four provides an overview of forest policy, including the evolution and 
practices of community-based forest management (CBFM) initiatives in Nepal. 
It discusses the farm-forest and livelihoods linkages for rural households and 
provides a detailed account of the evolution of the community forestry program 
and its socio-economic and environmental benefits at village level. This chapter 
then considers equity and gender issues, and the question of the effectiveness of 
the  community  forest  programs  in  addressing  the  problem  of  poor  and 
marginalized people to date in Nepal.  
 
Chapters five, six and seven are case studies of three community forest user 
groups (CFUGs). Each chapter begins with a brief introduction to the study site, 
socio-economic background information on the households. Each examines the 
context of forest degradation in the village, how the community forest programs 22 
 
were initiated, and the level of people‘s participation in the process. It further 
explores  the  dynamics  of  local  level  governance  of  community  forests  and 
considers  questions  of  protection  of  environmental  services,  equity  and 
community development benefits of the program. In a nutshell, the case study 
chapters assess how the prolonged armed conflict impacted upon participation in 
local level forest governance, livelihoods and the sustainability of environmental 
services associated with community forests.  
 
Chapter eight compares the three dimensions of the community forestry program 
-  resource  governance,  livelihood  security  and  environmental  sustainability  - 
across the three case studies chosen for study in terms of the influence of the 
conflicting  parties,  distance  to  the  district  centre  and  dependence  on  the 
community  forest  on  the  socio-economic,  governance  and  environmental 
parameters of investigation.  
 
Finally,  chapter  nine  presents  the  conclusions  and  policy  recommendations 
drawn from the study and identifies areas requiring further research.  23 
 
Chapter 2 
 
Governance of Common-Pool Resources (CPRs) 
 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
Previously in the Asian region and elsewhere, natural resources were typically 
either under the effective control of local communities or were available to them 
as open access. Even where traditional states claimed sovereignty, local people 
were  managing  and  harvesting  common-pool  resources  (CPRs)  under 
established  customary  rules  and  practices  (Persoon  and  van  Est  2003,  1-2). 
However, after colonization, authority over most commercially important natural 
resources  -  forests,  minerals,  land  and  water  -  was  appropriated  by  colonial 
governments.  Large  tracts  of  primary  forest  were  granted  as  concessions  to 
private  companies  for  commercial  purposes  and  large  forest  areas  were 
converted  to  either  agricultural  land  or  commercial  plantations.  During  this 
period, colonial interests, private companies and local elites mostly benefitted. 
After the end of colonial rule, the establishment of national governments in Asia 
and pursuit of developmentalist policies during the 1970s and 1980s intensified 
pressure  on  natural  resources.  Degradation  accelerated  as  global  markets 
expanded while governments did not have the technical, human and financial 
resources to control the vast areas theoretically under central government control 
(Berkes 1994; Persoon and van Est 2003, 3).  
 
In South Asia, forest management was heavily influenced by the British colonial 
administration  during  the  nineteenth  and  twentieth  centuries  that  shaped  the 
formalization of the forestry sector, creating a complex administrative, legal and 
policy framework. This colonial forestry legacy was institutionalized in almost 
all the South Asian nations (IUCN 2000, 5).  A dramatic depletion of natural 
resources including forests was experienced in the post-colonial ―development‖ 
period. After independence, national governments in most cases did not change 
natural resource management policy, leaving central state agencies tasked with 
implementing national policies and legislation (Korten 1987, 275; Persoon and 24 
 
van Est, 2003, 2; Webb 2008, 25). Pressure to exploit resources for national 
development, expanding markets and technological innovation in the 1960s and 
1970s led to overexploitation of the vast forest resources of the Asian region, 
which soon became exhausted across much of the region. (Persoon and van Est 
2003, 3) 
 
Beyond the formulation of laws in favour of state control, rationalized in terms 
of scientific management and national economic development, there was barely 
any  attempt  to  address  issues  of  local  property  rights,  or  institutional 
arrangements that would assure access to and sustainable use of common-pool 
resources (CPRs) for ordinary people. In the past, access to and use of these 
resources  had  been  largely  determined  by  the  local  communities  themselves. 
However,  under  the  modern  state  local  communities  lost  their  role  in  the 
management  of  resources  now  under  the  jurisdiction  of  central  government 
(Korten  1987,  276).  Critics  argued  that  while  modernizing  and  rationalizing 
resource  management,  authorities  underestimated  the  resource  management 
capacity  and  experience  of  local  communities  and  over-estimated  the  state‘s 
capacity to manage these resources on a sustainable basis (Berkes 1994, 19-20; 
Goodland,  Ledec,  and  Webb  1989,  150;  Persoon  and  van  Est  2003,  3). 
Governments undermined traditional systems of resource management, claiming 
that these systems were inequitable and unproductive. In doing so government 
put  a  great  burden  on  the  national  economy,  and  aggravated  disparities  by 
transferring  power  over  resources  from  local  people  into  the  hand  of  elites 
(Korten 1987, 1). Because of their technocratic and bureaucratic approach, many 
development projects in agriculture and rural development failed to deliver the 
desired  objectives  due  to  centralization  of  decision-making  and  minimal 
participation of local stakeholders (Chambers 1983).  
 
Narrowly defined economic development policies produced pernicious effects on 
the global environment (Weaver, Rock, and Kusterer 1997, 1) and aggravated 
poverty (Mansuri and Rao 2004, 5). Concerns over combined socio-economic 
and  environmental  impacts  reawakened  the  interest  of  the  international 
community in local management of natural resources. There was realization at 
the  international  level  that  the  existing  model  of  development  not  only  had 25 
 
negative  impacts  on  the  natural  resource  base,  but  also  increased  the  gap 
between developed and  developing nations.  In  order to  address  the issues  of 
failed development intervention, inequitable distribution of resources at a global 
scale,  and  the  deepening  environmental  crisis,  the  United  Nations  World 
Commission  on  Environment  and  Development  (WECD)  commissioned  the 
Brundtland Report (also known as ―Our Common Future‖) in 1987, which was 
primarily concerned with the integration of economic, social, and environmental 
aspects to achieve sustainable development
10 (Jacobs 1999, 21). Environmental 
issues received further attention after the convening of the 1992 Earth Summit 
and the adoption of Agenda 21. The Rio Declaration and the establishment of the 
―Commission  on  Sustainable  Development‖  were  considered  a  watershed  in 
placing  environmental  considerations  into  the  mainstream  of  development 
policy.  
 
Because  of  the  failure  of  many  development  interventions,  there  was  a 
realization among policy makers, academics, and development practitioners that 
the  problem  of  natural  resource  degradation  could  not  be  addressed  without 
understanding the nature of property rights and authority over natural resources 
(Bromley  and  Cernea  1989,  5).  In  his  seminal  article  ―The  Tragedy  of  the 
Commons‖  published  in  the  journal  Science  in  1968,  Garrett  Hardin  argues 
multiple individuals acting independently on the basis of their self-interest will 
ultimately deplete a shared limited resource, even when it is clear that it is not in 
anyone's  long-term  interest  for  this  to  happen  (Hardin  1968).  The  Hardin 
metaphor of the ―tragedy of the commons‖ had a remarkable influence among 
social scientists and policy makers in formulating new policies and programs in 
response to the inadequacies of state control (Bromley 1990, 6). Hardin‘s thesis 
was widely used to explain the overexploitation of forests, fisheries, overgrazing, 
and misuse of public land in the situation of open access regimes. In the 1960s 
and  1970s,  Hardin‘s  article  stimulated  intense  discussion  among  academics 
across both the natural and social sciences, emphasizing different aspects of his 
account of resource degradation, and taking different lessons from the allegory 
                                                 
10 - In the Brundtland Report, sustainable development is defined as ―development that meets the needs of 
the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs‖(WCED 1987, : 
87). However, due to the vagueness of the definition, and conflicting principles underpinning concepts of 
ecological sustainability and economic development, there has been widespread controversy concerning 
what ‗sustainable development‘ actually means. 26 
 
(Dietz, Dolsak et al. 2002). Hardin has been criticized for failing to distinguish 
an open access regime (a free-for-all) from a common property regime in which 
group rights are bounded and behavioural rules are specified, and was interpreted 
to refute the possibility of governing, organizing and managing a CPR through 
local  institutions,  with  rules  and  sanctions  prepared  by  the  resources  users 
themselves  (Bromley  1989,  875;  Bromley  and  Cernea  1989,  6). 
Misunderstanding  and  confusion  among  scholars,  planners  and  development 
workers,  and  their  tendency  to  treat  common  property  as  an  ineffective 
management regime, resulted in inappropriate policy recommendations and poor 
operational  decisions  (McKean  1992,  250;  Bromley  1991,  22;  Bromley  and 
Cernea 1989 1, 7)
11. 
  
Following  Hardin‘s  argument  many  countries  around  the  world  centralized 
natural resource management or, in line with neoliberal approaches, advocated 
privatization  as  the  most  efficient  solution  for  avoiding  the  tragedy  of  the 
commons (Warren and McCarthy 2009, 9). However, Hardin‘s allegory has been 
criticized heavily (Wade 1987, 95; Ostrom 1990; Feeny et al. 1990; Bromley and 
Cernea 1989, 6-7). Because of the conflation of common property resources with 
―open  access‖  regimes,  conventional  interpretations  of  the  allegory  failed  to 
recognize  that  common  property  resources  can  be  managed  in  a  sustainable 
manner under certain conditions (Poteete, Janssen, and Ostrom 2010, 31; Feeny 
et  al.  1990).  Subsequent  work  by  various  scholars  suggests  that  interpreting 
Hardin's thesis to argue that only privatization or state ownership of resources 
can avert the tragedy is overly simplified (Ostrom 1992; Feeny et al. 1990, 62; 
Bromley and Cernea 1989, 7-8). Empirical studies show that the degradation and 
unsustainable use of natural resources was observed in private as well as in open 
access situations, suggesting that ―tragedies of the commons are real, but not 
inevitable‖  (Ostrom  et  al.  1999,  281).  In  many  cases  local  communities 
successfully  adopted  communal  arrangements  for  common  property  resource 
management (Feeny et al. 1990, 61; Bromley 1989, 875). Actually, Hardin talks 
about  an  alternative  of  ―mutual  coercion,  mutually  agreed  on‖,  which  would 
have covered effective community management, but this was not taken up in the 
                                                 
11 For detail see (Warren and McCarthy: 2009) on how this allegory fed into public policy in the subsequent 
decades. 27 
 
earlier policy literature on CPRs, partly because it was incompatible with neo-
liberal  ideologies  on  privatization  emerging  in  that  period  (Warren  and 
McCarthy 2009).  
 
In recent decades there has been renewed interest in the study of common-pool 
resources (CPRs) and common property, mainly due to the failure of centralized 
control of natural resources and of market oriented policy instruments to solve 
the problem of escalating environmental degradation (Agrawal 2008, 46). Some 
scholars  argued  that  environmental  degradation  in  developing  countries, 
erroneously attributed to the ―common property system‖, in fact emerged after 
the  dissolution  or  disempowerment  of  traditional  institutions  of  resource 
management  (Berkes  1994,  19-20;  Goodland,  Ledec,  and  Webb  1989,  :150; 
Persoon and van Est 2003, 3; Bromley and Cernea 1989, 7). The destruction of 
common  property  institutions  originated  with  the  political  economy  of  the 
colonial era and was further spurred by national and developmentalist policies of 
the  post-colonial  period.  Growing  socioeconomic  differentiation  and 
stratification  within  these  societies  led  to  increasing  divergence  of  ideas  and 
interests  among  resource  users  that  rationalized  the  capture  of  common-pool 
resources  by  powerful  elites  through  state  and  private  capital  (Bromley  and 
Cernea  1989,  7).  Planners  without  proper  knowledge  of  former  or  existing 
common property regimes frequently advocated privatisation or nationalisation 
of  natural  resources  as  a  solution  for  solving  the  problem  of  resource 
deterioration,  overlooking  the  potential  of  local  resource  management 
institutions  (Bromley  and  Cernea  1989,  8).  The  privatisation  policies  which 
came into favour in the 1980s further undermined traditional local  collective 
action mechanisms as a means of dealing with environmental issues (Bromley 
1991, 35). The transfer of resource governance authority over common property 
resources,  from  local  communities  to  state  agencies,  often  led  to  a  dramatic 
decline in the resource base and negative impacts on the livelihoods of local 
people (Dietz et al. 2002, 13).  
 
There  is  serious  confusion  over  the  terms  ―commons‖,  ―common  property 
resources/regimes‖  and  ―common-pool  resources‖  in  the  debates  surrounding 
sustainable resource management (Bromley 1986, 595). As defined by (Dietz et 28 
 
al. 2002, 18), the term ―commons‖ refers to a diversity of resources, facilities or 
property  institutions  that  involve  some  form  of  joint  ownership  and  access. 
Whereas  common-pool  resources  (CPRs)  refer  to  any  natural  or  man-made 
resources or facilities to which more than one person has access and which is 
prone to degradation through over-use. Exclusion from a common-pool resource 
(such as forests or oceans) is costly and one person‘s use directly subtracts from 
the amount available to others: 
 
The term ―common property‖ implies a kind of management arrangement created 
by humans rather than a characteristic of the resource itself. The preferred term 
for resources from which it is hard to exclude users is ―common-pool‖ resources. 
The term ―common-pool‖ focuses on the characteristics of the resource rather 
than on the human arrangements used to manage it. Such a resource could be left 
as open access without rules or could be managed by the government, as private 
property, or by a common property regime. (Dietz et al. 2002, :17) 
 
 
 
2.2. Common Property Resources Management  
 
Understanding  the  nature  of  property  rights
12  and  authority  over  natural 
resources  is  regarded  as  central  to  addressing  the  problem  of  resource 
degradation (Bromley and Cernea 1989, 5). Proponents of privatization consider 
that communal property lacks clear and effective delineation of rights over the 
CPR. Thus, no one is interested in investment for the improvement of the 
resource base as there is no guarantee of sustainable and equitable use (Demsetz 
1967, 356). According to this view, lack of property rig hts leads to inefficient 
use  and  degradation  of  common  property  resources  (Poteete,  Janssen,  and 
Ostrom 2010, 32). In this ―tragedy of the commons‖ situation, the individual 
limits  his  investment,  while  benefitting  more  from  the  investment  of  others, 
which Mancur Olson refers to as the phenomenon of ―free riding‖ (Olson 1965). 
However, the conventional wisdom of the private property rights proponents has 
been challenged by case studies from around the world which demonstrated that 
collective management of CPRs is possible in the absence of private individual 
or state property (Singleton 1999, 388-89; McKean and Cox 1982, 82; Grove 
1993, 431;  Trawick 2001, 361). These studies  also  showed that neither state 
                                                 
12 Bromley (1986: 596) has identified basically four kinds of resource regimes over natural resources i.e. (i) 
Open access regime; (ii) Common property regimes; (iii) Private property regimes; and (iv) State property 
regimes.  29 
 
control  nor  private  property  could  guarantee  sustainability  or  equity.  Many 
empirical studies conducted on the commons revealed that local communities 
throughout  the  world  have  been  sustainably  and  efficiently  managing  local 
common-pool resources through self-governed institutions for centuries under 
collective (non-private) arrangements and that these common property resources 
do  (or  could)  continue  to  play  an  important  role  in  supporting  people‘s 
livelihoods and environmental conservation (Kassa et al. 2009, 1022; Berkes and 
Farvar 1989; McKean 1992, 247; Ostrom et al. 1999, 278; Jodha 1986, 1169; 
Ostrom 1994, 1990; 1992, 10; Ostrom and Gardner 1993, 102; Sneath 1998; 
Bromley and Cernea 1989, 9). 
 
Agrawal and Ostrom have argued that common property rights
13 over natural 
resources are  important for assuring lo cal access and benefit  (Agrawal and 
Ostrom 2001, 508) and that the outcomes of resource management can be largely 
explained by looking at what type of property rights and powers are exercised by 
the local community  (WRI 2005, 56; Agrawal and Ostrom 2001, 4 86-487; 
Meinzen-Dick et al. 1997, 1303). Secure rights over resources are recognized as 
a crucial factor in shaping the use of technology and investment in improvement 
of the natural resource base  (Knox, Meinzen-Dick, and Hazell 2002, 12), since 
without the guarantee of sharing benefits, people have no incentive to adopt new 
technology or change practices to improve the condition of the resource base 
(McCulloch, Meinzen-Dick, and Hazell 1998, 8). Some scholars argue, however, 
that formal property  rights do  not necessarily guarantee improved resource 
conditions, or enhance collective action, as resource management groups may 
pursue other activities and goals which they find profitable rather than pursuing 
sustainable and efficient resource use. In many studies informal CPR institutions 
and private property rights are found to be equally operational at field level 
(Poteete, Janssen, and Ostrom 2010, 51).  
 
It is argued that users of common property resources are more likely to achieve 
sustainable management under three conditions: secure tenure rights of the users 
over the resources, secure membership in the groups that determine rules which 
                                                 
13 A property right is defined as ―the capacity to call upon the collective to stand behind one‘s claim to a 
benefit stream (Bromley 1991, 15). 30 
 
assure continued access and use rights, and effective institutions to regulate and 
manage the use of resources over time under agreed rules (McCulloch, Meinzen-
Dick, and Hazell 1998, 12).  In any common property regime,  environmental 
resources are shared by users, who are the members of that particular resource 
system, which is generally regulated by either government legislation or through 
the customary practices (Bromley and Cernea 1989). When any individual has a 
legal right to some resource, the benefit arising from that particular resource 
system is guaranteed by the state with some rules and regulations. Rights are 
seen not only as a relationship between the appropriator and the resource itself, 
but in terms of the relationship of the individual appropriator with other potential 
users of a particular resource (Bromley 1992, 15).  
 
Common property institutions have been treated as  a set of rules that define 
access,  withdrawal,  exclusion,  management,  and  alienation,  in  respect  to 
particular resources (Schlager and Ostrom 1992, 250-251). Prominent scholars 
on  the  commons  have  suggested  a  number  of  factors  which  are  essential 
elements for the successful management of the commons
14. Based on a range of 
case studies, Ostrom proposes eight design principles for the success of any CPR 
governing institution. Seven of the design principles apply to small scale long -
enduring CPR institutions and an eighth condition is needed for CPRs that are 
part  of  a  larger  system.  The  design  principles  that  Ostrom  identified  for 
successful collective action are see Table 2.1): 
 
                                                 
14 See Ostrom (1990: 90); Wade (1988: 215-216); Balland and Platteau (1996: 215). 31 
 
Table 2.1: Design Principles for Successful Management of a Commons 
 
Design Principles for Successful Management of a Commons 
i.    clearly defined boundaries (the first step in organizing collective action; users of 
the CPR need to know who are the users who have a stake in the resource, and 
also what is being managed with respect to geographical boundaries and rules of 
acceptable behaviour); 
ii.    proportional equivalence between benefits and costs (rules governing the amount 
of products that the user is allowed to appropriate are related to local conditions, 
as are rules requiring labour, materials, and or money); 
iii.    collective choice arrangements (those affected by operational rules can participate 
and modify the rules overtime to better suit the local circumstances and needs); 
iv.    monitoring (those who actively audit CPR conditions and appropriator behaviours 
are accountable to the appropriators or are the appropriators); 
v.    graduated sanctions (appropriators who violate operational rules in use are likely 
to receive graduated sanctions [depending on the seriousness and context of the 
offences]  from  other  users,  from  officials  accountable  to  these  users,  or  from 
both); 
vi.    conflict-resolution mechanisms (users and their officials have rapid access to low-
cost  local  arenas  to  resolve  conflict  among  resource  users  or  between 
appropriators and officials); 
vii.    recognition  of  rights  to  organize  (the  rights  of  users  to  devise  their  own 
institutions are not challenged by external governmental authorities); and  
viii.    nested enterprises
15 (appropriation, provision, monitoring, enforcement, conflict 
resolution, and governance activities are organized in multiple layers of nested 
enterprises).  
Source: (Ostrom 1990, 90) 
 
The design principles that Ostrom has suggested are critical for maintaining the 
sustainability of common-pool resource institutions and the resource itself. By 
following  these  principles  the  users  of  any  CPR  institutions  can  maintain, 
improve and use the resources sustainably for their livelihoods and well-being. 
In  regard  to  management  of  common-pool  resources  (CPR),  (Schlager  and 
Ostrom  1992,  250-151)
16  identified two types of property rights: operational 
level property rights (access and withdrawal) and collective -choice property 
rights  (management,  exclusion  and  alienation).  According  to  Schlager  and 
Ostrom (1992, 250-251) operational level property rights refer to “access” rights 
to enter a defined property, and “withdrawal” rights to acquire resources from 
the system. The collective-choice property rights involve “management” – the 
authority over devising internal management and use patterns;  “exclusion” – 
rights to determine access and transfer of such rights; and ―alienation‖ – the right 
to sell or lease any of the above four rights. It is argued that collective-choice 
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rights are ultimately more important than operational-level rights, as the former 
rights depend for their authority on the latter. Based on the work of Ostrom 
(1990) and Wade (1988) four major variables (and many sub-variables within 
each)  are  set  out  by  Agrawal  (2008,  51)  as  facilitating  conditions  for  the 
emergence of effective commons institutions: 
 
i.  Resource  system  characteristics  (  small  size,  well  defined 
boundaries) 
ii.  Group  characteristics  (small  size,  clearly  defined  boundaries, 
shared  norms,  past  successful  experiences,  social  capital, 
appropriate  leadership,  interdependence  of  group  members,  and 
heterogeneity  of  endowments,  homogeneity  of  identities  and 
interests) 
iii.  Institutional arrangements (locally devised, easy to understand and 
enforce  rules,  graduated  sanctions,  availability  of  low-cost 
adjudication, and accountability of monitors and other officials to 
users); and 
iv.  External environment (State respect for local authority, supportive 
external sanctioning institutions, appropriate levels of external aid 
to compensate local users for conservation activities, nested levels 
of appropriation, provision, enforcement, and governance) 
 
Property  rights  over CPRs  strongly affect  the  adoption of technology,  socio-
economic  development,  poverty  reduction,  rights  of  access  to  credit,  benefit 
sharing and environmental sustainability of the resource base (Knox, Meinzen-
Dick, and Hazell 2002, 12). Common property rights over natural resources and 
capacity  for  collective  action  are  closely  interdependent  and  mutually 
reinforcing. Secure property rights not only encourage a long-term perspective 
on  collective  action  for  protection  of  the  CPR,  but  also  improve  the  self 
confidence  of  the  resource  users  (Ostrom  2004).  Among  scholars,  there  is 
general agreement over the importance of clearly defined property rights in the 
management of CPRs. The issue is who will hold those rights (Bromley 1991, 
35).  
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2.2.1. Common Property Institutions and Decentralized Governance 
 
Decentralization and devolution of management authority have been the primary 
policy response to the failure of centralized resource management systems and 
the resurgence of democratic movements in the developing world (Dietz et al. 
2002, 24).  In recent years, developing countries have been encouraged to focus 
their attention on local institutions by decentralizing the governance of natural 
resources (Agrawal 2002, 41). 
 
With  the  advent  and  consolidation  of  democratic  political  systems  in  many 
developing countries, there has been a growing concern over the need to link 
sustainable  management  of  environmental  resources  with  a  focus  on  poverty 
alleviation, local level economic development and conservation (Adhikari 2003, 
14). This political reform agenda has contributed to a reconsideration of the role 
of community in local resource management (Agrawal and Gibson 1999, 629). 
In the changed context of growing pressure on the finite natural resource base, 
mainly through increasing population pressure and consumption demands, there 
was a realization of the need to strengthen resource management systems. It is 
now recognized that a new form of coordination is required in natural resource 
management, since neither bureaucratic administration nor market mechanisms 
proved  able  to  solve  resource  degradation  problems  in  an  equitable  manner 
(Lockwood et al. 2009, 3; Dietz et al. 2002, 25; Korten 1987, 1). Now there is an 
understanding  that  multiple  institutional  strategies  are  needed  to  address  the 
problem of diverse threats to the global commons. Restructuring of institutional 
arrangements governing CPRs has been initiated that has significantly re-defined 
the role of the state, and instigated further exploration and experimentation with 
different  modes  of  co-management  and  community-based  arrangements 
involving both state and non-state actors (Meynen and Doornbos 2004, 235). 
 
Poor  economic  development  and  conservation  outcomes  from  decades  of 
centralized  resource  management  systems  led  to  renewed  interest  of  policy 
makers and academics in the study of traditional resource governing institutions 
(Berkes  and  Farvar  1989,  2).  New  policy  approaches  aimed  to  develop  a 
dynamic resource management partnership based on the capacity and interest of 34 
 
local  communities  and  complemented  by  facilitating  state  policy  and 
institutional  arrangements  (Korten  1987,  2).  This  approach  responded  to 
arguments that it is the right of local people to benefit from their surrounding 
environmental resources, and that the community based resource management 
approach would be more effective (Korten 1987, 3). Since governments in many 
developing countries lack the power to deliver appropriate policies and programs 
under conventional top-down governance structures, there has been a major shift 
in resource politics over recent decades.  In particular, there has been a great 
interest in reconfiguring natural resource governance relations between the state 
and  forest  communities  throughout  the  world.  A  wide  range  of  policies, 
programs and projects has experimented with the concept of community-based 
natural resources management (CBNRM) to achieve this aim (Menzies 2007, 
10).    
 
2.3.  Emergence  of  Community-Based  Natural  Resource  Management 
(CBNRM) 
 
Community-based  natural  resource  management  (CBNRM)
17  programs were 
initiated in the  late 1970s, mainly due to failure of conventional centralized 
governance structures to solve the issue of resource degradation and the growing 
demand for greater control and autonomy over natural resources by local people 
marginalized by former state policies (Menon et al. 2007, 4; Persoon and van Est 
2003, 1). Since then, approaches to resource tenure systems and property right s 
regimes have undergone a fundamental change. A major policy shift has been 
initiated in developing countries via decentralized institutional arrangements that 
attempt to incorporate local communities in resource management (Agrawal and 
Ribot  1999).  Since  the  1990s,  co -management  (CM)  and  community -based 
natural resource management (CBNRM)
18 have become popular natural resource 
                                                 
17 Agrawal and Gibson (2001, 1) define ‗community‘ as a small spatial unit, a relatively homogenous social 
structure holding shared norms. 
18 Defining community based-natural resource management (CBNRM) is not an easy task as the term is 
used in a broad set of resource management initiatives in different discipline by different scholars. The 
decentralization and devolution o f natural resource initiatives have been identified by  various terms 
including  co-management  (Plummer  and  Fitzgibbon  2004,  2006;  Pomeroy  and  Rivera -Guieb  2006); 
community-based management  (Tachibama and Adhikari, 2009); people -centred conservation (Brown, 
2003);  common  property  resource  management  (CPRM) ;  participatory  management;  collaborative 
management (Menon, 2007: 14); democratic decentralization of natural resources (Ribot et al, 2002, 3-4); 35 
 
approaches in developing countries (Menon et al. 2007, 1; Kumar 2005, 275). 
These  newly  evolved  community-based  governance  initiatives  open  up  an 
avenue of opportunities for collaboration between citizens and the government to 
further their respective interests (Brunner and Steelman 2005, 19). By the 1990s, 
the CBNRM approach was largely adopted in development endeavours in Asia 
regions, more specifically in common property resources (CPRs) management 
initiatives covering forests, water management, and fisheries (Agrawal and Ribot 
1999; Singleton 2000, 1).  
 
CBNRM is the collective management of environmental resources by devolving 
or  decentralizing  the  authority  over  resources  to  local  communities  for 
management, use and improvement (Fabricius and Collins 2007, 84). It is argued 
that CBNRM brings transparency to the decision-making process and promotes 
public vigilance and accountability, ensures effectiveness of development, and 
promotes social justice and environmental sustainability (Menon et al. 2007, 1-
2). The advocates of natural resource decentralization argue that local people‘s 
ownership of resource management responsibility not only enhances efficiency 
and  equity  but  also  contributes  to  development  that  is  socially  and 
environmentally sustainable  (Ribot, Agrawal,  and  Larson 2006, 1865)
19. It is 
expected that  decentralized governance will be cheaper, more effective and 
responsive to the needs of people  (Carlsson and Sandström 2008, 37; Colfer, 
Dahal, and Moeliono 2008), increasing accountability and societal participation 
while reinforcing co-governance (Ackerman 2004, 448-58). Heavy expectations 
were placed on CBNRM, which represented a shift away from a government-
driven to community-driven paradigm of resource management that would give 
voice to local communities and lead to their empowerment (Menon et al. 2007, 
4).  
                                                                                                                                    
community based forest management  (Agrawal and Ostrom 2008, 44-48), and co-management of natural 
resources (Persoon and van Est 2003, 1). 
19  While there is a broad consensus in the commons literature that equity is a critical component of 
sustainable development, there is no consensus about what it is. Beyond refer ring to general notions of 
fairness (Konow 2001), equity is mostly concerned with procedural justice (participation in decision 
making) or distributive justice (allocation of outcomes), which changes over time and is likely to vary 
across communities, issues and contexts ((Dobson 1998; Konow 2001,  139; Corbera, Brown, and Adger 
2007). Equity is generally concerned with distribution of socio -economic factors, goods and benefits to a 
member of the society based on the agreed criteria, rules and norms (Dobson  1998), and it is argued that 
equity needs to be looked at from three perspectives: i.e., equity in access (engagement and participation of 
the participants), equity in decision -making (voice of the participants in decision making) and equity in 
outcome (distribution of project costs and benefits (Brown and Corbera 2003)  36 
 
 
The CBNRM approach gained impetus through the advancement of  common 
property theory. It is argued that community based natural resource management 
(CBNRM) has three attributes which make it potentially more successful in lieu 
of centrally controlled development (Menon et al. 2007, 8). Firstly, communities 
are socio-ecologically diverse, reflecting wide varieties of natural resources and 
community/individual preferences that make the wider system potentially more 
adaptive  due  to  its  diversity  and  geographically  diffuse  decision-making 
processes. In contrast, a centralized system that functions according to rigid and 
standardized rules is likely to be less capable of responding and adapting in the 
context of social or ecological change; nor is it able to deal with the specific 
need and preferences of local people. Secondly, community based management 
employs available local resources (materials, equipment, skill, and manpower) 
that  make  the  project  and  programmes  cheaper  and  facilitate  effective 
conservation. In contrast, central government led programmes depend entirely on 
outside resources that make development more expensive. Thirdly, where the 
local community has control over decisions and outcomes, this ought to increase 
performance  and  local  accountability.  While  decisions  made  and  activities 
undertaken by the central government are accountable only to their superiors, 
local  people  who  are  affected  by  the  outcomes  of  state  interventions  have 
difficulty influencing distant bureaucracies. In summary, CBNRM is based on 
several premises: that the local populace have more interest than state authorities 
or distant project management teams in sustainable management of local natural 
resources; have more locality specific socio-ecological knowledge and skills, and 
thus have greater incentives to maintain the resource because of their livelihood 
dependency, and are more likely to be effective in the management and use of 
resources as they posses traditional knowledge, institutions, and social capital 
(Tsing, Brosius, and Zerner 2005, 1; Borrini-Feyerabend and Tarnowski 2005, 
74-75; The World Bank 1996; Meinzen-Dick, Raju, and Gulati 2002, 650).  
 
Co-management and CBNRM approaches are now widely practiced in the Asian 
region in the form of joint forest management in India, community forestry in 
Nepal, and National  Integrated Protected Areas System (NIPAS) on resource 
management in Philippines. The Indonesian government is also in the process of 37 
 
introducing social forestry policies and recognizing local community authority in 
forest management (Persoon and van Est 2003, 4). International agencies and 
donors such as the World Bank, European Union (EU), and Asian Development 
Bank (ADB) have been advocating the co-management approach in their policy 
agendas (Persoon and van Est 2003, 4). A shift in paradigm in forest policy 
around  the  world  initiated  the  process  of  devolving  the  authority  of  forest 
management from centralized government to either local government or to local 
communities. However, as these communities are often divided by gender, caste, 
and class there is also some scepticism about whether the decentralization of 
power  and  authority  in  itself  could  ensure  greater  community  control  over 
resources and equality in the distribution of the benefits (Potter 2008, 23; Larson 
and Soto 2008, 231). For these and other reasons, international agencies have 
been  more  inclined  to  advocate  the  co-management  approach  in  their  policy 
agendas, rather than CBNRM, emphasising a continued need for the role of the 
state in setting conservation parameters (Persoon and van Est 2003, 4). 
 
2.3.1.  Co-management  (CM)  versus  Community-Based  Natural  Resource 
Management (CBNRM)  
 
The terms ‗co-management‘ and ‗community-based management‘ are frequently 
used in the literature and there is a debate over the relative merit of these two 
concepts.  Co-management  is  a  hybrid  regime  that  combines  state  and  local 
community  institutions.  It  is  held  to  be  a  logical  management  approach  for 
solving  the  problem  of  common  property  resource  degradation  through  a 
partnership  between  the  state  and  local  resource  users  (Carlsson  and  Berkes 
2005,  71;  Pomeroy  and  Rivera-Guieb  2006,  31;  Singleton  2000,  6).  Co-
management  refers  to  joint  state-local  arrangements  described  variously  as 
collaborative,  participatory,  stakeholder,  multi-party  and  joint  management  in 
the literature
20. Due to the flexible and dynamic approach of co -management 
arrangements, the concept covers a range of variations
21. Co-management is 
                                                 
20 See for example, Soeftestad and Gerrard (1999); Borrini-Feyerabend et al (2004); Carlsson and Berkes 
(2005); (Berkes, George, and Preston 1991; Berkes 1995); Plummer and Fitzgibbon (2004); Pomeray and 
Rivera-Guieb (2006). 
21 Co-management is defined as ―the sharing of power and responsibility between the government and local 
resource  users‖  (Berkes,  George,  and  Preston  1991,  12;  Berkes  and  Farvar  1989).  Moreover,  ―'co  -
management'  is  also  defines  ―as  a  situation  in  which  two  or  more  social  actors  negotiate,  define  and 
guarantee amongst themselves a fair sharing of the management functions, entitlements and responsibilities 
for  a  given  territory,  area  or  set  of  natural  resources‖  (Borrini-Feyerabend,  Nguinguiri,  and  Ndangang 38 
 
viewed as a logical approach for solving the resource management problems of 
CPRs, as it is evident that both the state and local resource users cannot manage 
the  natural  resources  alone,  especially  in  the  changing  and  complex 
contemporary  world  (Carlsson  and  Berkes  2005,  71).  It  is  argued  that  co-
management enables improved governance of common property resources in a 
way  that  is  both  more  equitable  and  more  efficient  (Armitage,  Berkes,  and 
Doubleday 2007, 3), and that decentralization and co-management are mutually 
supportive  of  each  other.  Co-management  empowers  local  communities  in 
common property resource management, while creating linkages between local, 
national  and  international  spheres  (Soeftestad  and  Gerrard  1999,  11)  with 
potential for synergies and feedback across levels of governance (Berkes and 
Jolly 2002). In the co-management process various stakeholders, including local 
resource  users  (informal,  traditional,  customary),  state,  NGOs,  civil  society 
organizations, academic and research organizations share the responsibility and 
authority  of  management  based  on  dialogue  and  negotiation  (Pomeroy  and 
Rivera-Guieb 2006, 16). The decision regarding what kind and how much duty 
and power ought to be allocated to local level community organizations is a 
political decision that depends heavily on the relationships between state and 
non-state actors.  
 
Co-management  deals  with  the  collective  governance  of  common  property 
resources  (CPRs)  for  the  sustainable  use  and  management  of  the  collective 
goods.  This  governance  arrangement  is  located  part-way  between  pure  state 
property  and  pure  communal  property  regimes  (Pomeroy  and  Rivera-Guieb 
2006, 13), with various forms of partnership and power sharing arrangements 
that  integrate  local  (traditional,  customary,  and  informal)  and  centralized 
management  systems.  Figure  2.1  shows  that  a  wide  range  of  management 
arrangements  are  possible  in  co-management  between  the  extremes  of 
                                                                                                                                    
2000). Other scholars define co-management as ―the sharing of responsibilities, rights and duties between 
the primary stakeholders, in particular, local communities and the nation state; a decentralized approach to 
decision making that involves the local users in the decision making process as equals with the nation-state‖ 
(Soeftestad and Gerrard 1999, 11). Among many definitions, co-management is also defined as ―sharing of 
power, responsibilities and benefits with respect to the management of natural resources (including their 
exploitation and conservation) among government and individual or collective users‖ (Persoon and van Est 
2003, 4). 
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centralized  government  and  autonomous  local  management  (Pomeroy  and 
Rivera-Guieb  2006,  8)  (Persoon  and  van  Est  2003,  6)  find  that  actual 
management regimes vary according to the willingness of the state to handover 
or devolve power to local communities and the nature of the community (size, 
cohesion, type of leadership, ethnicity) itself. Co-management should be viewed 
as a process rather than a strategy, as it evolves by adjusting and adapting to 
changing conditions over time (Pomeray and Rivera-Guieb 2006, 10) 
 
Figure  2.1:  Co-management  Integrates  Local  and  Centralized  Government 
Management Systems  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Pomeroy and Rivera-Guieb 2006, 9   
 
It  has  been  asserted  that  the  aim  of  co-management  in  natural  resource 
governance  is  to  implement  conservation  and  management  policies  and 
programs in a cost effective way by shifting the state‘s responsibility to local 
social  actors  and  civil  society  (Borrini-Feyerabend  et  al.  2004,  XXXII).  Co-
management  is  considered  an  intermediate  path  between  objectives  of  social 
equity  and  efficiency  (Pomeroy  and  Rivera-Guieb  2006,  18).  Further,  co-
management  is  a  response  to  the  demand  for  active  participation  of  local 
resource users in environmental management, which would contribute to conflict 
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resolution,  democratic  decision  making  and  active  participation  of  relevant 
stakeholders (Armitage, Berkes, and Doubleday 2007, 3).   
 
There has been some confusion concerning the two concepts of co-management 
(CM) and community based resource management (CBRM), as many writers use 
the  terms  interchangeably.  Both  management  strategies  share  many  common 
attributes; however, there are some differences between these two approaches. 
Pomeroy and Rivera-Guieb (2006, 24) posit that CBNRM is more focussed on 
community process and provides more emphasis on the needs and knowledge-
base of local people, while CM is more concerned with institutional partnership 
arrangements between government and local communities of resource users. In 
terms of scope, CM has a broader framework that addresses issues beyond the 
community scale (regional and national), engaging multiple stakeholders; while 
CBM focuses more directly on internal community dynamics. As major actors, 
government  and  communities  also  take  on  different  degrees  of  primacy. 
Government plays a more active role in co-management arrangements, while the 
community has primary responsibility in community-based management (CBM) 
approaches. In community-based-management, the process is often initiated by 
the local community, and implemented in partnership with external agencies like 
GOs, NGOs and other private and civil society organizations. Multiple actors at 
different levels (local, regional, national) are involved alongside government in 
the management process in CM as well. But while there is also much emphasis 
given to the involvement of local stakeholders in the process, communities tend 
to be brought in at a later stage in the CM approach.  
 
Co-management  is  a  more  formalized  management  approach  evolved  in 
developed countries like USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, and such 
arrangements are usually codified in national laws (Armitage 2007, 2), while 
community  based  management  has  evolved  through  programs  in  developing 
countries (Pomeroy and Rivera-Guieb 2006, 24). Recently some scholars have 
combined the terms in referring to community-based co-management. Pomeroy 
and  Rivera-Guieb  (2006,  24)  argue  that  as  the  community  is  considered  an 
important component of the co-management process, the term community-based 
co-management can be used to better indicate a management system which is 41 
 
community  focussed,  populace  oriented  and  based  on  shared  management 
responsibilities,  incorporating  the  elements  of  both  co-management  and 
community-based management. 
 
2.4. Community-Based Forest Co-Management (CBFCM) as a New Mode of 
Governance  
 
In the contemporary world, new modes of governance in general and of natural 
resource governance in particular, have become a key subject of debate (UNDP 
1997a; Pierre and Peters 2000; Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 2004, XXXII). Until 
the  early  1980s  governments  were  regarded  as  the  legitimate  institutional 
embodiment  of  state  sovereignty  and  the  sole  source  of  political  and  legal 
decision-making (Pierre and Peters 2000, 37). During the 1990s, the nation state 
was perceived to be a declining institutional force in the face of globalization 
and the prominence of neo-liberal deregulatory, free market ideology (Petrella 
1996, 62). Since then, governments have been losing their policy autonomy to 
outside  organizations  at  the  same  time  as  there  has  been  strong  resistance 
emerging from people disaffected by the discrepancy between costs and benefits 
of government (Peters 1996, 1). In the changing global order, governments lack 
the  ability  to  achieve  the  necessary  policy  outcomes  alone.  Thus,  the 
participation of non-state actors in policy formulation and implementation has 
been sought (Hogl, Nordbeck, and Pregernig 2008, 1). Now, the concepts of 
governance and good governance are seen as offering a new way of thinking 
about state capacities and the state-society relationship. In its simplest sense, 
governance is about ―the interactions among structures, processes and traditions 
that determine how power is exercised, how decisions are taken on issues of 
public concern, and how citizens or other stakeholders have their say‖ (Graham, 
Amos, and Plumptre 2003, 1). 
 
Much  of  the  governance  literature  has  disassociated  itself  from  the  old 
hierarchical  top-down  model  of  government  towards  ―new  modes  of 
governance‖ which are flexible and enable horizontal modes of participation in 
decision-making  among  a  myriad  of  actors  (Smismans  2008,  874).  Now  the 
concept  of  governance  denotes  not  only  the  government,  but  also  other 42 
 
institutions, including the private sector and civil society organizations (Cheema 
and Rondinelli 2007, 1). There is   inevitably an ongoing struggle to  find an 
appropriate  balance  between  state  and  community  (Singleton  2000,  1)  in 
governance processes which are a fundamental determinant of economic, social 
and environmental outcomes and the well-being of society (Graham, Amos, and 
Plumptre  2003,  1).  Good  governance  has  become  the  focal  point  of  human 
development  and  sustainability  agendas  (UNDP  1997a).  The  UNDP  (1994) 
Initiative for Change states: 
 
The goal of governance initiatives should be to develop capacities that are needed 
to realize development that gives priority to the poor, advances women, sustains 
the  environment  and  creates  needed  opportunities  for  employment  and  other 
livelihoods (cited in (UNDP 1997a).. 
 
Governance is not only concerned with making policy, laws, rules and tools of 
implementation  through  vertical  command-and-control  structures  articulated 
with horizontal organizational arrangements, but takes as a central concern the 
processes that public managers, civil society and concerned stakeholders use in 
shaping policy, its implementation and enforcement (Bingham, Nabatchi, and 
O'Leary 2005, 548). It is argued that development efforts are not achievable and 
sustainable  without  good  governance  (UNDP  1997b,  xi).  Good  governance 
emphasizes creating a system that is participatory, transparent and accountable. 
Its success depends on the involvement of civil society organizations, as well as 
the  private  sector  in  partnership  with  government  (UNDP  1997a;  1997b,  4). 
Moreover, it is argued that good governance promotes human rights, encourages 
public participation, wide representation in decision making, and empowerment 
of women, minorities and other disadvantaged groups (UNHCHR 2007, 9). In 
practice,  it  requires  active  public  participation  with  formal  government  in 
shaping  governance  processes.  The  Good  Governance  international  policy 
agenda aims to overcome governmental and administrative malpractice and de-
legitimize non-democratic structures. In these processes, civil society and non-
governmental  organizations  play  a  significant  role  in  promoting  good 
governance practice.  
 
A normative concept of governance has unfolded and international organizations 
– including UNDP, World Bank and OECD – have developed principles of good 43 
 
governance  (Rametsteiner  2009,  146).  The  United  Nations  Development 
Programme  (UNDP  1997a)  under  the  ―Governance  and  Sustainable  Human 
Development, 1997‖ articulates a set of five principles of good governance i.e. 
legitimacy and voice, direction, performance, accountability and fairness. Under 
these five broad principles of good governance eight major characteristics of 
good  governance  have  been  recognized:  accountable,  transparent,  responsive, 
equitable  and  inclusive,  effective  and  efficient,  follows  the  rule  of  law, 
participatory, and consensus oriented (UNDP 1997a).  
 
The UNDP document states that the three domains of the governance – state, 
civil  society  and  the  private  sector  –  have  to  work  in  harmony  to  achieve 
sustainable human development (UNDP 1997a). Good governance tries to reach 
broad consensus across differing interest groups, and aims to achieve a long term 
perspective  based  on  the  historical,  cultural  and  social  conditions  to  make 
effective and efficient use of available resources. Further, good governance aims 
to be accountable to the stakeholders. Decisions should be taken in a transparent 
way involving all stakeholders, and information should be made easily available 
to  those  who  will  be  affected  by  any  decision.  Ultimately,  good  governance 
requires  that  benefits  and  costs  are  distributed  fairly,  and  that  community 
members have the opportunity to maintain and improve their well-being, with 
laws and regulations enforced impartially (UNDP 1997a).  
 
In recent years, international donor organizations have been reiterating the need 
to improve governance in the political and economic domain as a pre-condition 
for  development  cooperation  (Roy  and  Prasad  2007).  The  Council  of  the 
European  Community  in  1991  adopted  a  resolution  on  ―Human  Rights, 
Democracy and Development‖, which stipulated four conditions for achieving 
balanced and sustainable development in developing countries: human rights, 
democracy,  reduction  in  military  expenditure  and  good  governance  (Denters 
1995,  308).  This  conditionality  is  also  emphasized  by  Northern  donors  as  a 
requirement  for  granting  bilateral  and  multilateral  development  assistance 
(Raffer  1995,  343).  Reflecting  current  trends  toward  ―new  modes  of 
governance‖,  governments  in  many  countries  are  moving  toward  more 
participatory,  inclusive  and  integrated  practices  to  fulfil  policy  goals,  where 44 
 
public as well as private stakeholder actors are engaged (Hogl and Pregernig 
2009, 1; Howlett and Rayner 2006, 170). The rapid social and environmental 
changes that have been taking place in the last few decades have magnified the 
challenges of sustainable resource governance (Chapin III 2009), thus the role of 
local  community  has  been  fore-grounded  in  local  forest  management. 
Community  forestry,  which  has  now  become  a  popular  strategy  in  forest 
management,  has  been  evolving  in  the  context  of  these  new  modes  of 
governance concepts. 
 
The centralization of authority over natural resources including forests has been 
a common feature in the Asian region under colonization, and continued in the 
post-colonial  period  (Webb  2008,  25).  Many  governments  in  the  past 
nationalized  the  forests  formerly  owned  and  managed  by  local  communities 
living near and around the forests, with an expectation that the centralization of 
forest resources would be more efficient, generate more revenue and provide 
long-term sustainability of the resource base. Within the span of a few decades 
however, productive forests that were under government control in many parts of 
the world became severely degraded. After the failure of centralized resource 
management  regimes,  a  major  shift  toward  decentralized  institutional 
arrangements  that  attempt  to  incorporate  local  communities  in  resource 
management was initiated (Agrawal and Gibson 2001, 1).  
 
Since the 1990s, experiments with various types of community based and co-
managed regimes became popular in developing countries (Menon et al. 2007, 1; 
Kumar  2005,  275;  Agrawal  and  Ribot  1999,  1;  Singleton  2000,  1).  The 
community-based forest management (CBFM) approach emerged as a result of 
the growing concerns of activists, policy makers and the general public over the 
issues  of  deforestation,  good  governance,  accountability  and  the  impact  of 
globalization on local forest management (Menzies 2007, 101). Since the late 
1980s many governments around the world reformed national laws in favour of 
deconcentration or administrative decentralization (transfers of power to local 
branches  of  the  central  state,  such  as  administrators,  or  local  technical  line 
ministry agents), devolution (transfer of power from central government to any 
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customary authorities, private bodies and so forth), and delegation (transfer of 
public function to lower levels of government, public corporations, or any other 
authority outside of the regular political-administrative structure, to implement 
programs on behalf of a government agency) (Agrawal and Ribot 1999).  
 
Many nations in the Asian region began reforming the forestry sector since the 
1990s,  by  formulating  new  forest  policies  and  legislation  in  favour  of 
decentralization  and  devolution,  providing  greater  roles,  rights  and 
responsibilities to local communities in forest management. There is a growing 
consensus that community-based forest co-management can reconcile the goals 
of  social  justice,  equity,  development,  empowerment  and  environmental 
sustainability  by  transferring  forest  management  into  the  hands  of  local 
communities (Gauld 2000, 229). Studies suggested that local communities could 
be successful in conserving and managing the local forest sustainably through 
their local institution (Bray and Klepeis 2005, 215). It is argued that if forest 
decentralization  provided  greater  voice  and  participation  to  local  people  in 
resource management, it could contribute to greater community accountability, 
conflict resolution, control of corruption and improvement of the resource base 
(The World Bank 2008, 159). 
 
In most cases, community forestry was initiated as a pilot project which later 
evolved into a national program, ultimately backed by forest regulations. The 
nature of forest policy innovation differed from country to country depending 
upon the political environment, existing institutions, influence of donor agencies 
and existing legal instruments (Poffenberger 2006, 63). These community-based 
resource management initiatives were given further impetus with the adoption of 
decentralization  and  devolution  policies  in  forest  management  (Poffenberger 
2006, 62).  46 
 
Envisaging  that  community  involvement  would  lead  to  improved  rights  of 
access, and reduction of poverty in forest dependent rural communities as well as 
more sustainable rural development (Menzies 2007, 104), decentralized forest 
governance became a popular theme in the forest sector. According to Contreras-
Hermosilla, Gregersen and White (2008): 
 
 ―Forest governance‖ is defined as the set of rules and institutions that control and 
determine what happens to a nation‘s forests and who gains and who gets hurt as 
a consequence. ―Good‖ forest governance is governance that best meets, in a 
transparent, equitable and sustainable way, the forest related needs and goals of 
the population of the country and its constituent parts. Forest governance is about 
who holds power, who is responsible and how accountable decision makers are to 
citizens and to each other  (Contreras-Hermosilla, Gregersen, and White 2008, 
11). 
 
At the international level, the debate on community forests was launched with 
the 1978 World Forestry Congress, under the theme ―Forestry for People‖, with 
an idea that forests should be managed to meet people‘s needs, especially the 
needs of rural poor (Colchester et al. 2003, 1; Guggenheim and Spears 1985, 
305).  In 1985, the Food  and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 
(FAO) launched a ―Tropical Forestry Action Plan‖ and a draft convention on 
forests  was  disseminated  for  discussion  (Pfeil  and  Sepp  2008,  7).  After  the 
publication of the Brundtland report in 1987, natural resource governance and 
conservation came to the forefront of the international agenda, which began to 
link social, economic and environmental aspects into the concept of ―Sustainable 
Development‖ (Pulzl and Rametsteiner 2002). Deforestation of tropical forests 
stemmed from several causes, primarily expansion of agriculture, commercial 
logging, rising demand for timber and fuel wood for the rising population and 
unsustainable forest policy (Palo 2000, 3; Palo, Lehto, and Uusivuori 2000, 120; 
Jepma 1995, 259). However, there was an assumption at the international level 
that  deforestation  could  be  reversed  by  addressing  rural  poverty,  alongside 
policy reform in the agriculture sector mainly through watershed management 
programs  and  promoting  tree  planting  on  degraded  and  marginal  lands 
(Guggenheim and Spears 1985, 307). In line with these argument international 
donors including the World Bank revised their forest sector policy and moved 
their focus from the industrial forestry of the 1970s to social forestry from the 
1980s onward (Guggenheim and Spears 1985, 308). At the Earth Summit of 47 
 
1992 in Rio de Janeiro, Chapter 11 of Agenda 21, a non-legally binding Forest 
Principle, was adopted under the heading ―Combating Deforestation‖. It aimed 
to conserve, rehabilitate and manage forests and strengthen sustainable forest 
management  (SFM)  practices  worldwide.  Similarly,  the  1995  United  Nations 
Commission  on  Sustainable  Development  (UNCSD)  created  an 
Intergovernmental  Panel  on  Forests  (IPF)  and  in  1997  the  Intergovernmental 
Forum  on  Forests  (IFF)  was  established  to  facilitate  deliberations  on  forest 
policy worldwide (Pulzl and Rametsteiner 2002, 260). The international dialogue 
on forest policy and conservation gained momentum after the establishment of a 
separate  ―United  Nations  Forum  on  Forests‖  (UNFF).  In  2007,  the  UNFF 
adopted  a  non-legally  Binding  Instrument  (NLBI)  calling  for  policies  on  all 
types of forest through 2015 which would: (UN 2007, 5): 
 
i.  Reverse  the  loss  of  forest  cover  worldwide  through  sustainable  forest 
management,  including  protection,  restoration,  afforestation  and 
reforestation, and increase efforts to prevent forest degradation. 
ii.  Enhance  forest-based  economic,  social  and  environmental  benefits, 
including by improving the livelihoods of forest dependent people. 
iii.  Increase significantly the area of protected forests worldwide and other 
areas of sustainably managed forests, as well as the proportion of forest 
products from sustainably managed forests. 
iv.  Reverse  the  decline  in  official  development  assistance  for  sustainable 
forest  management  and  mobilize  significantly  increased,  new  and 
additional financial resources from all sources for the implementation of 
sustainable forest management. (UN 2007, 5) 
 
Policies adopted at the international level since the 1980s were directed toward 
sustainable forest management and emphasis was laid on heterarchical modes of 
governance, a deliberative and consensus oriented approach involving a myriad 
of stakeholders in forest management (Pulzl and Rametsteiner 2002, 262). Most 
of  the  countries  around  the  world  adopted  participatory  approaches  to  forest 
management  in  this  period.  With  the  rise  of  discourses  of  sustainable 
development  and  good  governance,  community-based  forest  co-management 
(CBFCM)  gained  increasing  attention  on  the  development  agenda  (Menzies 48 
 
2007, 13). Forest governance has to be seen as a dynamic and complex process 
linking local to global level. Forest governance is affected by the policies, legal 
instruments  and  institutional  conditions  at  the  local  level  (community  rules, 
norms and governance mechanism of forest use), national level (state policy and 
law  on  forest  resource  rights,  utilization,  conservation)  and  global  level 
(multilateral environmental agreements affecting forest products trade, national 
obligations, and conditionalities) (Mayers, Bass, and Macqueen 2002, 9).  
 
Decentralized forest  governance sought to shift  administrative responsibilities 
from the centre to the regional, district and field levels (Agrawal and Ribot 1999, 
475).  New  modes  of  governance  in  decentralized  forest  management  regard 
citizens as important actors in policy making (Ribot 2002b, 27; Ribot 2004, I; 
Borrini-Feyerabend and Tarnowski 2005, 82). Because of the prominent role that 
forest  resources  play  in  the  livelihoods  of  rural  communities,  new  modes  of 
decentralized forest governance have been advocated to enhance local people‘s 
leverage in the decision making process. It is reported that more than 80% of 
developing countries and countries in transition have already adopted some form 
of decentralized forest governance, transferring varying degrees of authority over 
forests to local communities (The World Bank 2008, 159).  
 
Good forest governance depends on many conditions including the state‘s role in 
enabling  policy,  legal  and  institutional  arrangements  that  determine  how  the 
community  forest  institutions  organize,  develop  and  enforce  rules,  provide 
access to resources and distribute benefits among members (Mayers, Bass, and 
Macqueen  2002,  3).  The  new  modes  of  community-based  forest  governance 
(CBFM)  opened  up  a  new  space  and  opportunities  for  local  communities  to 
exercise control over communal forest land and resources, define their priorities 
and the means of achieving them in a sustainable manner (Ribot 2002a, 5). The 
new  modes  of  governance  have  participatory  features,  involving  all  relevant 
stakeholders  –  public  and  private  –  and  operate  through  a  discourse  of 
governance rather than government, engaging a diverse range of actors beyond 
the traditional governmental sphere.  
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Before the 1990s forest management was dominated by conventional top-down 
bureaucratic models. However, the new modes of forest governance which are 
emerging in recent times seek to involve communities directly in policy making 
and provision of collective goods and services and are therefore less hierarchical, 
prescriptive and rigid than the previous top-down command and control type 
regulation  (de  Burca  and  Scott  2004,  3-4).  With  financial  assistance  from 
donors, decentralization reform in the forest has moved from a project-based 
approach  to  an  institution-based  approach  to  a  broader  forest  governance 
framework (Ribot 2002a, 5). Under these new modes of forest governance, local 
institutions and communities have gained legislative (rule making), executive 
(decision-making  and  implementation),  and  judiciary  (conflict  resolution) 
powers.  
 
2.4.1. Emerging Issues in Community-Based Forest Co-management (CBFCM) 
 
Although a fundamental shift has occurred in thinking as well as in practice 
regarding the ownership and control over forest resources, the questions of who 
benefits  from  the  resources  and  where  the  decision-making  power  should  be 
vested, remain contested issues in the community based approaches literature 
(WRI et al. 2005, 56). Studies conducted around the world on the issue of local 
forest  governance  suggest  that  devolution  of  power  and  authority  does  not 
automatically empower user groups. Outcomes depend upon the implications of 
internal social structures for collective control over decision making, and the 
extent to which poor and marginalized people are able to exercise authority and 
participate  in  benefit-sharing  arrangements  (Thoms  2008,  1461-62;  Nguyen 
2008, 187; Arora-Jonsson 2008, 62-63; Yasmi, Guernier, and Colfer 2009, 107). 
There is no guarantee either that the community‘s control and involvement will 
increase  the  effectiveness  and  sustainability  of  common-pool  resources 
utilization more than under private or state control (Meinzen-Dick 2007, 15204; 
Nagendra 2007, 15223; Oyono 2005, 357; Malla 2000; Lachapelle, Smith, and 
McCool  2004, 8-9). The supposition that community-based management  will 
lead to ecological restoration and improvement in people‘s livelihoods has been 
challenged  (Tacconi  2007,  341;  Dev  and  Adhikari  2007)  and  (Blaikie  2006, 
1954) suggest that genuinely successful outcomes are rare.  50 
 
 
While  decentralized  forest  governance  has  many  advantages  over  centralized 
control, there are some risks and challenges associated with decentralized forest 
governance that must be addressed (Contreras-Hermosilla, Gregersen, and White 
2008,  12).  Although  the  theoretical  argument  for  decentralized  forest 
management is persuasive, the actual outcomes of the devolution of power to 
community level have been mixed. Evidence of equitable distribution of benefits 
and  organizational  and  environmental  sustainability  remains  inconclusive 
(Agrawal and Ribot 1999; Mansuri and Rao 2004, 30; Kellert et al. 2000, 709; 
Ribot 1995, 1596; Ribot, Agrawal,  and Larson 2006, 1881;  Lane 2003, 291; 
Meinzen-Dick  and  Knox  1999,  45).  Populist  champions  of  the  decentralized 
community-based  approaches  tend  to  treat  communities  as  consensual 
homogenous entities capable of maintaining the resource base in a sustainable 
way,  glossing  over  the  implications  of  class,  caste  and  gender  inequalities 
(Leach, Mearns, and Scoones 1999, 242). Real communities are heterogeneous 
entities with structural inequalities that undermine the assumptions of equitable 
benefits assumed to be derived from collective action (Li 1999, 503; Meynen 
and Doornbos 2004, 239; Warren and McCarthy 2009, 13). The devolution of 
forest  management  authority  does  not  empower  disadvantaged  community 
members automatically as they generally have limited education, organizational 
skill and limited roles in the governance process (Evans, Jong, and Cronkleton 
2008, 2). Elite capture of benefits from decentralization of natural resources is 
widely reported and may lead to the emergence of conflict among stakeholders 
(Rosa et al. 2003, 27; Swallow, Meinzen-Dick, and Noordwijk 2005, 32; Yasmi, 
Guernier, and Colfer 2009, 107).  
 
There are multiple levels of government and agencies involved in decentralized 
forest  governance,  with  divergent,  sometimes  conflicting,  interests,  and  often 
with  unclear  delineation  of  authority  and  inadequate  resources,  making  it 
difficult to accomplish the desired objectives (The World Bank 2008, 159). Most 
cases of decentralized reform in the forest sector have been characterized by 
insufficient transfer of power to local institutions and retention of tight control 
by  state  agencies  (Ribot  2002a).  Forest  governance  by  local  people  is  also 
affected by changes in power structure within the government bureaucracy and 51 
 
the reluctance of government agencies to cooperate in the changed environment. 
As the government depends upon royalties and its agents may also lose private 
rent-seeking  opportunities,  there  are  strong  disincentives  against  effective 
transfer of power to local communities, as well as the difficulties of providing 
adequate financial and technical services to local institutions (Kaimowitz et al. 
1998).  Government  officials  are  unwilling  to  share  power  with  local 
communities, even when the power of forest governance is delegated by law, 
leaving local institutions insecure in the knowledge that devolved authority may 
be taken back easily by central government (Ribot 2004, 3). In practice, some of 
the  basic  aspects  of  decentralization,  such  as  downward  accountability  and 
discretionary power, are found to be lacking in practice (Ribot, Agrawal, and 
Larson 2006, 1865). Some critics argue that co-management arrangements in the 
forest  sector  have  further  strengthened  state  control  over  resources  policy, 
management and allocation of resources (Castro and Nielsen 2001, 229; Sarin et 
al. 2003, vi), and that it is not genuinely participatory when the agenda is pre-
determined by the local arm of the central government forest authority (Sundar 
2000,  255).  Potter  shows  that  in  the  name  of  decentralization  policy, 
communities  have  been  given  only  degraded  land  for  management,  while 
productive forests still remain under the control of central governments. When 
local people improve the status of degraded forest, there is no guarantee that they 
will ultimately receive the benefits, as the forests may be taken back by the state 
or the income from forest heavily taxed (Potter 2008, 23). 
 
Decisions about the most valuable resources are kept with the state agency and 
only limited powers are delegated to local authority  (Larson 2002). In India, 
under  the  Joint  Forest  Management  scheme,  the  Forest  Department  prepares 
forest management plans and objectives, and communities are responsible for 
implementing those rules with little benefit and no authority over management 
and use. In the Philippines, authority over forest governance is decentralized to 
local/regional government. However, in reality communities have little authority 
and real control still lies with the central government (Guiang, Esguerra, and 
Bacalla  2008,  163).  In  Indonesia,  after  the  end  of  Suharto  regime  in  1998, 
decentralization reforms were initiated. District governments (kabupaten) were 
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Product  Harvesting  Permits‘  (IUPHHK)  to  small  or  medium  state  owned  or 
private  agencies  with  a  limit  of  50,000  ha,  and  ‗Forest  Product  Harvesting 
Permits (HPHH)‘ that can be allocated to individuals, cooperatives and farmers 
associations with a limit of 100 hectares per permit (Yasmi, Guernier, and Colfer 
2009, 99). However, these decentralized authorities to local governments have 
not produced the desired outcomes, as local elites often captured the benefits and 
district  governments  typically  preferred  income  generation  to  sustainability 
criteria in allocating permits (Yasmi et al. 2005, 24; McCarthy 2004, 1216). It is 
argued that with inadequate checks and balances decentralized forest governance 
may lead to  reduction in  public revenue from  the forestry sector, inadequate 
technical,  institutional,  and  managerial  capability  within  decentralized 
institutions, and the tendency to ‗mine‘ the forest for immediate instead of long-
term benefits. The World Bank (The World Bank 2008, 160) asserts that the 
potential  benefits  and  risks  associated  with  decentralized  forest  governance 
depend entirely upon the institutional context.  
 
Debate remains centred on property rights and the appropriate mechanisms for 
checks and balances across and within scales. It is argued that property rights 
over  resources  are  vital  to  the  success  of  the  community-based  governance 
regime. Unless the benefits of natural resource conservation and management 
reach those who participate in the community forestry programs and lead to a 
general improvement in local livelihoods, the new modes of forest governance 
will be no more successful than older models (Newmann 2005, 189-90). Despite 
these  shortcomings  however,  there  is  still  a  great  deal  of  enthusiasm  toward 
community  based  co-management  in  the  policy  sector  (Leach,  Mearns,  and 
Scoones  1999,  242).  It  is  necessary  to  direct  future  research  towards 
understanding the dynamics of property rights, and how these community-based 
co-management interventions alter the power relationship between the state and 
local  resource users; and equally important  to  investigate  which segments  of 
society lose or gain in the process (Newmann 2005, 189). 
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2.5. Conclusion 
 
Since the publication of Garrett Hardin‘s (1968) influential article ―The Tragedy 
of the Commons‖, it was believed that common-pool resource users are typically 
trapped in an overuse dilemma where they find it difficult to regulate sustainable 
use (Ostrom 2009b, 26). Following the logic of Hardin‘s model, scholars argued 
that overuse of resources can be halted through government ownership (Ophuls 
1973, 228) or privatization (Simmons, Smith, and Georgia 1996, 15). Until the 
mid-1980s many countries around the world formulated policies that centralized 
authority over natural resources, ignoring local people‘s capacity and experience 
in sustainable management of CPRs (Bromley 1992, 14; McKean 1992, 250; 
Berkes 1994, 19-20; Goodland, Ledec, and Webb 1989, :150; Persoon and van 
Est 2003, 2-3; Bromley and Cernea 1989, 1, 7). However, governments around 
the world have generally failed to conserve precious natural resources without 
the support and participation of local people (Chambers 1983; Mansuri and Rao 
2004, 5). Alongside overexploitation on behalf of national and elite interests, the 
breakdown of traditional local institutions contributed to severe degradation of 
natural resources, in particular deforestation (Hutchings 2000; Berkes 1994, 19-
20;  Goodland,  Ledec,  and  Webb  1989,  150;  Persoon  and  van  Est  2003,  3; 
Bromley and Cernea 1989, 7), which had negative impacts on the livelihoods of 
local people (Dietz et al. 2002, 13).  
 
Since the failure of development interventions and poor conservation outcomes 
from centralized natural resource governance, there has been great interest in the 
study of traditional resource governing institutions (Bromley and Cernea 1989, 
5; Berkes and Farvar 1989, 2; Agrawal 2008, 46; Agrawal and Gibson 2001, 1). 
Hardin‘s  allegory  of  the  tragedy  of  the  commons  was  criticized  and  revised 
(Bromley 1992; Wade 1987, 95; Ostrom 1990; Bromley and Cernea 1989, 6-7) 
as numerous studies conducted around the world suggested that CPRs could be 
held  collectively  and  managed  sustainably  through  local  self-governing 
institutions (Ostrom and Gardner 1993, 2; McKean 1992, 247; Ostrom 1990; 
Berkes  and  Farvar 1989;  Ostrom 1992;  Agrawal  2007;  Poteete, Janssen, and 
Ostrom 2010, 31; Jodha 1986, 1169; Kassa et al. 2009, 1022).  
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Recognizing the role of community (Agrawal and Gibson 1999, 629) and local 
resource governing institutions in the management of CPRs, governments were 
encouraged  to  reform  their  policies  and  promote  local  initiatives  and  self 
governance (Korten 1987, 4; Menon et al. 2007, 8). Interest turned to the study 
of common property institutions: how they  regulate access and use of CPRs 
(Agrawal 2002, 43), shape patterns of human behaviour and determine outcomes 
of  resource  management  (Ostrom  1992,  24;  Dietz,  Ostrom,  and  Stern  2003, 
1907). In defence of local people‘s rights over their surrounding environmental 
resources  and  the  need  to  restore  local  governance  arrangements,  revisionist 
scholars argued that community-based resource management was more effective 
because of its participatory features (Korten 1987, 2-3), enabling greater public 
accountability and transparency in decision making, and the potential to combine 
equity  with  environmental  sustainability  (Menon  et  al.  2007,  1-2;  Ribot, 
Agrawal, and Larson 2006, 1865). Since the late 1970s, CBNRM programs were 
initiated  (Menon  et  al.  2007,  4;  Persoon  and  van  Est  2003,  1)  through 
decentralized  institutional  arrangements  that  attempted  to  incorporate  local 
communities in resource management (Agrawal and Ribot 1999). By the 1990s, 
a  range  of  co-management  (CM)  and  community-based  natural  resource 
management (CBNRM) approaches had become popular policies in developing 
countries  (Menon  et  al.  2007,  1;  Kumar  2005,  275).  The  CBNRM  and  CM 
approaches involved power sharing and partnership arrangements between the 
state and local resource users (Singleton 2000, 6; Carlsson and Berkes 2005, 71; 
Pomeroy  and  Rivera-Guieb  2006,  31).  Ideally,  nested  governance  and 
decentralized resource management involving state and non-state actors would 
contribute to more democratic decision making, more equitable distribution of 
benefits  and  better  environmental  management  (Armitage,  Berkes,  and 
Doubleday 2007, 3).  
 
In the conventional governance approach, governments had been considered the 
only legitimate institutions of political  and legal decision-making (Pierre and 
Peters 2000, 37); however, in the contemporary global order, participation of 
non-state  actors  in  policy  formulation  and  implementation  has  been  sought 
(Hogl, Nordbeck, and Pregernig 2008, 1). In the process, preferred models of 
governance have shifted from hierarchical top-down frameworks towards ―new 55 
 
modes of governance‖ which are flexible and heterarchical, in which a wider 
group  of  actors  can  play  a  role  in  more  horizontal  modes  of  governance 
(Smismans 2008, 874). In the sphere of resource management these reformist 
efforts aim to reach broad consensus across differing interest groups, to adopt a 
long-term perspective based on historical, cultural and social conditions, and to 
serve stakeholders in a more responsive way (UNDP 1997a).  
 
Despite the enthusiasm towards community-based forest management and co-
management alternatives, empirical studies suggest that the actual outcomes of 
the devolution of power to communities has had mixed results, especially with 
respect to the issues of equity, empowerment and environmental sustainability 
(Agrawal and Ribot 1999; Mansuri and Rao 2004, 30; Kellert et al. 2000, 709; 
Ribot 1995, 1596; Ribot, Agrawal,  and Larson  2006, 1881;  Lane 2003, 291; 
Meinzen-Dick and Knox 1999, 45). Studies show that the devolution of power 
and authority to lower levels of government does not automatically empower 
user groups (Meinzen-Dick 2007, 15204; Nagendra 2007, 15223). Many factors 
affect  the  success  of  community-based  resource  management  initiatives, 
including  internal  social-economic  inequalities  which  affect  poor  and 
marginalized  people‘s  access  to  decision-making  and  benefit-sharing 
mechanisms (Thoms 2008, 1461-62; Lachapelle, Smith, and McCool 2004, 8-9; 
Nguyen 2008, 187; Arora-Jonsson 2008, 62-63; Yasmi, Guernier, and Colfer 
2009,  107).  Conservation  outcomes  in  some  cases  were  also  found  to  be 
unsatisfactory (Oyono 2005, 357; Malla 2000; Tacconi 2007, 341). The main 
reason for the failure of many of these community-based resource management 
efforts is that there has been a tendency to treat communities as homogenous 
entities,  ignoring  the  structural  inequalities  and  differing  interests  of  various 
social groups (Warren and McCarthy 2009, 13; Meynen and Doornbos 2004, 
239; Leach, Mearns, and Scoones 1999, 242; Li 1999, 503).  
 
Research  suggests  that  positive  outcomes  in  decentralized  natural  resource 
governance are unlikely in the absence of the following conditions: effective 
democratic structures, secure tenure and access rights, clearly defined rights and 
responsibilities of forest users (WRI 2005, 55-57; Bromley and Cernea 1989, 22; 
Wade  1988,  217);  straight-forward  laws  and  regulations  and  participatory 56 
 
decision  making  systems  (WRI  2005,  55-77;  Blair  2000,  35;  Fiszbein  1997, 
1040; Ginther 1995, 157; Tolentino 1995, 141); local institutions and decision 
makers  downwardly  accountable  to  resource  users  and  to  wider  authorities 
(Ribot  2002a,  1;  Agrawal  and  Ribot  1999,  2);  technical  capability  of  local 
institutions (Kaimowitz et al. 1998, 58); adequate financial resources (Fiszbein 
1997, 1040; Fabricius and Collins 2007, 83); and effective outcome assessment, 
strong  and  fair  governance  arrangements,  and  a  focus  on  institutional  and 
capacity development at local, regional and national level (Agrawal, Chhatre, 
and  Hardin  2008b,  1462;  Shimizu  2006,  31;  Ribot  2002a,  6;  Bowling  and 
Maginnis 2003, 1). 
 
In the new millennium, sustainable resource governance is a complex task, and 
achieving the goals of social equity and environmental sustainability presents a 
formidable challenge from local to global scale (Warren and McCarthy 2009, 8). 
Good  forest  governance  practices  depend  upon  legal  and  institutional 
arrangements  that  determine  how  community  forest  institutions  organize, 
develop  and  enforce  rules  regarding  access  to  resources  and  distribution  of 
benefits  among  members,  and  how  representative  and  accountable  these 
institutional  arrangements  become  in  practice  (Mayers,  Bass,  and  Macqueen 
2002,  3;  Ribot  2002a,  5,  10;  The  World  Bank  2008,  162).  Discretionary 
authority in rule making, implementation and conflict resolution (Ribot 2002a, 6; 
The World Bank 2008, 151), and transfer of sufficient power, responsibility and 
resources to local communities, is likely to increase the success of community-
based forest co-management (The World Bank 2008, 159; Ribot 2002a). 
 
There  is  evidence  that  more  equitable  distribution  of  costs  and  benefits,  and 
external support enhance the success of community-based forest co-management 
(Cronkleton et al. 2008, IV). However, too much involvement and control of 
higher state authorities in decision making processes may adversely affect forest 
co-governance outcomes (Agrawal and Chhatre 2007, 83). Agrawal and Gupta 
(2005, 1101) show that equity issues in decentralized forest governance can be 
achieved  only  through  building  institutional  mechanisms  that  expand  local 
capacity and experience, and through improvement in educational opportunities 
(Agrawal and Gupta 2005, 1101). The sustainability of community-based forest 57 
 
co-management depends upon whether basic needs of the local community have 
been  met  by  the  community  forest,  whether  the  community  is  adequately 
involved  in  the  decision  making  process,  whether  the  resource  governing 
institutions at every level represent local community interests (Colchester 2008, 
69; Newmann 2005), and whether the intended benefits of forest management 
have reached the needy and improved their livelihoods (Newmann 2005, 189).  
 
Both the government and Community Forest User Groups (CFUGs) in Nepal 
play an important role in the community-based forest co-management process. 
Government  has  a  role  in  devising  enabling  policy,  legal  and  institutional 
arrangements, while CFUGs have also to fulfil certain conditions, addressing the 
issues of equitable distribution of benefits among members, inclusive decision 
making, and maintaining environmental services (Mayers, Bass, and Macqueen 
2002,  3;  Ribot  2002a,  5,  10;  The  World  Bank  2008,  162).  The  following 
chapters trace changes in policy toward community forest management in Nepal, 
where  massive  deforestation  took  place  with  the  shift  from  traditional  forest 
management regimes to centralized control with the nationalization of Nepal‘s 
forests in the 1950s (Mahat, Griffin, and Shepherd 1987b, 111). In attempts to 
reverse the situation, forests have been handed over to local forest user groups 
(CFUGs) under the Forest Act of 1993, which has granted these groups right of 
access,  exclusion  of  non-members,  and  management  rights,  while  ultimate 
authority over the forest regime lies with government.  
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Chapter 3 
 
Political Conflict and Resource Governance in Nepal  
(1996-2006) 
 
The goal of this chapter is to examine the political conflict which emerged in 
1996 to provide a context for understanding resource governance and livelihood 
issues in the forest-dependent rural communities of Nepal. The chapter provides 
a  historical  overview  of  political  processes  and  the  people‘s  struggle  for 
democracy,  considering  in  the  process  the  socio-political  and  economic 
disparities among social groups and between geographic regions that led to the 
conflict. The chapter in particular deals with the emergence of the communist 
movement and armed conflict in Nepal, which had significant socio-economic 
and environmental impacts.  
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
Nepal is one of the poorest countries in the world with a per capita income of 
US$ 386 per annum and is  ranked 144
th out of 182 countries in the Human 
Development Index (HDI) (ADB 2007, 3). According to World Bank estimates, 
in 1995/96, 41.8 % of the Nepalese population lived below poverty line. The 
situation was most acute in the countryside. Urban poverty in 1995-96 was half 
that of rural areas (CBS 2005, 13), and there were wide income gaps among 
different social groups; with high levels of poverty among lower caste and ethnic 
groups.
22 In 1998, the average annual per capita income of the Nepalese was 
only US$ 210. The distribution of income among Nepalese has been directly 
influenced  by  the  discrepan cy  in  distribution  of  assests  (particularly  land), 
income-earning opportunities and access to decision making processes. The top 
10 % of the population receives 50 % of the national income, while the bottom 
20% receive only 3.7% (Nepal South Asia Centre 1998, ii).  
                                                 
22 Data show that in 1995/96, 57.8 %, 48.7 %, 53.4% of the Dalits (untouchables), Hill Janjati 
(ethnic group), and Terai Janjati (ethnic group) lived below the poverty line respectively, well 
above  the  national  average  of  41.8  %.  In  contrast,  the  incidence  of  poverty  among  the 
Brahman/Chhetri (higher caste) was only 18.4% (CBS 2005). 59 
 
 
Women do not have equal access to property rights, which has a direct bearing 
on  their  access  to  education,  health,  nutrition  and  economic  pursuits  (Nepal 
South Asia Centre 1998, ii). Because of social exclusion low caste and ethnic 
minority groups, the poor, and women face severe barriers in socio-economic 
development, affecting health, nutrition and education; the key components of 
wellbeing and human resource development (Nepal South Asia Centre 1998, iii). 
 
Nepal has a diverse population comprising 103 caste and ethnic groups, with 
more than 106 language and dialects, and following different religious traditions 
of Hinduism, Buddhism, Christianity and Islam (Pradhan and Shrestha 2005, 2). 
Nepalese society is rigidly hierarchical, entrenching pervasive social inequalities 
based  on  caste,  ethnicity  and  gender.  These  differences  are  deeply  rooted  in 
culture, religion and practices built on centuries of feudal rule (USAID 2006). 
These forms of social discrimination persist and the state has failed to integrate 
the  poor  and  disadvantaged  groups  of  people  into  mainstream  politics  and 
development (Seddon and Hussein 2002, 2).  
 
People  living  in  remote  mountains  and  hills  have  limited  access  to  health 
services. There are significant differences in literacy rates among gender, castes 
and  across  physiographic  zones.  The  2006  Nepal  Demographic  and  Health 
Survey (NDHS) show that the literacy rate is 54.5% and 81% among females 
and males respectively. The same study indicates that literacy rates are 80.7%, 
47.35%,  and  68.25%  among  Bramhan/Chhetri  (higher  caste),  Dalits  (lower 
caste)  and  Janjatis  (ethnic  groups)  respectively.  The  literacy  rate  is  75.15% 
among people living in the mountains and 52.9% in the Terai/Madhesi (Ministry 
of  Health  and  Population  (MOHP),  New  ERA,  and  Macro  International  Inc 
2007,  38-40).  The  under-five  child  mortality  rate  is  high  among  Dalits  as 
compared to Brahman/Chhetri. The NDHS 2006 survey shows that out of 1000 
children born, under-five mortality is 76, 90, and 80 among Brahman/Chhetri, 
Dalits  and  Janjatis  respectively;  77  among  Hill/Mountain  and  84  among 
Terai/Madesh communities (Ministry of Health and Population (MOHP), New 
ERA, and Macro International Inc 2007). At the same time, Nepal‘s population, 
which has more than quadrupled in the last century from 5.6 million in 1911 to 60 
 
almost 28 million at present, has exerted tremendous pressure on the country‘s 
natural resources leading to degradation of forest and land resources. 
 
3.2.  Historical  Overview  of  Political  and  Socio-Economic  Setting  and 
Struggle for Democracy  
 
Nepal had been ruled as isolated principalities for centuries. These were unified 
in  1768  by  King  Prithivi  Narayan  Shah,  the  founder  of  modern  Nepal,  who 
defeated  the  Malla  lords  of  Kathmandu  Valley,  creating  a  unified  hereditary 
Monarchy (Joshi and Rose 1966, 23; Raj 1980, 9; Riaz and Basu 2007, 125). In 
the mid-nineteenth century, traditional monarchical rule was interrupted for a 
period of 104 years and Nepal came under the control of the Rana Family, who 
had strong ties to the royal court. The Rana regime gained power on September 
14  1846,  when  Jung  Bahadur  Kunwar  secretly  organized  the  kot  massacre, 
killing  his  opponents,  and  was  immediately  made  Prime  Minister  and 
Commander in Chief of the army by King Rajendra (Joshi and Rose 1966, 31). 
While confining the King to the Royal Palace and keeping strict surveillance 
over royal activities, the Rana regime maintained effective political control over 
the  civil  and  military  administration.  During  the  Rana  regime  the  national 
treasury was treated as private income and the government functioned largely as 
an instrument to fulfil the personal interests of the Prime Minister and a handful 
of Rana family members  (Joshi and Rose 1966, 38-39). During much of the 
Rana regime the ruling Rana family maintained close ties with the British Raj in 
India to secure its political power. 
 
After the fall of British rule in India and inspired by the nationalist movement, a 
group of Nepali political exiles in Banaras, India established two political parties 
– the Nepali Rashtriya Congress (Nepali National Congress) in October, 1946 
and  the  Nepal  Prajatantrik  Congress  (Nepal  Democratic  Congress)  in  1948, 
which merged in 1950 to form the Nepali Congress Party (Joshi and Rose 1966, 
70-71). The Nepal Democratic Congress had earlier established the Mukti Sena 
(Liberation Army) that took part in the 1950 revolution. A Communist Party of 
Nepal was established as well in 1949 to struggle against the autocratic Rana 
regime, feudalism and imperialism. As opposition against the regime was on the 61 
 
rise, the Rana government extended diplomatic relations with the United States, 
France, the Netherlands, Brazil, and Belgium. It also applied for membership of 
the United Nations in February 1949, to garner diplomatic support as a strategy 
to secure continued rule (Joshi and Rose 1966, 66-68). To dissipate the growing 
anti-Rana sentiment and resistance from political parties, Prime Minister Mohan 
Shamsher conferred on the people a written constitution in 1948, the first of its 
kind  in  Nepal‘s  history  (Joshi  and  Rose  1966,  71;  Baral  2006,  18).  Taking 
advantage of hostile relations between the then King Tribhuwan and the Rana 
regime, the Nepali Congress Party launched an armed struggle against the Rana 
government in 1950, which was supported by the king and the Nepalese people. 
The Nepal Communist Party also supported the anti Rana struggle. Finally, after 
104  years the Rana oligarchy was  overthrown under an agreement  signed in 
Delhi between King Tribhuwan, Rana Prime Minister Mohan Shamsher and the 
Nepali Congress Party.   
 
The ―Delhi Compromise‖ reinstated the power of the monarchy on January 8, 
1951  (Joshi  and  Rose  1966,  79).  The  1951  Interim  Government  Act  was 
promulgated as the basis for the new political order and on February 18, 1951 
King Tribhuwan established an interim government with representatives of the 
Rana  family  and  the  Nepali  Congress  Party.  The  interim  government  was 
mandated  to  conduct  elections  for  a  Constituent  Assembly  and  form  a 
democratic  constitution  no  later  than  1952.  However,  the  first  interim 
government  toppled  because  of  rivalry  between  the  Rana  and  the  Nepali 
Congress Party representatives in the cabinet. So, the task of holding an election 
could  not  be  completed  on  time.  Then  on  November  16,  1951,  a  new 
government  was  formed  by  King  Tribhuwan  under  the  leadership  of  M.  P. 
Koirala from the Nepali Congress Party. There was conflict within the Nepali 
Congress Party regarding the nomination of cabinet members and also because 
of differing ideas on social and political reform between leaders in the Nepali 
Congress Party (Joshi and Rose 1966, 98-101). In 1952, there were two revolts 
against the government – one by the special police forces and low-grade civil 
service  employees  and  another  by  an  armed  faction  known  as  Rakshya  Dal 
(Defense Force). The revolt lead by Dr. K. I. Singh resulted in the capture of 
most of the government offices including the cabinet secretariat, radio station, 62 
 
telephone office, prison and the artillery. However, the national army suppressed 
the revolt.  In the aftermath, the government  reorganized and modernized the 
national army with the help of the Indian Military Training Mission (Joshi and 
Rose 1966, 101).  
 
As Nepal entered into a democratic era after centuries of autocratic rule, there 
were  ongoing  power  struggles  between  the  King,  the  Rana  family  and 
democratic forces. Despite the intense desire of the Nepalese people and political 
parties to transform Nepal from a feudalistic to a modern democratic system, the 
reform  agenda  was  severely  hindered  by  ideological  differences  between  the 
parties.  Nevertheless  there  were  some  improvements  in  political  awareness, 
reform  in  the  bureaucratic  system  and  governance  structure,  including  the 
formation  of  an  independent  judiciary.  The  major  outcome  of  the  post-
revolutionary Rana-Congress coalition government was the initiation of a new 
political process, the formation of an interim constitution based on the premise 
of a constitutional monarchy, cabinet and modern administrative system.  
 
After the death of King Tribhuwan on March 14, 1955, Crown Prince Mahendra 
became king and took charge of the nation. On accession to the throne, King 
Mahendra  formed  the  Council  of  Royal  Advisers  headed  by  himself  and 
announced a general election to be held in October 1957. Between 1956 and 
1957  two  governments  were  sworn  in,  one  from  Praja  Parishad  headed  by 
Tanka Prasad Acharya, and the other in 1957 from the United Democratic Party 
under the leadership of K. I. Singh
23. Since the 1951 revolution King Tribhuwan 
had favoured the constitutional monarchy type of political structure. However, 
his son King Mahendra took a different approach. During the formation of these 
two governments King Mahendra manipulated the political system, handpicking 
the parties to form the government, mostly from the minor parties which had less 
credibility and lacked support from the larger sections of the society. In that 
respect, the cabinet formed under the direction of King Mahendra was a puppet 
government. When there was delay in issuing the date of the postponed election, 
                                                 
23 Dr. K. I. Singh initially was a member of Nepali Congress Party; however, in 1952 a revolt was led by 
him against the government by the armed faction known as Rakshya Dal (Defense Force). In 1957 he 
became Prime Minister of Nepal for four months as leader of the United Democratic Party. However, in 
1981 he joined the breakaway Nepali Congress (Subarna). 63 
 
the  United  Democratic  Front  launched  a  disobedience  movement  which  the 
Communist  Party  of  Nepal  also  supported  (Joshi  and  Rose  1966,  210).  The 
Communist Party of Nepal had been banned by the government after the 1951 
revolution; a ban that was lifted by the Tanka Prasad Government in April 1956 
(Joshi and Rose 1966, 262).  
 
When Rana rule ended  in  February  1951 King  Tribhuwan had promised the 
election of a Constituent Assembly no later than April 1953. However, this was 
prevented  by  differences  among  political  parties,  the  absence  of  a  national 
census, lack of fully fledged administrative machinery, and the unwillingness of 
the  political  parties  that  were  in  the  government  to  have  their  credentials 
examined  (Joshi  and  Rose  1966,  280).  After  his  accession  in  power,  King 
Mahendra had announced that the general election would be held in October 
1957. During the period between 1953 and 1957 there was disagreement among 
the parties about whether to hold an election of the Parliament or Constituent 
Assembly.  
 
Finally  King Mahendra issued a Royal  Proclamation  stating that the delayed 
election would be held on 18 February 1959, for a bicameral Parliament rather 
than a Constituent Assembly (Joshi and Rose 1966, 281). One week before the 
election, on February 12, 1959, King Mahendra proclaimed a new constitution. 
This  constitution  was  prepared  by  a  Constitution  Drafting  Commission 
comprised  of  members  of  different  political  parties  including  the  Nepali 
Congress, Gorkha Parishad and legal experts. The 1959 Constitution bestowed 
executive, judicial and legislative  authority upon the Crown  (Joshi and Rose 
1966,  312),  giving  it  final  authority  to  approve  or  veto  any  action  of  the 
government and of the Parliament. The new constitution was heavily criticized 
by the Communist Party of Nepal, which labelled it feudalistic (Joshi and Rose 
1966, 292).  
 
The inaugural general election was conducted in 1959. Out of a total 109 seats in 
the Parliament, the Nepali Congress won 74 seats (absolute majority), Gorkha 
Parishad  19  seats,  the  United  Democratic  Party  5  seats,  and  the  Community 
Party 4 seats. The eighteen Senators for the Upper House were nominated from 64 
 
the parties on the basis of proportional representation  (Joshi  and Rose 1966, 
299).  On  27  May  1959  the  leader  of  the  Nepali  Congress  Party,  Mr.  B.  P. 
Koirala, became the first elected Prime Minister. During the first year of tenure 
in the government, the Nepali Congress Party faced resistance from the National 
Democratic Front, a newly formed alliance between three political parties, the 
Nepal  Praja  Parishad,  the  United  Democratic  Party,  and  the  Prajatantrik 
Mahasabha. Most of the prominent leaders of these parties had been defeated in 
the  recent  general  election  and  were  very  critical  of  the  Nepali  Congress 
government.  Their main accusation  was  that the government  allowed foreign 
interference in  Nepal‘s  affairs, a criticism specifically  directed towards  India 
(Joshi and Rose 1966, 323-324).  
 
When the Nepali Congress government signed the Gandak Irrigation and Power 
Project  agreement
24  with  India, the National  Democratic  Front organized  a 
protest rally. The Front criticized this treaty for being against the interest of the 
Nepali  people  in  failing  to  provide  equal  benefits.  They  also   accused  the 
government of compromising the territorial integrity of Nepal by handing over 
the Gandak project to India  (Joshi and Rose 1966, 325 -326). The Communist 
Party of Nepal independently organized protests against the Gandak agreement, 
demanding a new treaty with provision for joint management. The Communist 
party launched fierce criticism of the Nepali Congress government both from 
within  the  Parliament  and  outside  of  it.  They  were  also  critical  of  India‘s 
interference in Nepal‘s internal affairs (Joshi and Rose 1966, 330). The elected 
Nepali  Congress  Party  government  was  under  constant  attack  from  the 
opposition  and  from  members  within  its  own  ranks,  provoking  the  King  to 
exercise his extra-parliamentary power to dismiss the government and to take 
charge of the government himself.  
 
During its tenure in office, the Nepali Congress-led government adopted a mixed 
economic strategy and abolished the Birta
25 land tenure system by promulgating 
the Birta Abolition Act on 17 September 1959. It also replaced the 1950 Trade 
                                                 
24 The  Gandak agreement  was signed by the two countries on December 4, 1959 with the purpose of 
providing irrigation and production of electricity by constructing a barrage, canal and head regulator in the 
Narayani River near Tribeni Ghat Bhaisalotan in the Nawalparasi district of Nepal. 
25 Birta was a system of granting huge land parcel to members of the nobility and the aristocracy, and other 
privileges for erstwhile royals. 65 
 
and Transit treaty with India which had prevented export or import of goods 
from countries other than India. Under the new treaty, Nepal could import and 
export from a third country using its own foreign exchange  (Joshi and Rose 
1966, 352).  
 
Although  the  Nepali  Congress-led  government  was  attempting  to  implement 
some reforms, after a short nineteen months‘ tenure in office King Mahendra 
dissolved  the  parliament,  dismantled  the  elected  government,  banned  all  the 
political  parties  and  imprisoned  the  Prime  Minister  along  with  his  cabinet 
colleagues on 15 December 1960 (Riaz and Basu 2007, 125; Muni 2004, 2). 
After the Royal takeover, the King formed a cabinet under his chairmanship and 
appointed  the  ministers  from  the  Nepali  Congress  Party  and  independents. 
Following the  royal  coup King Mahendra promulgated  a new  constitution in 
1962  and  introduced  the  four-tier  party-less  Panchayat  system
26.  The  1962 
Constitution gave the king powers to dismiss any minister from office despite his 
credentials in the parliament. It clearly extended royal prerogatives beyond the 
1959  Constitution  with  the  king  holding  greater  control  over  the  National 
Panchayat and the Council of Ministers (Joshi and Rose 1966, 405).  
 
King Mahendra and his successor King Birendra justified their political position 
claiming that the Panchayat system under royal patronage was the only political 
arrangement  compatible  with  N epali  culture  and  civilization.  During  the 
                                                 
26 Literally panchas means council of five persons and panchayats refers to a system of decision-making by 
the assembly of panchas which was prevalent in Nepali society from centuries. However, during the Rana 
regime it ceased to function (Joshi and Rose 1966, 397). The 1962 Constitution provides the theoretical 
foundation of a partyless panchayat democracy structure. The political units under the Panchayat regime 
were  the  Gaon  (village),  Nagar  (town),  Zilla  (districts)  one  panchayat  for  each  of  the  seventy-five 
Development  Districts,  and  fourteen  Anchal  (zonal)  panchayats  and  at  the  highest  level  the  Rashtriya 
(national) panchayats (Joshi and Rose 1966,  398). The panchayat system represented "democracy at the 
grassroots‖. The voters elect village councils then the District Assemblies are formed consisting of one 
member from each village panchayat and one third of the membership of each town panchayats. After the 
formation  of  District  Assembly  it  elects  an  eleven-member  Panchayat  Committee  that  serves  as  an 
executive body in each district. Then the District Assembly elects Anchal (Zonal) panchayats and finally 
fourteen Anchal (Zonal) assemblies elect ninety members to the National Panchayat. There is also provision 
for 15 members to be elected from Five Class Organizations and four from the Graduate Assembly and 15% 
to be appointed by the King. The overall monitoring of the panchyat system is governed by the Panchayat 
Ministry at the centre (Joshi and Rose 1966, 401-402). In addition, the 1962 Constitution provides for a Raj 
Sabha (Council of State) appointed by the king as an advisory body whose main duties were to supervise 
the succession to the throne or establishment of the regency in the event of the king‘s death or incapacity 
and also to act in certain circumstances in case of national emergency, or in the constitutional amendment 
process. Tour Commissions were formed consisting of members from the military and judiciary to visit the 
districts, hear and respond to grievances on socio-economic issues, and also to expedite administrative and 
judicial cases in favour of innocent, poor, old and women by taking direct action against oppressors and 
also to establish direct contact between the His Majesty‘s Government and the general public. 66 
 
Panchayat regime King Mahendra and his successor King Birendra were actively 
involved  in  national  politics  through  the  pro-monarchy,  party-less  Panchayat 
system.  However,  there  was  constant  pressure  and  agitation  from  political 
parties,  especially  from  the  Nepali  Congress  and  Nepal  Communist  Party  to 
restore  multiparty  democracy.  However,  due  to  divided  opinion  and  lack  of 
coordination among the parties as well as the Hindu belief that the King is vested 
with divine authority for protecting traditional customs and religious harmony in 
the country, the struggle against direct rule was unsuccessful, and it continued 
for 30 years with various political experiments under both rulers. Throughout 
these  years  of  Panchayat  rule,  the  students‘  associations,  journalists,  and 
opposing political parties continued to struggle for democracy (Joshi and Rose 
1966, 504).  
 
In 1990 a people‘s movement forced King Birendra to call a national referendum 
offering the options of a ―Reformed Panchayat" or "Multi-Party Democracy‖. 
The  referendum  result  favoured  the  former  by  a  margin  of  10  %.  Minor 
amendments were made to the constitution after the referendum incorporating 
some democratic ideals, but these were not sufficient to satisfy demands for full 
democracy.  The  Nepali  Congress  and  United  Left  Front
27  (ULF) formed an 
alliance  and  staged  a  nationwi de  political  protest  against  the  party -less 
Panchayat system to restore multiparty democracy. These protests lead to the 
system‘s overthrow in 1990 and the formation of an interim government led by 
the Nepali Congress Party leader Krishna Prasad Bhattarai, with mandates to 
draft a new constitution and hold free and fair elections within a year. In the 
general election held in 1991, the Nepali Congress Party achieved an absolute 
majority  and  formed  the  government  and  the  Communist  Party  of  Nepal  – 
Marxist  Leninist  (CPN-UML)  became  the  biggest  opposition  party  in  the 
parliament. However, the elected government did not run its full term due to 
inter-party and intra-party conflict and conspiracy. There followed a series of 
elections and frequent changes in government that created political instability 
and a governance crisis. Between 1991 and 2005, 3 elections were held and the 
government  changed  13  times  (Riaz  and  Basu  2007,  124).  The  governments 
                                                 
27 United Left Front (ULF) is the coalition of different communist Parties formed to fight against the party-
less Panchayat Regime 
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formed after the 1991 general election  were largely ineffective in addressing 
pressing socio-economic and governance issues. Those in political power did not 
attempt to launch any concrete steps towards transformation of the country, and 
political power remained in the hands of elites from higher socio-economic strata 
(USAID 2006). 
 
3.  3.  Evolution  of  the  Communist  Movement  and  Emergence  of  Armed 
Conflict in Nepal  
 
During the later years of the Rana regime, many educated Nepalese who had 
contact with the outside world participated in the anti-British movement in India. 
The growing Communist movement in neighbouring China also  attracted the 
educated youth of Nepal towards Marxism. In 1947, for the first time in the 
history of Nepal, a communist and socialist-led strike was held by workers in the 
Biratnagar  Jute  and  Cloth  Mill.  The  Communist  Party  of  Nepal  (CPN)  was 
formally founded in Calcutta, India on April 29, 1949 under the leadership of 
Pushpa Lal Shrestha; the party‘s founding General Secretary. The main goals of 
the CPN were to struggle against the autocratic Rana regime and fight against 
feudalism and imperialism (Pyakurel 2007). The CPN played a significant role 
in toppling autocratic Rana rule. After the 1951 revolution, the Nepali Congress 
(NC) Party joined the Interim Government, while the CPN became critical and 
formed the United Front, an alliance of anti-NC parties (Pyakurel 2007, 61). 
Their  main  accusation  was  that  the  Nepali  Congress  Party  had  become  pro-
Indian, compromising Nepal‘s territorial integrity, independence, and national 
interest. After the revolt led by Dr. K. I. Singh, which aimed to overthrow the 
government, the CPN was banned on 24 January 1952. However, the four year 
ban was lifted in April 1956 under the Tanka Prasad Acharya government (Joshi 
and Rose 1966, 262).  
 
In  the  years  following  its  inception,  the  Community  Party  split  and  reunited 
numerous times due to fundamental disagreements within the party Politburo. 
There was polarization within the CPN over the December 1960 Royal coup. 
One faction of the CPN led by Keshar Jung Rayamajhi was less critical of the 
coup, calling for restoration of the fundamental rights of the people, the release 68 
 
of political prisoners and election of a New Parliament. The other faction led by 
Pushpa  Lal  Shrestha, the founding  General  Secretary of the CPN, demanded 
reinstatement of the parliament and launched a struggle against the King (Joshi 
and Rose 1966, 450). Shrestha was replaced by Manmohan Adhikari, and later 
by Keshar Jung Raimajhi, while on a visit to China. There were fundamental 
differences in ideology as one group accepted the king as head of state, while the 
other  favoured  a  republican  order.  The  two  groups  were  also  split  over  the 
differences  in  ideological  ground,  one  pro-Chinese  and  other  pro-Russian 
sympathies (Pyakurel 2007, 61). At the 1961 Durbhanga Plenum, three positions 
were presented. The first position, in favour of working with the King, was led 
by Keshar Jung Rayamajhi; the second, arguing for struggle against the Royal 
coup while maintaining working ties with the Nepali Congress Party, was led by 
Pushpa Lal Shrestha; and the third, led by Mohan Bikram Singh, demanded a 
new election of the Constituent Assembly (Pyakurel 2007, 62). The Durbhanga 
Plenum  adopted  the  position  proposed  by  Pushpa  Lal.  The  following  year 
Rayamajhi was expelled from the party, accused of supporting the Royal coup. 
Later in 1968 Shrestha started a new party.  
 
In the period of rivalry between the two Communist Party factions in the early 
1970s  the  Nepal  Communist  Party  (Marxist–Leninist)  launched  an  armed 
assault,  killing  local  feudal  lords  in  eastern  Nepal.  The  Jhapali  uprising
28 
guerrilla movement in Jhapa District was influenced by the  Cultural Revolution 
in China and the Naxalite
29 movement in neighbouring India (Muni 2004, 1-3). 
In  1974,  Mohan  Bikram  Singh  and  Nirmal  Lama  convened  the  Fourth 
Convention  and  gave  birth  to  another  new  party,  named  the  CPN  Fourth 
Convention, which proposed the armed struggle. Further splits in the CPN led to 
the formation of two additional groups, Masal and Mashal, with the former being 
led by Puphpa Kamal Dahal alley Prachanda and the latter being led by Dr. 
Baburam Bhattarai. 
 
                                                 
28
 The ―Jhapali uprising‖, which was initiated in 1971 in the eastern region of the Jhapa district of Nepal, 
refers to a armed guerrilla movement against the Nepalese government launched by a revolutionary group 
influenced by the Maoism ideology and the Naxalites movement in West Bengal of India. 
29 Naxalite or Naxalism is an informal name given to radical, often violent, revolutionary communist groups 
that were born out of the Sino-Soviet split in the Indian communist movement that started their armed 
struggle in 1967 from Naxalbari, a small village in West Bengal, India. 
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In the 1989-1990 revolution, the CPN (Fourth Convention) decided to take part 
in the struggle and formed an alliance with the United Left Front (ULF). The 
ULF did not join the coalition formed by the Nepali Congress Party in the 1989-
1990 revolution, but instead operated independently. The people‘s movement of 
the  1990s  ended  with  an  agreement  introducing  multi-party  democracy  and 
constitutional  monarchy.  However  the  United  National  People‘s  Movement 
(UNPM), which was agitating against the Panchayat regime independently, did 
not accept the agreement between the King, the Nepali Congres (NC) Party and 
the United Left Front (ULF), led by Mohan Bikram Singh of the CPN. Their 
main demand was the abolition of the monarchy and declaration of a republic 
(Baral 2006, 260). When the demands of the radical faction of the communist 
party (UNPM) did not materialize, five factions of the CPN merged to form the 
CPN (Unity Centre) party, and after some contention decided to contest the 1991 
general election to expose the inadequacy of the parliamentary system through 
its political front, the United People‘s Front of Nepal, and move towards its goal 
of a People‘s Democracy (UPFN) (Muni 2004, 4-5). 
 
In the 1991 election the Nepali Congress Party won an absolute majority and 
formed  government,  while  the  CPN‘s  United  People‘s  Front  Nepal  (UPFN) 
ended up as the third largest party, with nine seats in the parliament (4.83% of 
the votes cast). In 1994, the Nepal Community Party (Unity Centre)/UPNF, still 
confronted with severe ideological differences among its leaders, formally split 
into two factions.  The communist faction, led by Pushpa Kamal  Dahal  alley 
Prachanda, could not secure an election symbol (to contest in the election) from 
the election commission for the mid-term election of 1994, and thus boycotted 
the election and went underground. This group founded the Communist Party of 
Nepal-Maoist (CPN-M) the following year and launched the people‘s war, as it 
believed that the people‘s revolution of 1990 was incomplete and that overall 
socio-political reform of the country was impossible within the existing political 
system (Bray, Lunde, and Murshed 2003, 108; Karki and Bhattarai 2003, 35; 
Muni 2004, 1). 
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3. 3.1. The Emergence of Armed Conflict in Nepal (1996 – 2006) 
 
The emergence of armed conflict in Nepal can be attributed to the undemocratic 
character of the state and suppression of the legitimate demands of the Nepali 
people. In the 1991 general election the United People‘s Front (UPF) was the 
third largest party represented in the House of Representatives. However, they 
could  not  participate  in  the  1994  mid-term  election  as  they  were  denied 
recognition as a political party by the electoral commission; and following this, 
they  launched  anti  government  activities.  Instead  of  initiating  dialogue  and 
negotiation  with  the  UPF,  on  September  1995  the  government  launched  a 
suppressive operation, ―Operation Romeo,‖ against UPF supporters, involving 
Nepal Police in Rolpa district, where hundreds of civilians were killed by the 
security forces (Kumar 2003, 170-171). Against this background, on 4 February 
1996  the  Communist  Party  of  Nepal  –  Maoist  (CPN-M)  presented  ―Forty 
Demands‖ to the coalition government led by Sher Bahadur Deuba, giving 15 
days for their demands to be met (Upreti 2006, 23; Kievelitz and Polzer 2002, 
25; Baral 2006, 261). Most of the demands put forward by the Maoists were 
directed towards a radical socio-political transformation of Nepalese society and 
the overthrow of the old feudal social hierarchy, calling for greater equality of 
economic access between the capital (Kathmandu) and other regions, and among 
ethnic  groups,  castes  and  between  genders.  Three  of  the  Forty  Demands 
presented by CPN-M were considered particularly sensitive by the government: 
i.e. the abolition of special rights and privileges of the King and his family, the 
establishment  of  an  interim  government  for  holding  Constituent  Assembly 
elections to form a new constitution, and declaration of Nepal as a secular state 
instead  of  a  Hindu  state  (Muni  2004,  19;  Baral  2006,  261).  When  the 
government  failed  to  address  the  Maoist  demands,  the  CPN-M  launched  an 
armed struggle on 13th February 1996. The Maoist ideology behind the armed 
struggle, promulgated by the party‘s ideologue Dr. Baburam Bhattarai, was to 
establish  a  new  people‘s  government  for  the  total  elimination  of  social  and 
economic  discrimination  and  hierarchy  (Upreti  2006).  They  claimed  that  all 
attempts  to  carry  out  reforms  within  the  ―old‖  crisis-ridden  semi-feudal  and 
semi-colonial  system  had  failed.  Their  main  policies  included  revolutionary 71 
 
reform in agriculture and land reform, national industrialization, integrated and 
balanced development and reduction of poverty (Bhattarai 1998).  
 
The Maoist People‘s War began in the Mid-Western Hill region of Nepal, where 
there  was  strong  sentiment  from  socio-economically  disadvantaged  groups 
towards communist ideology for decades (Seddon 2005, 3; USAID 2006). The 
1990s were the most significant in Nepalese political history with the restoration 
of multi-party democracy and the promulgation of a liberal constitution. The 
1990 Constitution guaranteed political freedom, civic liberties, and human rights 
as fundamental pillars of the political system; so there were high hopes among 
the Nepali people for socioeconomic transformation. However, between 1990 
and 1998 there was little progress on the human development front (Nepal South 
Asia Centre 1998). The 1996 national Human Development Index (HDI) was 
only  0.378,  with  the  per  capita  income  at  US$  210.  However,  the  HDI  in 
Kathmandu (capital city) is more than four times that of Mugu district which lies 
in the Mid-western region (Nepal South Asia Centre 1998, ii). Similarly, there 
was  a  wide  difference  in  the  HDI  between  geographical  regions  and  across 
gender and caste/ethnic groups. The level of HDI among the Newars was found 
to be twice as high as that of untouchables (lower caste). The literacy rate in 
1996 was 40%; however, women, disadvantaged caste and ethnic groups were 
far below the national average at only 10% for some castes (Nepal South Asia 
Centre 1998). There was a wide difference between the urban centres and rural 
Nepal  for  every  social  indicator  in  the  areas  of  health,  education,  and 
development  infrastructure.  It  is  argued  that  the  main  reason  for  the  slow 
progress in socio-economic development after the restoration of democracy was 
the resistance from feudal, commercial, bureaucratic, caste and gender related 
interests  which  generally  collided  with  the  quest  for  equitable  development 
(Nepal South Asia Centre 1998, ii).  
 
From  the  restoration  of  democracy  in  1990  until  2001,  human  development 
indicators show that the incidence of poverty remained high. Forty percent of the 
Nepali  population  (about  nine  million  people)  continued  to  live  below  the 
poverty line. The underdevelopment and low socio-economic growth are mainly 
attributed to weak governance, geographic disparity, disparities in the ownership 72 
 
of productive resources – both capital and non-capital, and exclusion of people 
from decision making processes (UNDP 2002, iii-1). According to a World Bank 
estimate, in 1996, 41.8 % of the Nepalese population lived below the poverty 
line. The urban poverty in 1995-96 was only 21.55% against 43.27% in rural 
areas (CBS 2005, 13). In 1998, the average per capita income of the Nepalese 
was only US$ 210. It is argued that the distribution of income among Nepalese 
has  been  directly  influenced  by  the  discrepancy  in  distribution  of  assets 
(particularly land), income-earning oppurtunities and access to decision making 
processes. The top 10 % of the population receives 50 percent of the national 
income, while the bottom 20 % receive only 3.7% of national income (Nepal 
South  Asia Centre 1998, ii). Similarly there is  massive difference in  income 
along gender lines, with women lacking access to property rights, which had a 
direct bearing on their acess to education, health, nutrition and economic security 
(Nepal  South  Asia  Centre  1998,  ii).  Low  caste,  ethnic  groups,  the  poor  and 
women faced severe barriers in socio-economic development. There was high 
child and maternal mortality, only 40% of the 6+ age group was literate, and safe 
drinking  water  was  available  to  only  small  portion  of  the  population  (Nepal 
South Asia Centre 1998, iii) 
 
Persistent poverty, social exclusion, and the widening gap between the capital 
city and other regions provided fertile ground for popular revolt (Parwez 2006, 
2).  Certainly  elite-focused  politics  and  Kathmandu-centered  development,  as 
well  as  deep-rooted  poverty,  discrimination,  bad-governance  and  corruption, 
provided the conditions  for the onset of civil  war in  Nepal  (DFID 2004, 4). 
There is some debate about whether revolt would have erupted if the Maoist 
Party had been permitted to participate in the 1994 election, and if the elected 
government had given attention in fulfilling the demands put forward by the 
Maoists. But  the Government did  not  take seriously the issues  raised  by the 
UPNF.  Instead,  the  state  machinery  was  mobilized  to  crush  the  Maoist 
movement. With strong organizational capacity and ideological appeal, the CPN-
Maoists  were  able  to  enlist  the  sympathy  of  local  people  against  the  state‘s 
operations,  which  were  considered  brutal  and  in  which  hundreds  of  non-
combatants  were  killed  between  1991-1994  (Muni  2004,  8-9;  Karki  and 
Bhattarai 2003, 5). 73 
 
 
The Mid-Western development region, especially the Rolpa district (the Maoist 
headquarters) was largely dominated by ethnic Magar (Mongolian) peoples, but 
the socio-political sphere was controlled by Brahmins and Chhetri, the so called 
upper castes. In the 1950s and 1960s, a prominent and influential leader of the 
communist movement in Nepal, Mohan Bikram Singh, had taken shelter in this 
district and was involved in spreading the communist ideology that made this 
district a communist stronghold. It is important to note that in the 1991 general 
election, out of nine parliamentary seats won by UPNF, two were won from the 
district of Rolpa and one from neighboring Rukum (Upreti 2006, 6). The ruling 
regime always considered the people from this region as rebels and the state 
machinery was focused on monitoring their activities rather than helping to raise 
their  socio-economic  condition.  Between  1980-1995  a  large  scale  Integrated 
Rural  Development  Project  (IRDP),  amounting  to  50  million  US$,  was 
implemented by United States Aid for International Development (USAID) in 
this development region. However the IRDP was completely unsuccessful, since 
the benefits went to local elites and politicians. Rising frustration among the 
poor and marginalised people doubtless helped the Maoists to motivate the fight 
against the government in this region. By 2002 the Maoist presence was felt all 
over  the  country.  They  attacked  government  and  Village  Development 
Committee  (VDC)  offices  throughout  the  countryside  to  pave  the  way  for 
forming their own local level administration. Political instability and a sense of 
insecurity among Nepalese people further deepened after the royal massacre of 
June 2001, when King Birendra and his entire family were killed.  The late king 
had nationalistic views, opposed foreign interference in Nepal‘s internal issues 
and had some sense of sympathy with  the Maoists,  making him reluctant to 
mobilize the army against their insurgency (Bhattarai 2005, 30; Bray, Lunde, 
and Murshed 2003, 9). 
 
During the insurgency, a high degree of brutality and human rights abuses were 
carried  out  by  both  militants  and  the  security  forces.  Civilians  were  used  as 
―human shields‖ and people were caught in the cross-fire between the two forces 
(Bray, Lunde, and Murshed 2003, 110). In July 2001, when the conflict was 
particularly  intense,  the  Nepali  Congress  Party  government  led  by  Prime 74 
 
Minister  Sher  Bahadur  Deuba  called  a  ceasefire  with  the  Maoists.  As  the 
ceasefire provided greater political freedom, the Maoists used this opportunity to 
extend their organization and strengthen their political philosophy through rallies 
and mass meetings. Three rounds of peace talks went on for four months, but 
ended without any agreement mainly due to disagreement over the three key 
Maoist  demands  for  abolition  of  the  monarchy,  formation  of  an  interim 
government, and election of a Constituent Assembly to draft a new constitution 
(Muni 2004, 19; Bray, Lunde, and Murshed 2003). As the government was not 
prepared to meet these demands, talks were broken off ending the ceasefire.   
 
On 23 November 2001, the Maoists launched a large-scale assault on military 
installations at Ghorahi, Dang District and several police posts throughout the 
country,  killing  hundreds  of  security  forces.  After  this  incident,  on  26
th 
November 2001, the government immediately declared a state of emergency, 
declared  the  Maoists  a  terrorist  organization  and  deployed  the  Royal  Nepal 
Army (RNA) against them (Karki and Bhattarai 2003, 22; Kievelitz and Polzer 
2002, 9). After the declaration of a state of emergency and deployment of RNA, 
civil liberties, press freedom, and constitutional rights were curtailed, and the 
incidence of confrontation between insurgents and RNA greatly increased. By 
October 2001, the Maoists announced their ―People‘s Government,‖ covering 25 
districts under the leadership of Dr. Baburam Bhattarai, second in command of 
the Maoist party. The emergency was extended for another 3 months, but the 
government could not get approval from parliament for a second extension. Then 
the Prime Minister dissolved parliament in May 2002, committing to hold a fresh 
election in November. The state of emergency ended in May; however, after a 
gap of only three days another emergency was declared and the Terrorist and 
Destructive Activities (Control and Punishment) Ordinance was enacted, which 
gave security forces power to arrest and detain suspects without trial for up to 
180 days (Karki and Bhattarai 2003, 22). In the face of growing international 
concern about terrorism, the government was able to garner military assistance 
for the Royal Nepal Army from the United States, UK and India (Upreti 2006). 
Although the government fully authorized the army to bring down the Maoist 
insurgency, the difficult geographical terrain of the country and lack of sufficient 
equipment and resources hampered their task. In the meantime, Maoists were 75 
 
displaying superior tactical skills as well as motivating rural people to take part 
in their movement. 
 
3. 3.2. Dynamics of Armed Conflict in Nepal 
 
It is argued that the launching of military operations and introduction of the 
Terrorist and Destructive Activities (Control and Punishment) Ordnance further 
escalated the conflict rather than addressing its root causes (International Crisis 
Group 2006, 23). Due to state suppression, many young people joined the Maoist 
movement.  At  the  same  time,  the  Maoists  established  their  own  local 
government  to  counter  the  state  machinery  in  their  stronghold  areas  and 
implemented  local  reform  and  development  works.  In  these  areas  the  vast 
landholdings of absentee landlords were confiscated and distributed among the 
peasantry, and those indebted to money lenders were released from their debts 
(Cottle and Keys 2007, 171). The Maoists adopted the concept of ―protracted 
war‖ following Mao‘s military strategy, combining strategic defence, strategic 
stalemate,  and  strategic  offence  (Thapa  and  Sijapati  2004).  Muni  (2004,  18) 
states that ―Maoists have systematically structured, ideologically cultivated and 
consistently  mobilized  the  diversified  social  support‖.  It  is  evident  that  the 
Maoists were very successful in enlarging their support base by exploiting the 
socio-economic and political grievances of the landless peasants, workers, poor 
farmers  and  socio-economically  disadvantaged  ethnic  groups  in  the  remote 
western hills districts of Nepal. This support expanded across the country as 
people  from  poor  as  well  as  middle  classes  became  involved.  These  people 
wanted greater participation in socio-economic and political decision making as 
well  as  better  livelihoods  for  themselves  and  for  their  children.  Maoists 
capitalized on public sentiment by adapting their strategies to the local situation 
and  mobilizing  these  diversified  groups  of  people  towards  establishing  a 
People‘s Republic and what they called ―new democracy,‖ as they believed that 
the multi-party system failed to meet the needs and aspirations of Nepalese at 
large  (Muni  2004,  14-18).  The  Maoists‘  main  goal  in  overthrowing  the  old 
regime‘s structure and production relations was to establish planned, balanced 
and  self-reliant  development  through  progressive  land  reforms,  nationally 76 
 
oriented  industrialization,  and  regional  balance  within  the  country  (Bhattarai 
1998). 
 
During  the  initial  stage  of  the  insurgency,  the  major  political  parties  were 
divided in  their response to  the Maoists and were unable to  take a common 
position on solving the conflict. The success of the Maoists lay as much in the 
government‘s  failure  to  address  the  socio-economic  and  political  agenda  put 
forward by the Maoists as in its inept counter-insurgency measures (Muni 2004, 
27-41; Gordon 2005). In 2001, the government launched the ―Integrated Security 
and  Development  Program  (ISDP)‖,  involving  the  RNA  in  development 
activities along with other government line ministries, in an effort to win the 
hearts and minds of the rural population through development assistance in the 
villages. The ISDP was launched mainly in the Maoist stronghold districts with 
the  objective  of  delivering  security,  providing  justice  and  effective  service 
delivery,  accelerating  social  and  economic  infrastructure,  addressing  poverty 
issues and creating employment through mobilizing people‘s participation in the 
local  development  process  and  to  revive  the  people‘s  faith  in  government. 
However,  the  ISDP  was  heavily  criticized  for  being  security  dominated  and 
failed  to  win  the  confidence  of  international  donor  agencies.  It  was  largely 
unsuccessful  in  delivering  services  and  defeating  the  Maoist  insurgency 
(Kievelitz and Polzer 2002, 28). 
 
3. 3.3. King Gyanendra‘s Royal Takeover 
 
After November 2001 the armed struggle reached an intense stage as the army 
was deployed to fight the Maoists. On the grounds that the security situation 
made it impossible to hold elections, on October 3
rd 2001, Prime Minister Deuba 
with the advice of the political parties asked the king to postpone the election 
through  the  constitutional  power  given  to  him.  Instead  of  postponing  the 
election, King Gyanendra sacked the Prime Minister on 4
th October 2002 and 
took  over  power,  appointing  a  puppet  government  with  Lokendra  Bahadur 
Chanda as Prime Minister from the Rastriya Prajatantra Party, a party loyal to 
the king. The government was tasked with holding fair elections,  controlling 
corruption and service delivery (Muni 2004, 60; Karki and Bhattarai 2003, 24). 77 
 
Prime Minister Chanda declared a ceasefire with the Maoists on 29
th January 
2003 and held two rounds of talks where the Maoists tabled Thirty demands 
similar to the previous Forty Demands. During these talks other parliamentary 
democratic  parties  were  not  involved.  Finally,  without  any  success,  Prime 
Minister Chand resigned on 30
th May 2003. On 4
th June 2003, King Gyanendra, 
against the opinion of parliamentary parties, appointed Surya Bahadur Thapa, 
Chairman  of  the  Rastriya  Prajatantra  Party,  as  a  Prime  Minister.  This 
government held informal talks with the Maoists, culminating in a crucial round 
on 17
th – 19
th of August 2003 in Dang district which ended without agreement as 
the Maoists persisted in their demands, whereas the government‘s bottom-line 
was  constitutional  monarchy  and  multiparty  democracy  (Karki  and  Bhattarai 
2003, 28-29). The ceasefire was ended by the Maoists on August 27, 2003 when 
they  launched  heavy  attacks  on  government  installations.  The  government 
mandated the Royal Nepal Army to fight against the Maoist under a ―Unified 
Command‖  and  also  set  up  local  defence  groups  mainly  composed  of  anti-
Maoist groups (Karki and Bhattarai 2003, 31). Like the declaration of emergency 
in 2001, that response severely escalated the conflict.  
 
The ―regressive move‖ of the king of 4
th of October 2002 severely threatened 
hopes of institutionalizing democracy and the prospect of solving the Maoist 
insurgency through political means (Sapkota 2004). King Gyanendra‘s second 
―royal takeover‖ on February 1, 2005 had further undermined the democratic 
process  by  assuming  power  as  the  head  of  the  government  and  chairing  the 
Cabinet  himself.  These  moves  further  sidelined  the  political  parties  and 
possibilities  for  negotiations  with  the  Maoists.  India,  the  United  States,  the 
European Union and the United Kingdom immediately suspended their military 
assistance (Vaughn 2006, 2; Crossette 2006, 75). The constitution of Nepal was 
suspended  and  the  government  almost  paralysed  after  the  Royal  coup.  The 
parliamentary  parties  repeatedly  demanded  the  resumption  of  Parliament, 
restoration of the constitution and dialogue with the Maoists as it was impossible 
to hold elections under the deteriorating security situation in the country. 
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3. 3.4. The People‘s Movement and Peace Process 
 
After the royal takeover, the difference between parliamentary parties and the 
king widened and the king himself emerged as the focus of the conflict. This 
incident further encouraged the Maoists in their movement and also helped to 
develop  a  working  relationship  between  them  and  major  political  parties  in 
opposition  against  the  king‘s  autocratic  regime  (Adams  et  al.  1997;  Adams 
2005). Vaughn (2006, 2) argues that King Gyanendra‘a inability to control the 
Maoist  insurgency  and  repression  of  democratic  forces  undermined  his 
legitimacy.  
 
After the royal  takeover, the major political  parties united against the king‘s 
autocratic actions in a Seven-Party Alliance (SPA) and organized a nationwide 
movement against the royal regime. There was a popular uprising in different 
parts of the country against the king‘s direct rule. The movement had popular 
support from all sections of society, including lawyers, journalists, civil society 
leaders,  media  personnel,  human  rights  activists,  bureaucrats  and  families  of 
security forces who totally paralysed the state machinery. Political analysts and 
foreign diplomats called for reconciliation between the political parties and the 
king to fight against the Maoists. However, the gap between the seven-party 
alliance (SPA) and the king had widened. As the king was committed to his 
autocratic regime and ignored the political concerns raised by the major political 
parties, a historic 12-point agreement was signed between the Maoists and SPA 
in November 2005 to fight against the king‘s autocracy. The SPA organized a 
pro-democratic  movement  in  April  2006,  which  was  strongly  supported  by 
Maoist  political  activists.  The  Government  issued  a  curfew  and  ordered  the 
police to ―shoot on sight‖ anyone who disobeyed the order. However, hundreds 
of thousands of people actively participated in the strike (Cottle and Keys 2007, 
172). During the general strike, the Maoist Chairman Prachanda announced a 
six-point program in support of the resistance movement involving: defiance of 
government  restrictions,  destruction  of  royal  statues,  removing  signboards 
bearing the name of ―His Majesty‘s Government‖, supporting local declarations 
of a republic, urging people not to pay tax, and blockading highways to disrupt 
supplies to the capital city (International Crisis Group, 2006). 79 
 
 
On April 21, 2006 on national television, the king offered to return executive 
power to  the  people and invited the SPA to  nominate a candidate  for prime 
minister. The royal proclamation was immediately praised and endorsed by the 
international community, including UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, without 
assessing public opinion or the position of the SPA. The day following the royal 
proclamation an estimated 200-300 thousand people came out on the streets of 
Kathmandu defying the curfew ordered by the royal government. As there was 
nothing fundamental and progressive in the royal proclamation, the Maoist and 
SPA immediately rejected the proposal. As a result, the king was compelled to 
make a second proclamation on April 24, 2006 recognising the sovereignty of 
the people, and agreeing to resolve the conflict with the SPA and Maoists. On 
April 26, 2006 he reinstated the parliament, which met on 28 April 2006 (Singh 
2009, 308; International Crisis Group 2006, 13-14; Hutt 2007, 19). On 4 May 
2006, the reinstated parliament approved the SPA roadmap, which was based on 
a twelve-point understanding with the Maoists. On 18 May 2006, parliament 
declared itself as ―Sovereign and ―Supreme‖ and ―His Majesty‘s Government‖ 
became the ―Government of Nepal‖. The parliament brought the Nepalese Army 
under  civilian  control,  declared  Nepal  a  secular  state,  and  dissolved  the 
Rajparished (Royal Privy Council). More importantly, authority to make laws, to 
amend or nullify the arrangements regarding the succession to the throne came 
under  the  parliament  (Hutt  2007,  19;  Singh  2009,  308).  Provisions  were 
announced to tax the King‘s private property, and the King would be subject to 
questioning by parliament or the court. 
 
In June 2006, the Seven Party Alliance (SPA) and the Maoists formally agreed 
to  implement  the  earlier  12-point  agreement,  to  invite  the  United  Nations  to 
monitor  the  National  and  Maoist  Armies  and  to  hold  an  election  of  the 
Constituent  Assembly  (Hutt  2007,  19).  The  agreement  did  not  mention  the 
composition of the Constituent Assembly and the fate of monarchy, although the 
Maoists reportedly stated that they would abide by the decision of Constituent 
Assembly  on  the  future  of  the  monarchy  (Cottle  and  Keys  2007,  174).  A 
landmark Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed on 22 November, 2006 
between the SPA and the CPN (M) declaring the end of the decade long armed 80 
 
conflict, and a Tripartite Agreement on Monitoring the Arms and Armies of the 
National Army and the Maoist Army was also reached between the government, 
the  Maoists  and  the  UN.  By  early  2007  the  Maoists  joined  an  interim 
government  (Pyakurel  2007,  134)
30.  On  15  January  2007,  the  Parliament 
repealed  the  1990  Constitution  and  issued  an  Interim  Constitution  which 
provided no powers for the king (Singh 2009, 308). 
 
3.4. The Causes of Armed Conflict  
 
Since the end of the cold war, intra-state armed conflict has been the dominant 
feature  of  civil  conflict  around  the  world,  posing  serious  problems  for 
environmental and human security (Ballentine and Sherman 2003, 1). After the 
end  of  the  cold  war,  non-traditional  threats  to  security  have  been  given 
increasing attention (Lietzmann and Vest 1999, 35; Collier et al. 2003). Jessica 
Tuchman Mathews argues that the definition of national security needs to be 
broadened to  include environmental  and demographic issues  (Mathews  1989, 
61).  
 
Similarly, Myers argues that: 
 
Security concerns can no longer be confined to traditional ideas of soldiers and 
tanks, bombs and missiles. Increasingly they include the environmental resources 
that underpin our material welfare. These resources include soil, water, forests, 
and climate, all prime components of a nation‘s environmental foundations. If 
these foundations are depleted, a nation‘s economy will eventually decline, its 
social fabric will deteriorate, and its political structure will become destabilized. 
The outcome is all too likely to be conflict, whether in the form of disorder and 
insurrection within a nation or tensions and hostilities with other nations (Myers 
1993, 20).     
 
Since the early 1990s scholarly and policy attention has explored the linkage 
between environmental change, conflict over natural resources and its impact on 
human insecurity (Brown 2005, 1; Ballentine and Sherman 2003, 1). Various 
schools of thought have emerged in the study of civil conflict and environmental 
factors. The environmental scarcity school that adopts a neo-Malthusian model, 
which relates population growth, resource scarcity and conflict, concludes that 
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when  resource  scarcity  combines  with  population  growth  and  unequal 
distribution  of  natural  resources,  it  often  leads  societies  to  violent  conflict 
(Homer-Doxon 1999a, 85; Ullman 1983, 139). Homer-Doxon (1999) argues that 
when  powerful  elites  capture  productive  natural  resources,  this  leads  to  the 
displacement of poorer groups (ecological marginalization), which in turn leads 
to environmental degradation and civil unrest (2007, 77)Three major areas of 
resource  scarcity  have  been  identified  by  (Nyong  2007,  77)  i.e.  –  economic 
scarcity,  related  to  the  quantity  of  resources;  ecological  scarcity,  concerning 
quality of resources; and finally, the structural scarcity that takes account of the 
unequal  distribution  of  resources  within  the  society.  The  declining  state  of 
natural resources undermines the state‘s ability to fulfil the needs of its people, 
which undermines the government‘s legitimacy and ultimately leads to a violent 
struggle. Environmental degradation increases poverty and social inequalities, 
which in turn increase the potential for civil conflict (Ohlsson 2000; Myers 1993, 
21). While there is considerable research on the relationship between resource 
scarcity  and  eruption  of  violent  conflict,  assumptions  of  a  simple  and  direct 
connection between environmental degradation and scarcity of renewable natural 
resources have been challenged (Gleditsch 1998).  
 
Since the 1990s, the focus of conflict analysis has shifted from resource scarcity 
to the economic dimensions of conflict, especially towards understanding the 
role  of  resource  abundance  on  the  escalation  and  sustenance  of  civil  wars 
(Ballentine  and  Sherman  2003).  The  second  focus  of  debate  (Collier  and 
Hoeffler 2004, 564) is polarized around two models – basically ―loot-seeking‖ 
and ―justice-seeking‖ behaviours – arguing the case for economic versus socio-
political (greed versus grievance) drivers of civil war (Ballentine and Nitzschke 
2003, 2). It is argued that most of the productive resources of a country are 
captured by powerful elites, leaving the majority of the least powerful struggling 
to meet their livelihood needs. The source of social and economic disturbance, 
insecurity and conflict in society, according to this line of argument, is mainly 
one  of  bad  governance  and  weak  institutions  (Nyong  2007,  77-78).  High 
resource  dependency  makes  a  government  weak,  induces  poor  economic 
performance, bad governance, and provides people living in resource rich states 82 
 
with  an  incentive  to  form  rent  seeking  groups,  as  well  as  offering  potential 
resources to finance rebel movements.  
 
An  econometric  study  conducted  by  (Do  and  Iyer  2007)  concludes  that  the 
primary cause of armed conflict in Nepal was the high level of poverty and low 
economic development. Zartman (2005, 257), however, argues that poverty is 
rarely the sole cause of conflict but that both poverty and conflict are rather the 
effect of a complex web of socio-political structures in society. People who have 
poor quality of life, low income levels and limited access to political decision-
making processes are more likely to support rebel movements when they are 
dissatisfied  with  the  current  situation  if  non-violent  means  of  bringing  about 
change are not available (Cramer 2003; Walter 2004, 385). Poverty and conflict 
are  understood  as  interconnecting  and  reinforcing  each  other,  although  the 
relationship is neither direct nor immediate. It has been observed that many poor 
countries are in peaceful and stable condition, while countries with intermediate 
income levels are nonetheless subject to conflict (Duffield 2001, 121). A study 
conducted  by  the  OECD  covering  the  34  poorest  countries  in  the  world 
concludes that two thirds of these countries are engaged in conflict or have just 
emerged  from  conflict.  Although  poverty  and  underdevelopment  do  not 
automatically  trigger  conflict,  they  do  increase  the  probability  of  outbreak 
(Duffield  2001,  121).  While  poverty  contributes  to  conditions  that  produce 
conflict,  conflict  itself  paradoxically  has  the  direct  effect  of  deepening  pre-
existing poverty, destroying infrastructure as well as social capital, and making it 
difficult for the affected countries to recover in the post conflict situation. It is 
important to understand how these factors relate to each other in the emergence 
and  sustaining  of  armed  conflict  in  order  to  devise  appropriate  policies  for 
resolving conflict situations (Zartman 2005, 256-257). 
 
3. 4.1. Causes of Armed Conflict in Nepal (1996 – 2006) 
 
Studies conducted on the causes of civil war in Nepal suggest that the primary 
factors for the emergence of conflict were: economic factors arising mainly from 
centuries-old  accumulated  socio-economic  grievances  like  persistent  poverty, 
social inequalities based on the ethnic/caste system, and landlessness (Parwez 83 
 
2006, 5; Korten 1987; Deraniyagala 2005, 61; Bray, Lunde, and Murshed 2003, 
107;  Murshed  and  Gates  2005,  132);  and  inequitable  land  distribution 
(Hatlebakk  2009,  13);  underdevelopment,  social  and  political  exclusion,  elite 
caste domination, joblessness, corruption and bad governance (Parwez 2006, 5; 
DFID 2004, 5). Unquestionably environmental factors have been significant and 
play an important role in engendering insecurity and violent conflict (Cramer 
2003, 409; Brown 2005, 4; Myers 1993, 22). But some argue that environmental 
factors (degradation and scarcity of resources) only play an intervening role, as a 
symptom  of other underlying  conflicts  rather than the  cause of civil  conflict 
itself  (Gleditsch  2001,  64).  The  forests  occupy  a  central  role  in  Nepalese 
people‘s  livelihoods.  They  supply  firewood  as  a  main  source  of  energy  for 
cooking, fodder for supporting animal husbandry, and are crucial for maintaining 
soil  fertility  and  protecting  watersheds  (Tachibana  et  al.  2001,  274).  The 
increasing population of Nepal, which has grown 5-fold from 5.6 million in 1911 
to almost 28 million in the 2001 census, has exerted tremendous pressure on the 
country‘s natural resources, leading to degradation of forest and land resources. 
The causes of conflict are evidently a complex combination of environmental, 
political and economic factors arising from environmental stresses, accumulated 
socio-economic grievances and the lack of substantive political reform (Bray, 
Lunde, and Murshed 2003, 107). 
 
3. 5. Socio-economic and Environmental Impacts of the Armed Conflict in 
Nepal (1996-2006) 
 
The Maoist insurgency in Nepal had an effect on every walk of Nepalese life 
(ADB and ICIMOD 2006, 169-170). Maoist insurgents destroyed hydropower 
generation  plants,  telecommunication  facilities,  conservation  infrastructure, 
government buildings and security installations worth around US$ 400 million 
(ADB 2004a, 2). A major portion of the government budget was diverted to 
security expenditure; consequently, development projects were either reduced or 
halted,  severely  affecting  employment  and  livelihoods  (Thapa  and  Sijapati 
2004).  Expenditure  on  internal  security  (police)  increased  from  0.84%  in 
1997/98 of the GDP to 1.43% in 2002/03 and military expenditure from 0.86% 
to 1.39% of the GDP during the same period. Similarly, expenditure on social 84 
 
and economic services in 1997/98 was 3.43% and 5.95 % of the GDP, however, 
during  the  conflict  period  (2001/02)  it  came  down  to  2.73%  and  4.13  % 
respectively (Pyakuryal and Sainju 2007, 9). There was a sharp decline in GDP 
growth during the conflict. A study indicates that before the conflict period ( 
1987/88-1994/95)  average  annual  GDP  growth  was  4.1  %,  while  during  the 
following  six  years  of  conflict  (1995/96-2001/02)  the  GDP  dropped  to  3.8% 
(Sharma 2006, 1242), and further declined to 2.8% during the 2002/03-2006/07 
periods (UNDP 2009, 22).  During ten years of armed conflict in Nepal (1996-
2006) over 13,284 people were killed, among them more than 475 were children 
(Gautam  2007,  3;  EPSP  2010).  Besides  that,  thousands  were  injured  and 
displaced and thousands more were widowed and orphaned; and human rights 
abuses by both the security forces and Maoist insurgents were rampant (Murshed 
and Gates 2005, 121). A large number of people (mostly the young) migrated to 
urban centres, or to neighbouring India and beyond in search of employment and 
security. Those that were left  behind  in  the villages  in  areas  affected by the 
insurgency were mostly the old, the sick and the infirm, along with women and 
children  (Adhikary 2004;  UNICEF 2006, 132).  In some districts  80%  of the 
villagers had left their home due to fear and lack of security which resulted in 
breakdown of village social structure  (UNICEF 2006, 132). Furthermore, the 
social and economic costs of the decade long conflict were immense. During this 
period around 200,000 people were internally displaced (IDMC 2008, 5). People 
were  trapped  between  the  two  forces.  They  were  subject  to  demands  and 
atrocities  from  both  sides  (NGO  Federation  2003,  84).  The  fate  of  many 
hundreds  of  people  who  were  arrested  either  by  the  security  forces  or  the 
Maoists is not known. Those who were displaced from their homes or places of 
habitual  residence,  particularly  women  and  children,  were  vulnerable  to 
violence, exploitation and discrimination (Tamang 2009, 3). 
 
The supply of many essential goods including food, medicines and construction 
materials were prevented in certain districts, and travel and transportation were 
restricted (Seddon and Hussein 2002, 27-29; NGO Federation 2003, 109). In 
addition, social relationships and harmony among people were disrupted due to 
suspicion and fear, and families broke up due to forced recruitment by Maoists 
(USAID  2006).  There  was  a  breakdown  of  safety  nets  and  traditional  social 85 
 
security systems during the conflict period and victims of the conflict were often 
neglected for fear of reprisal by opposing forces (Pyakuryal and Sainju 2007, 21; 
NGO Federation 2003, 82).  
 
There was frequent closure of schools as students had to attend political rallies 
organized  by  the  Maoists  (UNICEF  2006,  132).  Hundreds  of  schools  were 
turned into military barracks and abduction of school teachers and students was a 
common occurrence during the insurgency. It is reported that in the period 1996 
– 2004, 136 school teachers lost their lives and about 200 left their villages in 
search of security (ACHR 2005, 7). 
 
Women  and  children  were  particularly  vulnerable  to  the  disruption  of 
transportation  and  health  facilities.  UNICEF  reports  that  between  2000  and 
2004, the child mortality rate under five was 76 (the infant mortality rate 59) per 
thousand. The primary school enrolment rate for male and female children was 
75 and 66 respectively (UNICEF 2006, 130). However, the exact impact of the 
armed  conflict  on  health  and  sanitation,  child  and  maternal  mortality,  the 
incidence of epidemic diseases and food shortage is not known due to restricted 
access  to  those  areas  and  lack  of  any  comprehensive  study.  Children  were 
abducted and recruited into the Maoist Army. It is believed that around 18% of 
the Maoist forces may have consisted of boys and girls less than eighteen years 
of age. Many children were also abducted or arbitrarily detained by government 
security forces who suspected them of being Maoist supporters (Watchlist on 
Children and Armed Conflict 2005, 5). Children were forced to work as child 
soldiers, messengers, informants, cooks, sentries, and as carriers of ammunition 
(UNICEF 2006, 132). Those children who were displaced from their villages 
were deprived of basic health, education, food and proper care. Children were 
forced to work under severe conditions and were vulnerable to sexual abuse and 
exploitation. 
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3. 5.1. Environmental Impacts of Armed Conflict  
 
Beside social and economic impacts, studies show that civil conflict places stress 
on the environment leading to degradation of natural resources as well as causing 
negative impacts on environmental management institutions (UNEP 2006, 392). 
In addition to destruction of life and property, forests, waterways, biodiversity, 
cropland  and  other  natural  resources  are  often  adversely  affected.  Generally 
during a period of armed conflict governance structures are weakened and are 
unable to assure access to and protect resources (Shambaugh, Oglethorpe, and 
Ham 2001, 13-14). The impact of conflict on resource governance and the local 
environment depends upon the type, intensity and duration of conflict (Collinson 
2003,  10-11).  Civil  society,  NGOs  and  community  voices  are  crucial  in 
environmental policy-making and conservation efforts. However, during a period 
of  armed  conflict  all  these  forums  are  in  a  disorganized  state.  Lack  of 
information and the ability to communicate and assemble in turn restricts the 
basis for good environmental decision-making (WRI 2003, 27). During armed 
conflict, short-term human needs like shelter, food and security receive priority; 
thus,  environmental  conservation  and  sustainable  resource  management 
initiatives  receive  low  priority  and  may  lead  to  over-exploitation.  The 
breakdown  of  law  and  order  during  armed  conflict  creates  a  favourable 
environment for poachers of protected endangered flora and fauna (Baral and 
Heinen  2006,  8). During  the  armed  conflict  in  the  Central  African  Republic 
between  1996  and  1997,  elephant  populations  were  reduced  by  90%  due  to 
illegal hunting and poaching (Blom and Yamindou 2001, 14). The civil war in 
Cambodia resulted in the loss of 29% of the country‘s primary forest, which was 
used  by  both  the  Khmer  Rouge  and  the  government  for  funding  military 
expenses (Renner 2002; Le Billion 2000; FAO 2006, 197). During the civil war 
in Rwanda between 1990 and 1994, there was massive deforestation in Gishwati 
and Mukura forest and loss of 70% of the Akagera National Park (Plumptre, 
Masozera, and Vedder 2001, 27). In many instances such as in Sierra Leone, 
Central African Republic and Ethiopia, donor support to conservation programs 
was curtailed due to the atmosphere of insecurity and violence (Squire 2001, 24). 
A similar study conducted on the impact of conflict on the environment in sub-
Saharan Africa found most of the damage to the environment to be from non-87 
 
military  personnel  taking  advantage  of  anarchy  and  lawlessness  during  the 
period of violent conflict. Armed conflict equally affects the performance and 
ability  of  non-governmental  organizations  (NGOs),  civil  society,  media  and 
resource users  to  access information,  meet  and discuss  resource management 
issues (World Resource Institute (WRI) 2003, 27; REC 1997, 35). 
 
Some positive outcomes have been observed, where inaccessibility, personal risk 
or displacement of local populations led to improvement in wildlife habitat and 
forest condition through reduced exploitation and natural regeneration (UNEP 
2006, 395; Glew and Hudsona 2007, 141-147; Hatton, Couto, and Oglethorpe 
2001, 51). However, political instability and social disorder as a consequence of 
armed conflict disrupts conservation efforts, and ecosystems continue to suffer 
even  after  the  end  of  war  (Vanasselt  2003),  due  to  weakened  resource 
governance  institutions,  lack  of  funding,  manpower  and  priority  from  the 
government (Orr 2002, 139)
31 . The studies referred to above indicate that those 
countries that experienced armed conflict not only witnessed heavy loss of li fe 
and property, disruption of socio-economic infrastructure, and cultural shocks, 
but also faced heavy exploitation of natural resources, damage to conservation 
programs  and  infrastructure,  making  people  who  depend  directly  on  these 
resources more vulnerable. 
 
3.6.  Armed  conflict,  Community-Based  Forest  Governance  and  Rural 
Livelihoods 
 
Forests  in  Nepal  have  always  been  a  source  of  livelihood  resources  for  the 
people living in the mountains and villages. In 1978, the government of Nepal 
introduced a community forestry program that has since expanded throughout 
the country. In the last three decades the community forestry program in Nepal 
has  emerged  as  a  successful  natural  resource  management  initiative, 
strengthening  local  level  resource  governance  (USAID  2006;  Pokharel  et  al. 
2008,  55).  However,  the  decade  of  civil  conflict  since  1996  placed  the 
                                                 
31 In the post-war situation, where government and traditional local authorities are in a disorganized state, 
illegal loggers and poachers take advantage to exploit timber and wildlife inside and outside of protected 
areas for quick benefit, as was the case in Mozambique (Hatton, Couto, and Oglethorpe 2001, 43-48). 
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Community Forestry program under threat. During the conflict period, forests 
were used as training sites and hideouts by Maoists and were frequently targeted 
by security forces. Security forces also cleared the forest for the establishment of 
additional  barracks  and  check  posts.  During  the  insurgency,  the  government 
provided 35,608 hectares of forest to security forces for the establishment of 
additional barracks in 37 districts around the country, in many cases without any 
notice or consultation with Community Forest User Groups (Khanal 2006b, 14). 
In 1998 such a case was challenged by the local CFUGs in Doti district, who 
filed a case against the government in the Supreme Court. Finally in 2000, the 
Supreme  Court  gave  a  verdict  in  favour  of  the  CFUG.  The  Supreme  Court 
verdict  notes  that  as  the  community  forests  have  been  handed  over  to  the 
community under Section 25 of the 1993 Forest Act, the security agency has to 
coordinate with the CFUGs before conducting any firing and training exercises 
in  these forests and must  not  restrict the  rights  of forest  users regarding the 
utilization  of  forest  products,  conservation  and  management  activities. 
Nonetheless, impacts were serious. Deforestation, smuggling of protected flora 
and fauna and exploitation of timber in the Terai region are among the impacts 
reported  (Upreti  2006,  271).  A  study  conducted  by  Roka  (2006)  in  eight 
different  districts  of  Nepal,  including  hill  and  terai  districts,  concluded  that 
security forces indiscriminately cleared forest near their camps due to the fear of 
Maoist attack. Furthermore, use of landmines, explosives, and aerial bombings 
destroyed  forest  areas  (Upreti  2006,  271).  Security  forces  declared  restricted 
zones in district headquarters surrounded by forest which directly impacted upon 
people‘s  access  to  forest  products.  Restrictions  on  meetings  and  gatherings 
adversely affected the scheduled meetings of CFUGs, as well as implementation 
of  management  plans,  and  CFUG  members  were  threatened  or  physically 
tortured by security forces accusing them of being supporters or sympathizers of 
the Maoists.  
 
In some cases Maoists also prohibited villagers from entering the forest as they 
feared that security personnel might use the forest under cover to spy on their 
operations. Thus, people were suffering from both sides (Khanal 2006a). Most 
affected were firewood and non-timber forest product collectors, grazers, and 
some indigenous people such as the Raute and Chhepang, whose livelihoods 89 
 
directly depend upon forest resources (Khanal 2006a). Those who disobeyed the 
prohibitions  set  by  the  contending  parties  risked  being  killed  or  prosecuted. 
There are some incidents reported where villagers were shot dead by security 
forces when they went to collect fodder inside the forest (Limbu 2002, 2002). 
 
Some of the indigenous groups such as the Bankariya and Chhepang relied on 
the  forest  to  collect  roots,  tubers,  rhizomes  and  fruits  for  their  food.  When 
digging holes inside the forest looking for food, security forces assumed that 
they were making trenches for the Maoists. The Chhepang who practice shifting 
cultivation could not harvest their agricultural products due to the restrictions 
imposed by security forces. The Bote Maghi (indigenous people) who are reliant 
on  fishing  for  their  livelihoods,  were  prevented  from  accessing  streams  and 
rivers for fishing. The Raute indigenous people, who live in the forest and rely 
totally on it for making wood based utensils, which they sell to buy rice and 
other goods, were heavily affected by forest access restrictions, and by the loss 
of monkey meat as a food supplement as a result of aerial bombing or disturbed 
habitat. The livelihoods and survival of these minority groups were seriously at 
risk (Khanal 2006a, 12-13). 
 
During  the  insurgency  period,  encroachment  of  forest,  illegal  felling,  illegal 
poaching, hunting and smuggling of medical plants were widely reported (Upreti 
2006, 271). Timber smugglers in the Terai collaborated with security forces in 
poaching and illegal harvesting of valuable timbers (Roka 2006, 59). Maoists 
captured  different  national  parks  throughout  the  country  and  prohibited  the 
government  officials  and  employees  from  entering.  For  example,  Maoists 
captured Makalu – Barun National Park in the Eastern hills, Langtang National 
Park in Rasuwa district, and Dhor Patan Hunting Reserve in the Western hills of 
Nepal and prohibited entry by parks officials. As the security forces which had 
been  deployed  for  the  conservation  of  protected  areas  were  mobilized  for 
counter-insurgency  operations,  there  was  an  increase  in  the  illegal  activities 
inside protected areas (Upreti and Adhikari 2006, 272). It is reported that by 
2002, out of 112 guard posts in 11 protected areas in the country, only 34 were 
functional (Limbu 2002). Thus, the absence of forest guards and check-posts 
created  favourable  conditions  for  illegal  poachers  and  hunters,  resulting  in 90 
 
increased  poaching  of  one  horned  rhinoceros  in  the  Terai,  as  well  as  snow 
leopard, musk deer and wild boar in the mountains and hills (Gajurel 2004). In 
Chitawan National Park alone, between July 2001 and June 2002, 38 endangered 
one  horned  rhinoceros  were  killed.  The  rhinoceros  population  in  Chitwan 
National Park was reduced from 544 in 2000 to 372 in 2005 (Limbu 2002). 
Similarly, during the insurgency period, forest guards were unable to  protect 
forests from illegal felling because they were unarmed and were also constrained 
by basic logistics as the government reduced the budget for the conservation 
sector. Forestry infrastructure was destroyed; and Forest Area offices and staff 
based in different parts of the district were shifted to district headquarters in fear 
of  abduction  and  killings.  By  2002,  it  is  reported  that  Maoist  insurgents 
destroyed nine district forest offices, 33 area forest offices and 142 range posts. 
Insurgents also destroyed the offices of the King Mahendra Trust for Nature 
Conservation in  the villages  of  Philim,  Prok and  Samagaon  on northwest  of 
Gorkha district (Limbu 2002, 2002). 
 
During  the  insurgency,  community  forest  user  group  bank  accounts  in  many 
districts  were  closed  by  order  of  District  and  Zonal  Administrators  because 
government feared the CFUGs‘ funds might get into the hand of rebels. The 
closure of CFUG bank accounts and disruption of marketing of forest products 
had direct impacts on local community development activities being carried out 
by the CFUGs (Khanal 2006b, 20). It is reported that during 2004 – 2005, the 
Chief  District  Officer  (CDO)  in  16  districts  had  issued  curfew  notices 
prohibiting entering the community forest, which affected the CFUG members‘ 
access to the forest (Khanal 2006b, 17). 
 
Maoist policy was against interventions by international development agencies, 
with  the  result  that  many  donor  supported  forestry  projects  closed  and 
government  support  to  forestry  programs  was  heavily  reduced  (Upreti  2006, 
271). Due to the worsening law and order situation in the country, in February 
2005, the governments of Denmark and Switzerland suspended development aid 
to Nepal, amounting to $25.56 million and $16-17 million respectively, some of 
which had been earmarked for development projects and community forestry 
programs  (Sarkar  2005).  The  Nepal  Australia  Community  Resource 91 
 
Management and Livelihoods Project (NACRMLP) which was scheduled to run 
through January 2009 was terminated in June 2006 due to the worsening law and 
security situation (NACRMLP 2007a). 
 
During the insurgency period, the government was strictly regulating the supply 
of subsidized food items to some hill districts. The government‘s main intention 
was to stop the supply of food reaching the rebels. In Gorkha district, when the 
people  did  not  have  sufficient  food  to  eat  due  to  the  government‘s  food 
restriction policy, local people were compelled to clear the forest and sell it to 
the nearby Tibet autonomous region of China to buy foods and essentials. By 
taking advantage of this situation, illegal timber traders and smugglers had also 
cleared  the  forest  for  profit  (Limbu  2002,  2002).  The  Maoists  also  adopted 
various  strategies  to  fund  the  armed  struggle  by  taxing  natural  resources 
depending on the local situation – for example, taxation of non-timber forest 
products (NTFPs) in the mountains, and of valuable timber in the lowland Terai. 
Maoists  also  taxed  timber  contractors  and  non-timber  forest  products  traders 
depending upon the local situation and the nature of the NTFPs. Economically 
valuable timbers like Sisso (Dalbergia sisoo) and Khair (Acacia catechu) were 
taxed  at  the  rate  of  15%  by  government  as  a  royalty,  while  the  Maoists 
demanded the same amount of tax from CFUGs (Khanal 2006b, 25; Roka 2006). 
When the Maoists established ―United Revolutionary People‘s Councils‖ in 25 
districts  (Karki  and  Bhattarai  2003,  22),  they  gave  authority  to  these  local 
councils to fix and collect tax according to the local situation (Khanal 2006a). 
Maoist  policy  related  to  forest  and  other  natural  resources  was  articulated 
through the United Revolutionary People‘s Council program: 
 
  The Forest and natural resources shall be kept as public property under 
the ownership of local people's government; 
  An integrated, balanced and interrelated policy shall be adopted for the 
management and distribution of natural resources; 
  Local people's government shall prepare and implement a site specific 
―forest plan‖ based on the local context and necessity, as outlined in the 
―Forest Directives‖ under the ―People‘s Government Operation 
Directives‖ within the framework of United Revolutionary People's 92 
 
Council Directives (unofficial translation based on the Nepali publication by 
FECOFUN Nepal - (Khanal 2006a, 10). 
 
The Maoists did not specifically set out a detailed community forestry policy in 
the ―Minimum Common Policy and Programme of the  United Revolutionary 
People‘s Council‖. As the community forestry programme had become a widely 
popular feature of Nepali society, at a later stage, the Maoists acknowledged the 
concept of community forestry and recognized three types of forest management 
policy,  specifically,  National  Forest,  Community  Forest  and  Cooperative 
Production  Forest  (Khanal  2006a,  11).  This  policy  was  incorporated  in  the 
―Operational  Directive  for  People‘s  Government‖,  although  they  adopted 
different  approaches  and  modalities  within  the  community  forestry  program 
depending on local  context  (Khanal  2006b, 37-39).  In an interview  with  Dr. 
Baburam Bhattarai (second in command in the CPN -M) on February 12, 2006, 
he denied that the Maoists were engaged in taxing natural resources including 
forest products and NTFPs. He stated that the CPN -M did not have any policy 
which would disturb the activities of the community forestry programme. He 
noted  that  although  the  CFUGs  were  independent  institutions,  this  did  not 
necessarily mean that they do not have class characteristics. He argued that the 
elites were taking greater benefit from the Community Forests than the people 
from lower socio-economic strata, and that this weakness of the CF program 
needed to be addressed at local level
32 (FECOFUN 2006, 4-5). 
 
When the intensity of the armed conflict was on the rise, the government adopted 
a strict policy towards the community forestry program. In 2000, the government 
formulated new Forest Sector Policies providing that 40% of the income earned 
from the sale of surplus timber (10% formerly) from CF in Terai
33, Siwalik and 
Innner Terai
34 had to be deposited in a government account. Under the new 
forest policy, government no longer handed over large blocks of forest in the 
Terai region to community forest user groups. Rather the forest was managed 
                                                 
32 This article was published in Nepal Rastriya Saptahik and republished in Samudayik Ban Aawaj the same 
month. 
33 The Southern edge of the Siwalik range below 700 meter MSL, also known as the  lowest range of the 
Himalayan foothills is classified as the Terai region. 
34 The low valleys in between Churia hills to the north of the southern plains (Terai) and Mahabharat range 
are called ―Duns‖ or Inner Terai 
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through  the  joint  collaboration  of  local  users,  local  political  bodies  and 
government. 75% of the income from collaborative management of the forest 
under this arrangement went to the government account, and the remaining 25% 
was shared between users and local bodies (Kanel, Poudyal, and Baral 2005, 72). 
This  new  forest  policy  prepared  by  the  government  was  totally  against  the 
established policy, regulation and practices of the community forestry program. 
There were two reasons behind formulating this policy. First, as most of the 
countryside  was  controlled  by  the  Maoists,  the  government  feared  that  the 
income generated from CFUGs might go into the hands of the Maoists. Second, 
large sums of money from CFUGs could be used to fight against the Maoists. 
The  government‘s  main  motive  for  its  new  forest  policy  was  to  control 
community forest user group funds through the bureaucracy and also to govern 
CFUGs activities through political organizations.  
 
Beside  the  negative  impact  of  armed  conflict  on  community  forestry,  some 
positive impacts have also been observed. Study shows that there was increased 
empowerment and participation of disadvantaged people and women in CFUG 
activities, reduction in illegal felling, and illegal encroachment (Roka 2006). For 
example, in the Illam district in the eastern part of Nepal, Maoists had adopted 
conservation  and  development  programs  in  community  forestry  and  in  many 
instances  they had taken stringent actions  against  timber smugglers.  In other 
examples,  Maoists  launched  a  campaign  against  encroachers  in  the  National 
Forest  and  punished  those  who  had  misused  CFUG  funds.  The  Maoist 
insurgency also provided impetus for reform within the CF program, especially 
the introduction of public auditing, good governance, gender balance and pro-
poor initiatives. In some instances, security forces and CFUGs jointly undertook 
patrols  against  timber  smugglers.  In  other  cases,  the  Maoist  presence  also 
encouraged CFUGs to be more transparent and inclusive in their programs and 
resource distribution practices (Baral and Heinen 2006, 8-9; USAID 2006, VI). 
The  pressure  exerted  by  the  conflict  also  encouraged  CFUGs  to  be  more 
transparent and responsive to the needs of people.  
 
The conflict forced development agencies to reorient their programmes to be 
more transparent, inclusive, and responsible. Many donors working in Nepal like 94 
 
DFID, SDC, GTZ, reviewed their existing policy, trained their staff in conflict 
management  and  adopted  a  ―do  no  harm‖  approach  in  their  development 
interventions  (LFP  2007,  2).  The  donor  agencies  reformulated  their  working 
procedures  to  promote the participation of poor and disadvantaged people in 
decision-making processes of the community forestry program. Although there 
was  a  general  lack  of  support  from  government  to  the  community  forestry 
program  during  the  insurgency  period,  the  results  of  this  research  and  other 
studies  indicate  that  CFUGs  were  the  only  grass  roots  institutions  that  were 
functioning  despite  the  political  instability  and  deteriorating  law  and  order 
situation (USAID 2006, IX).  
 
3.7. Conclusion 
 
From the time Nepal was unified and emerged as a nation-state; the political 
system was controlled by elite families under feudal conditions. During the 104 
years  of  the  autocratic  Rana  regime,  there  was  no  political  space  for  citizen 
participation in the political process. People were without access to education, 
health  facilities,  and  other  basic  needs.  With  the  development  of  egalitarian 
political movements in the Asian region and the emergence of political parties, it 
became possible to launch a struggle for political reform. Following the 1950 
revolution, in which the new political parties, the general public and the king 
himself played active roles, a compromise was reached that forced the century 
old Rana regime to accept a democratic political system. The political system in 
the post 1950 period could not function well, however, as there was constant 
struggle for power between the King, the Rana family, and the political parties. 
There  was  a  huge  challenge  for  the  new  government  to  restructure  political 
institutions and reform the feudal caste-bound society. The struggle of the pro-
democratic political parties to alter the traditional system met heavy resistance 
from feudal elements within the new political system. The promise of the 1950 
revolution  was  aborted  in  any  case,  when  King  Mahendra  banned  political 
parties and took control of the administration himself, imposing the partyless 
Panchayat system, and becoming directly involved in national politics and the 
country‘s government. His successor, King Birendra, followed the same political 
arrangements  introduced  by  his  father.  Finally,  the  1990  people‘s  movement 95 
 
overthrew the Panchayat system that had been in place for 30 years, restoring 
multiparty  democracy.  However,  after  the  formation  of  first  democratically 
elected  government  in  1991,  instead  of  working  towards  socio-economic 
transformation of Nepali society, there was constant power struggle within and 
between  parliamentary  political  parties.  Good  governance,  economic 
development, and social transformation toward which the people aspired did not 
materialize.    
 
In 1996, the Nepal Communist Party (Maoist) launched a people‘s war against 
the government, demanding the abolition of special rights and privileges of the 
monarchy, Constituent Assembly elections, and establishment of a secular state. 
The civil war continued for a decade and finally, a landmark peace deal was 
signed  between  the  political  parties  and  Maoists,  who  joined  an  interim 
government in January 2007.  
 
Research on Nepal‘s conflict points to a combination of bad governance and 
underlying  socio-  economic  grievances  –persistent  poverty,  unequal  land 
distribution, social inequalities based on caste, ethnic, gender, and geographic 
disparities (Deraniyagala 2005, 61; Parwez 2006, 5; Murshed and Gates 2005, 
132;  Hatlebakk  2009,  13;  Bray,  Lunde,  and  Murshed  2003,  107)  –  that 
contributed to support for the Maoist insurgency in Nepal (Bray, Lunde, and 
Murshed 2003, 116). In the case of Nepal, socio-economic grievances were used 
by  Maoists  to  enlist  large  segments  of  the  population  to  their  radical  social 
reform agenda for the society. Promises of redistribution of land to the landless 
and freeing bonded labour (kamaiya) appealed to the poor in the countryside 
(Hutt  2007,  15).  Their  program  also  appealed  to  youth  who  constituted  the 
majority of the unemployed in the population and saw no prospect for the future. 
As  the  Maoists  implemented  social  reforms  in  their  stronghold  areas  more 
people were attracted to their movement. In a short span of time thousands of 
people joined the movement as militants or sympathizers.  
 
Environmental factors have also been significant in engendering insecurity and 
political  conflict  (Cramer  2003,  409;  Brown  2005,  4;  Myers  1993,  22). 
Environmental factors are not surprisingly linked to socio-economic and political 96 
 
issues,  since  declining  ecological  services  and  competition  over  resources, 
compounded by inequitable access to resources, can be significant in triggering 
conflict (Elliott 2004, 207). Furthermore, violent conflict is often both cause and 
consequence of environmental degradation (Græger 1996, 110).  
 
The  overwhelming  majority  of  people  in  Nepal  still  live  in  rural  areas  and 
areheavily dependent upon forest resources to meet their daily needs for fuel 
wood,  fodder,  medicine,  building  materials,  as  well  as  cultural  and  spiritual 
needs.  Since  1978,  the  government  has  implemented  a  series  of  community 
forestry programs and handed over large tracts of government-controlled forest 
to local communities, a policy which has been considered a progressive step in 
strengthening local level resource governance. The introduction of community 
forestry  and  formation  of  Community  Forest  User  Groups  (CFUGs)  in  the 
villages created a social and institutional platform at local level which has been 
considered  vital  in  empowering  collective  decision  making,  increasing 
awareness and bargaining power at local level (Dev et al. 2003, 66). However, 
the  decade  long  insurgency  (1996-2000)  threatened  community  forest 
governance  and  sustainable  management  of  these  resources.  Firstly,  as 
overwhelming parts of the country were under the control of the Maoists, the 
Nepalese government sent security forces into community forests and in some 
cases declared restricted zones in these areas that severely affected forest users‘ 
access and capacity to fulfil their livelihood needs from the forest. In other cases, 
insurgency and counter insurgency measures adopted by both contending parties 
restricted  people‘s  access  to  the  community  forests.  Secondly,  due  to  the 
deployment  of  security  forces  away  from  national  parks  protection  to  fight 
against  insurgency,  there  was  a  rise  in  the  illegal  timber  trade,  hunting  and 
smuggling  of  fauna  and  flora  that  undermined  conservation  efforts  and 
protection of endangered species. Thirdly, due to the lack of security and fear of 
Maoist capture, many forestry department and national park staff were displaced 
from  the  villages,  severely  undermining  government  conservation  activities 
undertaken  at  the  field  level.  Fourthly,  due  to  the  weakening  law  and  order 
situation in the countryside many conservation and development projects funded 
by  international  donors  were  terminated.  Fifthly,  as  a  counter  insurgency 
measure  the  government  changed  forest  policies  during  the  conflict  period, 97 
 
imposing heavy taxes on community forests, controlling the bank accounts of the 
CFUGs and also discouraging CFUG forest enterprises, which made the working 
situation of the CFUG very challenging. Lastly, during the insurgency period, 
CFUGs  had to  bear a double tax burden as  they  had to  pay tax both  to the 
government as well as to the Maoist jansarkar (Maoist People‘s Government) 
which  undermined  their  profits  from  forest  management  and  also  crippled 
community development activities carried out by the CFUGs with these funds. 
The functioning of community-based forest governance, the access of different 
socio-economic  groups to forest  resources,  and  the impact  of conflict  on the 
livelihoods of forest dependent rural communities as well as on the forest itself 
was unclear. The empirical chapters of this thesis investigate the impact of the 
decade-long armed conflict on community forest governance, environment and 
the livelihoods of people in forest dependent rural communities in the Middle 
Hills region of Nepal. As background to the three case studies investigating these 
issues in Kavrepalanchok District, the following chapter provides an overview of 
the development of community forestry in Nepal.  98 
 
Chapter 4 
 
Forest Policy and Governance in Nepal: An Overview
   
 
This chapter reviews the history and evolution of forest policy and governance in 
Nepal. Forest governance in this context is understood as the rules, institutions 
and policies that govern the conduct of institutions and individuals in the forest 
sector.  The  chapter  discusses  the  impact  of  forest  policies  formulated  under 
different political regimes on the environmental conditions of the forest and the 
well being of the people dependent upon it. The chapter also critically examines 
the impact of more recent community forestry programs on local level resource 
governance  and  livelihoods.  Finally,  it  discusses  the  emerging  issues  in  the 
governance  of  forest  commons  and  sustainable  management  of  common 
property resources at local level. 
 
4. 1. Background  
 
Nepal has an area of 147,181 sq. km., of which the forest area covers 55,180 sq. 
km.,  approximately  39%  of  the  total  area.  23.23%  of  the  country  has  been 
delineated as  national  park and  conservation areas  (DoFRS 1999a;  Tamrakar 
2003, 1; DNPWC 2010). Nepal ranks twenty-fifth globally in biodiversity, with 
118 ecosystems, 75 vegetation types and 35 forest types, 5,100 flowering plants 
(out of which 370 species are considered endemic), 1,600 species of fungi, and 
over 460 species of lichen. Although Nepal occupies only 0.1 % of the earth‘s 
surface, it possesses over 2% of the world‘s flowering plants, about 9% of the 
world‘s bird species and 4% of the world‘s mammalian species (FAO 1999, 6; 
ADB and ICIMOD 2006, 42).  
 
Nepal is divided into five physiographic zones with varying climatic conditions 
and forest types. The climate, ecology and forest type is greatly influenced by 
topography of the country (FAO 1999). 99 
 
Table 4.1: Physiographic Zones 
Physiographic zones  Elevation  Area(1000 ha)  Area in % 
 
Terai  Less than 500 meter  2,111  14 
Siwaliks  500-1000 meter  1,886  13 
Middle Hills  1000-3000 meter  4,443  30 
High Mountain  3000-5000 meter  2,959  20 
High Himal  Above 5000 meter  3,350  23 
Source: (CES 1998) 
 
Map 4.1: Map of Nepal Showing Physiographic Zones 
 
Source: {WWF, 2001 #1433} 
 
Table 4.2: Forest Types of Nepal, Classified on the Basis of Altitude 
Altitude (m) above sea 
level 
Climatic zones  Type of forest 
0 - 1000  Sub-tropical  Shorea  robusta,  Pinus  roxburghii,  Mixed 
forest 
1000 - 2000  Warm temperate  Pinus roxburghii, Mixed forest 
2000 - 3000  Cool temperate  Pinus wallichiana, Mixed forest 
3000 - 4000  Sub-mountainous  Pinus wallichina, Mixed forest 
4000 - 4500  Mountainous  Arundnaria, Grassland 
4500 and above  Alpine  - 
Source: DOF (1995, 4) 100 
 
 
Nepal‘s economy is still largely rural and agrarian. Rural communities in Nepal 
still  depend  heavily  on  forest  resources  for  their  livelihood  and  wellbeing, 
although there has been a gradual shift in livelihood patterns from traditional 
agriculture to non-farm sectors in recent years (ADB and ICIMOD 2006, 23). 
About 99% of the population residing in the mountains and 88% in the hills use 
fuel wood as a main source of household energy; 37% of the fodder needs of 
their livestock are also met from forests (FAO, 1999). Forest utilization, farming 
and  animal  husbandry  are  well  integrated  and  provide  the  main  source  of 
livelihoods and food security in Nepal. About 86% of people in Nepal reside in 
rural  areas and, 66% of the employed population are engaged in agriculture, 
forestry and fisheries (ADB and ICIMOD 2006, 23; Acharya 2002).  
 
The forest is an important source of plant nutrients as chemical fertilizers are 
costly.  Leaf  litter  collected  from  the  forest  is  used  as  bedding  material  for 
livestock  which  is  converted  to  compost  and  used  as  organic  manure  for 
maintaining  soil  fertility  (Mahat,  1987)
35.  Forests  are  also  important  for 
watershed conservation and for regulating water flow  (Shepherd and Gill 1999; 
Dougill et al. 2001, 263). Forests are the source of non-wood forest products such 
as medicinal and aromatic plants (MAPs), lokta
36 (Daphne Bhoula), resin, wild 
fruits,  vegetables  and  numerous  other  life  supporting  resources.  Moreover, 
collection of medicinal plants from the alpine region constitutes an integrated part 
of household strategies providing 3 to 44% of the total annual household income 
(Olsen  and  Larsen  2003,  243-254).  There  was  an  old  and  popular  saying  – 
“Hariyo Ban Nepal Ko Dhan” (Green forest is the wealth of Nepal). However, 
over  the  last  several  decades,  Nepal‘s  forest  has  undergone  massive 
deforestation,  which  is  mainly  attributed  to  the  illegal  clearing  of  forest  for 
agricultural land, political instability and deficient land use and tax policies of 
the government (Metz 1991).  
                                                 
35 See, for example, Mahat (1987) for a detailed account of forest and farm linkages in the mountains of 
Nepal. 
36 Lokta botanically known as Daphne Bhoula or Daphne Papyracea, is an indigenous plant of Nepal. It is 
found at the altitude of 6500 feet to 9500 feet from the sea level. The bark of the Lokta has long been used 
as raw material for paper-making. Paper made from Lokta is non-perishable in water, and highly resistant to 
insects like silverfish, paper crawlers etc. 101 
 
 
4. 2. Forest Policy and Governance in Nepal  
 
State forest management history in Nepal has been broadly classified in three 
different phases (Hobley and Malla 1996, 65-92) – privatisation (1768 – 1951), 
nationalisation (1951 – 1987), and populism (1987 onward).  In a similar way, 
other scholar divide the forest history of Nepal into four phases i.e. pre-1957 
(before unification), from 1957 to 1976 (forest nationalization), from 1976 to 
1988  (emergence  of  participatory  forest  policy  and  legislation)  and  1988 
onwards  (inception  of  community  forestry  policy  and  legislation)  (Gautam, 
Shivakoti, and Webb 2004, 137-140). For this research, I examine the forest 
policy  based  on  the  political  regime  as  changes  in  political  regime  directly 
affected forest policy. 
 
4. 2.1. Forest Policy before Unification  
 
There is not much known about forest management practices, policies and forest 
governance systems during the early historic period in Nepal. Forest legislation 
evolved from simple indigenous codes of practice which existed throughout the 
hills for centuries, although there is little documentation (Gautam 1993). During 
King Ram Shah‘s regime (1606-1636) few codes that relate to forest use have 
been  reported.  Among  those  on  record  are  the  12th  Code  –  that  refers  to 
maintaining communal grazing land; 13th Code – that deals with maintaining 
trees along paths; and 14th Code – that requires maintaining trees around water 
springs (Gautam 1993). Prior to 1743, and before unification in 1769, Nepal was 
divided into 46 small principalities (Malla 2001, 290; Joshi and Rose 1966, 4). 
During  that  period  state  policies  were  directed  towards  clearing  forest  and 
encouraging peasant farmers to cultivate more land. The petty states aimed to 
strengthen their hold by bringing all land under state ownership and increasing 
the tax base (Stiller 1975; Griffin, Shepherd, and Mahat 1988, 45; Bhattarai and 
Khanal 2005; Malla 2001, 290)
37. 
                                                 
37 See Mahat, Griffin and Shephered (1986a) for an account of state forest policy from the 17
th century to 
the mid 19
th century. 102 
 
  
Historically,  natural  resource  management  in  Nepal  involved  two  forms  of 
control  and  management:  one  at  the  formal  level  of  centralized  government 
bureaucracy, and the other (informal) at the local level, where rural communities 
have  been  developing  and  enforcing  their  own  indigenous  practices  and 
customary rules (Chapagain, Kanel and Regmi, 1999). Prior to 1957 the local 
level  forest  management  system  was  not  governed  by  any  comprehensive 
legislative  framework.  It  was  under  the  control  of  informal  local  level 
institutions and customary rules. During the Rana regime, most of the forests in 
the  hills  of  Nepal  were  under  the  control  of  local  village  leaders  known  as 
talukdar
38. The talukdar were entrusted by the state as revenue collectors, and 
also  had  law  enforcement  authority.  Besides  the  land  revenue  collection,  the 
talukdar were also responsible for regulation of access to the forest and forest 
products  distribution.  The  talukdar  appointed  chitadars/chaukidars  (forest 
watchers), who  were responsible to  control  the illegal  activities in  the forest 
under  the  supervision  of  talukdar  (Regmi,  1978  cited  in  Fisher,  1989,  4). 
However, after the collapse of the Rana regime, the externally sponsored system 
of forest management, commonly known as “talukdari” system collapsed, and 
villagers resorted to their own systems of forest management (Fisher et al 1988, 
24) (Gilmour 1989, 12). The following table summarizes the work of a number 
of researchers into the indigenous forest management system that operated in 
Nepal
39. 
 
                                                 
38 The term talukdar is a generic term covering a number of different types of local tax collectors (Regmi, 
1978). 
39  For  further information on  the indigenous system of forest  management in Nepal, see for  example, 
Arnold and Campbell, 1986), Fisher (1989, 1991), Fisher et al (1990), Molnar (1981), Masserschmidt 
(1985). 103 
 
Table 4.3 Indigenous Forest Management Systems in Nepal 
Management 
system  
Location  Main elements of the system 
Kipat  Eastern  hills 
of Nepal 
Land was under kipat tenure, controlled by the local 
tribes  where  members  of  the  community  can  use 
forest and pasture land; however, non-members had 
to pay fees for use (Arnold and Campbell 1986, 428-
429; Fisher 1988, 4). 
Communal 
collection  
Far-west  of 
Nepal 
Communal  harvesting  and  gathering  of  forest 
products like fodder, leaf-litter and equal distribution 
among  the  members  (Arnold  and  Campbell  1986, 
428-429). 
shingo naua  Khumbu 
region 
In  the  mountain  Khumbu  region  below  Mount 
Everest, reserved forests were controlled collectively 
by  the community. The  Sherpa headman appointed 
shingo naua (forest guards) for the control of forest 
use. The  shingo naua had delegated power to levy 
fines  on  the  illegal  harvesting  of  timber.  They  had 
authority to check wood stocks in every household to 
prevent violation of rules. As forest growth is very 
slow in high altitudes, this system was adopted for 
the regulated distribution of timber for construction. 
Permits  could  be  granted  for  house  building  and 
wood required for funerals (Fürer-Haimendorf 1964, 
110-111). 
Religious 
forest 
Throughout 
the 
Mountains 
and  Hills  of 
Nepal 
Forests  were  harvested  only  for  religious  purposes 
(Arnold and Campbell 1986, 429). 
Manapathi  Throughout 
the  Hills  of 
Nepal 
Forest watchers, appointed by the villagers for forest 
protection,  were  paid  with  grain  collected  from 
member households (Campbell 1978). 
Controlled 
cutting 
Myagdi 
district 
Villagers were allowed to cut only dead and fallen 
trees  and  leaf-litter  (pine  needle)  to  avoid  fire. 
Villagers had to pay a small fee for accessing forest 
products  and  donate  grain  for  forest  watchers. 
Villagers plant trees in groups; the forest watchman 
was hired from among the poorest villagers. Fodder 
can  be  collected  only  during  winter,  and  thatching 
material  can  be  harvested  only  in  fall.  Trees  were 
allowed to be cut only for house construction; non-
members  are  excluded  from  the  use  of  forest 
products. Goats are restricted from grazing inside the 
forest  but  cattle  grazing  were  allowed  with  some 
restriction (Masserschmidt 1985, 460).  
 
Studies show that indigenous forest management systems were operational in 
most parts of the middle hills and mountains, where villagers devised their own 
local governing rules, harvesting only selected products and species based on 
resource conditions, limitation on harvesting based on season, time, quantity, 
equipment  to  be  used,  area,  and  agency  (women,  children,  hired  labour), 
harvesting  on  rotation  in  order  to  control  illegal  harvesting  and  to  allow 
regeneration,  harvesting  within  a  specified  time  period  to  avoid  uncontrolled 104 
 
cutting and assure equity in products distribution (Arnold and Campbell 1986, 
437-448). In some instances local communities used to keep aside a patch of 
forest as raani ban (queen forest) with utilization of such forest permitted only 
for a few months and left undisturbed to regenerate for the rest of the year. A 
study by (Molnar 1981) shows that even after the private forest nationalization 
by the state in 1957, people in the hills of Nepal (Gerkhu village of Nuwakot 
district and Singhana village of Baglung district) were protecting and managing 
the forest effectively on communal as well as private land.  It can be concluded 
that  the  indigenous  system  of  forest  management  evolved  in  the  hills  and 
mountains of Nepal to  address the scarcity of forest products and worsening 
local environment. It is evident that people are very much aware of their natural 
environment and proved able to address many problems of resource management 
through local mechanisms.  
 
4. 2. 2. Forest Policy after Unification (1769 – 1847) 
 
In 1769, the Gorkha King, Prithvi Narayan Shah unified Nepal after conquering 
the petty principalities including Kathmandu valley and created what is now the 
modern state of Nepal (Joshi and Rose 1966). After the unification of Nepal, an 
active land reclamation policy was adopted by clearing forests in the hills of 
Nepal. People were encouraged through local functionaries to clear forest, build 
irrigation canals and establish settlements. It is reported that the policy of land 
conversion,  especially  in  the  fragile  hill  slopes  of  Nepal,  caused  serious 
problems  of  landslides,  erosion,  and  drying  of  water  sources  (Bhattarai  and 
Khanal 2005, 16). In order to accelerate the process of conversion of forest into 
agricultural land, the state proclaimed that the newly converted lands could not 
be taxed for three years. As peasant farmers normally paid half of their produce 
either to the state in tax or to the landholder, who had been given the land in 
recompense for services to the state, conversion of forest into agriculture for 
additional food production was the only means the peasant farmers had to pay 
rent  or  tax  and  maintain  their  livelihoods  (Ives  and  Messerli  1989,  48).  As 
population pressure increased in the hills a great deal of forest was converted to 
agricultural  land  during  this  period.  However,  the  Terai  region,  which  was 
heavily  covered  by  dense  forest  and  sparsely  populated,  was  left  relatively 105 
 
untouched in the Terai, the Southern belt of Nepal near the Indian boarder, the 
government  maintained  a  policy  to  protect  the  forest  as  a  defensive  natural 
barrier (Hamilton 1819, 51-52; Ojha 1983, 23). At the same time it is reported 
that in order to fulfil the demand for armouries for the state, large areas of forest 
were harvested to meet the supply of charcoal for iron smelting, especially in the 
Sindhupalchok and Kabhre Palanchok districts adjoining Kathmandu (Ives and 
Messerli 1989, 48). 
 
4. 2.3. Forest Policy during the Rana Regime (1847-1950) 
 
In the mid-1800s,  the king‘s power was  restrained by the Rana family, who 
assumed hereditary premiership for 104  years. In 1854, the first Rana Prime 
Minister, Junj Bahadur Rana, introduced a legal code “Muluki Ain‖
40 including a 
section which prescribed fines for cutting trees on communal land based on their 
importance for the local environment (Gautam 1993). Although Nepal was never 
a  part  of  the  British  Empire,  policy  during  the  Rana  regime  was  heavily 
influenced  by  colonial  ideology  that  was  directed  towards  commercial 
exploitation of the Terai forests (Bhattarai and Khanal 2005, 1). In 1927, the 
regime embraced a policy of harvesting economically valuable timber and other 
forest products from the Terai region and exporting it to British India. Aside 
from earning foreign currency, it is believed that the decision to export timber 
from  the  Terai  region  to  India  was  to  avoid  invasion  by  maintaining  good 
relationships with the British. Beside the sale of timber Prime Minister Jung 
Bahadur Rana supplied 200,000 railway sleepers free of charge from the Terai 
forest to the government of British India as there was heavy demand for ‗railway 
sleepers‘  for  the  expansion  of  the  Indian  railways  (Collier,  1928  quoted  in 
Gautam, 2006: 179).  
 
During the 1920s, the government cleared considerable areas of virgin forest for 
large  scale  settlement  schemes,  mainly  in  the  Rapti  valley  and  Morang  area 
(Ojha 1983, 25), to maximize rent and tax. Since hill people were reluctant to 
                                                 
40 Muluki Ain is a collection of administrative procedures and legal frameworks for interpreting civil and 
criminal matters, revenue collection, landlord and peasant relations, inter-caste disputes, and marriage and 
family  law.  In  1854,  Prime  Minister  Jang  Bahadur  Rana  commissioned  leading  administrators  and 
interpreters of texts on dharma (religious scriptures) to revise and codify the legal system of the nation into 
a single body of laws. A 1,400-page Muluki Ain was prepared. 106 
 
migrate to the Terai due to the fear of malaria and other endemic diseases, the 
Rana regime encouraged Indian settlers to migrate in the Terai by providing 
them with credit, food, health services and free timber for home construction, in 
addition to a land tax exemption for 10 years (Ghimire 1991, 71; Ojha 1983, 25). 
Those who brought  settlers  into this  scheme and helped in  the process were 
rewarded with land grants (Ojha 1983, 25). The forest policy adopted by the 
Rana  regime  suggests  that,  aside  from  some  attention  to  the  regulation  of 
communal forest during their 104 years of rule (1847-1950), the regime was 
primarily  concerned  with  the  commercial  exploitation  of  Terai‘s  productive 
forest. After the clear felling of trees in the settlement areas, large quantities of 
timber become available for sale to British India that generated a substantial 
amount of money for the Rana regime (Ghimire 1991, 71).  
 
The earliest forest policy document on Nepal known to have been written in the 
modern era is a report prepared by J. V. Collier in 1928, a British Forest Officer, 
who had worked in British India. Collier was contracted by the Rana regime to 
advise government on commercial exploitation of the Terai forest and to prepare a 
plan for harvesting. He worked as a Forest Advisor for five years from 1925 to 
1929. Under his supervision massive felling was carried out in Western Nepal, a 
similar  operation  was  carried  out  in  the  Morang  area  of  the  eastern  Nepal  to 
increase the land available for agriculture. Due to extensive felling of trees the 
forest became heavily depleted. Subsequently, two missions were carried out by 
British  foresters  in  1941  and  1947  with  the  main  objective  of  advising  the 
government on the establishment of a forest service in Nepal (Robbe 1954, 4). 
 
Modern forest administration in Nepal began in 1925 with the establishment of the 
Forest  Inspection  Office  (then  known  as  Ban  Jaach  Goswara)  and  Kathmahal 
(Timber Office). In 1941, the government appointed E. A. Smythies, a British 
forester, as a forest adviser who prepared a working plan to manage the Terai 
forest.  On  his  advice,  in  1942,  the  government  established  the  Department  of 
Forests  and  set  up  a  separate  Forest  Service  (Robbe  1954,  4).  After  the 
establishment of the forestry organization, a large part of the Terai forest was cut 107 
 
down, and the regime distributed almost one-third of the forest land as birta
41 to 
various  Rana  families,  civil  and  military  officials,  and  members  of  nobility, 
chieftains  of  conquered  principalities  and  others  loyal  to  them.  Moreover, 
government  employees  and  functionaries  were  paid  for  their  services  through 
assignment  of  lands under  jagir tenure
42  (Regmi 1978; Chapagain, Kanel, and 
Regmi 1999). The income generated from the sale of timber from the Terai forest 
profited mainly the Rana family (Wagley and Ojha 2002, 5; Regmi 1978; Lynch 
and  Talbott  1995,  38) .  The  Rana  regime  appointed  local  landlords  as 
functionaries (talukdar) of state for revenue collection. They were also entrusted 
with  controlling  forest  access  and  the  distribution  of  forest  products  (Regmi 
1978; Fisher 1988, 4; Springate-Baginski et al. 2003). Although the birta and 
jagir  system  was  practised  by  the  state  from  the  early  unification  period,  the 
expansion of these tenure practices greatly increased during the Rana regime. The 
system  of  birta  and  jagir  during  the  Rana  period  enabled  those  in  power  to 
appropriate huge areas of land under private ownership, including large tracts of 
forests,  mainly  in  the  Terai  region  (Regmi  1971).  It  is  believed  that  from  the 
inception of the Rana regime until its end in 1951, one-third of farmland and forests 
fell under the birta tenure, with 75% of this belonging to the Rana family (IUCN 
2000, 60). 
 
Even though the Rana regime prepared forest policy for the management of the 
Terai forest (mainly oriented toward extraction), there was no policy formulated to 
regulate this large scale exploitation of the forests in the Hills and Mountain zones. 
But de facto recognition of the local kipat system
43, the talukdari system
44 and the 
indigenous  forest  management  system  in  the  hills  of  Nepal  remained.  The 
following systems of forest governance were operational in the hills of Nepal in 
1910:  
                                                 
41 Birta was a grant of land given to a noble as a reward for a service rendered to the state. Birta was usually 
both tax free and inheritable, and had no set time limit to tenure. It was valid until it was recalled or 
confiscated (Regmi 1978), 
42 jagir was also a grant of land given to government employees (civil or military) in lieu of salary. The 
jagir land grant was also tax free but remained valid only as long as the concerned person served the 
government.  
43 Kipat is an ancient type of communal land tenure, applied to both cultivated and forested land. Under this 
system, a community was granted land by the king in recognition of traditional communal tenure. On such lands, 
the headmen gave individuals the right to till certain areas and to collect forest products from other areas (Regmi 
1978) 
44As described above, the talukdari is a local functionary (usually hereditary) of the state, which existed until the 
1950‘s. The term talukdar is a generic term referring to local tax collectors. 108 
 
 
Table 4.4: Official Forestry Organization in the Hills Region of Nepal in 1910 
  Central  District   Village 
Institution  Prime minister 
Muluki-adda 
Ban-goswara 
Goswara 
Addas 
Talukdar 
Functions  Policy formulation  Judicial action  Execution against  
offenders 
Source: (Gautam 1991)   
 
4. 2.4. Forest Policy after the Advent of Democracy (1951 to 1961) 
 
In 1951, Nepal underwent a dramatic change after the overthrow of the Rana 
regime by a democratic movement under the leadership of Prajaparishad and 
the Nepali Congress party. The new government put more focus on social reform 
and national development. In 1951 the government entered an agreement with the 
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) obtaining the technical assistance of two 
forestry experts to advise government on a long term forest policy and prepare the 
necessary legislative reform to implement it. The mission‘s objective was mainly 
focussed on preparing a plan to protect the forest, with emphasis on reforestation, 
soil conservation and preservation of natural resources (Robbe 1954, 5). During the 
1950s a massive land reform program was undertaken. After the end of the Rana 
regime,  the  newly  formed  government  abolished  jagir  tenure  in  1951
45  and 
enacted the Birta Abolition Act in 1959. Those forest lands under  birta tenure 
now  came  under  state  control,  subject  to  taxation  as  agricultural  land  or 
nationalized as forest (Hobley and Malla 1996, 69; Ojha 1983, 27).   
 
4. 2.4.1. The 1957 Private Forest (Nationalisation) Act 
 
In  implementing  land  reform,  the  government  proclaimed  the  Private  Forest 
(Nationalisation) Act 1957, seizing forest land owned by local elites and de facto 
private owners who had obtained land as birta or jagir during the Rana regime. 
These  lands  were  to  be  put  in  the  service  of  national  development  and  the 
welfare of the people (Malla 2001; Regmi 1978; Joshi 1993).The main aim of 
                                                 
45District revenue officers replaced zamindars, the landlord functionaries responsible for collecting tax with 
limited powers of land administration) 
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this Act was to end feudal tenure by bringing the birta and jagir land grants 
under the domain of the Forest Department  (IUCN 2000).  
 
Under the Forest Nationalization Act 1957 (CPFD 1995) individuals could keep 
only 1.25 hectares of forest in the hills and 3.25 hectares in the Terai as private 
forest. The Act aimed: firstly, to dis-empower the elites and those people loyal to 
the Rana regime; secondly, to increase state revenue; and thirdly, to open up the 
newly  acquired  forest  lands  to  resettle  migrants  from  the  hills  of  Nepal 
(Chapagain,  Kanel,  and  Regmi  1999,  5-6).  The  objective  was  to  bring  this 
economically and  environmentally valuable national forest  asset  from  private 
monopoly  under  state  control,  and  increase  the  productivity  of  the  forest  by 
putting  it  under  active  management.  However,  the  legislation  was  negatively 
received by the general population as it also curtailed the customary rights of 
access  and  use  of  forests  by  ordinary  people  (Belbase  and  Regmi  2002,  1; 
Arnold and Campbell 1986, 430; Wallace 1983, 224). The newly enacted forest 
law did not provide any assurance or compensation to those who were deprived 
of land ownership or customary access, which created insecurity among rural 
people. The response towards the Private Forest (Nationalisation) Act differed 
among socio-economic groups.  
 
According  to  (Malla  2001,  292-293)  the  peasant  farmers  welcomed  the 
government decision to nationalize private forests in general because they felt 
that they no longer had to seek permission from local elites and functionaries to 
access and use forest products (although the Act did not necessarily guarantee 
free access). Moreover, the peasant farmers would not have the obligation to 
provide gifts and free labour to local functionaries in return for permission to 
access the forest. Newly disenfranchised elites encouraged peasant farmers to cut 
more trees in the hope that the government might reverse its policy of private 
forest nationalization. Bromley and Chapagain (1984) attribute accelerated forest 
degradation, especially in the hills, to the 1957 Private Forest Nationalization 
Act (Bromley and Chapagain 1984). After private forest nationalization, people 
lost their sense of ownership of the forest, and increased their harvesting of trees 
on their private property as well as in nearby state forest in an effort to secure 110 
 
land tenure rights (Belbase and Regmi 2002, 6; Regmi 1978; Bajracharya 1983b; 
Palit 1996, 21).  
 
Before 1957, the forest was not classified under any land tenure policy of the 
government. At that time only two kinds of land tenure existed: raiker (state 
landlordism) and kipat (communal ownership). In 1968 kipat and raiker land 
tenure  was  abolished  and  replaced  by  three  kinds  of  land  tenure:  private 
holdings, institutional holdings and state holdings (Wallace 1981, 121). As there 
was no cadastral survey defining clear boundaries between national and private 
forests, people quickly cleared the forest in the hope that the land without trees 
could  be  registered  as  private  property  (Regmi  1978;  Bajracharya  1983b; 
Wallace  1987;  Palit  1996,  21).  Moreover,  the  newly  enacted  Private  Forest 
Nationalization Act could not differentiate between those people who had been 
conserving forest on their private land for decades and those who had originally 
acquired vast areas of valuable productive forest from the state as birta tenure. 
Given the remote and isolated geography of the hills and mountains, the existing 
poor forestry infrastructure, limited human and financial resources and the weak 
capacity of the government to effectively implement the act, as well as the absence 
of an effective monitoring and enforcement system, the government was not able 
to cope with the strict and challenging forest administration provisions set by the 
Private Forest (Nationalisation) Act 1957 (Hobley and Malla 1996). The 1957 
Private  Forest  (Nationalisation)  Act  undermined  the  traditional  forest 
management system without replacing it with an effective alternative, and forests 
were soon regarded as an open-access resource (Hobley and Malla 1996; Arnold 
and Campbell 1986).   
 
In addition to the nationalization of forests, government resettlement policy also 
contributed  to  deforestation  in  the  Terai  region  of  Nepal.  The  government 
viewed the Terai as a region for potential development to relieve overpopulation 
in  the  Middle  Hills.  Vast  areas  of  Terai  forest  were  cleared  for  settlement 
purposes and to increase the area of farmland (Kolmair and Muller-Boker 2002, 
75).  The  government  initiated  the  planned  resettlement  programme  by 
establishing Nepal Punarvas Company (Nepal Resettlement Company) in 1964, 
and since then a series of resettlement projects were implemented (Ojha 1983, 111 
 
29-30). Between 1955 and 1988 the government distributed 116,648 ha of forest 
land to 100,658 families for farming, and it is believed that an equal amount of 
forest  area  was  encroached  (Joshi  1993).  The  Nepal  Malaria  Eradication 
Organization  was  established  in  1958  to  control  malaria  infestation  in  the 
densely forested region of the Terai, and by the 1960s the incidence of malaria 
was largely controlled (Ojha 1983, 28). After the eradication of malaria in the 
Terai region, large numbers of people from the Middle Hills migrated to this 
area,  with  serious  impact  on  the  Terai  forest  as  the  settlement  process  was 
haphazard  and  uncontrolled  (FAO  2000,  6).  The  1977  Land  Tax  Act  also 
encouraged forest clearing (Pardo 1993). Even after the establishment of forest 
offices in the country, due to the lack of cadastral surveys, and reliable statistics 
on the forest itself, government could not distinguish public forest from private 
landholdings,  which  caused  frequent  disputes  between  local  people  and  the 
forest department.  
 
It is clear that by the 1950s there was already severe pressure on the forests, 
mainly from expanding agriculture and grazing due to the rising population. In 
1954, a field trip carried out by an FAO forestry expert to the Mahabharat range 
reported that people complained about the gradual disappearance of the forest 
and the shortage of basic forest products (Robbe 1954, 24). Robbe (1954, 3) 
found that forests in the mountains were facing severe degradation from over-
felling, over-grazing, lopping and annual burning.  
 
4.2.5.  Forest  Policy  and  Governance  during  the  Panchayat  Regime  (1961  to 
1990) 
 
After the end of the Rana regime, and a short period of multi-party democracy, 
King Mahendra dismissed the government and replaced it with the "partyless" 
Panchayat system
46 (Rose 1963, 16). The 1957 Private Forest (Nationalization) 
Act was supplanted by the 1961 Forest Act, which remained  the legislative 
framework  for  forest  management  until  1990.  Gradually,  the  government 
established District Forest Offices in all 74 districts, a process completed only in 
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1983 (CPFD 1995, 1). The 1961 Forest Act further cemented the government‘s 
control over forest, curtailing even the use rights of local communities (Ribot, 
Agrawal,  and  Larson  2006,  1871;  Graner  1997,  42).  This  act  provided  the 
government‘s forest department with absolute authority and control over forests 
(policing, licensing, controlling and administrative authority), overlooking local 
people‘s  right  of  access  to  forest  resources,  and  undermining  the  indigenous 
system of forest management (Regmi 1978; Gilmour and Fisher 1991). Since 
then the government expanded its role and established forest based industries in 
the Terai region by harvesting and marketing timber to India to generate revenue 
for  its  development  activities.  The  Act  imposed  strict  penalties  if  anybody 
entered  the  forest  to  collect  any  forest  products.  Under  the  1961  Forest  Act 
collection of the following products from state forest was prohibited  (Graner 
1997, 42-43): 
i.  timber, charcoal, gum, wood-oil, bark; 
ii.  Trees,  leaves,  fruits,  flowers,  mahuwa  (Bassia  longifolia),  chiraito 
(Swertia chiretta) and other categories of wild herbs, medicinal and 
other plants, as well as their parts; and 
iii.  Mines, rocks, clay, and all categories of minerals. 
 
Strict penalties consisting of fines and imprisonment of up to one year depending 
on the nature of crime were provided (Graner 1997, 42-43). The same act also 
made  provision  to  hand  over  government  forests  to  local  communities  as 
community  forests  through  local  Panchayats.  However,  without  proper 
operational  guidelines  for  implementation,  that  principle  was  not  effectively 
translated into practice. Chapter 3, clause 25, under the ―power to separate state 
forests‖, stated that government may separate state forest or parts thereof in any 
prescribed area for public use (translated in Regmi NMS (13/89: 12/13, cited in 
Graner,  1997).  Further,  chapter  5,  clause  29,  under  the  heading  ―Delivering 
Power of the State‖, stated ―any government forest or any part thereof may be 
handed  over  to  the  Panchayat.  Ownership  of  the  forest  handed  over  to 
Panchayat  remained  with  government  (29/2)  and  rights  conceded  could  be 
cancelled (29/3). Although these provisions were not  implemented, it can be 
argued that the 1961 Forest Act did recognize the community‘s potential role in 
forest management.  113 
 
 
In  1967,  the  government  promulgated  the  “Forest  Protection  (Special 
Arrangements) Act”, which further consolidated its control over the forests by 
criminalizing even the slightest transgression of state forest regulations. This act 
has provided special authority to the District Forest Officer (DFO) including the 
power of arresting forest offenders without warrant, filing cases against forest 
offenders, and also adjudicating against a case filed by department of forestry 
staff in a“One-person Special Court” (Kanel 2006, 4; IUCN 2000, 60). This act 
provided unlimited power to forestry officials, which was largely misused and 
increased corruption (Wagley and Ojha 2002, 10). In the same act under the 
―Removal‖  clause,  ―the  act  of  bringing  or  attempting  to  bring  any  product 
outside the forest boundaries‖ exceeding the value of NRs. 50/- was prohibited 
and it was forbidden ―to cut off, fell or enclose any tree or plant within forests, 
extract the bark in such a manner as to cause trees to wither, chop branches, or 
set forest on fire‖. Those who committed such acts would be penalized to the 
value of the damage plus an additional 10-40% of the damage or a maximum 
fine of NRs. 2000, and/or imprisonment of one year. The Act even authorized 
forest security personnel to shoot any person who entered the national forest 
illegally.  The  1957  Private  Forest  (Nationalisation)  Act  and  1967  Forest 
Protection (Special Arrangements) Act 1967 were guided by the philosophy that 
government is the sole agent responsible and capable of conserving the forests, 
and forest conservation is possible only through enactment and enforcement of 
state regulations preventing public access and use (Bromley and Cernea 1989, 
8). The 1974 Range Land Nationalization Act nationalized all pasture land. This 
Act  curtailed  the  customary  rights  of  the  people  to  use  communal  land  for 
grazing livestock, and had serious negative impacts on people in the mountains 
of  Nepal  whose  livelihoods  were  based  on  income  from  livestock  rearing 
(Bhattarai and Khanal 2005, 20-21; Upreti and Adhikari 2006, 24).  
 
In May 1979, a major political movement was launched against the Panchayat 
system  that  forced  King  Birendra  to  call  for  a  nationwide  referendum  to 
determine the future form of government. In the referendum which was held on 
May 2, 1980, an improved version of the Panchayat system was chosen. During 
this  period  it  is  estimated  that  about  4%  of  the  forest  land  was  cleared. 114 
 
Apparently the government turned a blind eye to the illegal cutting as forest 
resources were mobilized to gain financial support required for the election, and 
also as a means to gain public support in the referendum (ICIMOD 1995). 
 
4. 2.5.1. Emergence of New Modes of Governance in the Forest Sector 
 
Before colonization, natural resources in the Asian region were either under the 
effective control of local communities or were available to them as open access. 
During that time local people were managing and harvesting the common-pool 
resources (CPRs) under established customary rules and practices (Persoon and 
van  Est  2003,  1-2).  However,  since  colonization,  authority  over  most 
commercially  important  natural  resources  was  appropriated  by  colonial 
governments. After independence, national governments in most cases did not 
change  natural  resource  management  policy  in  favour  of  the  people  (Korten 
1987, 275; Persoon and van Est, 2003, 2; Webb 2008, 25). Since then there has 
been a rapid rise in deforestation, mainly because of the demand of timber in the 
expanding global market and the inability of central governments to control the 
vast area of forest land theoretically under central government control (Berkes 
1994, 19; Persoon and van Est 2003, 3). After the failure of these centralized 
resource  management  regimes,  governments  in  many  developing  countries 
began a paradigm shift to natural resource management from a top-down to a 
bottom-up  approach,  acknowledging  the  role  of  local  communities  in  local 
resource  management.  This  paradigm  shift  has  brought  about  changes  in  the 
policy  framework  and  legislation  in  favour  of  devolution  of  power  from 
government bureaucracy to the local level (Arnold 1992; Hobley 1996, 2).  
 
By  the  late  20
th  Century  international  attention  was  drawn  to  the  loss  of 
biodiversity and the impact of environmental degradation worldwide (Goodland, 
Ledec, and Webb 1989, 148). During the 1970s, Nepal faced severe and wide-
spread deforestation in the mountains as a consequence of growing population 
pressure and inappropriate forest policy that threatened the livelihoods of the 
people  (AusAID  2006).  The  publication  of  Erik  Eckholm‘s  1975  article 
―Deterioration  of  Mountain  Environments‖  amongst  others,  stimulated 115 
 
heightened  interest  among  environmentalists,  policy  planners,  and  academics 
concerning the rapid deterioration of the Himalayan environment:  
 
…there  is  no  better  place  to  begin  an  examination  of  deteriorating  mountain 
environments  than  Nepal.  Villagers  must  roam  farther  and  farther  from  their 
homes to gather fodder and firewood. Ground-holding trees are disappearing fast 
among  the  geologically  young,  jagged  foothills  of  the  Himalayas.  Topsoil 
washing down into India and Bangladesh is now Nepal's most precious export, 
but one for which it receives no compensation (Eckholm 1975, 764-65). 
 
The debate on the theory of ―Himalayan Environmental Degradation‖ became 
intense  among  scholars,  attracting  serious  attention  in  the  international 
community  and  among  policy  makers
47.  The  degradation  of  the  mountain 
environment  and  loss  of  livelihoods  in  the  Nepalese  Himalaya  and  the 
downstream  effects  of  flooding  and  erosion  in  the  lower  Gangetic  plain, 
especially  in  India  and  Bangladesh,  created  a  sense  of  urgency  among 
international donors and national governments. Since then many conservation 
projects have been launched in Nepal
48. In 1978, the World Bank conducted a 
forestry  sector  review  of  Nepal,  and  recommended  a  massive  reforestati on 
program in the hills of Nepal, to respond to the severe shortage of fuel -wood 
(Kanel 1998). 
 
Since the mid-1980s however, the theory of Himalayan degradation has come 
under scrutiny, and various empirical studies have challenged the notion that 
                                                 
47 It is argued that the deterioration of the fragile ecosystem of the Nepalese Himalayas is compounded by 
high  population  growth  that  forces farmers to  clear  forest  and cultivate in  marginal  lands to  fulfil  the 
demand for food in a vicious circle, which further degrades the mountain ecosystem and the productivity of 
agricultural  land  (Eckholm  1976;  Eckholm  1975).  However,  various  studies  criticize  the  theory  of 
Himalayan environmental degradation on the grounds that the theoretical construct is overly simplistic, and 
insufficiently grounded in empirical data (Ives 1987, : 189) Griffin, Shepherd and Mahat, 1988, 43; Fox 
1993, 98; (Bajracharya 1983a, 1057). (Ives and Messerli 1989) conclude that the fundamental problem in 
the Himalayas is not environmental, but socio-economic and especially political (Thompson and Warburton 
1985; Fox 1993; Mahat, Griffin, and Shepherd 1986b, 1986a; Griffin, Shepherd, and Mahat 1988). 
 
48Conservation projects were launched in the Nepalese Himalayas including the USAID funded Resource 
Conservation and Utilization Project (1980-1985); AusAID funded Nepal- Australia Forestry Project (1978- 
1983) in  Kavrepalanchok  and Sindhupalchok districts, Asian Development Bank (ADB) loan funded 
Sagarnath  Forestry  Development  Project  (1979 -1985);    the  USAID  funded  Rapti-Integrated  Rural 
Development Project (1980-1985); the World Bank funded Community Forestry Development and Training 
Project (1980-1985); the Finnish assisted Forestry Sector Project initiated in 1983; FAO funded Kulekhani 
Integrated Watershed Management Project launched in 1987; Tinau Watershed Management Project (1980-
1985); Integrated Hill Development Projects (1975 -1980) launched in Dolakha district under the Swiss 
Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC);followed in 1991 by the Dolakha Ramechhap Community 
Forestry Project (DFCFP). The UK Department for International Development (DFID) assisted four Koshi 
Hill Rural Development Projects (1979-1984) and launched a Livelihood Forestry project in 2001 (Wallace 
1981, : 148; AusAID 2006; Tiwari 2002; Negi 1994; ADB 1987; Arnold and Campbell 1986, : 440). 
Moreover,  the  Nepalese  government  established  the  Department  of  Soil  Conservation  and  Watershed 
Management in 1974 to conserve the watershed area and control soil erosion, landslides and flooding. 116 
 
subsistence  farmers  in  the  hills  were  the  root  cause  of  the  problem  of 
deforestation. Rather it  has  been  argued that they  are an integral  part  of the 
solution
49. These studies point to the close linkages between farms and forests in 
the hills, where farmers, from time immemorial, practiced well managed terrace 
systems that are less prone to erosion (Carson 1985). They found that farmers in 
the hills are maintaining a substantial number of trees on their private land. Thus, 
farmers‘  ignorance  and  mismanagement  could  not  be  the  sole  or  even  the 
primary cause of deforestation. Rather, the real cause of deforestation had been 
the  misconceived  land  policy,  tenure  arrangements  and  forest  policy  of  the 
government (Kolmair and Muller-Boker 2002, 77). Studies conducted by several 
scholars (Carter and Gilmour 1989; Virgo and Subba 1994; Gilmour and Nurse 
1991) on the Middle Hill region of Nepal indicate that during the period 1964-
1989  there  was  a  significant  increase  in  the  number  of  trees  per  hectare  on 
private land.  
 
The forestry sector in Nepal has faced serious management problems since the 
enactment of the Private Forest (Nationalization) Act 1957 and Forest Act 1961. 
Both  Acts  conferred  absolute  authority  over  forest  management  and 
administration on the forest department, where administrative inefficiency and 
lack of technical and financial resources made it impossible to implement forest 
policy.  Moreover,  forest  resources  were  in  decline  and  there  was  increasing 
conflict between the forest department and people. In this context, in 1974, the 
Department  of  Forest  organized  the  Ninth  National  Forestry  Conference  in 
Kathmandu, in which forestry professionals from various districts participated, 
and  which  for  the  first  time  arrived  at  a  resolution  in  favor  of  community 
participation  in  forest  management,  recommending  that  the  government 
formulate a policy to this effect. In 1978, the Food and Agricultural Organization 
of the United Nations (FAO) organized the Eighth World Forestry Congress, 
with  the  theme  ―Forests  for  People,‖  and  also  promoted  the  concept  of 
community involvement in forest management. This was further promoted by 
the  publication  of  a  document  by  FAO  ―Forestry  for  Local  Community 
Development‖ (1978), considered a milestone in the promotion of community 
                                                 
49 For detail see, Ives and Messerli (1989); Thompson and Warburton (1985); Griffin et al. (1988), Mahat et 
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forestry. Later, FAO and the Swedish International Development Administration 
(SIDA)  were  actively  involved  in  promoting  community  forestry  programs 
around the world (Arnold 1992; Hobley 1996, 6; WINROCK 2002, 5).  
 
An interesting experiment had been taking place since 1966 with the assistance 
of the Australian government to reforest the denuded hill slopes in two districts 
of the Middle hills region of Nepal. This partnership between the Nepalese and 
Australian governments had a very significant impact in the forestry sector of 
Nepal, especially in the inception and strengthening of the community forestry 
programme (AusAID 2006, 5-7).
50 With the realization of the adverse impacts of 
the Private Forest (Nationalization) Act, the government of Nepal introduced a 
series of policy interventions from 1975 onwards, to address the deforestation 
problem  (Springate-Baginski  et  al.  2003,  11) .  In  response  to  the 
recommendations of the Ninth Forestry Conference, the government formulated 
a  ―National  Forestry  Plan”
51  in  1976,  which  for  the  first  time  fully 
acknowledged the role of local communities and the importance of their active 
participation in forest management. The Plan provided a policy framework for 
participatory forest management programmes in the Hills of Nepal (Bajracharya 
1993). After two decades of forest nationalization, this policy shift opened an 
                                                 
50 Australian support to the forestry sector of Nepal began in 1966 by sending the first technical adviser, AD 
(Tony)  Cole.  During  first  phase  the  Australian  assistance  was  concentrated  mostly  on  advisory  roles, 
establishment and improvement of nursery practices, plantation, and special trials. In January 1976 the 
project was  formally renamed  “Nepal-Australia Forestry Project”. During its second phase (1978-86), 
managed by the Australian National University‘s Forestry faculty, the project worked with the government 
to introduce public participation in plantation establishment and forest management. The Nepal-Australia 
Forestry Project‘s third phase (1986-1991) promoted the concept of community forest user groups (CFUG) 
in  the  management  of  local  forests.  Its  fourth  phase  (1991-1997)  focused  more  on  developing 
methodologies for sustainable forest management for subsistence and market use, capacity development of 
the forest users through training and fostering income generation through CFUGs (Karki and Eijnatten, 
1997).  The  fifth  phase  of  what  was  by  then  known  as  the  Nepal-Australia  Community  Resource 
Management Project (NACRMP), from 1997 to 2002, focussed on promoting sustainability of Forest User 
Groups (FUGs) by providing post-formation support to CFUGs and developing methodologies that enabled 
the application of participatory  resource management and watershed management principles to a wider 
range of ecological and social situations. The sixth phase, launched in 1 February 2003, ended in June 2006. 
Its main objectives were reducing poverty by developing and institutionalizing equitable and sustainable 
community  based  natural  resource  management  systems,  building  capacity  of  local  communities  in 
community resource  management and improving livelihoods. During the four decades long partnership 
(1966-2006),  the  Nepal  Australia  Community  Forest  Project  established  21,000  ha  of  plantations,  and 
42,500 ha of natural forests have been handed over to 800 community forestry user groups (CFUGs) (Karki 
and Eijnatten 1997; AusAID 2006). 
51 The National Forest Plan, 1976, aimed to maintain ecological balance through the management of forests; 
reduce incidence of floods, landsl ide and erosion; meet local needs for timber, fuel wood and fodder; 
protect and conserve wildlife; expand and establish National Parks and Wildlife reserves; mobilize forest 
resources for sustained economic growth, promote forest based industries and export of value-added forest 
products, promote reforestation, and adopt scientific forest management. It also aimed to expand the scope 
of forest administration,  launch forestry extension, involve the public in forest management; conduct 
surveys, inventory and research; develop human resources, generate employment opportunity and promote 
overall socio-economic development. 118 
 
avenue  of  partnership  between  the  state  and  local  community  in  forest 
management. The amendments to the 1961 Forest Act and the promulgation of 
the Panchayat Forest (PF) Rules and Panchayat Protected Forest (PPF) Rules in 
1978,  the  legal  basis  for  handing  over  government  controlled  forests  for 
management  and  use  through  local  village  Panchayats,  are  considered  the 
foundation  for  the  emergence  of  the  community  forestry  program  in  Nepal 
(Gautam  and  Shivakoti  2008).  Subsequently,  government  enacted  the  1982 
Decentralization Act and the 1984 Decentralization Regulation that strengthened 
the provisions made in the PF and PPF regulations to hand over the forest to 
local institutions. According to the provisions of the PF and PPF, lands without 
trees and those that are completely degraded could be handed over to Panchayats 
(the lowest  administrative and political  unit during the Panchayat  regime) as 
―Panchayat Forest,‖ and those communal lands with trees could be handed over 
as “Panchayat Protected Forest”. After hand-over, villagers had to reforest and 
conserve these forests. These rules provided responsibility to Village Panchayats 
to protect, conserve, manage and use forest products based on operational plans 
approved by the government (Manandhar 1980; Gautam and Shivakoti 2008). 
Although  the  Panchayat  Forest  Rules  of  1978  provided  the  legal  basis  for 
devolution  of  authority  over  government  controlled  forest  to  local  village 
Panchayats,  these  rules  still  did  not  take  into  account  the  effectiveness  of 
traditional resource management systems of the local communities. Critics argue 
that these rules could not be seen as a genuine ―shift from administrative-centred 
to people-centred forestry‖, as they put more emphasis on the control of forest 
through local political institutions based on administrative boundaries rather than 
peoples‘ indigenous institutions and traditional boundaries of forest management 
(Graner 1997, 47). The PF and PPF regulations provided the authority of forest 
management  to  a  state  established  political  institution,  namely  the  local 
Panchayats
52,  rather  than  to  local  users.  These  rules  take  into  account  the 
political  boundary  while  handing  over  the  forest,  ignoring  the   natural  and 
traditional/social use boundaries for forest management  (Kanel, Poudyal, and 
Baral  2005;  IUCN  2000) .  Among  other  consequences,  these  regulations 
excluded many traditional users who happened to reside outside the Panchayat  
                                                 
52 The Panchayat in this context should be understood as a formal lower level political institution under the 
Panchayat regime rather than an informal traditional Panchayat that was functional in earlier times. 119 
 
boundary,  leading  in  many  cases  to  non-functional  committees  and 
disenfranchised users (Hobley and Shah 1996). As the forest was handed over to 
Panchayats rather than to real users, people felt that they did not have a stake in 
forest management (CFDD 1991, 17; Kanel, Poudyal, and Baral 2005, 70). The 
PF and PPF rules also failed to devise a clear procedure for how the authority of 
forest  protection,  management  and  utilization  would  be  transferred  to  the 
community. According to PPF rules, out of total income generated from these 
forests 75% and 25% of the income has to be divided between the Panchayat and 
government  respectively.  The  income  first  had  to  be  deposited  in  the 
government‘s treasury and in the next year the amount would be handed over to 
the Panchayat account. People felt that there was no guarantee that the funds 
deposited  by  them  in  the  government  treasury  would  reach  the  Panchayat 
account.  Such  policies  created  mistrust  among  the  people  that  severely 
undermined the forest handover process (Kayastha and Karmacharya 1987, 6). 
The newly enacted PF  rules  stipulated that only  degraded land without trees 
could be handed over to local Panchayats. Furthermore, there were no initial 
benefits and incentives to encourage long term management. Despite the policy 
shift,  apparently  the  bureaucracy  was  still  not  fully  convinced  that  local 
institutions  could  be  trusted  with  sustainable  management  of  the  forest.  The 
forest bureaucracy did not want to lose its hold over the forest by delivering its 
power to local communities. 
 
4. 2.5.2. Master Plan for the Forestry Sector (MPFS), 1989 
 
Despite the government‘s efforts to protect the forest through revised legislation, 
there was continuing decline in the status of the forest. The situation in the Hills 
and Mountains was so alarming that there was pressure on the government to 
address this issue urgently. The Master Plan for the Forestry Sector (MPFS), 
prepared with the support of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and Finnish 
International Development Agency (FINNIDA), was officially approved by the 
government  in  1989  (Graner  1997,  47).  This  comprehensive  visionary  forest 
policy and planning document, prepared for 21 years (1989-2010), was the first 
of its kind. The long-term objectives of the MPFS  were to meet the people's 
basic needs for forest products on a sustained basis; conserve ecosystems and 120 
 
genetic  resources;  protect  land  against  degradation  and  other  effects  of 
ecological imbalance, increase food production through effective co-ordination 
in forestry and agriculture farming systems, create opportunities for employment 
and income generation through forest management and development of forest-
based industries, and contribute to local and national economic growth.  
 
The MPFS emphasized that all the accessible hill forests of Nepal should be 
handed over to user groups (not to the Panchayats) ―to the extent that they are 
able and willing to manage them‖ (CFDD 1991, 14). It encouraged involvement 
of women and the poor in the management of CF and reorientation of forestry 
staff  as  extension  agents,  service  providers  and  advisors  rather  than 
administrators and controllers. It is reiterated that the central policy aim of the 
plan  is  ―…  to  develop  and  manage  forest  resources  through  the  active 
participation of individuals and communities to meet their basic needs‖ (CFDD 
1991, 14).  To achieve this aim, the MPFS laid out plans, policies and resource 
needs for implementation of the programmes. It was envisaged that all accessible 
hill forests would be handed over to local communities by the year 2010 (DOF 
and  FAO  1997).  MPFS  provided  the  basis  for  people‘s  participation  in 
management, and for reforming the organisational structure of forestry in order 
to achieve organisational goals. The MPFS identified six major forestry sector 
programmes, out of which the community and private forestry programme was 
prioritized. The community and private forestry programme is the largest and has 
received 47% of the total budget allocated (Hobley and Malla 1996, 79; CFDD 
1991, 14). The six major forestry sector programmes recognized by MPFS are: 
i.  Community and Private Forestry 
ii.  National and Leasehold Forestry 
iii.  Conservation of Ecosystems and Genetic Resources 
iv.  Soil Conservation and Watershed Management 
v.  Wood Based Industries 
vi.  Medicinal and Aromatic Plants and Other Minor Forest Products 
 
To  achieve  the  objectives  set  by  MPFS,  several  supportive  programs  were 
identified: i.e. policy and legal reforms, institutional reforms, human resource 
development, research and extension, forest resources information systems and 121 
 
management  planning,  and  monitoring  and  evaluation  (CPFD  1995,  6).  The 
MPFS endorsed the concept of community forest user groups (CFUGs) and also 
identified the need for further amendment to the existing forest regulations.  
 
The  MPFS  also  recognized  the  role  of  women  in  forest  management  and 
emphasized the need for training and reorientation of the entire forestry staff 
under the Ministry of Forest and Soil Conservation for their new role as advisers 
and extensionists (Hobley and Malla 1996, 79). The MPFS 1989 is considered to 
be a landmark and turning point in the history of forest management in Nepal, 
marking the beginning  of the ‗populist‘ phase  of forestry  policy. The  MPFS 
placed significant emphasis on the user group concept and recognized local users 
as  the  custodians  of  local  resource  management  (Wagley  and  Ojha  2002; 
Gautam and Shivakoti 2008; Kanel, Poudyal, and Baral 2005, 71-72). The user 
group  approach  enabled  the  incorporation  of  traditional  forest  users  beyond 
Panchayat political boundaries, which was restricted by the previous PF and PPF 
rules.  Unfortunately,  for  political  and  bureaucratic  reasons,  the  community 
forestry program in Nepal could not gain momentum and the handover process 
was  very  slow.  Only  with  the  enactment  of  the  1993  Forest  Act,  was  the 
community forest handover process accelerated (Figure 4.1).   
 
Figure 4.1: Community Forest Handover (1986/87 to 2006/07)  
 
Source:  Community Forestry Division, Department of Forest, 2008
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53 Data received from Forest Officer, Mr. Bala Ram Kandel, Community Forestry Division, Department of 
Forest, Kathmandu, Nepal, 11/27/08 122 
 
As the forest handover process was too slow under the Panchayat system, in 
January  30,  1990  the  Department  of  Forest  (DoF)  prepared  ―Operational 
Guidelines for the Community Forestry Programme‖ in order to expedite the 
handover process. The objectives stipulated in the guidelines (MoFSC 1990, 6) 
were:   
  to hand over the state forest area to communities which had traditionally 
used them; to meet daily requirements for fuel, fodder, leaf litter and 
timber; 
  to establish forest plantations by active participation of communities; 
  to encourage private plantation by the distribution of free seedlings; and 
  to encourage the installation of fuel efficient cooking stoves. 
 
The main reasons behind the slow progress of forest handover were firstly, that 
official procedures were complicated and lengthy; and secondly, the user group 
based  approach  of  MPFS  could  not  bypass  the  village  Panchayats  until  the 
system was terminated in 1990 (Fisher et al. 1990).  
 
4. 2.6. Community Forestry Policy and Governance: After the Restoration of 
Multi-party Democracy  
 
In  1990,  the  thirty  year  Panchayat  regime  was  overthrown  by  the  people‘s 
movement  and  multiparty  democracy  was  restored  (Hachhethu  1994,  91). 
Subsequently  the  democratically  elected  government  promulgated  the  1993 
Forest Act and the 1995 Forest Regulations and repealed the 1961 Forest Act. 
The 1993 Forest Act devolved substantial authority of forest governance to local 
communities. According to the 1993 Act, Nepal‘s forests are now classified into 
six sub categories (CPFD 1995, 6) with designated governance responsibilities 
(see Table 4.5).  
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Table 4.5:  Types of Forest, Objective and their Management Responsibilities  
Type of forest  Management objective  Governance 
responsibility 
Government 
managed  
forest 
National Forest to be managed by state for timber and 
other forest products. 
Department  of 
Forest 
Leasehold  
forest 
Any part of the National Forest granted to a corporate 
body,  industry  or  community  under  a  leasehold  to 
produce raw materials required for industries, promote 
tourism,  scientific  management  of  insects,  butterflies 
and  wildlife  through  NGOs  and  industry,  and  also  to 
promote  agro-forestry  to  reduce  poverty  by  allocating 
leasehold  forest  to  poor  families,  to  enable  them  to 
increase incomes from forest products and livestock and 
improve livelihoods. 
NGOs,  industry 
and    community 
groups 
Religious 
 forest 
National forest handed over to any religious body, group 
or community desirous to develop, conserve and utilize 
the  National  Forest  of  any  religious  place  or  its 
surroundings. 
Any  religious 
body,  group  or 
community  
Community 
forest 
National forest handed over to a community to develop, 
conserve,  use  and  manage,  permitting  it  to  sell  and 
distribute the forest products according to Operational 
Plan (OP). 
Community  Forest 
User  Groups 
(CFUGs) 
Protected  
forest 
National Forest protected for its special importance in 
terms  of  environmental  (biodiversity),  scientific  or 
cultural importance. 
Department  of 
Forest 
Private forest  Privately owned forest where the individual owner has 
rights  to  develop,  conserve,  manage  and  utilize  for 
private purposes. 
Individual, 
industry, NGOs 
Source: (MoFSC 1995)  
 
The 1993 Forest Act embraced the user group approach, and adopted the policy 
framework of the MPFS, a progressive policy approach decentralizing authority 
over forest management from the state to local communities (Belbase and Regmi 
2002).  The  1993  Forest  Act,  the  1995  Forest  Regulations  and  subsequent 
operational guidelines assured local community access to forest resources.  
 
The 1993 Forest Act defines community forests as ―national forests handed over 
to the forest user groups (CFUGs)
54 for protection, management and utilization‖. 
Since the devolution of power from government to the local community, the role 
of CFUGs in sustainable forest management and good forest governance has 
been  considered  important  in  addressing  the  issues  of  gender,  equity,  social 
inclusion  and  poverty  alleviation  in  the  rural  context  (Dahal  and  Chapagain 
                                                 
54 ‗Community Forest User Groups‘ refers to ―those individuals or communities who are dependent on a 
certain  forest  area  to  meet  their  day-to-day  requirements  for  forest  products,  and  those  who  would  be 
directly affected if they did not have access to the forest products of such forest areas, and are naturally 
prepared to participate in protection, management and utilization of such forest area‖ (CPFD 1995, : 9).. 
There is general consensus on the broad definition of community forests emphasizing the management of 
forest by people for communal and household benefit (FAO 1987, : 1; Shepherd 1985, : 317).  124 
 
2008, 67). This represents a clear shift in government policy towards recognizing 
the indigenous system of forest management and rights of people to manage the 
forest rather than considering the forest management a state monopoly (Bhattarai 
and Khanal 2005, 45). Since the enactment of community-based forest policy, 
many  international  donors  like  the  World  Bank,  United  States  Agency  for 
International Assistance (USAID) and Overseas Development Agency (ODA) 
have provided financial and technical assistance to the Nepalese government for 
the implementation of community forestry projects throughout the Middle Hills 
region (Kanel 1998; Gautam and Shivakoti 2008).  
 
The Department of Forest assessment of the forests of Nepal shows that out of 
5,500,000 hectares of total forest area in the country, 3,561,649 hectares (which 
is  64.76%  of  the  total  forest  area)  could  potentially  be  handed  over  to 
communities  as  community  forest.  In  Kavrepalanchok  district  alone  50,469 
hectares of forest has potential to be handed over as community forest (CPFD 
1995, 85-87). 
 
Table 4.6: Potential Community Forest Area, Nepal 
Region  Potential Community Forest (ha) 
Forest Area  Open Area  Total 
Eastern Region  417,983   259,861   677,844  
Central Region  335,934   248,098   584,032  
Western Region  446,977   458,552   905,529  
Mid-western Region  403,311   468,455   871,766  
Far-western Region  320,021   202,456   522,477  
Total(Nepal)  1,924,226   1,637,422   3,561,648  
Source: (CPFD 1995, 85-87)    
 
4.2.6.1.  Legal  Instruments  Guiding  Community  Forestry  Governance 
Mechanisms 
 
As most of the forests in the hills of Nepal were fragmented in small patches, the 
management of forest by communities themselves proved the most viable option 
for the sustainable management of the forests. Community forest user groups 125 
 
(CFUGs) are formed based on the traditional use rights
55 of local communities 
following  preparation  of  an  Operational  Plan  (OP)  through  a  participatory 
process. Before finalising the OP, consultations across community social groups 
including women‘s groups, socio-economically disadvantaged and ethnic groups 
are  required.  The  aim  of  such  consultations  is  to  identify  the  interests  and 
expectations of various social groups and to build consensus among users for 
better  forest  management.  The  salient  features  of  CF  according  to  the  1993 
Forest  Act  and  the  1995  Forest  Regulations  are  summarized  below  (MoFSC 
1995): 
 
  The Forest Act, 1993, Section 25 (1) states that the District Forest Officer 
may handover any part of a National Forest to a Users' Group in the form 
of a Community Forest as prescribed, entitling them to develop, conserve, 
use  and  manage  the  forest  and  sell  and  distribute  the  forest  products 
independently  by  fixing  their  prices  according  to  an  Operational  Plan 
(OP)
56. However, the ownership of forest remains in the hands of the 
government. (Section 13 (64);  
  While handing over a Community Forest, the District Forest Officer shall 
issue a certificate of alienation of the Community Forest to the CFUG. 
(Section 25 (1); 
  Section  43  (1)  of  the  1993  Forest  Act  recognizes  a  CFUG  as  an 
autonomous  and  corporate  body  having  perpetual  succession  that  can 
acquire, possess, transfer or otherwise manage moveable and immovable 
property, and has the right to manage and use forest resources, but the 
ownership of the land itself lies with the government; 
  The handing over of national forests to communities as community forest 
will have priority over leasehold forests (Section 30 of the 1993 Forest 
Act); 
  Forest  Regulation  (2)  provided  that  CFUGs  can  plant  short-term  cash 
crops including non-timber forest products inside the community forest, 
                                                 
55 ‗Traditional user‘ refers to those individuals or communities who are dependent on a certain forest area to 
meet their day-to day requirements for forest products, and who would be directly affected if they did not 
have access to the forest products of such forest area. 
56The Operational Plan (OP) is a routine legal document prepared by user groups and approved by the 
District Forest Office for the management of a particular forest area under their jurisdict ion. The OP 
outlines activities to be carried out for the protection, management and utilisation of a given forest, and how 
and when such activities are to be undertaken. 126 
 
with the exception of cereal crops, without adversely affecting the crown 
cover, and such activities have to be included in the operational plan; 
  CFUGs  are  entitled  to  maintain  their  funds  from  grants  received  by 
government and other local institutions, from the sale of CF products and 
money received from other sources such as fines ( Rule 36); 
  CFUGs can spend funds on any kind of community development work 
and can amend their operational plans by informing the DFO ( Rule 28 
(2); 
  In  cases  of  forest  offences,  CFUGs  have  authority  to  punish  their 
members according to their constitution and operational plan ( Section 28 
of the 1993 Forest Act); 
  In cases of deviation from the approved operational plan and failure to 
manage the forest properly, resulting in damage to the forests, then the 
DFO  can  cancel  the  registration  of  the  CFUG  and  withdraw  the 
community  forests from the CFUGs.  However, the CFUGs  may file  a 
complaint against the decision to the Regional Forest Director, and the 
DFO  must  give  the  forest  back  to  the  CFUG  once  the  committee  is 
reconstituted (Sections 27 and 28 of the 1993 Forest Act).  
 
Community forestry governance in Nepal involves a co-management approach 
between the state forest department and local forest user groups. Although local 
CFUGs have received considerable authority over forest governance at the local 
level,  the  state  forest  department  has  responsibility  for  monitoring  and 
overseeing the governance activities undertaken by the CFUGs. For example, 
every  year  the  CFUG  has  to  submit  an  annual  report  to  the  District  Forest 
Officer (DFO), who may provide suggestions to CFUGs if necessary. The 1995 
Forest Rule 32(1) gives authority to the CFUG to collect, sell, and distribute 
forest products. However, when selling forest products outside the community, 
the CFUG is required to provide data on forest products sold to DFO. Likewise, 
according  to  Rule  32(3)  the  CFUG  can  run  a  forest-based  industry,  but  is 
required  to  obtain  approval  from  concerned  authorities  based  on  the 
recommendation of the DFO. The CFUG is free to undertake any conservation 
activities in the forest.  
 127 
 
Activities  that  are  prohibited  inside  the  CF  include:  transfer  of  ownership, 
clearing  for farming, hunting, quarrying, building huts  and houses  inside the 
forest, and any activities that may cause erosion. The forest regulation authorizes 
CFUGs to take loans from financial institution using forest products as collateral 
and  can  build  a  hut  for  security  purposes  with  approval  from  the  DFO 
concerned. While preparing the OP, the CFUG may ask District Forest Officers 
(DFO) for technical guidance, especially during preparation of forest inventories 
and operational plan formulation. Until recently, the operational plan included 
only  basic  forest  resource  assessments.  After  amendments  to  the  CFUG 
operational  guidelines  in  2002,  every  CFUG  is  now  required  to  prepare  a 
comprehensive forest resource inventory with the formation of a new CFUG or 
revision of the existing OP. The main elements to be included in the Operational 
Plan under the 1995 Forest Regulations (Rule 28) are as follows. 
 
Table 4.7: Elements of CFUG Operational Plan  
Elements of the CFUG Operational Plan 
(a)  a. Details of the Forest - name, boundaries, 
areas, condition of the Forest and types of 
Forest 
g.  Nursery,  tree  plantation,  income 
generating programme and time schedule 
b. Map of the Forest 
 
h. Details of areas suitable for the cultivation 
of  herbs,  types  and  species  of  such  herbs, 
cultivation programmes and time schedule 
c. Block division and their details- name, 
boundaries,  areas,  aspects,  slope,  soil, 
type of the Forest, main species, useful 
species, age and situation in respect to 
natural regeneration 
i.  Provisions  relating  to  use  of  income 
accruing  from  the  sale  of  Forest  Products 
and other sources 
 
d. Objectives of Forest management 
 
j.  Provisions  made  for  the  penalties  which 
may be inflicted on users pursuant to Section 
29  of  the  Act  (fines  and  penalties  are 
prepared  and  enforced  by  the  CFUGs 
depending  upon  local  circumstances  and 
vary between the CFUGs), 
e. Method of forest protection  k. Provisions relating to the protection of the 
wildlife 
f. Forest promotion activities- thinning, 
pruning,  cleaning  and  other  Forest 
promotion activities 
l.  Other  matters  prescribed  by  the 
Department 
Source: (MoFSC 1995)  
 
Process of Forming a Community Forest User Groups (CFUG) 
 
According to the 1995 Forest Rules and the 1996 Community Forest Directives, 
communities residing in a particular area and willing to form a CFUG need to be 128 
 
organized in a group based on traditional use rights to the forest and the spirit of 
the user group. According to the guidelines prepared by the DoF, there are five 
major  phases  (refer  table  4.7)  to  be  followed  during  the  community  forestry 
development process (CFD 2001, 1-2)
57. The most important part in this process 
is the identification  of real users to avoid conflicts at a later stage. While 
identifying users, some of the criteria to be taken into consideration are: distance 
to the forest area; interests of the users; the nature of dependency on the forest; 
existing indigenous system of forest management; and the mutual understanding 
and aspirations of users to work as a collective team  (CPFD 1995, 11-12). 
During the process of identification of real users, the DoF forest technician plays 
a  facilitating  role.  Moreover,  the  participation  of  all  users  in  the  meeting, 
especially the involvement of poor and disadvantaged, is required. Traditional 
users are classified into three categories as primary user
58, secondary user
59 and 
tertiary user,
60 based on the dependency of users on the forest and  nature of the 
use. The detail of the CF development process is presented in the following table 
(see Table 4.8). 
 
                                                 
57 The initial guidelines for community forestry development were published in 1995 and upgraded in 2009. 
In both sets of guidelines, five major phases have been identified in the community forestry development 
process. Based on experiences gained during the previous two decades, more emphasis has been given to 
empowerment and community-based approaches when developing any new CFUGs. 
58 Primary users are those who are  directly adversely affected if the resource is depleted; generally such 
users live in or around the forest area and may have been using forest resources as an inseparable part o f 
their farming system and benefit from the conservation and management of the forest.  
59 Secondary users are those who are not directly affected if the forest is depleted as they have alternative 
resources to meet their demand for forest products. They ge nerally live on the outskirts or further away 
from the forest area, but frequently come to the forest for collecting forest products. 
60 The third category of users are those who live below the forest area (downhill), use certain indirect forest 
resources like water for drinking and irrigation, but do not use forest products and generally are not directly 
impacted due to adverse effects of forest depletion. Those living downhill generally are affiliated with other 
CFUGs, thus they do not have a direct stake in the more distant uphill forest. 129 
 
Table 4.8: Community Forestry Development Phase  
Phases  Role of Forest Users  Role of DFO 
1.Identification 
and 
Empowerment 
 
 
Identify  potential  CF  area  and  form  a  User 
Committee  to  discuss  and  prepare 
constitution and operation plan (OP)
61; 
Prepare  the  list  of  forest  users  based  on 
traditional use rights and local norms;  
Hold thorough discussions with local political 
institution,  traditional  institutions,  ethnic 
groups and other organizations; 
Form a committee to prepare constitution and 
operational plan (OP); 
Prepare social and resource map of the forest 
and the community and discuss with users to 
resolve conflict if there is any; 
Identify real users of the forest and organize a 
joint  meeting  with  forest  technicians  from 
DFO. 
 
Rapport building with forest users. 
Discuss  formation  procedure  for  CFUG  with 
users,  existing  forest  policies,  acts  and 
regulations and their rights and responsibilities, 
and implementation process; 
Assist  forest  users  in  identifying  different 
socio-economic groups (class, caste, gender and 
disadvantaged)  living in every hamlet; 
Collect  social  and  technical  information  on 
forest;  
Assist  community  in  preparing  social  and 
resource map; 
Discuss  traditional  system  of  forest 
management and issues of participation, equity, 
gender,  livelihoods  and  sustainable  forest 
management issues. 
2.CFUG 
Formation  and 
Registration  
 
Collect  all  socioeconomic  profiles  of  forest 
users; 
Identify special interest of forest users  who 
are  totally  dependent  on  forest  for  their 
livelihoods; 
Prepare  basic  framework  of  CFUG 
constitution; 
Organize  a  general  assembly  (GA)  of  all 
forest users to discuss the constitution; 
Give priority to the participation of women, 
poor  and  marginalized  sections  of  the 
community in GA meetings; 
Formulate  User  Committee  (UC)  ensuring 
representation  of  poor,  women  and 
disadvantaged people; 
Apply for the registration of CFUG at DFO 
with the minute of GA meeting 
Discuss  with  all  stakeholders  and  create  an 
environment  for  free  and  fair  discussion  and 
take  account  of  local  opinion  in  shaping 
decisions,    identify  the  interests    of 
disadvantaged groups; 
Facilitate  UC  to  organize  separate  hamlet 
meetings; 
Assist  forest  users  to  prepare  CFUG 
constitution; 
Attend  forest  users  assembly  and  provide 
information  as  sought  by  the  users  regarding 
community forest development; 
Ensure  at  least  50%  representatives  are  from 
women, poor, and marginalized sections of the 
community;  
Register the  CFUG  and  provide  certificate of 
registration 
3.Preparation  and 
Registration  of 
Operational  Plan 
(OP)  
 
Prepare participatory resource map; 
Prepare  action  plan  based  on  resource 
condition,  socio-economic  status  of  users, 
environmental  status  and  other  issues 
identified by users; 
Divide the forest area into blocks, sub-blocks, 
working units as per the condition of forest, 
geography, and needs of the group; 
Prepare  forest  management  plan 
(management  practices,  annual  harvesting 
plan, distribution of forest and NTFPs);  
Provide income generation activities, training 
and other human resource development needs 
of the community;  
Organize  interest  group  and  Tole  (hamlet) 
meetings;  approve  OP  through  users 
assembly and submit an application to DFO 
for obtaining CF. 
Assist users in preparing participatory resource 
map  including  socio-economic  and 
environmental status of forest and community, 
data analysis, and forest boundary survey; 
Assist  users  in  preparing  forest  inventory 
(stock, annual increment, species diversity), and 
detailed  action  plan  for  sustainable  forest 
management  practices,  including  identifying 
environmental benefits; 
Facilitate  CFUG  meeting  to  prepare  an 
operational  plan  that  incorporates  issues  of 
forest  management,  institutional  development 
and community development; 
Review  and  approve    the  OP  submitted  by 
CFUG within 30 days of receiving application 
by the user‘s assembly; and 
if  found  within  the  framework  of  the  1995 
Forest  Act  and  1995  Forest  Regulation  forest 
hand CF over to community with certificate. 
                                                 
61 The Operational Plan (OP) is a collection of directives on forest protection, conservation, and utilization 
activities - protection, thinning, weeding plantation, collection and harvesting regime and the sharing of 
benefits - specifying how and when activities are to be undertaken.  It is based on the decision of users and 
formally signed off by the chairman of the users group and the District Forest Officer. 130 
 
4.Implementation 
Phase 
 
 
Organize  meeting  with  CFUG  members  in 
each hamlet to inform them about the CFUG 
constitutional  provisions  and  operational 
plan; 
Prepare annual plan and implement pro-poor 
and  livelihoods  improvement  program  and 
sustainable  silviculture  operation,  forest 
product utilization and forest-based enterprise 
development activities; 
Adopt good forest governances practices like 
public  hearings,  participatory  monitoring, 
public  auditing  of  income  and  expenditures 
and  inclusive  decision  making  including 
poor, women and disadvantaged groups; 
Conduct  outcome  assessment  every  year 
among different socio-economic groups;  
Networking  and  coordination  with  other 
organizations 
Human resource development of its users; 
Submit  annual  report  to  DFO  about  its 
activities. 
Assist  CFUG  is  meeting  their  capacity 
development  through  technical  training, 
administrative,  and  human  resource 
development  needs  through  annual  budget 
received from DoF; 
Assist  in  resolving  emerging  issues  and 
problems as requested by the CFUGs. 
5.Review  and 
Revision  of 
Constitution  and 
Operational  Plan 
(OP) Phase 
 
 
Conduct  extensive  discussion  with  CFUG 
members  regarding  proposed  amendments 
based on past experiences and lessons learned 
and incorporate their view point; 
Revise Constitution and OP based on needs 
of users, forest condition and experience and 
learning of the past; and 
Endorse revised Constitution and OP through 
GA  meeting  and  submit  to  DFO  within  15 
days for approval. 
Provide  CFUG  with  necessary  information 
about  the  resources  available  from  the 
government; 
Assist  CFUGs  in  constitution  and  OP 
preparation  and  amendment  process  and 
priority should be given to weaker CFUGs; 
Approve revised constitution and OP; and  
Agreement between CFUG and DFO 
Source: (CFD 2009, 2001)    
 
After  the  preparation  of  the  Constitution  and  Operational  Plan  (OP)  it  is 
submitted to District Forest Office (DFO) for approval. The DFO reviews the 
operational plan in line with the CF Act, Regulations and Guidelines, and finally 
an agreement is signed b etween DFO and the Chairman of the CFUG; after 
which the DFO hands over the forest to CFUG (Bhattarai and Khanal 2005, 47-
48). According to the present rules on community forests the communities are 
independent in carrying out forestry activities and use o f forest products and 
NTFPs, as long as these operate according to the approved Operational Plan.
62 
With the amendment of the 1993 Forest Act in 1999, it has been mandated that 
CFUGs  have  to  invest  25%  of  the  income  generated  from  CF  in  forest 
management activities, and the remaining 75% can be invested in any local 
community  development  activities  (HMG  1999)
63.  These  policies  have 
encouraged local communities to participate more actively in forest conservation 
and management.  
 
                                                 
62 See Chapter 5 of the 1993 Forest Act. 
63 Section 48, additional issue 69 of Nepal Gazette published on February 4, 1999. 131 
 
As of July 2008, of the 3.5 million hectares of potential CF in the country (which 
is  65% of total  forest), the government  of Nepal  has  handed over 1,230,000 
hectares (35.14%) of government managed forests to 14,440 CFUGs involving 
1,660,000  households.  The  CFUGs  are  now  one  of  the  biggest  grassroots 
organizations in rural Nepal and are considered very important to the livelihoods 
of the majority of people, who depend on agriculture and animal husbandry to 
maintain their livelihoods. 
 
Table 4.9: Status of Community Forest in Nepal (as of July 2008) 
Total land area of Nepal    14.7 million ha 
Total forest area  5.5 million ha 
Potential Community Forest area  3.5 million ha 
Community Forest handed over to communities       1,230,000 ha  
Total number of CFUGs             14,440 
Total number of households involved       1,660,000 
Average Community Forest size                      85 ha  
%age of potential forest area already handed over                      35.14%  
Source: (CPFD 1995, 85); Kandel (2010)
64   
 
The official statistics of forest handover reveal that the progress of handover of 
the government forest to local communities has been slow. The MPFS planned 
to hand over all the potential CF area to local communities by 2010. However, if 
the present trend of forest handover continues it seem s that it may take at least 
another two decades to complete the process.  
 
4.2.6.2.  Actors,  Institutions,  and  Nesting  in  Community-  Based  Forest 
Governance  
 
CFUG  governance  activities  in  Nepal  are  organized  into  multiple  layers  of 
nested  organizations.  There  is  vertical  (across  levels  of  organizations)  and 
horizontal (across space) interplay among various institutions related to CFUG 
activities. Commons literature suggests that neither the local-level nor higher-
level resource management initiatives are likely to functions  well if they are 
functioning  independently,  as  natural  resource  management  almost  inevitably 
implicates  cross-scale  temporal  and  spatial  relations  in  the  modern  period 
                                                 
64  Pers. comm. Balaram Kandel, Forest Officer at the Department of Forest, Community Forestry Division, 
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(Berkes  2002,  293).  Those  management  systems  that  address  the  issues  of 
dynamic linkages and interactions among multiple scales and multiple levels are 
more successful in improving the environment and livelihoods of the resource 
users (Cash et al. 2006). 
 
With  decentralization  in  Nepal  there  has  been  a  sharing  of  responsibilities 
between the state forest agencies and CFUGs. There are different interest groups, 
including women‘s groups, savings  and credit groups,  youth  clubs, and local 
village-level political institutions (hamlets, VDCs and municipalities) bargaining 
with CFUGs at the local level, as well as with government agencies at district 
and  national  level  to  influence  community  forestry  policy  formulation  and 
outcomes  of  CF  management.  CFUG  rules,  regulations  and  management 
activities operate within the broader framework of Forest Act and Regulations, 
where both state forest agencies and local CFUGs have important roles to play. 
The Forest Department has delegated a substantial degree of forest governance 
authority  to  local  people  and  at  the  same  time  they  also  provide  training, 
technical and financial resources for CFUGs.  
 
The 1993 Forest Act provides that the CFUG may amend their operational plan 
and constitution through the general assembly meeting of the CFUG; however, 
they must inform the DFO regarding such amendments. If the DFO considers 
that  the  amendments  may  have  significant  negative  impacts  on  the  local 
environment, it may direct the CFUG not to implement them. In extreme cases 
the  DFO  may  cancel  the  registration  of  the  Users'  Group  and  take  back  the 
Community Forest. However, the DFO must restore the community forest to the 
same CFUG or to a new reconstituted committee, after a proper investigation of 
the case. These provisions of the Forest Act are intended to provide the checks 
and balances of a nested governance arrangement, which would ideally enable 
the monitoring, enforcement, and conflict resolution of self-governing natural 
resource institutions  (Ostrom 1992, 75).  
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Figure 4.2 illustrates the multi-layered community forestry governance structure, 
actors, and institutions. Multiple actors, both formal and informal, are engaged 
with  state  forest  agencies  and  community  forest  user  groups  (CFUGs).  The 
vertical structure of state forestry offices from national level to Range Post level 
is paralleled by Community Forest User Groups (CFUGs) at the village level, 
incorporated into FECOFUN in the National level. In 1995 the Federation of 
Community  Forestry  Users,  Nepal  (FECOFUN)  was  established  as  a  formal 
network of Community Forest User Groups (CFUGs) from all over Nepal, with a 
main objective of strengthening the role of users in policy making processes. 
FECOFUN has networks from local to national level to advocate for CFUGs 
locally, nationally and regionally. To a large degree the day to day authority over 
forest management has been shifted from government to CFUGs where millions 
of people are organized under the FECOFUN umbrella. As of July 2009, more 
than  1.6  million  households  are  affiliated  with  14,439  CFUGs  around  the 
country. 
65. 
                                                 
65 Pers. comm. Balaram Kandel, Forest Officer at the Department of Forest, Community Forestry Division, 
2/05/2010 
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Figure 4.2: Forest Governance Structure in Nepal 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  (Dahal and Chapagain 2008, 71; FECOFUN 2010) with modification 
 
Forest governance in the state sector is administered through the Ministry of 
Forest and Soil Conservation (MOFSC) which has responsibility to implement 
the forest plan, develop policy and enforce forest acts and regulations for the 
management  and  conservation  of  the  forests.  Ministry  of  Forest  and  Soil 
Conservation (MoFSC) at the national level, Regional Forest Directorate at the 
regional level, District Forest Office (DFO) at district level and Range Posts at 
the community level are engaged in forest governance in Nepal. The Department 
of  Forest  (DoF)  under  the  MoFSC  is  responsible  for  forest  governance  and 
providing support to the community forestry programme through its Community 
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Forestry  Division.  The  DoF  has  5  Regional  Forest  Directorates,  74  District 
Offices, 93 Ilakas (regional forest offices within the districts) and 698 Range 
Posts (covering Village Development Committees in the district). The regional 
forestry directorate is mainly involved in monitoring and supervision of the work 
carried out by District Forest Offices (DFOs). The District Forest Office (DFO) 
organizes  training  programs,  workshops,  and  observation  tours  annually  to 
upgrade  the  knowledge  and  skill  of  forest  user  groups.  The  DFO  helps  in 
afforestation and overall forestry administration in the district. The lowest level 
forest office in the district is the Range Post, whose main duty is to assist and 
facilitate the work of CFUGs for the effective management of the community 
forest.  The  source  of  funding  for  Forestry  Department  infrastructure  comes 
mainly from the national budget. However, there is number of foreign assisted 
projects providing technical and financial resources for the development of the 
community forestry program.  
 
The Community Forest Users Groups (CFUGs) at village level are the key actors 
directly  involved  in  the  governance  of  the  forest  commons.  An  important 
development  in  CF  governance  took  place  in  1990,  after  the  formation  of 
informal networks of CFUGs in the eastern part of Nepal was taken up by the 
Nepal-UK  Community  Forestry  Project  funded  by  DFID  (Ojha  and  Timsina 
2008,  63-64).  After  a  national  conference  of  CFUGs,  the  Federation  of 
Community Forestry Users, Nepal (FECOFUN) was established in 1995. Since 
the  establishment  of  FECOFUN,  there  has  been  a  fundamental  shift  in  the 
balance of power between the Forest Department and CFUGs.  FECOFUN is 
now playing an active role in safeguarding the rights of community forest users 
through  capacity  building,  advocacy,  and  technical  support.  It  is  lobbying 
national  and  international  donors  in  the  forestry  sector  to  strengthen  the 
leadership and institutional management capacity of CFUGs and users‘ rights 
over  resources  and  aims  to  address  the  problems  of  equity  and  the  social 
exclusion  of  disadvantaged  groups  in  the  decision-making  processes  (Uprety 
2003, 102). The FECOFUN Constitution states that 50% of the positions in all 
FECOFUN committees and CFUGs have to be allocated to women (Paudel and 
Ojha 2008, 66). As of 30 August 2006, FECOFUN had 74 district chapters, 550 
range post level FECOFUN chapters, 14,431 CFUGS and more than 5 million 136 
 
people  are  affiliated  with  FECOFUN,  now  one  of  the  largest  civil  society 
networks in Nepal (Dahal and Chapagain 2008, 73; Agrawal and Ostrom 2001, 
500).  
 
The  community  forestry  programme  in  Nepal  has  provided  a  ‗space  of 
engagement‘ (Cox 1998, 2) for local communities to interact on a range of local 
issues  that affect  their lives, primarily through  the collective management  of 
forest commons. Increased dialogue and partnership with various organizations 
increases  access  to  information  and  resources  and  has  therefore  allowed  the 
CFUG to manage their local natural resources more effectively (Pokharel et al. 
2007,  15;  Khanal  2007,  23).  In  the  present  community-based  forest  co-
management model in Nepal, state forest agencies have to honour the interests of 
local forest users, while the CFUG also has to abide by existing forest laws and 
cooperate with the state forest agencies to conserve and sustainably manage the 
community  forests.  Since  the  initiation  of  the  community-based  forest 
management  approach,  the  government  has  made  several  changes  to  the 
structure  of  the  forestry  department  and  orientation  of  its  staff  to  meet  the 
demands of the new concept of community forestry, turning bureaucrats from 
forest administrators to facilitators.  
 
4.3. Outcomes and Issues Encountered During Initial Phase of Community-
Based Forest Management (CBFM)  
 
Nepal has made a major policy innovation by devolving the authority of natural 
resource governance from state-centric approaches towards community driven 
approaches in order to address the challenges of environmental degradation, and 
improve  livelihood  security  and  well-being  of  forest-dependent  rural 
communities  through  collective  action  for  management  of  common-pool 
resources (Ojha et al. 2008, 26; Pokharel et al. 2008, 55). This shift in policy was 
in response to the failure of the government in the past to manage the forest on a 
sustainable  basis.  It  is  argued  that  decentralization  and  devolution  of  forest 
governance authority from state to local communities is a promising means of 
institutionalizing effective community-based forest management (Ribot 2002a, 
1). The logic behind devolution of power is that local institutions possess better 137 
 
knowledge about local needs, are more accountable to the local population, and 
are in a better position to monitor and enforce resource use rules (Ribot 2004, 3; 
Ribot,  Agrawal,  and  Larson  2006,  1865).  Although  decentralization  or 
devolution  of  authority  over  forest  governance  is  likely  to  expand  citizen 
participation  in  forest  management,  it  is  not  a  sufficient  condition  for  the 
equitable distribution of benefits and participation in forest governance (Potter 
2008, 39). Devolution of power and authority does not automatically empower 
user  groups,  unless  and  until  internal  social  inequalities  are  addressed 
(Lachapelle, Smith, and McCool 2004, 8-9; Nguyen 2008, 205; Arora-Jonsson 
2008, 62-63; Thoms 2008, 1461-62). The outcomes of community-based forest 
management  (CBFM)  have  been  mixed,  with  goals  of  social  equity  and 
environmental  sustainability  often  proving  elusive  (Meinzen-Dick  and  Knox 
1999, 45; Lane 2003, 291; Agrawal and Ribot 1999; Mansuri and Rao 2004, 30; 
Kellert et al. 2000, 709; Ribot 1995, 1596; Ribot, Agrawal, and Larson 2006, 
1881).  The  following  section  summarizes  the  results  of  different  studies 
assessing the first decades of Nepal‘s community forestry programme, looking at 
its early achievements and limitations.  
 
During the initial phase of the Community Forestry programme, the challenge 
was to build trust between forest department staff and community members, and 
for forestry staff to reorient themselves as facilitators. The Forestry Department 
encountered various problems in the implementation of the community forestry 
program, including lack of staff trained in participatory forestry, lack of financial 
resources, and few incentives for field level staff (CPFD 1995, 22). Most of the 
extension  programs  during  the  initial  phase  of  the  community  forestry 
programme were directed toward forestry staff, project employees, and village 
leaders,  and  the  knowledge  gained  by  them  was  not  readily  transferred  to 
ordinary  CFUG  members  (Malla,  Fisher,  and  Gilmour  1988;  Shrestha  1995, 
102).  The  district-level  forestry  staff  encouraged  the  constitution  of  user 
committees  quickly  without extensive discussions,  to  fulfil targets  set  by the 
Forest  Department.  The  formation  of  CFUGs  was  mainly  carried  out  in 
consultation with village leaders and local elites who took the opportunity to 
boost  their  social  and  political  status  (Malla,  Fisher,  and  Gilmour  1988). 
Conflicts emerged during the early stages of community forestry development, 138 
 
over the failure to identify and include all traditional forest users in the CFUGs, 
and over benefit sharing (whether to distribute equally to every household or 
according to the number of family members), in addition to boundary conflicts 
between and within CFUGs  (Shrestha 1995, 103-5;  Tumbahanphe and  K. C. 
1995, 108)
66. These conflicts hampered the process of transferring community 
forests, as there were various personal and political factors playing out  around 
the issue. These conflicts mainly arose because the user groups were formed in 
haste, without proper discussion to identify the issues, problems and interests of 
different  socio-economic  groups.  The  CF  programmes  as  well  as  the 
performance of forest officials were evaluated by the number of forests handed 
over to communities, and there was less attention given to developing the 
capacity of forest users to manage them efficiently  (Karki, Karki, and Karki 
1994, 26; Jackson, Vaidya, and Hunt 1995).  
 
In the beginning of the CF program, heavy emphasis was placed on nursery 
establishment and planting. A seminar conducted in 1991 for sharing early 
experiences in the community forestry program concluded that in the earlier 
phase of the CF program, the PF an d PPF which had been mandated to govern 
the community forests through Panchayats failed to elicit popular participation, 
and  that  conventional  silvicultural  management  systems  practiced  by  the 
foresters were insufficient to address social, economic, and environmental issues 
at the local level (Karki, Karki, and Karki 1994, 123; ICIMOD 1992, 3). It is 
argued that without addressing the existing social divisions by caste, class and 
gender that are deeply rooted in Nepali society, it is unlikely that the CF program 
would benefit the poor and marginalized  (Hobley 1987, 14). However, some 
positive  results  were  recognized,  including  improvement  in  the  fuel-wood 
situation,  greater  community  access  to  forest  products,  and  promising  and 
economical regeneration of degraded forests (ICIMOD 1992, 3).  
 
Initially user groups received cash subsidies for nursery operation, plantation 
development, and for the salaries of forest watchmen. But by the mid 1990s, 
subsidies phased out and user groups were slowly taking responsibility for all 
aspects  of  community  forest  management  (Shrestha  1996,  5).  The  early 
                                                 
66 See Banko Janakari volume 5, No. 3 for a detailed account of conflict regarding community forestry. 139 
 
community forestry program gave more emphasis to forest protection rather than 
utilization, which resulted in lack of motivation among users (Karki, Karki, and 
Karki  1994,  124).  The  CF  program  at  that  time  was  narrowly  focussed  on 
protection  and  only  concerned  with  meeting  subsistence  needs  for  forest 
products (Shrestha 1996, 10). Similarly, there was a lack of long-term policy and 
planning for the sustainable management of CF, both on the part of government 
as well as forest users (Karki, Karki, and Karki 1994, 126).  
 
 Nonetheless,  as  the  community  forestry  program  evolved,  local  institutions 
demonstrated enhanced governance capacity (decision making process, record 
keeping,  information  dissemination,  mobilization  of  funds  for  local 
development,  networking  and  conflict  resolution),  and  forest  dependent 
communities  experienced  increased  access  to  improved  forest  resources 
alongside some livelihood benefits. A general consensus emerged that Nepal had 
achieved  an  appropriate  policy  and  legislative  environment  for  supporting 
community-based  forest  co-management  at  the  local  level  (Pokharel  and 
Tumbahamphe 1999). However, at the same time as observers recognized the 
many positive outcomes of the CF program, some challenging issues remained 
to be addressed; primarily elite domination (Shepherd and Gill 1999), effective 
participation,  livelihood  improvement,  and  effective  pro-poor  initiatives 
(Pokharel and Tumbahamphe 1999, 100-101). 
 
4.4. Conclusion  
 
It is clear that state policy and practices in the periods before the mid-1970s led 
to  serious  deforestation  in  the  Middle  Hills  and  Terai  regions  of  Nepal,  and 
severely disturbed the indigenous system of forest management (Bromley and 
Cernea 1989, 8). The problem  of deforestation in  Nepal  is  a result of many 
factors – conversion of forest into agricultural land; an exploitative land tenure 
system; population growth and resettlement programs (Ojha 1983; Metz 1991; 
Kolmair and Muller-Boker 2002, 75); political instability; and changes in the 
forest  tenure  regime  –  which  all  impacted  on  Nepal‘s  forests  and  on  the 
livelihoods  of  people  living  in  the  hill  districts  as  they  encountered  severe 
shortages of fuel-wood, fodder and timber (AusAID 2006, 1). The emergence of 140 
 
the forest conservation movement spurred a series of policy interventions in the 
early 1980s, and international donors assisted Nepal in the implementation of a 
series  of  forestry  and  watershed  management  projects  (Arnold  1992;  Hobley 
1996, 6; WINROCK 2002, 5).  
 
Decentralized forest management policies initiated in Nepal after the enactment 
of the 1978 Panchayat Forest (PF) and Panchayat Protected Forest (PPF) Rules 
received strong policy support after the endorsement of the 1989 Master Plan for 
the  Forestry  Sector.      Following  the  restoration  of  multiparty  parliamentary 
democracy  in  1990,  the  democratically  elected  government  promulgated  the 
1993 Forest Act and the 1995 Forest Regulations, which further strengthened the 
local community‘s control over the management of local forests. Subsequently, 
the  hand-over  of  government  controlled  forest  to  local  communities  gained 
momentum, and within a decade millions of hectares of forest were handed over 
for local management and use.  
 
The following case study chapters critically examine the community-based co-
management approach adopted in Nepal as it was applied in three communities 
in Kavrepalanchok District, in order to assess the effectiveness of the community 
forestry  program  in  terms  of  governance,  livelihood  improvement,  and 
environmental  sustainability  before  and  during  the  period  of  the  Maoist 
insurgency, 1996 - 2007.  
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Chapter 5 
 
Case Study One- Sharada Devi Community Forest User 
Group (CFUG) 
 
5.1 Background 
 
The  Sharada  Devi  Community  Forest  User  Group  (CFUG)  is  situated  in 
Ugratara-Janagal  Village  Development  Committee  (VDC),  ward  no.  6  in  the 
Middle Hill region of the district of Kavrepalanchok. It lies about 25 km east of 
Kathmandu  and  2  km  south  of  Banepa  municipality,  a  commercial  town  of 
Kavrepalanchok  district.  The  Sharada  Devi  Community  Forest  is  located 
between  Sinagal  village  in  the  east,  Nagidanda  and  Dhaneswori  Community 
forest in the west, Balyangroko Gahiro village in the north, and the Salleni and 
Baikiwa forests to the south. Compared to the other two case study sites, Sharada 
Devi CFUG is located closer to the district centre and is relatively accessible to 
the market. Of the three case studies, the Sharada Devi CFUG was least affected 
by the armed conflict.  
 
The majority of the households in Sharada Devi belong to the middle-income 
group (54%) with 26 % and 20 % in the upper-income and low-income groups 
respectively. The per capita community forest area is about 0.20 hectare, which 
is lower than any other case study. The household dependency on forest for fuel-
wood is 69%, which is lower than the other two sites. Besides fuel-wood, CFUG 
members  in  Sharada  Devi  use  LPG  gas,  bio-gas  and  sawdust  as  sources  of 
household energy, mainly for cooking. Most of the land in Sharada Devi CFUG 
is  productive.  Farming  (including  agriculture,  animal  husbandry  and  poultry) 
provides 38.59% of total household income. The dependence of households on 
the community forest in Sharada Devi CFUG is low compared to the other two 
study sites. The CFUG members use the community forest only for fuel-wood 
and leaf-litter.  142 
 
Map 5.1: Participatory Map of Sharada Devi CF 
 
Source: Map prepared by author with the help of CFUG Members, 2008 
 
The Sharada Devi community forest is situated at an altitude of 1,500 meters 
above  sea  level,  with  a  total  area  of  44.25  hectares.  It  is  located  above  the 
settlement  and  mainly  composed  of  broadleaf  species,  especially  Schima-
Castanopsis (Katus-Chilaune) forest type, which is a common forest type in the 
Middle hills of Nepal.  
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Table 5.1: Bio-physical Characteristics of Sharada Devi CF at Chaubas 
Description  Number 
Total area of forest (ha.)  44.25 
Forest blocks  5 
Aspect  North-east 
Slope (degrees)  20 – 40 
Canopy coverage (%)  60  
Age of forest (years)  25 years 
Average altitude (meters) above sea level  1500  
Major forest species  Castanopsis indica (Roxb.), Schima 
wallichii, Myrica esculenta, Myrsine 
semiserrata wall, Pinus spp. 
Source: (Sharada Devi CFUG 2008)  
 
5. 2 Socio-economic Profile of the Sharada Devi CFUG 
 
There are six hamlets under the Sharada Devi CFUG, i.e. Karnitar, Gautam- 
Dahal  basti,  Thapa-Baniya  basti,  Banjara-Khadka  basti,  Nagi-Nayabasti  and 
Dokhadol, with a total of 170 households and total population of 880. Of the 
total  population,  88%  of  residents  belong  to  the  so-called  higher  caste 
(Bramhan/chhetri),  11%  to  ethnic  minority  groups,  and  1  are  in  the  lower 
occupation castes. 
 
Table 5.2: Major Caste and Population Characteristics at Sharada Devi CFUG  
Description  Number  % 
Number of tole (hamlets) under the CFUG  6  - 
Total population  880   
Men  421  47.8 
Women  459   52.2 
Literacy (%)      
Men  -  84.6 
Women  -  52.5 
Caste composition (no. of households)      
Higher-caste     
Brahman/ Chhetri         150                   88  
Ethnic minority groups            -                      -    
Bhujel             5                     3  
Giri             4                     2  
Newar             6                     4  
Gurung             1                     1  
Magar             2                     1  
Occupational caste            -                      -    
Kami             2                     1  
Source: (Sharada Devi CFUG 2008)  144 
 
 
A  participatory  wealth  ranking  exercise  was  carried  out  to  assess  the  socio-
economic status of households within the Sharada Devi CFUG. The households 
were categorized into three major income groups: low-income, middle-income 
and upper-income households
67. The wealth ranking indicates that more than 
half of the total households fall under the middle -income group and 20% and 
26%  of  the  house holds  belong  to  low -income  and  upper -income  groups 
respectively. 
 
Figure 5.1: Wealth Ranking of Sharad Devi CFUG  
 
Source: Fieldwork by author, 2008 
 
5. 2.1. Land Holding 
 
The household survey indicates that land is a very scarce commodity in Sharada 
Devi  CFUG.  The  average  total  land  holding  is  7.11  ropani  (0.35  ha)  per 
household,  which  differs  significantly  among  socio-economic  groups.  The 
upper-income households have fertile irrigated land with relatively larger plots 
of kharbari (private land especially allocated for growing grass and trees), while 
low and middle-income household kharbari holdings are negligible, and their 
dependency on community forest higher than upper-income households.     
                                                 
67 Refer to Chapter One for the criteria used in the participatory wealth ranking. 145 
 
Table 5.3: Mean Land Holding per Household in Sharada Devi CFUG (all income 
categories) 
Category of land  Mean land 
holding 
(ropani)
68 
Mean  land  holding  by  income  category 
(ropani) 
      Low-
income 
Middle-
income 
Upper-income 
Irrigated  land 
(Khet) 
2.1  0.4  2.5  3.3 
Non-irrigated land  0.3  0.3  0.1  0.4 
Bari(upland)  4.5  4.8  3.9  4.9 
Kharbari
69  0.3  0.1  0.1  0.6 
Share farmed  0.0  0.1  -  - 
Total  7.1  5.6  6.5  9.3 
Source: Field survey by author, 2008 
 
5.2.2. Basic Household Characteristics 
 
The household survey in Sharada Devi CFUG shows that household income in 
the sample is related to the household size, age of household head, and level of 
literacy.  The  data  also  indicate  that  as  household  income  increases,  the 
dependency on the forest for fuel wood decreases (Table 5.4).  
 
                                                 
68 1 ropani is approximately 500 square meters or .05 hectare. 
69 Kharbari is private land designated especially for growing grass (including thatching grass) and trees to 
supplement the household‘s needs for fodder, fuel-wood and timber. 
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Table 5.4: Household Characteristics by Income Category in Sharada Devi CFUG 
(mean values from sample 
Household characteristics 
(mean values from sample) 
Low-
income 
Middle-
income 
Upper-income 
Number of households  34.0  91.0  45.0 
Household size (no. of members)  4.9  5.9  7.4 
Mean annual household income(NRS)  63,897.0  131,515.0  260,331.0 
Annual household income (US$)
70  863.0  1,777.0  3,518.0 
Age of household head (yrs)  51.6  55.3  57.1 
Education of household head       
Overall literacy rate (%)  60.0  73.3  80.0 
Primary education only (%)  46.7  33.3  40.0 
Higher secondary education (%)  6.7  13.3  26.7 
College/University (%)  6.7  26.7  13.3 
Livestock holding(no.)       
Buffalo  0.6  1.2  0.6 
Cow  0.7  1.1  1.5 
Ox  -  0.1  0.1 
Goat/Sheep  2.1  3.3  4.3 
Pig  -  0.2  - 
Chicken  0.3  -  54.0 
Household with:       
Electricity (%)  93.3  100.0  100.0 
Piped water (%)  60.0  93.3  93.3 
Telephone (%)  60.0  93.3  93.3 
Audiovisual appliance(s) owned (%)       
Radio  20.0  100.0  100.0 
Television  66.7  100.0  100.0 
Source of household energy (%)       
Fuel-wood  93.3  66.7  46.7 
LPG Gas  6.7  33.3  53.3 
Source: Author, Field survey, 2008 
 
5.3. Historical Background of Sharada Devi Community Forest 
 
According to oral history, the present area occupied by Sharada Devi CFUG was 
once a very dense forest with plenty of big trees and abundant wild life. This fact 
is also supported by the age-old tradition of acquiring the ―lingo‖
71 for religious 
rituals  of  Chandeswori  Mai  (the  goddess  Durga)  temple  in  Banepa.  For  this 
particular ritual, every year a healthy, tall mature tree has to be erected in front 
of the temple. For this ceremony, the tree tended to be acquired from Sharada 
Devi forest since there were plenty of such trees available. Due to population 
growth  and  expansion  of  agricultural  land,  the  forest  area  was  declining  for 
                                                 
70 1 US$ is equivalent to Nepali Rupees (NRS) 74 
71 ‗Lingo” refers to a ceremonial pole, a thick, shorn tree-trunk some eighty feet in length erected during 
special religious rituals in front of the temple.  147 
 
many  decades;  however,  after  the  enactment  of  the  1957  Private  Forest 
Nationalization  Act  the  deforestation  process  was  rapid  due  to  loss  of  local 
ownership and breakdown of the traditional system of forest management.  
 
Previous studies show that there were many forests under the indigenous system 
of  management  in  Kavrepalanchok  and  Sindhupalchok  districts.  Fisher  et  al. 
(1989) reported that although there were no formal committees in the villages 
before  the  1970s,  the  system  of  indigenous  forest  management  remained  in 
place.  Many  researchers  (Gilmour  1989,  4-9;  Fisher  1991,  2-4;  Fisher  et  al. 
1990)  observed  various  indigenous  forest  management  systems  in  the 
Kavrepalanchok district. For example, indigenous systems were found in Sikher 
Ambote  Panchayat,  Daraune  Pokhari,  Pandey  Ban,  Nala-ko-thulo-Ban, 
Ugrachandi, and Hokse Bazzar, where local villagers have devised various rules 
of  forest  management  according  to  forest  condition  and  locality.  In  Daraune 
Pokhari  of  Kavrepalanchok  district,  seven  forests  were  found  under  local 
management, where the focus was more on conservation due to the fact that the 
forests had been heavily deforested 20 years before (Gilmour 1989, 7-9). The 
villagers were allowed to collect fallen dead wood, grass and leaf-litter from the 
forest.  One  forest  was  exclusively  managed  for  the  purpose  of  fuel-wood 
required for cremation. These studies revealed that people had reacted to the 
dwindling forest resources through their own local forest management system. 
Some forests, like Jogeswor Mahadev Mandir, had been managed as a religious 
forest  under  the  traditional  indigenous  system  (Fisher  et  al.  1990,  46).  Such 
forests were managed exclusively to be used for religious ceremonies. However, 
people were allowed to collect dry wood and leaves occasionally at certain times 
of  the  year.  There  were  restrictions  on  cutting  green  trees,  and  those  who 
breached  the  rules  were  fined,  and  the  materials  used  for  cutting  were 
confiscated.  Under  the  indigenous  local  system  of  forest  management,  every 
household  contributed  grains  to  the  local  chaukidar  (forest  watchmen),  also 
known as the manapathi system. The villagers themselves had prepared norms 
of forest use, management and sanctions for breach of the local rules. Fisher et 
al. (1988) also noted that is some cases, informal committees existed, which met 
on an ad hoc basis as needed. According to Fisher et al. (1988, 24) after the end 
of Rana regime in 1950, the externally imposed talukdari system collapsed and it 148 
 
was  substituted  by  local  systems  initiated  by  the  people  themselves,  which 
gained further impetus after the failure of Private Forest Nationalisation Act.  
 
According  to  CFUG  members  in  Sinagal,  the  Sharada  Devi  forest  remained 
under the traditional system of management during the Rana regime. The forests 
were under the control of Mukhiya and Talukdar (local headman appointed by 
the  state),  who  were  responsible  for  distributing  forest  products  to  the  local 
people for their subsistence use, which collapsed after the fall of Rana regime. 
When the talukdari system collapsed and the forests were nationalized in 1957, 
villagers in Sinagal experienced acute deforestation mainly due to lack of a local 
control mechanism.  
 
After the forest came under state control, village elites benefited greatly, because 
they  were  able  to  exploit  the  forest  resources  without  penalties  due  to  their 
comfortable relationship with district forest staff. On the other hand, legal access 
to the forest was limited for the general population. Nevertheless, the livelihoods 
of  ordinary  people  remained  dependent  on  forest  resources,  and  local  users 
continued to harvest forest products, albeit cautiously since they had to avoid the 
forest  guards.  Many  villagers  stated  that  during  this  time,  the  village  elites 
tended to report people who collected the forest products to the District Forest 
Office (DFO). Thus, the majority of the villagers had to face various forms of 
penalty and punishment. Moreover, forestry officials took undue advantage of 
those people who were charged with stealing products from the forest. Under the 
nationalization regime, although the forest was officially under state control, lack 
of infrastructure, manpower and logistics handicapped the forestry department‘s 
ability to monitor, administer and regulate the collection of forest products. The 
forest became a truly open access resource, resulting in dramatic degradation
72. 
Conversion of the Sharada Devi forest to degraded shrubland was also due to 
increased pressure from the surrounding villages. During that time the villagers 
from Banepa, Thapagaon, Budol, Sinagal, Bansdol, and Mahendra jyoti  were 
responsible  for  uncontrolled  and  illegal  harvesting,  and  encroachment  of 
forestland. Influential elites took this opportunity to appropriate degraded forest 
                                                 
72 The National Forest Inventory indicates that the forest declined drastically from 6.4 million hectares 
(45%) in 1964 to about 4.1 million hectares in 1975, a drop of over one-third in just a decade
72 (Wallace 
1983, 221). 149 
 
land  and  convert  it  to  agricultural  land.  According  to  the  villagers,  forest 
products collection practices at that time were guided by narrow self- interest 
rather than the interest of the collective good because there was no guarantee that 
the  villagers  could  be  assured  of  ongoing  use  of  the  forest  products  in  a 
sustainable manner. Thus, there was unregulated competition over the harvesting 
of forest products that eventually led to deforestation. 
 
Respondents  in Sharada Devi  claimed that they had attempted to  protect  the 
forest under local management, but were largely unsuccessful, mainly due to the 
pressure from adjoining villages, as they did not have legal rights to regulate 
conditions of access. People from surrounding villages continued exploiting the 
forests by collecting the remaining stump and roots of the cut trees as there were 
no  other  alternative  sources  of  household  energy  available  for  cooking  and 
heating.  During  interviews,  villagers  reported  that  when  the  forest  was 
completely  denuded  even  the  rabbits  in  the  forest  could  be  spotted  from  a 
distance, which expresses the extreme state of degradation of the forest.  
 
The Department of Forest (DoF) attempted to protect the Sharada Devi forest by 
fencing the forests and also by recruiting forest guards to enforce the regulations. 
However, the forest department‘s efforts were unsuccessful, mainly due to the 
non-cooperation  of  the  villagers.  With  the  degradation  of  forest,  the  local 
population of Sharada Devi suffered greatly as they did not have enough forest 
products to support their basic needs. During those days villagers had to spend 5-
6 hours to collect a head load of leaf-litter and fuel-wood. Households with more 
family members tended to collect more forest products and vice-versa due to 
competition,  as  there  were  no  local  rules  and  regulations  in  place.  One 
respondent stated that ―before 1990, hundreds of people harvest forest products 
in Sharada Devi from morning to the late evening and collected whatever was 
available in the forest – saplings, shrubs, tree or even the roots‖.  
 
When villagers in Sinagal experienced this severe shortage of forest products, as 
a response to the changing situation they decided to revive the indigenous forest 
management systems. In 1990, through the village assembly, they formulated an 
informal  forest  conservation  committee  and  decided  to  act  to  conserve  the 150 
 
remaining forest. To stop the indiscriminate harvesting and encroachment from 
neighbouring  villages,  they  hired  a  local  ban  heralu  (forest  watchman)  and 
pooled their own resources to pay for the salary through a grain levy collected 
from every household. Each household took turns to patrol the forest – a practice 
known as lauri palo. Their efforts coincided with the expansion of the Nepal 
Australia  Forest  Project  (NAFP)  in  Kavrepalanchok  District.  In  1989,  a 
plantation programme was carried out in Sinagal village through the NAFP with 
the  involvement  of  local  people.  The  local  people  in  Sinagal  were  actively 
involved in the protection of the newly established plantation.    
  
5.4.  Community-based  Forest  Governance  (CBFG)  Arrangements  in 
Sharada Devi CFUG 
 
Although  Sharada  Devi  community  members  were  protecting  the  forests 
informally,  villagers  had  no  officially-recognized  authority  over  the  forest-
resources. The absence of legal rights over the forest impeded the community‘s 
ability to formulate and implement the forest management activities. Since the 
community was very keen to take over management responsibility for the forest, 
the 1993 Forest Act created a favourable legal environment to constitute a Forest 
User Group (FUG)
73. On September 2, 1993, villagers in Sinagal convened a 
meeting and formed a forest protection committee. They took the initiative of 
forest protection upon themselves, although not yet formally approved by the 
government. Ultimately the enactment of the 1993 Forest Act and the 1995 
Forest Regulations was instrumental in officially transferring the authority over 
forest management to the Sharada Devi user group. 
 
The Sharada Devi CFUG prepared its constitution and operational plan (OP) 
through the meeting of its general assembly (GA). The CFUG constitution and 
OP contain the local  rules of CF  governance, which is  a mandatory legal 
document required for handing over national forest to CFUGs. After review of 
the constitution and OP, the document was signed by the CFUG Chairman and 
the District Forest Officer on behalf of the local community and the national 
                                                 
73 According to the 1993 Forest Act and 1995 Forest Regulation, CFUG constitute users from the village or 
surrounding  village  or  from  next  village  and  even  from  other  districts,  regardless  of  the  political  and 
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government respectively. The handover of state owned forest to Sharada Devi 
CFUG took place on July 3, 1995. Following the handover of forest control, the 
13 member Sharada Devi Community Forest User Committee (CFUG took over 
day-to-day operational activities of forest management based on its Operational 
Plan (OP). This detailed document describes the status of the forest, objectives, 
management plan, norms and rules concerning forest product use, monitoring 
mechanisms and penalties in case the rules are violated. The Operational plan 
(OP) is generally a five year plan of action on forest management that can be 
amended as required or after the expiry of the existing OP through the meeting 
of GA with approval from the DFO. The salient feature of the operational plan of 
Sharada Devi CFUG which was prepared in line with the Rule 28 (1) of the 1995 
Forest Rules contains the following elements:  
 
Table 5.5: Components of Sharada Devi CFUG Operational Plan  
 
(b) Components of Sharada Devi CFUG Operational Plan 
i.  Introduction of the Forest (name, boundaries, areas, historical background of 
the forest) 
ii.  Objectives of forest management  
iii.  Definition of terms 
iv.  Review of previous OP 
v.  Socio-economic condition of the CFUG and collaboration with other agencies 
vi.  Status of forest products demand and supply, present condition of forest  
vii.  Block division (name, boundaries, areas, aspects, slope, soil, main species, and 
status of the natural regeneration, block management method 
viii.  Details of forest products utilization procedure, norms, distribution of benefits 
and sale of forest products 
ix.  Penalties which may be inflicted on users pursuant to Section 29 of the Act 
and process of enforcement of penalty (refer Table 5). 
x.  Method  of  forest  protection  (control  of  encroachment,  control  of  illegal 
harvesting, grazing) 
xi.  Procedures to be followed while harvesting timber (marking, stamp, billing) 
xii.  Human resources development plan  
xiii.  Election of CFUG Executive committee 
xiv.  Resource mobilization and community development activities (management of 
CFUG  funds,  focused  program  for  women  and  disadvantaged  groups, 
community infrastructure development, forest management activities, income 
generating activities) 
xv.  Income and expenditure of CFUG 
xvi.  Ten year plan of forest management 
Source: (Sharada Devi CFUG 2008) 
 
The  objective  of  the  Sharada  Devi  CFUG,  explicitly  mentioned  in  the 
constitution, is to conserve, manage and utilize the forest and to become self-152 
 
sufficient in forest products. The CFUG intends to initiate forest-based income-
generating  activities  to  enhance  the  economic  situation  of  its  users. 
Environmental  conservation  and  erosion  control  are  also  listed  as  primary 
objectives of the CFUG. According to the CFUG executive committee chairman, 
every member in the Sharada Devi CFUG has to pay NRs 120/- as an annual 
membership  fee  upon  which  the  person  is  issued  with  a  membership  card. 
Migrants from  another community have to  apply to the CFUG committee to 
become a member of the CFUG. At present, every household within the Sharada 
Devi community has become a member of the CFUG and participates in the 
CFUG activities regularly.  
 
5.4.1. Provisions Relating to Offence and Punishment 
 
When  the  Sharada  Devi  Forest  was  handed  over  to  the  community,  CFUG 
obtained authority over the conservation, management and use of forest. As the 
forest was completely degraded the CFUG General Assembly meeting made a 
decision to restrict access to the forest completely for two years, with an aim of 
promoting  favourable  conditions  for  better  growth  and  regeneration  of  trees. 
During this period CFUG members used forest products from their kharbari, and 
those  who  had  few  or  no  private  trees  on  their  farmland  used  agricultural 
residues,
74 sawdust, and purchased fire-wood in the village from those who had 
surpluses.  Although  it  produced  minimal  overt  resistance  from  within  the 
community,  the  restricted  access  to  community  forest  was  not  a  popular 
regulation among villagers. Initially, the CFUG continued to experience the 
problem of illegal harvesting of  forest resources, especially from adjoining 
villagers. However with the cooperation a nd active participation of all CFUG 
members,  the  Sharada  Devi  CFUG  was  eventually  able  to  control  illegal 
harvesting. In order to protect the forest, the CFUG hired  ban heralu (forest 
watchman) and all households participated in patrolling the forest in turn, to 
control illegal harvesting and encroachment.  
 
                                                 
74 In rural Nepal, when there is a shortage of fire-wood, people use agricultural residues as a source of 
energy for household cooking and heating. Agricultural residues used for cooking were wheat straw, rice 
straw, corn stalks and khoya. 153 
 
The CFUG operational plan (OP) incorporated a range of fines and penalties 
against those who violate CFUG rules. The CFUG has specified certain acts 
which are against the spirit of the community forestry principle, including illegal 
harvesting of forest products, non participation in CFUG activities, misuse of the 
CFUG  funds,  setting  fire  within  the  forest,  grazing  cattle  inside  the  forest, 
encroachment of forest land, hunting, and any activities that increase erosion and 
landslides. In cases of violation of rules, various fines and penalties have been 
specified  (see  Table  5.6).  According  to  the  CFUG  executive  committee 
members,  there  were  few  cases  of  rule  violations  in  the  initial  stage  of 
community forestry intervention.  
Table 5.6: Fines and Penalties for Violation of Rules at Sharada Devi CFUG  
Type of damage    Fine in Nepali Rupees   
First time  Second 
Time 
Third time  Fourth time 
Stealing firewood  100/-  200/-  500/-  Expelled  from  the 
membership of CFUG & 
loss  of  access  to  the 
community forest 
Stealing fodder, leaf litter   50/-  100/-  150/-  - as above - 
Stealing poles and pegs  500/-  1,000/-  2,500/-  - as above- 
Cutting  trees  or  stealing 
timber 
The offender will be fined up to NRs 3,000/- and if the offence is 
repeated the person will be expelled from CFUG membership and 
forwarded for legal action to DFO. 
Grazing:         
    Goats  20/-  30/-  50/-   
   Cattle  50/-  75/-  150/-   
Setting fire  Any person who lights a fire in the forest will be fined based on the 
valuation  of  the  damage  and  the  person  has  to  reforest  the  land 
destroyed by fire. Moreover, the person will be handed over to DFO 
for legal action as per existing forest laws. 
Encroachment of forest   The encroacher will be fined based on the evaluation of the damage 
to forest. Also, the person is fined NRs 5,000/- to 10,000/, and will be 
handed over to DFO for further legal action. 
Absent  in  General  Assembly 
Meeting 
If  any  member  of  the  CFUG  is  absent  in  the  meeting  of  General 
Assembly without any valid reason, he/she will be restricted in their 
use of forest products for a particular period of time 
Source: (Sharada Devi CFUG 2008) 
 
Those who violated the CFUG rules were punished by the decision of the CFUG 
general assembly, and publicly scolded during the general assembly meeting. 
The positive aspect of the CFUG as reported by the villagers is that community 
members now have a sense of ownership over the forest. Sharada Devi CFUG 
has permanently hired a forest watchman on a paid basis for regular patro lling. 
All members of the CFUG are also actively involved in monitoring the forest, 
and  report  wrongful  activities  to  the  committee.  Because  of  this  legally 154 
 
recognized public monitoring, it is extremely difficult for outsiders to violate the 
rules and harvest the forest products illegally.  
 
The meeting of the CFUG executive committee takes place every month, during 
which the situation of the forest is assessed and any issue raised by a member is 
discussed and appropriate decision taken. According to the CFUG committee 
members, at present the Sharada Devi CFUG is not confronted with any cases of 
illegal harvesting and encroachment of forest. 
 
5.5.  Community-based  Forest  Governance  Outcomes  at  Sharada  Devi 
CFUG 
 
In the following section, I examine the three major outcomes associated with the 
community  forestry  intervention,  i.e.  community-based  forest  governance, 
livelihood  security,  and  environmental  sustainability.  I  will  then  report  how 
community-based  forest  governance  was  functioning  pre/early  during  the 
emergence of armed conflict, and how the prolonged armed conflict affected 
these newly established community-based forest governance mechanisms.  
 
5.5.1. Participation in Community Forest Governance in Sharada Devi CFUG 
 
It has been argued that community-based forest governance is a mechanism that 
opens new horizons and new spaces for local communities to exercise control 
over their resources, ideally ensuring transparency and accountability through a 
horizontal decision making process  (Baltodano 2008, 9). The most important 
factors in any decision making process are the mechanism and processes via 
which policy decisions are made. Local participation allows for the incorporation 
of the preferences and viewpoints of the public and therefore leads to a more 
dynamic  policy  shaping  process  (Dietz  and  Stern  2008,  12).  Fairness  and 
appropriateness  are  also  important  factors  in  any  kind  of  decision  making 
process (Kahn 2005, 147). By involving the public in local level natural resource 
management  initiatives,  competing  stakeholders  are  able  to  express  their 
concerns  and  shape  the  outcome  of  the  decision.  In  earlier  days,  public 
participation was sought after most of the decisions had already been made by 155 
 
government and the local stakeholders had little or no role in the process (Kahn 
2005,  148).  However,  after  the  emergence  of  participatory  community-based 
approaches, local communities are increasingly involved in the decision making 
process,  management  and  governance  of  natural  resources.  Proponent  of 
decentralized forest governance argue that decentralized community-based forest 
governance  allows  greater  participation  of  local  communities  in  the  forest 
management  decision  making  process  and  therefore  results  in  an  increase  in 
accountability of the state forest agencies in resource management (Anderson 
2000, 20).  
 
5.5.2. Election of Executive Committee and Processes of Decision-making in the 
Sharada Devi CFUG 
 
The formation of the CFUG executive committee and mechanism and process of 
decision  making  are  important  aspects  in  the  Nepalese  community  forest 
management regime. As the executive committee has a major role in facilitating 
and influencing the decision of the general assembly and the implementation of 
decisions, it is important to know how the committee is formed and the true 
nature of its representation. In Sharada Devi the election of the CFUG executive 
committee  is  done  through  the  meeting  of  the  GA.  The  CFUG  executive 
committee  consists  of  13  members,  including  the  Chairman,  Vice-chairman, 
Secretary, Joint-secretary, Treasurer, and 8 members. The term of the committee 
is  fixed  for  four  years;  however,  the  committee  can  be  dissolved  and 
reconstituted through a meeting of GA as and when necessary. According to the 
Sharada  Devi  Operational  Plan,  it is  mandatory  for  every  CFUG  member  to 
participate in the General Assembly meeting. If any members cannot attend the 
meeting, he/she must provide prior notice to the executive committee with valid 
reasons.  If  a  CFUG  member  violates  this  rule  the  person  is  restricted  from 
accessing forest products for one occasion (Sharada Devi CFUG 2008, 38). The 
strict  rules  set  by  the  CFUG  have  helped  to  make  the  GA  meetings  more 
participatory,  democratic  and  transparent.  When  the  annual  GA  meeting  is 
convened,  the  committee  Chairman  presents  the  progress  report,  income  and 
expenditure report and an annual plan for the coming year, which is endorsed by 
the GA meeting after due discussion. Every four years, the existing committee is 
dissolved for the election of a new executive committee. Until now the Sharada 156 
 
Devi CFUG Chairman has been elected by consensus. If there were more than 
one  candidate  for  the  position,  there  would  be  an  election.  Once  the  CFUG 
Chairman in elected, other officials for the committee are nominated and elected 
(if there were more than the required number of candidates) by the GA meeting. 
There are 6 hamlets within the Sharada Devi CFUG, thus CFUG has adopted a 
policy to nominate at least one member from each hamlet to make the CFUG 
committee more representative in terms of geographical coverage. To date there 
has  been  no  competition  for  the  nomination  of  candidates  in  the  executive 
committee. Reportedly, most people were reluctant to serve on the committee 
since it is a volunteer position, without any form of salary and benefit. In many 
instances, the General Assembly meeting has to force the CFUG members to 
serve on the committee.  
 
Members of the executive committee have given several reasons why people are 
not interested to serve on the CFUG committee. Firstly, people who are elected 
to the executive committee must allocate a significant amount of time for CFUG 
activities, which restricts their involvement in other income generating activities. 
Secondly, as a responsible committee member, they must make decisions and 
implement various policies and programs for the sustainable management of the 
community forest, which may not always be popular among all CFUG members. 
Thirdly, people who are required to take on management positions within the 
CFUG, such as Chairman, Vice-chairman, Secretary, Joint-secretary or Treasurer 
require some leadership qualities, and social recognition as well as a sufficient 
educational background to undertake the job responsibly. This generally restricts 
people from lower socio-economic strata from serving on the upper management 
of the CFUG. Finally, the scale of economic activity of the CFUG has been 
found to be one of the factors attracting people to serving on the committee. 
Until now, Sharada Devi CFUG has not generated much income, which may be 
one of the reasons that people are reluctant to become serving members. 
 
5.5.2.1. Representation of CFUG Members in the Decision Making Process 
 
The devolution of authority over forest management to local communities does 
not  automatically  empower  women,  poor  and  disadvantaged  groups  in  the 157 
 
community-based forest management model (Potter 2008, 39). It is important to 
consider how these groups are represented on the CFUG committee, which is the 
main forum for making and enforcing rules and devising forest management and 
community development activities. It is equally important to examine the type of 
positions  reserved for  women, poor and disadvantaged  groups. Sharada Devi 
data  show  that  from  1993  to  2007,  mean  representation  of  upper-income, 
middle- income and low-income groups was 27%, 61% and 12% respectively 
(see Table 5.7). Relative to a population profile of 24% (upper- income), 56% 
(middle-income)  and  20%  (low-income),  these  statistics  clearly  show  that 
representation  in  the  CFUG  committee  is  disproportionately  skewed  toward 
representatives  from  middle-income  and  upper-income  groups,  whereas  the 
representation of people from lower-economic strata was almost nil. In addition, 
the statistics show that some influential persons in the community – all from the 
upper-income  group  –  had  occupied  the  important  portfolio  of  the  CFUG 
executive committee many times. For example, BP (upper-income) occupied the 
post of CFUG Chairman seven times, and GKB (middle-income) three times. 
Similarly, KK (upper-income) occupied the position of Chairman three times, 
Vice-Chairman  two  times  and  Treasurer  five  times.  Likewise  IS  (middle-
income) occupied the position of Vice- Chairman four times and Secretary five 
times and IB (middle-income) occupied the post of Secretary four times. Out of 
12 CFUG Committees constituted between 1993 and 2004, there was only one 
woman elected as Joint-Secretary.   
 
Overall the data show that positions on the CFUG executive committee have 
been  mostly  dominated  by  a  few  members  of  the  elite,  holding  executive 
positions in turn, which indicates that the voices of the poor and women would 
not have been adequately represented in the decision making processes of the 
CFUG.   
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Table 5.7: Representation in CFUG Executive Committee by Gender, Class and 
Caste 
    Gender  Income categories  Caste 
Total  
members 
Men 
(%) 
Women 
(%) 
Upper-
income 
(%) 
Middle-
income 
(%) 
Lower-
income 
(%) 
Higher 
Caste 
(%) 
Lower 
caste 
(%) 
Ethnic 
group 
(%) 
Sep 2, 1993 to Mar 
24, 1994 
13  100  0  23  54  23  92  -  8 
Mar 25, 1994 to Mar 
14, 1995 
13  85  15  8  69  23  100  -  - 
Mar 15, 1995 to Aug 
16, 1996 
13  85  15  38  46  15  100  -  - 
Aug 17, 1996 to May 
13, 1997 
13  100  0  15  54  31  100  -  - 
May 14, 1997 to Aug 
16, 1998 
13  62  38  15  62  23  100  -  - 
Aug 17, 1996 to July 
16, 1999 
13  77  23  31  62  8  100  -  - 
July 17, 1999 to July 
15, 2000 
13  100  0  23  69  8  100  -  - 
July 16, 2000 to Aug 
16, 2001 
13  77  23  23  69  8  100  -  - 
Aug 17, 2001 to Aug 
16, 2002 
13  69  31  31  69  0  100  -  - 
Aug 17, 2002 to Aug 
17, 2003 
13  69  31  23  69  8  100  -  - 
Aug 18, 2003 to July 
15, 2004 
13  69  31  46  54  0  100  -  - 
July 16, 2004 to Aug 
17, 2007 
13  69  31  46  54  0  100  -  - 
Total  156  80  20  27  61  12  99  0  1 
Source: Compiled from Sharada Devi CFUG records
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During interviews, women repeated the message that they have more concern 
about  community  fores ts  than  do  men,  and  that  women‘s  involvement  in 
community  forest  management  activities  is  always  more  than  men‘s,  even 
though CFUG membership is given to the (male) household head. Data collected 
from CFUG records also show that women‘s representation in CFUG executive 
committee is minimal. From 1993 to 2007, the average representation of women 
in CFUG committees was only 20%. In later years, some policy reforms have 
been introduced to include a higher proportion of the poor, women and other 
disadvantaged members in the CFUG committee. However, the above data show 
that  the  representation  of  low-income  groups  has  been  declining  since  1999, 
which indicates that they are not interested in serving on the committee; possibly 
due to time constraints and involvement in other income generating activities, or 
                                                 
75 The Sharada Devi CFUG Constitution had made a provision that the term of CFUG Executive 
Committee shall be for the period of four years. However, due to many reasons like resignation, 
inability to serve in the committee, death, unsatisfactory work the CFUG executive have been 
reconstituted almost annually. 159 
 
due to elite domination, or because they do not consider that involvement in 
CFUG executive committees is useful for them.  
 
When  women‘s  representation  is  further  disaggregated  among  income 
categories, it shows that from 1993 to 2007, the representation of women from 
upper, middle and low-income groups is 2%, 16% and 2% respectively. This 
indicates that 80% of the female representation comes from women from the 
middle-income category, while representation of women from upper-and low-
income groups is only 10% per group. These data indicate that households from 
middle-income  categories  are  participating  and  benefitting  more  from 
community forests than people from other income groups.  
 
Table 5.8: Representation in the Sharada Devi CFUG Executive Committee by 
Gender and Income Category 
  Duration  Upper-income  Middle-income  Low-income 
Women 
(%) 
Men  
(%) 
Women 
(%) 
Men  
(%) 
Women 
(%) 
Men  
(%) 
Sep 2, 1993 to Mar 24, 1994  -  23  -  54  -  23 
Mar 25, 1994 to Mar 14, 
1995 
-  8  15  54  -  23 
Mar 15, 1995 to Aug 16, 
1996 
-  38  8  38  8  8 
Aug 17, 1996 to May 13, 
1997 
-  15  -  54  -  31 
May 14, 1997 to Aug 16, 
1998 
-  15  23  38  15  8 
Aug 17, 1996 to July 16, 
1999 
8  23  15  46  -  8 
July 17, 1999 to July 15, 
2000 
-  23  -  69  -  8 
July 16, 2000 to Aug 16, 
2001 
-  23  23  46  -  8 
Aug 17, 2001 to Aug 16, 
2002 
-  31  31  38  -  0 
Aug 17, 2002 to Aug 17, 
2003 
-  23  31  38  -  8 
Aug 18, 2003 to July 15, 
2004 
-  46  23  31  -  - 
July 16, 2004 to Aug 17, 
2007 
8  38  23  31  -  - 
  Mean %   2  25  16  45  2  10 
Source: Compiled from Sharada Devi CFUG record 160 
 
 
Similarly,  women‘s  participation  in  the  General  Assembly  (GA)  meetings  is 
much lower (9%) when compared with their male counterparts. However, it was 
found that women are active and participate more than men in community forest 
management activities.  
 
Table 5.9: Participation in CFUG Annual General Assembly Meetings  
Year  Total participants  Women  Men 
  Number   %  Number  % 
1994  44  -  -  44  100 
1995  72  13  18  59  82 
1996  92  9  10  83  90 
1997  103  5  5  98  95 
1998  96  10  10  86  90 
1999  105  4  4  101  96 
2000  107  10  9  97  91 
2001  138  11  8  127  92 
2002  141  11  8  130  92 
2003  103  13  13  90  87 
2004  153  15  10  138  90 
2005  176  18  10  158  90 
2006  156  19  12  137  88 
Total  1486  138  9  1348  91 
Source: Compiled from Sharada Devi CFUG records 
 
Inadequate participation of women in the GA meetings can be attributed to many 
factors (primarily cultural) and to CF policy. According to CF policy, only one 
member  from  each  household,  generally  the  household-head,  becomes  the 
official member on the CFUG; however, women can participate voluntarily in 
the GA meeting.  In recent years, especially after 2001, the representation of 
women  on  the  CFUG  executive  committee  has  increased  (see  Table  5.8). 
Various  factors  may  have  played  a  role  in  increasing  the  represent ation  of 
women on the executive committee, including pressure from the Maoists for 
social  and  economic  transformation,  and  second  generation  issues  in  CF 
highlighted by researchers, leading to policy shifts from the government as well 
as by donor agencies.  
 161 
 
5.5.2.2. Frequency of CFUG General Assembly (GA) and Executive Committee 
(EC) Meetings 
 
The GA is the apex body of the CFUG, and has the mandate to approve rules of 
forest  governance,  an  annual  plan,  and  assessment  of  past  activities.  It  also 
determines  an  appropriate  benefit  sharing  mechanism.  The  GA  meeting  also 
elects  the  executive  committee,  which  is  responsible  for  devising  and 
implementing the decisions made by the GA. The GA convenes once a year 
while the Executive Committee meets once a month. However, both committees 
can be convened according to necessity as well. The regularity and frequency of 
these meetings is an indicator of how active and functional CFUG governance 
has been. Data compiled during fieldwork indicate that the GA meetings were 
conducted regularly from 1993 to 2006 (see Figure 5.2).  
 
Figure 5.2: Frequency of General Assembly and Executive Committee Meetings at 
Sharada Devi CFUG 
                 
 
Source: Compiled from Sharada Devi CFUG record 
 
However, there were difficulties organizing a GA meeting between 2000 and 
2005. During the intense period of armed conflict, the Kavrepalanchok District 
Administration Office (DAO) issued a circular to obtain permission from DAO 
in advance before conducting any mass meeting of CFUG, and also to provide 
written information on planned meetings to nearby local security forces. Despite 162 
 
these difficulties  the Sharada  Devi  CFUG was  able to  conduct  their General 
Assembly meetings regularly, with some delays of a few weeks.  
 
5.5.3. Equity, Access and Benefit Sharing Mechanisms in Sharada Devi CFUG 
 
It has been argued that decentralization of authority of resource governance to 
local people will lead to a greater level of local participation, which will ensure 
sustainable  and  equitable  natural  resource  use  (Meynen  and  Doornbos  2004, 
235-36). Although there are different perspectives on the roles of property rights 
regimes  and  institutional  arrangements,  there  is  a  consensus  among  social 
scientists that institutions play a pivotal role in managing people‘s interactions 
with surrounding common-pool natural resources (Meynen and Doornbos 2004, 
235-237). Common property institutions like CFUG, and the operational rules 
they devise, dictate the resource use and benefit sharing patterns of local users. 
When the Sharada Devi forest came under community control, the GA meeting 
of the CFUG made a decision to restrict access to forest completely for two 
years, to enable regeneration. In 1996, during the third year of protection, the 
community forest was opened for use by CFUG members. However, access to 
the community forest was made on a limited basis, with members only allowed 
to collect leaf-litter to reduce the risk of forest fire. During the initial two years 
of complete protection, households in the community fulfilled their fuel-wood 
needs from the kharbari (private land allocated for growing grass and trees) and 
those who did not have access to forests products in their private land purchased 
from others. Since 1998 thinning operations have been carried out on a regular 
basis, and forest products generated from thinning practices (mainly fuel-wood) 
have been distributed to forest users, with every household receiving an equal 
amount of fuel-wood irrespective of family size and socio-economic status.  
 
As a management strategy, Sharada Devi CFUG has divided the forest into five 
blocks
76. The CF is opened three times a year to collect leaf -litter in the months 
of November, March and April. The CFUG Executive Committee decides on the 
exact date of collection and notifies its members. The forest is opened from 5am 
                                                 
76  A forest block is a unit of forestland, whose size varies according to geographic condition, forest 
composition and management purposes.  163 
 
until  5pm  to  collect  leaf-litter.  Only  CFUG  members  can  enter  the  forest  to 
collect  the leaf-litter.  If any CFUG member wants  to  hire a worker  – a non 
CFUG member – to assist them in collecting leaf-litter, the concerned household 
needs to obtain permission from the CFUG Executive Committee and paying the 
relevant fee. CFUG members are allowed to collect grass in the months of July 
and August after notification from the CFUG executive committee. Only one 
member from each household is allowed to enter the forest, and CFUG members 
do not have to pay any fee for the collection of grass. Similarly, from November 
to February the CF is opened every Saturday from 6am to 4pm for collection of 
dead wood and twigs. During this period CFUG members are also allowed to 
collect  Banmara
77  (Chromolaena  odorata),  and  Ningalo  (Drepanostachyum 
spp), free of cost. 
 
Every year CFUG members carry out thinning operations in December. Before 
undertaking the thinning, a notice is given to the District Forest Office (DFO) in 
advance,  specifying  the  date  and  time  of  thinning.  During  the  thinning 
operations, forest technicians from DFO may observe the thinning process and 
provide technical advice. The thinning operation is conducted under the close 
supervision of CFUG committee members, who have adopted a policy of hiring 
limited numbers of personnel to carry out the thinning operations, in order to 
avoid unscientific and unregulated cutting of trees. Previously, hired labourers 
from outside the village were used in thinning operations; however, after the 
realization  that  significant  amounts  of  money  had  gone  from  village  hiring 
workers outside of local community, the Sharada Devi CFUG decided to hire 
labour  from  the  forest  users  group  only.  This  practice  has  increased  the 
employment  opportunities  and  household  incomes  of  poorer  sections  of  the 
community.  Thinning  operations  are  performed  according  to  the  provisions 
made in the CFUG operational plan. Four major activities must be undertaken in 
thinning, i.e shrub management, singling, pruning, and thinning. Every year the 
CFUG executive committee estimates  the quantity of forest  products  derived 
from thinning, based on field observations. The forest products generated from 
                                                 
77 The Banmara (Chromolaena odorata) is an invasive species mainly used for animal bedding and turned 
to compost. This species spreads quickly by forming dense strands and prevents the establishment of other 
species. When it becomes dry it increases the risk of forest fire. Thus, the Sharada Devi Community forest 
has a policy to remove this invasive species periodically from the forest. 164 
 
thinning operations are distributed equally among all CFUG members. A local 
measurement unit is used to distribute the fuel-wood
78. The Sharada Devi CFUG 
has a policy that the forest products generated from thinning will not be sold 
outside  the  community  unless  and  until  comm unity  demand  is  satisfied. 
Currently, every household in the Sharada Devi CFUG pays NRs 300/- annually 
as a fee to acquire forest products from the CF. 
 
The Sharada Devi CFUG has a policy to provide timber for the construction of 
houses. In order to get timber from the forest, the CFUG member has to submit 
an  application  to  the  CFUG  executive  committee.  Once  the  application  is 
received,  the  committee  members  inspect  the  house  of  the  applicants  to 
investigate the validity of the claim. Once the investigation   is complete and 
provided that the demand for timber is valid, then the committee makes a 
decision  to  provide  timber.  At  present,  any  CFUG  member  who  wants  to 
construct a new house receives one pine tree free of cost; with those belonging to 
poorer sections of the community being awarded two trees. In addition to this, 
poorer CFUG members also receive other forest products free of cost, and they 
do not have to pay the annual membership fee. The Sharada Devi CFUG has also 
adopted a policy of providing free timber to construct houses and animal sheds 
that have been destroyed by fire or other natural disasters. The Sharada Devi 
community forest is still young, so users are not yet in a position to derive 
commercial benefits from the forest.  However, CFUG membe rs have fulfilled 
their subsistence needs from forest products, including fuel -wood, leaf-litter, 
fodder and grass.  
 
5.5.3.1. Forest Governance, Access and Distribution of Forest Products during 
late Conflict Periods  
 
According  to  interviews  with  the  CFUG  Chairman,  there  was  no  noticeable 
impact on the governance mechanisms of Sharada Devi CFUG during the late 
conflict periods of the armed insurgency. The activities of the CFUG reportedly 
                                                 
78 The local measurement unit used by the Sharada Devi CFUG for the distribution of fuel-wood is a rope. 
At the time of data collection, one household receives fuel-wood (branches and twigs) equivalent to 30 haat 
(12 meters), in circumference, which is equivalent to 17 bhari (head-load).  One head-load of firewood 
generally weighs 40 kg. 165 
 
ran smoothly throughout the conflict period. Further, he reported that there were 
no  disturbances  or  pressure  from  either  of  the  contending  parties  in  the 
implementation  of  CFUG  activities.  The  CFUG  was  able  to  continue  forest 
management activities as stipulated in the operational plan. General assembly 
and executive committee meetings were convened regularly, although there were 
occasional  delays.  Since  the  Maoist  guerillas  used  to  take  shelter  inside  the 
forest, the CFUG was obliged to get permission from the District Administration 
Office  (DAO)  and  were  required  to  give  notice  of  any  forest  management 
activities  to  nearby  security  forces,  in  order  to  avoid  accidental  aerial 
bombardment and firing. There was never more than a few months‘ delay in 
carrying out management activities. Before the emergence of conflict, the Nepal 
Australia  Community  Resource  Management  and  Livelihoods  Project 
(NACRMLP)  in  collaboration  with  the  District  Forest  Office  (DFO) 
Kavrepalanchok  provided  various  capacity  building  programs  for  CFUG 
members,  including  training  and  observation  tours.  After  the  escalation  of 
violent  conflict,  the  Nepal  Australia  Community  Resource  Management  and 
Livelihoods Project (NACRMLP) terminated its assistance programme effective 
from 30 June 2006, which greatly affected the budget and programs of the DFO, 
Kavrepalanchok. There was also a decline in the development activities being 
carried  out  by  other  government  agencies,  although  the  savings  and  credit 
programme in the village continued to run smoothly. Saving and credit groups 
operating in Sharada Devi CFUG greatly increased the villagers‘ access to loans, 
even during the later conflict periods of the insurgency. Among these, several 
groups are explicitly run by women, also without any obstruction. 
 
The villagers in Sharada Devi stated that they did not experience any significant 
negative impact on forest access and distribution of forest products during late 
conflict periods of the armed insurgency. Every year the Sharada Devi CFUG 
has  been  able  to  continue  its  thinning  operations  and  distribution  of  forest 
products. The community forest continued to open 3 to 4 times a year, as per the 
annual plan of the CFUG. Access to the forest was as usual, and CFUG members 
were able to collect forest products without any interruption either from Maoist 
insurgents or from security forces. The data collected indicate that there was no 
reduction in the quantity of forest products collected during late conflict periods. 166 
 
In fact the amount of fodder and leaf litter collected increased by roughly 3% 
during later periods of the conflict (see Table 5.10). 
 
Table 5.10: Mean Annual Forest Product Collection/Household during Pre/Early 
and late conflict periods, Sharada Devi CFUG - All Categories * 
Forest products  Pre/Early 
conflict 
Late conflict periods   Change 
(%) 
Timber (cu. ft)  -  -  - 
Fuel wood (Bhari)  16.71  16.71  - 
Fodder (Bhari)  8.29  8.55  + 3.13 
Grass (Doko)  2.22  2.22  - 
Leaf litter (Bhari)  21.09  21.64  + 2.60 
Source: Fieldwork by author, 2008* 1 bhari of green fuel wood is approximately equivalent to 
50 kg; 1 bhari of fodder or grass is equivalent to 25 kg; and 1 doko of leaf litter is equivalent to 20 kg. 
 
 
The  data  were  further  analyzed  to  determine  the  access  of  different  socio-
economic groups to forest products during pre/early and late conflict periods. 
There was no noticeable difference in the amount of forest products collected 
between different income groups, and the amount of forest products collected 
increased slightly across all income groups (see Table 5.11. 
 
Table  5.11:  Mean  Annual  Forest  Products  Collection  per  Household  during 
Pre/Early and Late Conflict Periods (all income categories), Sharada Devi CFUG  
Income group  Fuel wood 
(Bhari) 
Fodder (Bhari)  Grass (Doko)  Leaf litter (Bhari) 
Low-income         
Pre/Early 
conflict 
16.5  6.7  2.3  14.0 
Late conflict  16.5  6.5  2.7  15.0 
Change (%)  -  -3.0  +14.2  +7.1 
Middle-income             
Pre/Early 
conflict 
16.8  8.4  1.7  26.3 
Late conflict  16.8  8.9  2.0  26.7 
Change (%)  -  +5.6  +19.8  +1.5 
Upper-income             
Pre/Early 
conflict 
16.8  9.7  2.7  23.0 
Late conflict  16.8  10.3  2.0  23.7 
Change (%)  -  +5.6  -5.1  +2.9 
Source: Fieldwork, 2008 
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5. 5.4. Income and Expenditure of Sharada Devi Community Forest User Group 
(CFUG)  
 
The Sharada Devi CFUG does not have a secure source of income. To date, they 
have not sold any forest products outside the community because the forest in 
still young. The major source of income for the CFUG is through membership 
fees, donations and the sale of fuel-wood. Over the last decade, membership fees 
accounted for 36% of the total income of the CFUG, while 25% was derived 
from  donations.  The  CFUG  Chairperson  reported  that  various  national  and 
international visitors come to this CFUG for observation tours and donate money 
during their visits. From 1997/98 to 2007/08, the Sharada Devi CFUG earned a 
total income of NRs. 561,691 (equal to US$ 7590).  
Table 5.12: Income of Sharada Devi CFUG, Kavrepalanchok (1997/98 - 2007/08) 
Source of Income  Amount(NRs)  % of total 
 
Sale of timber                         12,100                       2.2  
Sale of fuel wood                       107,618                      19.2  
Sale of leaf-litter                         30,079                       5.4  
Sale of sand                            1,400                       0.2  
Membership fee                       202,623                      36.1  
Household contribution                         41,280                       7.3  
Donation                       141,869                      25.3  
Prize                            6,400                       1.1  
Fine                            1,395                       0.2  
Interest                         16,928                       3.0  
Total                       561,691                    100.0  
Source: Compiled from CFUG records 
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5.5.4.1. CFUG Income during Pre/Early and late Conflict Periods 
 
Sharada Devi CFUG records show that there was not a serious impact on CFUG 
income during the period of the conflict. Sales of forest products, which were 
relatively low throughout, were halved over the 1995/6 – 2000/1 and 2001/2 – 
2006/7 periods, but this decline was compensated for by increased membership 
fees and international donor contributions.  
 
Table  5.13:  Income  of  Sharada  Devi  CFUG  during  Pre/early  and  late  Conflict 
Periods  
Source of 
Income 
Pre/Early conflict   Late conflict periods 
  
(1995/96 - 2000/01)*  (2001/02 - 2006/07)* 
 
  Amount 
(NRs) 
%   Amount 
(NRs) 
%  
Sale of timber  -  -  12,100  2.3 
Sale of fuel 
wood 
65,720  12.6  33,898  6.5 
Sale of leaf-litter  25,111  4.8  4,468  0.9 
Sale of sand  1,400  0.3  -  - 
Membership 
fees 
73,669  14.1  108,554  20.7 
Household 
contribution 
(salary of forest 
watchman) 
41,280  7.9  -  - 
Donations  54,693  10.4  79,176  15.1 
Prizes  6,400  1.2  -  - 
Fines  1,246  0.2  149  - 
Interest  7,102  1.4  8,726  1.7 
Total  276,621  52.8  247,070  47.2 
Source: Compiled from Sharada Devi CFUG Record 
Note:  Violence  in  Nepal  was  intensified  in  the  latter  period  of  conflict  especially  after  2000/01. 
Respondents in all study communities indicated they did not experience serious effects until the later stage 
of the conflict, and in Sharada Devi this was least disruptive. 
 
 
5.5.4.2. CFUG Expenditure and Community Development Activities of Sharada 
Devi CFUG 
 
Since the inception of the Sharada Devi CFUG, various programs have been 
launched in  the community. CFUG records  indicate that most of the income 
(77%) of the Sharada Devi CFUG has been invested in forest conservation and 
management activities such as forest thinning, construction of forest roads and 169 
 
establishing a ―Farmer Forest Management School‖
79 (see Table 5.14). Between 
1995 and 2008, Sharada Devi CFUG constructed 3.66 km of forest roads, which 
have not only helped in minimizing the risk of forest fire but have also facilitated 
forest products transportation and linking of local villages to markets.  About 
10% of the total income has been invested in community development activities 
such as the construction of public toilets, community buildings, loans to CFUG 
members  and  training  programs.  CFUG  committee  members  indicated  in 
interviews that the limited amount of income of the CFUG restricted their ability 
to invest more in community development programs, although the Sharada Devi 
CFUG has initiated a number of community development projects (see Table 
5.16). 
 
                                                 
79 The Farmer Forest Management School (FFMS) was established primarily to address the identified needs 
of  the  community  forest  users  in  sustainable  forest  management  practices.  The  FFMS  aims  to  train 
facilitators including the forest users to develop and apply appropriate forest management practices in forest 
management  and  strengthen  the  forest  users‘  capacity  in  community  forest  management  through  the 
knowledge  and  skills  gained  through  the  experimental  learning  techniques  and  participatory  training 
methods. The FFMS was launched in Nepal in various CFUGs, including the Sharada Devi CF in early 
2000 by the Regional Community Forestry Training Centre (RECOFTC) and the Forest, Trees and People 
Program  (FTPP),  in  partnership  with  the  Department  of  Forests  (DoF),  FAO and  other  donor  assisted 
community  forestry  projects  including  the  Nepal-Australia  Community  Resource  Management  Project 
(NACRMP), and the Federation of Community Forestry Users in Nepal (FECOFUN). The FFMS brings 
forestry  technicians  and  forest  users  together  to  explore  the  appropriate  methods  of  sustainable  forest 
management to ensure maximizing the benefits to CFUGs without compromising conservation objectives 
(Singh, 2003). 170 
 
Table 5.14: Expenditure of Sharada Devi CFUG (1995/96 to 2007/08)  
Activities  Amount (NRs)  % of total 
1.  1. Forest Management
80        
1.1 Salary of Forest Watchman               212,528                  37.6  
1.2 Forest management activities               184,036                  32.6  
1.3 Revision of Forest Operational 
Plan 
                 1,611                    0.3  
1.4 Forest road construction                 28,795                    5.1  
1.5 Farmer Forest School                  10,426                    1.8  
Sub-total            437,396                77.4  
2.  2. Community development
81       
2.1 Public toilet construction                 20,520                    3.6  
2.2 Women‘s Empowerment 
Training 
                 8,370                    1.5  
2.3 Motivation Class                   5,847                    1.0  
2.4 Loans to CFUG members                 11,500                    2.0  
2.5 Community building construction                 10,000                    1.8  
Sub-total              56,237                10.0  
3.  3. Administrative costs
82                 71,744                  12.7  
Total               565,377                100.0  
Source: Compiled from Sharada Devi CFUG Records 
 
5.5.4.3. CFUG Activities during the Pre/Early and late Conflict Periods 
 
The  data  on  the  expenditure  of  Sharada  Devi  CFUG  have  been  analyzed  to 
assess  the  trend  of  CFUG  investment  in  different  activities  within  the 
community. Data clearly show that of the total expenditure, 48% and 52% of the 
investment took place over the two five year periods roughly corresponding to 
the pre/early and late conflict periods (see Table 5.16). Surprisingly, investment 
in forest management activities was greater during the period of intense conflict 
as compared to the earlier period, although community development expenditure 
declined. It is important to note that data do not indicate any negative impact on 
the governance of community forest activities during the conflict. The success of 
the  Sharada  Devi  CFUG  in  implementing  planned  activities  even  during  the 
conflict period can be attributed to two factors according to local community 
sources. The first reason is that the local community did not take the side of 
                                                 
80 Forest management activities include salary of forest watchman, costs for planting, thinning and pruning, 
Chapan, Muchan, shrub management, upgrading of the operational plan, transportation of logs etc, forest 
road construction and other activities related to forest management. 
81  Community development activities typica lly  include community infrastructure development  such as 
construction of public toilets, community building, rural road, drinking water scheme s, and community 
empowerment activities  such as loans to CFUG members, training and any other activities that aim  to 
benefit the forest users. 
82 An administrative cost includes audit fees, taxes, purchase of stationary and meeting costs etc. 171 
 
either  of  the  contending  parties,  and  thus,  there  was  little  pressure  and 
interference in the forest managment activities from the conflicting parties, and 
the second facor is that the local governace mechanism of the CFUG was quite 
mature and stable. 
 
Table 5.15: Expenditure of Sharada Devi CFUG  
Activities  Pre/Early conflict  
(1995/96 – 2000/01) 
Late conflict  
(2001/02 – 2006/07) 
1. Forest Management  Amount  % of 
total 
Amount  % of 
total 
1.1 Salary of Forest Watchman  82,380  15.6  100,070  19.0 
1.2 Forest management activities  62,917  11.9  117,663  22.3 
1.3 Revision of Forest 
Operational Plan 
1,611  0.3  0  0.0 
1.4 Forest road construction  9,121  1.7  16,374  3.1 
1.5 Farmer Forest School  9,926  1.9  500  0.1 
Sub-total  165,955  31.5     44.5 
2. Community Development             
2.1 Public toilet construction  20,520  3.9  0  0.0 
2.2 Women Empowerment 
Training 
0  -  8,370  1.6 
2.3 Motivation Class  5,847  1.1  0  0.0 
2.4 Loan to CFUG members  11,500  2.2  0  0.0 
2.5 Community building 
construction 
10,000  1.9  0  0.0 
Sub-total  47,867  9.1     1.6 
4.  3. Administrative Cost  37,361  7.1  33,161  6.3 
Total Expenditure  251,183  47.6  276,138  52.4 
Source: Compiled from Sharada Devi CFUG Record, 2008   
 
5.6. Livelihoods Outcomes 
 
In  the  following  section,  I  will  examine  the  different  livelihood  outcomes 
associated  with  community based forest  governance in  Sharada Devi  CFUG, 
especially  with  respect  to  household  income,  community  forest  based 
employment opportunities and community development activities carried out by 
the CFUG during pre/early and later conflict periods. 
 
5.6.1. Household Income of Sharada Devi CFUG 
 
Common property resources (CPR) play a crucial role in the rural economy and 
the livelihoods of people, especially in low-income rural communities (Jodha 
1990, A65; Shackleton et al. 2007, 573). Forests in the hills of Nepal contribute 172 
 
directly to the farming system, as they provide essential inputs to agriculture and 
animal  husbandry.  Also,  forests  play  a  crucial  role  in  ensuring  livelihood 
security and the conservation of the local environment (Dev et al. 2003, 76; Beck 
and Nesmith 2001, 129; Dev and Adhikari 2007, 148).  
 
Households in Sharada Devi CFUG pursue different livelihoods portfolios to 
diversify  their  sources  of  household  income.  Due  to  increasing  population 
pressures and the declining size of land holdings, households in Sharada Devi 
are adopting new ways of farming combined with off-farm activities that are 
mainly  oriented  towards  the  market.  Due  to  the  area‘s  proximity  to  the 
commercial business centre and industries, household members in Sharada Devi 
CFUG work in the government service, factories and business firms, and also 
rely on dairy and vegetable production as a major source of household income. 
The household  survey  reveals  that  out  of the total household  income  among 
Sharada Devi CFUG respondents, 45%, 51% and 3% of household income is 
derived  respectively  from  the  combined  agriculture  and  livestock  sector,  the 
service sector, and community forest. Within the agriculture and livestock sector, 
dairying (18%), cereal crops (11%) and vegetable farming (11%) are the three 
major  sources  of  income.  Vegetable  farming,  especially  the  cultivation  of 
potatoes, cauliflower, cabbage and leafy vegetables, has become popular and is a 
significant source of household cash income among farmers. In recent  years, 
farmers in Sharada Devi CFUG are also engaged in rearing an improved breed of 
buffalo, and substantial household cash income is derived through the sale of 
milk. Small animals like goats and poultry also supplement household income. 
Substantial  additions  to  household  income  are  contributed  through  off-farm 
wages  (casual)  and  overseas  employment.  Within  the  service  sector, 
salaries/waged work (permanent) (29%), self-employment (13%), and overseas 
employment (6%), are the three major sources of household income (see Table 
5.17).  Data  taken  during  field  work  show  that  during  pre/early  periods  of 
conflict, nine people from this community were engaged in salaries/waged work 
(permanent), and no person from the community was in overseas employment. 
However,  during  the  period  of  conflict,  the  number  of  people  engaged  in 
salaries/waged work (permanent) increased from 9 to 13, and 23 people from 
Sharada Devi CFUG left for overseas employment. According to the villagers, 173 
 
this  migration  can  be  explained  by  the  limited  employment  opportunities 
available within the country, and also the political and social instability caused 
by  the  violent  conflict.  Data  indicate  that  the  contribution  of  overseas 
employment to household income is currently 5.5%, mainly among middle and 
upper-income  households.  Overseas  employment  does  not  contribute  to  the 
household income of poorer families because they cannot afford to invest the 
money required for agents‘ fees and the initial investment to obtain overseas 
employment. According to the local people in Sharada Devi, those aspiring to go 
overseas must pay at least NRs. 50,000/- and potentially hundreds of thousands 
of NRs in fees to employment agencies, depending on the countries where they 
seek work;  which is  beyond the reach of people from  lower socio-economic 
strata. An assessment was done to determine the consumptive value of the forest 
products  as  a  component  of  household  income.  Data  suggest  that  the 
contribution of CF to household income in terms of direct consumptive value is 
3.3%; however, the indirect contribution of the CF to the farming system and 
animal husbandry is much greater. Households in Sharada Devi have diversified 
their sources of income besides agriculture. It is important to note, however, that 
these new and emerging sources of income cannot replace the traditional forms 
of livelihood such as farming and animal husbandry that form the foundation of 
the livelihoods of the Sharada Devi population.  
 
Table 5.16: Mean Annual Household Income in Sharada Devi CFUG (all income 
categories) by source of income 
Source of income  Annual household 
income (NRs) 
% of total income 
Salaries/waged work (permanent)  43,756  28.8 
Dairying  27,122  17.9 
Self employment  19,244  12.7 
Cereals crops  17,226  11.3 
Vegetable farming  16,251  10.7 
Overseas employment  8,356  5.5 
Forests products  4,938  3.3 
Small animal (goat/sheep)  4,911  3.2 
On-farm wages (casual)  4,078  2.7 
Poultry rearing  2,756  1.8 
Off-farm wages (casual)  2,144  1.4 
Pension  667  0.4 
Fruit growing  467  0.3 
Total  151,915  100.0 
Source: Field survey by author, 2008  
 174 
 
Household income among Different Income Groups 
 
The pattern of household income in Sharada Devi CFUG shows little variation 
across  the  socio-economic  groups.  Salaries/waged  work  (permanent)  and 
farming are the most prominent sources of household income for all income 
groups.  Due  to  the  proximity  to  the  market,  households  from  every  income 
category were employed in business firms or factories which are the primary 
source of household income and source of living. Another finding of this study is 
that the direct contribution of CF to household income is inversely proportional 
to household income. Data show that, out of total household income, 6.7 % of 
income  for  low-income  household  comes  from  the  CF  in  the  form  of  forest 
products, while this is only 4% and 2% for middle and upper-income households 
respectively.  In other  words,  the data indicate that  the  greater the household 
income, the lower the reliance on CF for livelihood support (see Table 5.17).  
 
Table  5.17:  Mean  Household  Income  (NRs)  in  Sharadaevi  CFUG  by  Income 
Category 
 Source of income  Low-income  Middle-income  Upper-income 
Amount  %  Amount  %  Amount  % 
1.Agriculture and 
livestock sector 
           
1.1 Cereal crops  8,780  13.7  18,313  13.9  24,583  9.4 
1.2 Vegetable farming  10,187  15.9  12,967  9.9  25,600  9.8 
1.3 Fruit growing  800  1.3  200  0.2  400  0.2 
1.4 Dairying  10,800  16.9  35,033  26.6  35,533  13.7 
1.5 Small animals 
(goat/sheep) 
2,767  4.3  5,600  4.3  6,367  2.5 
1.6 Poultry  267  0.4  -  -  8,000  3.0  
Sub total  33,600  52.6  72,113  54.8  100,483  38.6 
2.Service sector                   
2.1 Salaries/waged work 
(permanent) 
11,000  17.2  26,000  19.8  94,267  36.2 
2.2 Overseas employment  -  -  6,400  4.9  18,667  7.2 
2.3 Self employment  7,200  11.3  12,800  9.7  37,733  14.5 
2.4 Pension  -  -  2,000  1.5  -  - 
2.5 On-farm wages 
(casual) 
2,133  3.3  6,400  4.9  3,700  1.4 
2.6 Off-farm wages 
(casual) 
5,700  8.9  467  0.4  267  0.10  
Sub total  26,033  40.8  54,067  41.1  154,633  59.4 
3.Forests products (CF)  4,264  6.7  5,336  4.1  5,215  2.0 
Total  63,897  100.0  131,516  100.0  260,332  100.0 
Source: Fieldwork by author, 2008  
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5.6.2.  Household  Income  in  Sharada  Devi  CFUG  during  Pre/Early  and  Late 
Periods of Conflict 
 
During the priod of armed conflict households in Sharada Devi have diversified 
their souce of income by intensifying agriculture and animal hunbanday as well 
as other oppurtunities available. Surprisingly, household income in Sharada Devi 
CFUG increased by 44% during the period of armed conflict (see Table 5.18). 
The overall household income increased during the period of conflict mainly due 
to the shift to poultry farming and a significant increase in overseas employment. 
The shift to poultry farming may be due to the fact that as the Sharada Devi 
community  is  very  close  to  the  market,  that  poultry  raising  is  far  less  labor 
intensive as compared to other farming activities and is a good source of cash 
income. The boost in overseas employment can be attributed to the search for 
better income opportunities and as a strategy to escape fom the conflict.  
 
Table 5.18: Mean Household Income (NRs) in Sharada Devi CFUG (1995/96 – 
2006/2007)  
Source of income   Pre/Early conflict 
(1995/96– 
2000/01) 
 Late conflict 
(2001/02- 
2006/07) 
Change (%) 
1.Agriculture and livestock 
sector 
     
1.1 Cereal crops  16,977  17,226  +1.5 
1.2 Vegetable farming  10,922  16,251  +48.8 
1.3 Fruit  333  467  +40.0 
1.4 Dairying  27,144  27,122  -0.1 
1.5Small animals (goat/sheep)  4,222  4,667  +10.5 
1.6 Poultry  111  2,756  +2380.0 
Sub total  59,710  68,488  +14.7 
2.Service sector          
2.1 Salaries/waged work 
(permanent) 
26,911  43,756  +62.6 
2.2 Overseas employment   0  8,356  +8356 
2.3 Self employment  5,267  19,244  +265.4 
2.4 Pension  667  667  0.0 
2.5 On-farm wages (casual)  5,622  4,078  -27.5 
2.6 Off-farm wages (casual)  3,556  2,144  -39.7 
Sub total  42,022  78,244  +86.2 
3.Forest products  1,403  1,421  +1.3 
Total  103,135  148,154  +43.7 
Source: Field survey by author, 2008 
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When household income (Table 5.19) is further disaggregated among different 
income categories it shows that during the period of conflict, overall household 
income increased by 30%, 28% and 55% among low-income, middle-income 
and  upper-income  households  respectively.  It  is  important  to  note  that  the 
income  from  community  forest  increased  marginally  during  the  period  of 
conflict by 1.76%, 1% and 0.7%, among low, middle and high income household 
respectively. While there appears to be a marginal increase, this would need to 
have been studied over a longer period to investigate its significance. 
 
Table  5.19:  Mean  household  Income  (NRs)  during  Pre/Early  and  late  Conflict 
Periods in Sharada Devi CFUG 
   Low income  Middle income  High income 
    Pre/early 
conflict 
Late 
conflict 
Change 
(%) 
 Pre/early  Late 
conflict 
Change 
(%) 
 Pre/early 
conflict 
Late 
conflict 
Change 
(%) 
1.Agriculture and 
livestock sector 
                 
1.1 Cereal crops  9,180  8,780  -4  18,933  18,313  -3  22,817  24,583  +8 
1.2 Vegetable 
farming 
3,567  10,187  +186  10,133  12,967  +28  19,067  25,600  +34 
1.3 Fruit  800  800  -  -  200  -  200  400  +100 
1.4 Dairying  8,667  10,800  +25  40,367  35,033  -13  32,400  35,533  +10 
1.5. Small animals 
(goat/sheep) 
2,367  2,767  +17  4,567  5,600  +23  5,733  6,367  +11 
1.6 Poultry  267  267  -  -  -  -  67  8,000  +11899 
Sub total  24,847  33,600  +35  74,000  72,113  -3  80,283  100,483  +25 
2. Service sector                            
2.1. Salaries/waged 
work (permanent) 
2,400  11,000  +358  12,000  26,000  +117  66,333  94,267  +42 
2.2. Overseas 
employment  
-  -  -  -  6,400  -  0  18,667  +18667 
2.3. Self 
employment 
3,800  7,200  +90  2,667  12,800  +380  9,333  37,733  +304 
2.4. Pension  -  -  -  2,000  2,000  0  0  0  - 
2.5. On-farm wages 
(casual) 
4,267  2,133  -50  6,533  6,400  -2  6,067  3,700  -39 
2.6. Off-farm wages 
(casual) 
9,800  5,700  -42  533  467  -13  333  267  -20 
Sub total  20,267  26,033  +30  23,733  54,067  +28  82,067  154,633  +55 
3. Forest products  4,209  4,264  +2  5,240  5,336  +1  5,175  5,216  +1 
Total  49,322  63,897  +30  102,974  131,516  +28  167,525  260,332  +55 
Source: Field survey by author, 2008 
 
5.6.3.  Contribution  of  Community  Forest  (CF)  to  Household  Income  and 
Livelihoods in Sharada Devi CFUG 
 
Because the wild resources received from forests are gathered and used directly 
without  entering  the  market,  the  valuation  of  these  resources  for  livelihood 
security of rural poor and forest dependent communities is ignored by planners 
and  decision  makers  (IIED  1997a,  5).  Despite  the  apparent  small  financial 
contribution to household income from forest products, forest goods and services 177 
 
nevertheless provide important economic benefits to local communities, which 
are  underestimated  in  national  economic  statistics  as  well  as  this  survey. 
Government statistics in many countries record only the income from the formal 
forestry sector, ignoring the indirect environmental services and the contribution 
of forest products through the informal sector (Mogaka et al. 2001, 7). Since 
forest products are mainly used for subsistence purposes and never reach the 
market for economic valuation, their value is hard to estimate accurately. It can 
be argued that the value of the subsistence use of forest products is far greater 
than  its  formally  calculated  economic  value.  ‗Consumptive  values‘  refers  to 
these benefits received from the direct use of the forest products.   
 
It  is  difficult  to  assess  the  monetary  value  of  ecosystem  services  such  as 
watersheds  and  soil  conservation,  water  flow  regulation,  and  carbon 
sequestration (Merlo and Croitoru 2005, 29). The community forest in Nepal 
renders essential inputs to the farming system and is well integrated into the 
farming  system  (Dev  and  Adhikari  2007,  148).  The  contribution  of  the 
community forest in the Sharada Devi farming system is also significant as it 
provides various inputs  for agriculture and animal husbandry. However, it is 
difficult  to  estimate  the  flow  of  energy  from  community  forest  to  farming 
systems, and to calculate the benefits directly in simple monetary terms. The 
resources  from  community  forests  form  an  extremely  important  input  to 
community livelihoods.  
 
A focus group discussion was held with village women in Sharada Devi CFUG 
to  examine  their  viewpoint  on  the  contribution  of  community  forest  to  local 
livelihoods.  They  confirmed  that  people  in  Sharada  Devi  CFUG  accrue 
substantial  benefits  from  their  community  forest.  One  woman  said  that  ―she 
loves the community forest more than her children‖ since the forest  was her 
main source of livelihood. She further stated that community forests supported 
local livelihoods in many ways. First, community forests provided fodder and 
grass that supports animal husbandry. Similarly leaf-litter collected from the CF 
is  used  as  bedding  material  for  livestock,  which  is  ultimately  converted  to 
compost  and  applied  on  the  farm  for  maintaining  soil  fertility  that  helps  to 
increase  agriculture  production.  Secondly,  community  forest  provides  fuel-178 
 
wood, an affordable source of household energy for cooking for the majority of 
the households. Thirdly, the community forest serves watershed protection that 
provides benefits to downstream users in the form of drinking and irrigation 
water.  
 
Villagers reported a direct link between the conservation of forest resources and 
an increase in the quantity of water from the forest watershed. They also stated 
that the establishment of community forest has directly helped to increase their 
household income. Before the inception of the CF, their land tended to be fallow 
in the winter season after the harvest of wheat until the rainy season, mainly due 
to  the  shortage  of  water  for  irrigation.  Previously,  nobody  grew  and  sold 
vegetables from this community. However, the protection and restoration of the 
CF lead to a significant increase in the availability of water resources and has 
resulted  in  most  households  growing  off-season  vegetables  and  earning 
substantial  additional  cash  income  (see  Table  5.20).  Moreover,  due  to  the 
increase in the availability of grass, fodder and leaf litter from the CF, most 
villagers are rearing milking buffalo. 18% of total household income is derived 
through the sale of milk (see Table 5.17). A direct benefit received from the 
community forest is the availability of drinking water. Before the establishment 
of the Sharada Devi CF, there were only eight community drinking water taps in 
Sharada Devi CFUG due to the shortage of water. Recently, another 25 water 
taps have been constructed to provide access to drinking water for the entire 
community. This was made possible due to the increase in the quantity of water 
in  the  stream  and  springs  coming  from  the  CF  watershed.  It  is  evident  that 
significant  inputs  for  primary  production  are  derived  from  the  community 
forests.  CFUG  members  stated  that  farming  and  animal  husbandry  are 
completely  dependent  on  the  inputs  drawn  from  the  community  forests.  In 
Sharada Devi CFUG 45% of total household income comes from the combined 
agriculture and livestock sector which is largely supported by community forest 
products and environmental services.  
 
During  the  course  of  this  study,  an  attempt  has  been  made  to  calculate  the 
income  from  forest  products  in  terms  of  the  value  for  consumption.  The 
―consumptive  value‖  is  defined  as  the  quantity  of  forest  products  directly 179 
 
obtained and used by households. The ―consumptive value‖ has been calculated 
in  economic  terms  based  on  the  quantity  of  forest  products  used  by  each 
household annually from the CF, and the local market value of such products. 
However,  valuation  of  non-consumption  uses  like  biodiversity  conservation, 
watershed  protection,  recreation,  aesthetic,  cultural  and  spiritual  values  are 
equally important but difficult to assess in economic terms, and such calculation 
is beyond the scope of this study.  
 
Table  5.20:  Consumptive  Value  of  Forest  Products  (NRs)  by  Income  Category 
during Pre/Early and Late Conflict Periods at Sharada Devi CFUG
83   
Forest 
Products 
Low-income  Middle-income  Upper-income 
    Pre/early 
conflict 
Late 
conflict 
    Pre/early 
conflict 
Late 
conflict 
    Pre/early 
conflict 
Late 
conflict 
  
   Amount 
(NRs) 
Amount 
(NRs) 
Change 
(%)) 
Amount 
(NRs) 
Amount 
(NRs) 
Change 
(%) 
Amount 
(NRs) 
Amount 
(NRs) 
Change 
(%) 
Fuel 
wood 
2,480  2,450  -1.2  2,520  2,520  -  2,520  2,520  - 
Fodder  505  490  -3.0  630  665  +5.6  730  770  +5.6 
Grass  175  200  +14.2  120  150  +25.0  200  150  -25.1 
Leaf litter  1,050  1,125  +7.1  1,970  2,000  +1.5  1,725  1,775  +2.9 
Total  4,209  4,264  +1.3  5,240  5,336  +1.8  5,175  5,216  +0.8 
Source: Fieldwork by author, 2008 
 
The statistics above show that the gross value of forest products collected from 
the CF is slightly higher among middle-income and upper-income households as 
compared  to  low-income  households.  However,  the  percentage  of  the 
contribution of CF to household income is higher among low-income households 
as  compared  to  middle  and  upper-income  households  (see  Table  5.18). 
Interestingly, the data indicate that the household consumption value of forest 
products  increased  among  all  income  groups  during  the  period  of  armed 
insurgency, indicating that there was no negative impact on the income accrued 
from community forests during the armed insurgency. 
 
In conclusion, it may be said that people are less dependent on the community 
forest for household cash income to support their livelihoods according to the 
                                                 
83 The income from forest products was calculated based on the work of Gregersen at al. (1995) and Murthy 
et al. (2005) where consumptive value of forest products in each CFUG was calculated based on per unit 
current local price of the particular forest products and multiplied by the amount of forests products used by 
the households. The consumptive value of forest products used by households in Sharada Devi CFUG was 
calculated based on the local value of the particular forest products. After discussion with general members 
and CFUG committee members, the price of the forest products was fixed at the rate of NRs 50/- per cu ft 
for timber and a NRs. 25/- for a bhari of fuel-wood, fodder, leaf-litter and grass.  
 180 
 
availability  of  development  opportunities,  and  that  the  significance  of  the 
community forest as a direct provider of a living to marginalized people may 
decrease  as  these  expand.  However,  the  significance  of  community  forest  in 
supporting  animal  husbandry  and  agriculture  and  maintaining  ecosystem 
functions is increasingly recognized. 
 
5.6.4.  Community Forestry- Based Employment at Sharada Devi CFUG 
 
With the inception of the community forestry program in Sharada Devi, some 
opportunities  for  employment  have  been  generated
84. From 1995/96 through 
2006/07,  the  Sharada  Devi  CFUG  created  about  6,648  person  days
85  of 
employment for the local community. Employment opportunities are generated 
mainly  during  forest  thinning  operations  and  implementation  of  vario us 
community development activities within the community. 49.4 % and 50.6 % of 
employment  was  generated  during  the  early  and  late  conflict  periods 
respectively. These data show virtually no impact on CFUG based employment 
in Sharada Devi community during the armed conflict (see to Table 5.22).
86  
 
Table 5.21: Employment Generated by Sharada Devi CFUG during Pre/Early and 
late Conflict Periods 
Activities  Total 
employment 
(Person days) 
Pre/Early Conflict 
 ( 1995/96 to 2000/01) 
Late Conflict 
 ( 2001/02 - 2006/07) 
      Person days  % of total  Person days  % of total 
Forest 
management 
6,456  3,172  47.7  3,283  49.4 
Community 
development 
193  109  1.6  84  1.3 
Total  6,649  3,281  49.3  3,367  50.7 
Source: Compiled from Sharada Devi CFUG records 
The  Sharada  Devi  CFUG  has  also  made  contributions  in  the  livelihoods  of 
women through literacy classes conducted through the assistance of the Nepal 
                                                 
84 The employment opportunities generated from community forestry activities are calculated based on the 
expenditure of the CFUG in a particular year and the local wage rate of that particular year. However, 
employment generated from community forestry-supported activities like increases in vegetable farming, 
animal husbandry are not included. 
85 Person days refer to the time in days required for one person to complete a task in an 8 hour shift. 
86 However, discussion with blacksmiths revealed that their livelihoods depended on making and selling of  
tools like  spades, axes, ploughs,  sickles, knives and other household utensils. During the late conflict 
periods they could not make and sell such tools due to the restrictions imposed by the security forces, which 
drastically reduced their incomes. Security forces believed that the tools manufactured by the blacksmiths 
might be used as weapons by the Maoist insurgents.  
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Australia Community Forestry Project  (NAFP) and DFO, which helped raise 
awareness  among  women  and  made  them  confident  enough  to  express  their 
opinions in public forums. In the last eight years, women in the Sharada Devi 
CFUG  have  formed  12  women‘s  saving  and  credit  groups.  As  most  of  the 
productive resources  are in  the hands  of men, this  saving and credit scheme 
provides credit to women at a low interest rate that has increased their productive 
capacity. Those who become members of the women‘s saving and credit group 
deposit NRs. 50/- per month into the revolving fund, which is provided to its 
members for pursuing various activities like vegetable farming and purchase of 
milking buffalo. The limit of credit for vegetable farming is NRs. 10,000 and for 
the purchase of buffalos NRs. 30,000, and the interest rate is 13% per annum. A 
member of the women‘s saving and credit group said ―after the establishment of 
the women‘s saving and credit group, women‘s status in society, as well as in the 
household has improved significantly‖. According to her, women are now in a 
position to recommend and give loans to their counterparts which has boosted 
their image in family as well as in society. Such saving and credit groups have 
been  supported  by  various  organizations  including  the  Participatory  District 
Development Planning (PDDP)
87, Nari Chetana
88 and Chhimek Bikas Bank Ltd 
(Neighbourhood Bank)
89. The women reported that even during the period of 
conflict, the saving and credit groups were functioning smoothly.  
 
5.7. Environmental Sustainability Outcomes of Sharada Devi CFUG 
 
Measuring  environmental  outcomes
90  of  any  common  property  resource 
management regime is not an easy task (Baland, Bardhan, and Bowles 2007, 6). 
                                                 
87 Participatory District Development Programme (PDDP) is a follow-up to "Supporting Decentralisation in 
Nepal" (NEP/92/027), a Nepal Planning Commission (NPC)/UNDP project which worked primarily at the 
district-level  to  promote decentralised  participatory  development  and  to  strengthen  local  governance  in 
Nepal. 
88 The Nari Chetana Kendra Nepal (WACN), an NGO, has been collaborating with Helvetas Nepal since 
1993  for  conducting  integrated  Community  Based  Development  Program  (ICBDP)  in  Kavrepalanchok 
District.  Activities  include  social  mobilization,  group  formation,  informal  group  savings,  informal 
education, capacity building and cooperative establishment. These have been effectively implemented by 
WACN for empowerment of rural women. 
89 Chhimek Bikas Bank Ltd. is a microfinance development bank. It provides microfinance services to 
women and the marginalized and deprived living below the poverty line. 
90 Environmental outcomes and outputs are two different things. Outputs generally refer to tangible result s 
of any collaborative plans, policy and projects. Environmental outcomes refer to the effects of outputs on 
environmental and social condition (Koontz and Thomas 2006, 113).   
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Different  scholars  have  focused  their  study  by  measuring  environmental 
outcomes in terms of crown cover, forest stock, or the flow of resources such as 
the quantity of harvests or the number of head loads of fire-wood collected in a 
particular time period (Somanathan, Prabhakar, and Hehta 2007, 270; Baland, 
Bardhan,  and  Bowles  2007,  249).  Also  subjective  measures  such  as  the 
participants‘  perceptions  of  environmental  improvements  through  survey  and 
interviews  have  been  used  to  gauge  environmental  outcomes  (Gaspart  and 
Platteau 2007, 165; Leach, Pelkey, and Sabatier 2002, 652). The appropriateness 
of these measures to evaluate environmental outcomes varies across space and 
according to circumstance (Brogden 2003). During fieldwork, the environmental 
outcomes of the Sharada Devi CFUG were assessed based on perceptions of 
forest users and the environmental indicator data available. Several rounds of 
focus group discussions and interviews were conducted to assess local people‘s 
perceptions of environmental benefits after the establishment of Sharada Devi 
CFUG.  
 
CFUG members concurred that the establishment of community forests led to 
several environmental benefits. The most important environmental outcome as 
reported  by  the  local  users  was  the  improvement  in  forest  condition,  which 
greatly  helped  in  improving  local  environmental  quality.  Moreover,  people 
reported that illegal harvesting, encroachment; cultivation of marginal land, and 
open  grazing  had  stopped  completely  after  the  inception  of  the  CFUG.  In 
addition, community forests provided environmental services such as greenery, 
biodiversity conservation, watershed protection, erosion and landslide control. 
Other  benefits  of  spiritual  and  recreational  value  that  the  local  community 
derives from CF were regarded as equally important. The Sharada Devi CFUG 
has invested a small portion of its income for the development of an ancient 
temple, Sharada Devi, which is located in Sinagal village. In the long run, they 
have  planned  to  develop  the  Sharada  Devi  community  forest  as  a  unique 
ecotourism site for bird watching and trekking, with a tower on the mountain top 
for a panoramic view of Kathmandu city along with historic cities in Bhaktapur, 
Lalitpur  and  Terai  districts.  By  developing  the  community  forest  as  an 
ecotourism destination, the Sharada Devi CFUG has planned to earn substantial 183 
 
amounts  of  money  and  invest  the  income  earned  from  ecotourism  in 
conservation of the forest as well as in overall community development.  
 
5.7.1. Status of Wildlife in Sharada Devi CFUG 
 
Sharada  Devi  CFUG  members  were  asked  whether  they  experienced  any 
changes in the status of wildlife in the community forest after the inception of 
the  community  forestry  program.  Most  people  reported  that  before  the 
establishment of the community forest there were no wildlife in the degraded 
forest  except  rabbits  and  jackals.  According  to  the  forest  users,  after  the 
establishment of the community forest and conservation program, many species 
of wildlife have migrated into the community forest  and their numbers have 
increased significantly. While visiting the forest for assessing forest products, 
forest  users  in  Sharada  Devi  reported  numerous  encounters  with  wildlife, 
although the exact numbers are not known. Table 5.22 lists those species which 
were sighted. However, the increase in the number of wildlife has had some 
negative impacts as well. Farmers reported that wildlife destroyed their crops, 
and in 2007 a child was killed by a leopard. 
 
Table 5.22: List of Wild Life at Sharada Devi CFUG Sighted by Informants 
Vernacular name  English name  Scientific name 
Wild animals       
Bandel  Wild boar  Sus scrofa 
Pate Bagh  Tiger  Panthera tigris tigris* 
Chituwa  Leopard  Panthera pardus 
Dumsi  Porcupine  Hystrix indica 
Salak  Chinese pangolin   Manis pantadactyla* 
Rabbit   Hispid hare   Caprolagus hispidus 
Shyal  Jackel  Canis aurevs 
Ban Biralo  Wild cat  Telis chans 
Chittal  Spotted dear  Axix axis 
Ratuwa mirga  Barking Deer  Muntiacus muntaijak 
Lokharke  squirrels  Funambulus spp. 
Birds       
kalij   kalij pheasant  L. l. leucomelanos 
Battai  Quail  Coturnix coturnix 
Titra   Hill-partridge  Arborophila torqueola 
Fiste   -    - 
Lampuchree  Yellow billed Blue Magpie  Urocissa flavirostris 
Dhukur  Oriental Turtle Dove  Streptoplia orentalis 
Koili  Plaintive Cuckoo  Cacomantis merulinus 
Source: Fieldwork by author, 2008   * Protected species under Nepalese law 184 
 
 
 5.7.2. Status of Regeneration and Stock of Trees at Sharada Devi CFUG  
 
Until the late 1980s, the present forest area occupied by the Sharada Devi CFUG 
had  become  completely  degraded  shrubland.  In  1993  the  forest  came  under 
community-based management and the local community took over management 
of  this  forest.    After  15  years  of  community-based  forest  management,  the 
Sharada Devi  forest  is  now converted back into a dense forest,  although the 
forest is still young. Although the community carried out plantation in a few 
patches  of  the  forest,  most  of  the  forest  has  been  established  through 
regeneration.  This  forest  is  composed  of  broadleaf  species,  mainly  Schima-
Castanopsis (katus-chilaune) forest type, which is common in the Middle Hills 
of Nepal. A recent forest inventory conducted in 2008 by Sharada Devi CFUG 
with the technical help of foresters from DFO indicates that the tree size, density, 
and species composition have significantly improved after the establishment of 
community forests. Inventory data show that the regeneration of forest species is 
encouraging. A recent forest inventory prepared by Sharada Devi CFUG shows 
that there are about twenty- three thousand trees per hectare in Sharada Devi 
community forest, out of which 17,375 are saplings
91 and 5417 pole size
92 trees 
(see Table 5.24). Since there is a large number of trees per hectare, every year a 
thinning operation is carried out to remove trees that are growing too close 
together. The main purpose of the thinning operation is to maintain a healthy 
stock of forest by promoting the growth of trees and also to reduce the risk of 
wildfire. The fuel-wood generated from such thinning operations is distributed 
among the CFUG members.  
 
                                                 
91 Saplings refer to young trees below 5 cm diameter at breast height (DBH). 
92 Pole size refers to young trees having 5- 10 cm diameter at breast height. 185 
 
A recent assessment conducted by the CFUG shows that the crown cover of the 
Sharada Devi CF is now 60%
93 which indicates that the status of the forest is 
above average. The regeneration status of the forest is as follows: 
 
Table 5.23: Status of Forest Regeneration in Sharada Devi CF 
Source: (Sharada Devi CFUG 2008) 
 
The  forest  inventory  prepared  by  Sharada  Devi  CFUG  with  the  technical 
assistance of forest technicians shows that the growth of trees at Sharada Devi 
CF  is  promising.  Data  indicate  that  six  tree  species  predominate  in  the 
community forest. The mean annual increment of timber in the Sharada Devi CF 
is 2,806 cubic feet per hectare per year (see Table 5.24). This figure indicates 
that in years to come, Sharada Devi CFUG can earn a substantial amount of 
money  from  the  sale  of  forest  products,  which  can  be  used  for  community 
development. 
 
                                                 
93 Canopy cover refers to the percent of a fixed area covered by the crown of an individual plant species or 
delimited by the vertical projection of its outermost perimeter; small openings in the crown are included. 
 
Local name  English 
name 
Botanical name  Saplings 
(no. of 
trees/ha) 
Pole size tree 
(no. of 
trees/ha) 
Katus  Chinquapin  Castanopsis indica (Roxb.)  1,544  1,373 
Chilaune  schima  Schima wallichii (DC.) 
Korthals 
3,500  178 
Phalant  Oak  Quercus lamellose  307  794 
Setikath  -  Myrsine capitellata Wall.  1,437  770 
Kafal  Box myrtle  Myrica esculenta Buch-Ham-
ex D. Don 
236  194 
Kalikath  -  Myrsine semiserrata Wall.  685  102 
Jhingane  -  Eurya acuminate   100  227 
Jamun  Indian 
blackberry 
Syzigium cumini (L.) Skeels  34  53 
Other species  -  -  9,532  1,726 
Total      17,375  5,417 186 
 
Table 5.24: Status of Forest Stock at Sharada Devi CF 
Local 
name 
10-30 cm diameter 
 
Above 30 cm diameter  Total 
number 
of  
tree/ha 
Mean annual 
increment 
(cubic feet)
94 
  Number of 
trees/ha 
Volume 
(cubic feet) 
Number of 
trees /ha 
Volume 
(cubic feet) 
   
Katus  558  996  -  -  558  996 
Chilaune  157  242  -  -  157  242 
Phalant  22  20  -  -  22  20 
Setikath  3  2  -  -  3  2 
Kafal  52  73  -  -  52  73 
Sallo  69  809  17  463  96  1,272 
Others  167  201  -  -  167  201 
Total  1,028  2,343  17  463  1,055  2,806 
Source: Sharada Devi CFUG (2008)  
 
People  in  the  hills  and  mountains  of  Nepal  have  always  used  a  variety  of 
medicinal plants  from  the forest  for the treatment  of various  ailments. Since 
there is no reliable access to health care system, people in rural areas depend 
upon these medicinal plants. Recent inventories show that there are significant 
non-timber  forest  products  (NTFP)  which  have  medicinal  properties  and  are 
found in the Sharada Devi community forest.  
 
According to the people in Sharada Devi CFUG, future growth of the NTFP 
industry is promising. At present people do not collect and sell medicinal plants 
on a commercial scale due to their low volume. However, local households use 
the medicinal plants frequently for the treatment of various ailments. 
                                                 
94 The mean annual increment is the average net annual increase in the yield (expressed in terms of volume 
per unit area) of living trees to a given age, and is calculated by dividing the yield of a stand of trees by its 
mean age (Centre for International Forestry Research (1999). 
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Table 5.25: Status of Non-timber Forest Products at Sharada Devi CFUG 
Local name  Scientific name  No. of plants 
per ha. 
 Kukur 
Daino 
Smilax macrophilia  1,732 
Nigalo  Himalayacalamus fimbriatus  1,828 
Ban Pan  Hemigraphis hirta Vahl.  142 
Others  Dhasingare (Gaultheria fragrantissima Wall.); Aaiselu 
(Rubus  ellipticus);  Sungabha  (Dendrobium  clavatum 
Roxburgh);  Nundhiki  (Osyris  wightiana  wall.  Ex 
wight);  Banlasun  (Allium  carolinianum  DC.  ); 
Chiraito(  Swertia  chirayita);  Ban  Kera  (Capparis 
zeylanica);  Kukurdaino  (Smilax  ferax  wallich  ex 
kunth); Bhyakur (Dioscorea pentaphylla L.); Nagbeli 
(Lycopodium  clavatu);  Bhasme,  Kharelo,  Rudilo 
(Pogostemon benghalensis) 
427 
Total    4,129 
Source: (Sharada Devi CFUG 2008)  
 
5.7.3. Status of the Watershed in the Sharada Devi CFUG 
 
All of the respondents reported that after the establishment of the community 
forest,  the  watershed  condition  significantly  improved.  Previously  landslides, 
mudflows,  soil  erosion  and  siltation  had  severely  affected  downstream 
operations such as rice production. However, the conservation of the CF has 
reduced the incidence of these adverse events. Villagers stated that conservation 
of the community forest has resulted in a significant increase in the amount of 
water coming from the forest watershed both in terms of quality and quantity. 
Before  the  inception  of  the  community  forest,  the  forest  was  completely 
degraded  and  there  was  a  shortage  of  water,  which  led  to  frequent  conflicts 
among farmers for water especially during nursery bed preparation for paddy. 
Now  farmers  have  sufficient  water  for  irrigation  and  drinking.  One  farmer 
reported  an  annual  income  of  NRs  10,000/-  before  the  inception  of  the 
community  forest  from  wheat  production.  After  the  wheat  harvest,  the  land 
tended to be fallow until the rainy season because of the shortage of water for 
irrigation.  However,  when  the  source  of  water  was  significantly  increased, 
through protection provided by the CF, the farmer now earns an annual income 
of Nrs 40,000/- from the same piece of land and grows additional vegetables and 
crops. Another farmer from the same CFUG said that he has a small land holding 188 
 
on which he grew rice and maize that was previously left fallow in the spring, as 
there was insufficient water to grow other crops. Now there is sufficient water to 
grow off-season vegetables from which he earns an additional Nrs 25,000. In 
recent years, many villagers have started growing vegetables on a commercial 
scale mainly because of the increase in the quantity of water. Moreover, as noted 
above, it was possible to add 25 water taps to the eight previously available in 
the Sharada Devi community due to the increase in the quantity of water in the 
stream and springs from the CF watershed. 
 
5.8. Conclusion 
 
The Sharada  Devi  Community Forest  (SDCF)  is  located  close to the district 
centre and well connected with the market. The majority of households belong to 
the  middle  income  group  (54%)  and  depend  upon  agriculture  or  the 
wage/salaried sector for their incomes. The Sharada Devi community forest is 
mainly composed of natural regeneration of broadleaf species and the per capita 
area of forest is 0.20 hectare. The Sharada Devi CF has been able to fulfil local 
demand for forest products partially. The data indicate that off-farm income has 
become the largest single source of household income. The second largest source 
of household income comes from farming activities, i.e. agriculture and animal 
husbandry (45%), where community forest makes a major contribution, mainly 
in terms of animal feed, composting, and water for irrigation.  
 
On average about 69% of the population in Sharada Devi depend on fuel-wood 
collected from forest as a source of household cooking, however the dependency 
of people from the lower-income group is 93%, which demonstrates that CF 
matters most to poorer people. Through their limited income the Sharada Devi 
CFUG is implementing various community development activities. The training, 
observation  tours,  and  literacy  classes  for  women  conducted  by  the  Nepal-
Australia Community Forest Project have improved awareness among women, 
and  social  capital  has  been  improved  through  the  establishment  of  new 
community institutions such as a women‘s group, saving and credit group, and 
youth  club  Similarly,  there  has  been  an  incremental  development  of  natural 
capital reflected in improved regeneration, greenery, forest stock, biodiversity, 189 
 
and enhanced water regime. There is a significant increase in the supply of forest 
products  every  year,  and  reported  increases  in  the  number  and  species  of 
wildlife. Due to enhanced watershed protection, the most noticeable outcomes 
have been improved irrigation and drinking water facilities, off-season vegetable 
farming and dairying. Due to the good conservation outcomes, the Sharada Devi 
CFUG has been awarded the ―Bandevi Puraskar‖ – a prestigious national prize 
in  appreciation  of  their  exemplary  contribution  to  local  forest  management. 
Many  international  visitors  regularly  come  to  this  forest  to  learn  about  the 
successful model of community-based forest co-management at the local level.  
 
Community-based forest co-management in the Sharada Devi CFUG has had a 
positive  impact  on  the  bio-physical  environment  and  building  capacity  of 
resource  users.  Nonetheless  the  voices  and  representation  of  women  and  the 
socio-economically marginalized in forest policy formulation and benefit sharing 
needs  to  be  further  strengthened.  Most  of  the  income  generated  from  the 
community  forest  has  been  invested  in  infrastructure  development  and  forest 
management activities, with limited focus on income-generating activities. Some 
policies  of  positive  discrimination  to  address  the  issue  of  equity  have  been 
initiated,  including  free  membership,  and  free  timber  for  the  construction  of 
houses for poorer sections of the community. But there is a need to formulate a 
pro-poor program in order to increase the socio-economic status of marginalized 
sections of the community.  
 
During  the  late  conflict  periods  of  insurgency,  the  outreach  activities  of  the 
District Forest Office in Kavrepalanchok were greatly reduced. However, the 
study found that there was no marked impact as a result of the armed conflict on 
the governance regime of Sharada Devi CFUG. The mechanisms of community-
based forest governance continued to function there. This study suggests that 
community-based forest governance is resilient, and can adapt and respond to 
challenges according to the changing situation.  
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Chapter 6 
 
Case Study Two: Hile Jaljale (Ka) Community Forest 
User Group (CFUG)  
 
6.1.  Introduction 
 
Hile  Jaljale  (Ka)  Community  Forest  falls  under  the  Tukucha  Village 
Development  Committee  (VDC)  ward  no.  6  and  7,  Ghimire  Gaon  of 
Kavrepalanchok  district,  north-east  of  Kathmandu.  The  Hile  Jaljale  CF  is 
connected with a dirt road to Banepa, a commercial centre of Kavrepalanchok. 
The altitude of the Ghimire Gaon varies from 1500 to 2100 meters above the sea 
level.  The  Hile  Jaljale  community  forest  (CF)  is  situated  between  Majhuwa 
Khola in the east, Punyamata Khole in the west, cultivated land of Bhesonath 
and Tikaram Ghimire in the north and the confluence of the Thulo Khola and 
Punya Mata Khola in the south. Although, most of the areas are sloping terrain, 
about 14 (70%) sq. km of the area is under cultivation. Agriculture and animal 
husbandry are the main sources of livelihood for more than 90% of the residents. 
Other  sources  of  livelihoods  include  wage  labour,  salaries/waged  work 
(permanent),  overseas  employment  and  small  business.  The  bulk  of  the 
household income is obtained through the sale of milk and vegetables, especially 
the cultivation of potatoes, cauliflower, cabbage, and beans. The major cereal 
crops grown in this area are rice, maize, wheat and millet. The community forest 
provides important inputs to farming and animal husbandry, and supports local 
livelihoods through the supply of fuel-wood, fodder, timber, manure and water. 
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Map 6.1: Participatory Map of Hale Jaljale (Ka) Community Forest 
 
Source: Prepared by author with the help of CFUG Members 
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6. 1.1. Bio-physical Characteristics of Hile Jaljale (Ka) 
 
The Hile Jalajle (Ka) CFUG has a total area of 118 hectares, which is divided 
into 7 blocks and 27 sub-blocks and 7 working circles. The majority of trees in 
the forest are pines aged more than 20 years. 
 
Table 6.1: Bio-physical Characteristics of Hile Jaljale (Ka) CF 
Description  Number 
Total area of forest (ha.)  118.14 
Forest blocks  7 Blocks, 27 Sub-blocks and 7 Working 
Circles  
Manageable forest area (ha.)  89.64 
Aspect  South – West and North-East 
Slope (degrees)  Oct-25 
Canopy coverage (%)  65 
Age of forest (years)  20 
Average altitude (meters) above sea 
level 
2020 
Major forest species  Pinus patula, Pinus walichiana, Schima 
wallichii, Rhododendron arboreum Sm, 
Castanopsis indica,  
Myrica esculenta,  
Source: (Hile Jaljale (Ka) CFUG 2001) 
 
6.1.2. Socio-economic Profile of Hile Jaljale (Ka) CFUG 
 
A  household  questionnaire  survey  was  administered  to  assess  the  basic 
household characteristics of the CFUG in Hile Jaljale (Ka) CFUG. Predictably, 
the survey data indicate that households with upper incomes have more family 
members  and  higher  educational  status  than  middle  income  and  low  income 
households (see Table 6.2).  
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Table 6.2: Household Characteristics by Income Category in Hile Jaljale CFUG 
 Household characteristics  
(mean values from sample) 
Low-
income 
Middle-
income 
Upper-
income 
Household size (no.)                6                 6                    9  
Average age of household head (yrs)              38               54                  51  
Household income          
Mean annual household income (NRS)        48,593         81,200          174,367  
Mean annual household income (US$)
95            657           1,097              2,356  
Education of household head          
Overall literacy rate (%)              73               40                100  
Illiterate (%)              27               60                  -    
Primary education (%)              73               27                  60  
Secondary education (%)              -                 13                    7  
Higher secondary education (%)              -                 -                    13  
College/University (%)              -                 -                      7  
Livestock holding (average no.)          
Buffalo                0                 2                    1  
Cow                0                 1                    2  
Goat/Sheep                2                 3                    6  
Chicken    1.87                 0                    0  
Household with:          
Electricity (%)              80             100                100  
Piped water (%)              93             100                  93  
Telephone (%)              47               73                  87  
Radio/television (%)              87               93     100  
Source: Field survey by author, 2008 
 
There are a total of 243 households in the Hile Jaljale (Ka) CFUG, with a total 
population of 1,569. All households are members of the Hile Jaljale community 
forest user group. Out of the total population, 92% belong to Brahman/Chettri 
‗upper‘  castes  and  the  remaining  households  belong  to  ethnic  minorities  and 
occupational castes such as Kami and Damai.  
 
Table 6.3: Demographic Profile of Hile Jaljale (Ka) CFUG 
Caste  Number of 
households 
Population  Total population (%) 
 
Brahman/Chhetri  219  1,388  92 
Kami (blacksmiths)  13  73  5 
Damai (tailors)  7  36  2 
Bhujel  2  9  1 
Newar  2  10  1 
Total  243  1,516  100 
Source: Hile Jaljale (Ka) CFUG Constitution, 2005 
 
                                                 
95 1 US$ equivalent to Nepali Rupees (NRs) 74 194 
 
The  land  holding  sizes  of  Hile  Jaljale  (Ka)  CFUG  members  differ  between 
wealth groups. The average land holding per household is 3 ropani
96 for low-
income households, while it is 4.6 and 20 ropani for middle-income and upper-
income  households  respectively  (see  Table  6.4).  Moreover,  upper-income 
households have fertile irrigated land and private forests while middle-income 
households have moderate land holdings  with  irrigated land but  do not  have 
private forests.  
The low-income households have less land, mostly un-irrigated upland, and do 
not possess private forests. 
 
Table 6.4: Mean Land Holding in Hile Jaljale (Ka) CF by Income Category 
Land holding  Low-income  Middle-income  Upper-income 
Average land holdings (ropani)              3    4. 6               20  
Irrigated              1               3                 6  
Rain-fed            -               -                   0  
Upland               2               2               11  
Kharbari
97            -               -                   3  
Source: Source: Author, Field survey, 2008 
 
The participatory wealth ranking method (see Chapter One) undertaken with CF 
users  and  CFUG  executive  committee  members  was  used  to  divide  the 
households into three major classes based on the socio-economic status
98. The 
result of the wealth ranking exercise indicates that out of 243 households 12%, 
58%, and 30% belong to upper -income, medium and low-income households 
respectively (see Figure 6.1). 
 
                                                 
96 1 ropani is equivalent to 500 square meters, making 20 ropani to the hectare. 
97  Kharbari  is  a  private  land  designated  for  growing  grass  (including  thatching  grass)  and  trees  to 
supplement the household‘s needs for grass, fuel-wood and timber, especially when demand cannot be 
fulfilled from government owned or communal forests. 
98 Upper-income households supplement their income from farming, local businesses, and salaries/ waged 
work in Nepal and overseas employment. They often have land outside the village, have irrigated as well as 
un-irrigated land holdings, larger areas of  kharbari (private forest and pasture land). Generally they have 
cattle and have food sufficiency.   
Middle-income households commonly have land-holdings and cattle, but only modest kharbari. Significant 
household income earned from animal husbandry (including dairying), and vegetable farming (depending 
on the fertility of the soil and distance to the market). They tend to be heavily dependent on inputs to their 
farming  systems  from  community  forests.  Off-farm  employment  is  also  important  for  their  income. 
Generally they produce cereals enough to feed their family for 6 months. For the rest of six months they 
have to buy food from market or borrow in the village. 
Lower  income  households  (including  landless households) have  small  or  no  land  holdings,  are  mostly 
dependent on off-farm activities, such as laboring, artisan work (blacksmithing, tailoring, mason, carpentry) 
and non timber forest product collection. To pursue these livelihoods they have specific needs from the 
forest distinct from the other wealth-rank groups; such as charcoal for blacksmithing, and fuel-wood and 
medicinal plants for sale. For most of the year they have to buy food from market to feed their family. 195 
 
Figure 6.1: Wealth Ranking of Hile Jaljale (Ka) CFUG Members 
 
 
6.2.  Historical Background of Hile Jaljale (Ka) Community Forest 
 
6.2.1.  Hile Jaljale (Ka) Forest during birta Tenure 
 
The vamsabali (genealogical  history)  found in  the  Dahal village of Tukucha 
revealed that the present area occupied by Hile Jaljale (Ka) forest was granted as 
a  Kus  birta
99  by  King  Jayapati  Malla  of  Nalabalambhu  to  the  ancestors  of 
Ghimire and Dahal clan during the seventeenth century. 
 
The birtawal  (owner of the  birta) treated the forest  as  private property.  The 
water originating from the birta land was also managed by the birtawal. During 
fieldwork it was observed that numbers of water canals were constructed for 
irrigation purposes from the stream originating from the Hile Jaljale forest. There 
are five irrigation canals that irrigate land in Dahal Gaon (village) and several 
canals serve Ghimire Gaon. From the time of the granting of birta during the 
Malla dynasty, up to the unification of Nepal and Rana Rule, the birta area was 
already a settlement, occupied by the descendents of Dahal and Ghimire clan. 
                                                 
99 Birta is a form of land grant by the state to individuals who can not participate in economic pursuits by 
virtue of their religious traditions, or their political and social functions. It was generally provided to priests, 
religious teachers, soldiers, and members of nobility and the royal family. It symbolized high social and 
economic status in the society. Birta is private property with clearly defined rights (Regmi 1976, 17). Over 
time birta become a corrupt form of land tenure by which favourites of the rulers were rewarded. 196 
 
The property rights in the birta forest were vested as communal rights among all 
of  the  descendents  of  Dahal  and  Ghimire  clan,  and  the  forest  was  under 
collective management based on the indigenous system of forest management. 
 
After the emergence of Rana rule, the rulers interfered in birta tenure and tried to 
impose their control over the land. According to the oldest persons in the village, 
during the Rana regime one patch of the Hile Jaljale (Ka) forest was cleared for 
the establishment of dairy farming to supply milk to the rulers in Kathmnadu. 
After the enactment of Muluki Ain (civil code), the forest management system 
practiced by the birtawals was disturbed. The Rana regime introduced various 
changes. In the east of Kathmnadu, Purba Yek Namber Ban Goswara (East No. 
1) Forest Inspection Office was established to administer the forest as well as 
taxation  and  legal  proceedings,  and  new  officers  like  dithha  (judge),  bichari 
(court  record  keeper),  and  banpale  (forest  watchman)  were  introduced. 
According  to  the  eldest  persons  in  the  village,  following  the  appointment  of 
these officials and functionaries birta land came under the control of the state, 
and the birtawal has to follow their instruction for the management and use of 
forests. The dittha had the power to give decisions on forest disputes and rule 
violations,  and  the  banpale  (forest  watchman)  was  appointed  by  the  sate  to 
control illegal harvesting and encroachment. During that time, according to the 
villagers, the following fines and penalties were imposed in cases of violation of 
rules: 
 
Table 6.5: Local Rules of Forest Management during the Period of Rana Regime 
Nature of violation  Fine/penalty 
Illegal harvesting of bhata (branches of 
trees) for roofing 
NRs. 1/- 
Illegal collection of leaf-litter  50/- Paisa  
Illegal harvesting of fuel-wood  25/- Paisa 
Felling of trees  NRs. 5/- 
Intentional forest fire, and hunting of 
wildlife 
The offender is submitted to the hakim 
(Officer) in Forest Goswara for 
prosecution.  
Source: Fieldwork by author 2008 
 
Until the 20
th century, the Hile Jaljale (Ka) forest was in very good condition; 
but  it  was  badly  affected  by  the  catastrophic  earthquake  of  1933.  After  the 197 
 
earthquake, large numbers of trees were cut down and brought to the large cities, 
mainly Kathmandu, Bhaktapur and Patan, for reconstruction of houses destroyed 
by the earthquake. Large numbers of big trees were also destroyed during the 
disastrous snowfall of 1943. The Hile Jaljale (Ka) forest was further degraded 
during  the  political  upheaval  of  1944-1950  when  the  government  gave 
permission to cut the remaining big trees to generate state revenue.   
 
6.2.2.  Hile Jaljale (Ka) Forest under Open Access Regime 
 
After the political changes
100 of 1951, the newly formed government abolished 
birta
101 tenure. After the abolition of birta, private ownership of forests no longer 
existed, and subsequently the Hile Jaljale (Ka) forest became in practice open 
access. The sudden institutional vacuum created by the abolition of the  birta 
system  induced  the  collapse  of  the  traditional  system  of  forest  management. 
After the abolition of birta tenure, the Hile Jaljale forest officially came under 
the control of the state. Without a management system in place, the forest was 
heavily used for grazing cattle, collecting firewood, fodder and timber from the 
surrounding  villages.  Due  to  these  various  underlying  causes,  the  forest  was 
completely degraded by 1967. As a consequence, there was a severe shortage of 
essential forest products, and villagers said they had to walk hours to collect a 
head load of fuel-wood or fodder. 
 
6.2.3. Hile Jaljale (Ka) Forest under Community Management 
 
The villagers in the Hile Jaljale (Ka) community faced a severe scarcity of forest 
products during the 1960s and the livelihoods of people were on the verge of 
collapse (AusAID, 2006). The degradation of forest was so acute that it had 
severe impacts on the farming system. To improve the livelihoods of people, the 
Department of Forest (DoF) initiated a large-scale tree plantation program with 
assistance from the Nepal-Australia Community Forestry Project. In 1969, the 
                                                 
100 For details on political changes see chapter three.  
101 According to Regmi (1978), birta was a grant of land given to a noble as a reward for a service rendered 
to the state. It was usually both tax free and heriTable, and had no time limit on tenure. After the end of the 
Rana regime in 1950, the newly formed government enacted the Birta Abolition Act in 1959 and those 
forest lands under birta tenure now came under state control, subject to taxation as agricultural land or 
nationalized as forest. 198 
 
denuded hill slope of Hile Jaljale was planted with two species of pines i.e. 
Pinus patula and Pinus wallichina. At the beginning of the plantation, some 
people in the village opposed the plantation program as they feared that this 
would restrict their access to the forest for collecting fire wood and grazing their 
livestock.  However,  as  the  majority  of  the  villagers  were  in  favor  of  the 
plantation, conservation efforts were largely successful. After plantation, the area 
was fenced to protect it from grazing and encroachment, and the villagers were 
entrusted by the Forest Department with conservation of the newly established 
plantation. The program offered employment to local people during plantation 
and forest fencing as well as jobs as forest watchman. As a result, some sections 
of the community supported forest conservation and participated actively in the 
program. Shortly after the completion of fencing, in some section of the forest, 
fences were destroyed and the poles were stolen. Generally, people who had a 
large number of livestock and who  were  enjoying open  access  grazing  were 
against  the  plantation  and  conservation  program.  Poor  people  who  depended 
primarily on the forest for meeting various livelihoods requirements such as fuel-
wood,  medicinal  plants,  and  the  collection  of  roots  and  shoots  as  food 
supplements  were  also  affected.  In  order  to  stop  the  illegal  harvesting  and 
encroachment of forest a banpale (forest watchmen) from the local community 
was recruited to guard the forest area and a system of penalties was introduced to 
punish those who violated the rules of forest management.  
 
In subsequent years, those farmers who had large numbers of livestock replaced 
them  with  more  productive  dairy  cattle,  and  a  system  of  stall  feeding  was 
introduced instead of open grazing. People from lower socio-economic strata 
who relied on the forest for their income through the sale of fuel-wood also 
changed their livelihood portfolio from wood sellers to wage laborers, taking on 
casual  work  in  on-farm  and  off-farm  activities.  The  Chairman  of  the  Hile 
Jalajlke (Ka) CFUG admitted that there was only one household in the village 
whose livelihood was totally dependent on the sale of fire-wood collected from 
the  forest.  Through  a  decision  of  the  CFUG  general  assembly  meeting,  the 
person was compensated financially by providing money generated through the 
sale  of  firewood  and  collected  through  fines  and  penalties.  Five  years  after 
establishing the plantation, in 1981 the first thinning operation was carried out 199 
 
under the supervision of forestry staff from Hattisar
102, and the wood generated 
from thinning was distributed to villagers for their use. Although the legal 
authority of the forest was still with the government, villagers were generally 
happy  to  get  the fuel -wood after the thinning  operation.  During  that  time, 
involvement of local people in forest thinning was guided by the 1978 Panchayat 
Forest and Panchayat Protected F orest Rules. Within a short time the forest 
improved significantly and many species of trees were regenerated. 
 
People in Hile Jaljale (Ka) CFUG were actively involved in the protection of 
forest since the beginning of the plantation program, although they did not have 
legal authority to manage and use the forest on their own initiative. Villagers 
were required to obtain permission from the forest department to conduct any 
kind of forest management activities, which was a lengthy process. In January 
1991, since the adoption of the community forestry policy, 75 hectares of 
government controlled forest was formally handed over to the Hile Jaljale (Ka) 
community. During the formation process, there was a dispute between Hile 
Jaljale (Ka) and Hile Jaljale (Kha)  CFUGs on the issue of boundaries; but after 
resolution of the conflict, on February 11, 1998, District Forest Office (DFO), 
Kavrepalanchok handed additional 36.2 hectares with a total of 111.2 hectares of 
forest to the Hile Jaljale community. The conflict  was solved through dialogue 
and discussion with the Forest Department, Village Development Committee 
(VDC) representatives, and local political representatives from various political 
parties. 
 
After the hand-over of forest, Hile Jaljale adopted a strict po licy of protection, 
with the aim of improving the bio -physical condition of the forest. The users 
were also allowed to collect grass, leaf litter and firewood under the supervision 
of the CFUG committee. After a few years of plantation, people experienced 
some negative environmental changes. There was a significant reduction in the 
availability of water in streams, springs and wetlands, and a shortage of water for 
drinking and irrigation. People believed that this had occurred due to the pine 
plantation, which suppresses the growth of understorey plants and reduces the 
water-holding capacity of the soil. Hence the availability of water from the forest 
                                                 
102 Hattisar refers to a place where Community Forestry and Afforestation Division (CFAD) was located. 200 
 
watershed  was  drastically  reduced  in  the  initial  phase  of  pine  plantation. 
However  over  the  next  20  years  the  quantity  of  water  from  the  watershed 
increased gradually, and the forest prospered. Broadleaf forest species started to 
grow,  which  helped  to  increase  the  water-holding  capacity  of  the  forest 
watershed. A study conducted in South Africa showed that mature pine trees also 
require less water, which contributes to increased water abundance (Scott and 
Prinsloo  2008)
103.  According  to  villagers,  after  the  pine  plantation  was 
established,  many  species  of  medicinal  plants  like  Nagbeli  (Lycopodium 
Clavatum),  Dwapare,  and  Dhasingare  (Gaultheria  fragrantissima  Wall) 
disappeared  from  the  forest.  Informants  also  reported  that  after  the  pine 
plantation they experienced a rise in temperature, and an infestation of termites. 
However, despite any initial negative effects of the plantation, after 20 years the 
Hile  Jaljale  (KA)  forest  is  now  at  a  stage  of  harnessing  economic  benefits. 
Where there had been an acute shortage of forest products in 1968/69, at present 
the forest product requirements of CFUG members are totally fulfilled and the 
CF has contributed substantially to the local farming system.  
 
A joint study was conducted by the Nepal Australia Community Forestry Project 
(NACFP) and Department of Forest to assess the status of the pine plantation 
(Pinus  roxburghii  and  Pinus  patula)  in  Kavrepalanchok  and  Sindhupalchok 
districts. The subjective assessment suggested that out of total 8713 hectares of 
pine  plantation  in  Kavrepalanchok  district,  which  is  now  under  community-
based forest management, about 80% of the pine plantations are in average or 
better  condition  (NACFP  1995).  The  study  reported  that  the  pine  forest  was 
overstocked and required urgent scientific management to improve the health of 
forest. The study further suggested that the pine plantation has great potential to 
generate additional income, employment opportunities and the development of 
forest-based enterprises for the CFUGs, and that sustainable forest management 
could  be  achieved  through  improved  forest  management  and  appropriate 
silvicultural operations. 
                                                 
103 The study concluded that there was a sharp decline in stream flow after pine plantation (Pinus radiata) 
when the trees were between 10 and 20 years old, however, after 30 years of plantation the flow reduction 
trend  was  reversed,  and  stream  flow  effects  appear  to  be  tending  toward  pre-afforestation  levels.  The 
authors concluded that the reduction in stream flow was mainly due to the rapid growth of trees during the 
initial establishment period.  201 
 
6.3. Community-based Forest Governance (CBFG) Arrangements at Hile 
Jaljale (KA) 
 
Community based forest governance in Hile Jaljale (Ka) commenced after the 
formal hand over of government control of forest to the local community for 
management and use on January 15, 1991. The community governance of forest 
resources is guided mainly by two documents, the CFUG constitution, and the 
operational  plan  (OP).  These  two  documents  are  prepared  according  to  the 
provisions of the 1993 Forest Act and 1995 Forest rules, and community forestry 
guidelines issued by the Department of Forest. The CFUG Constitution and OP 
provide  guidelines  on  the  rights  and  responsibilities  of  forest  users,  election 
process, obligations for accountability and distribution of benefits and services, 
and  decision-making  processes.  Community  forest  governance  is  operated 
through the collective decision of users and executed by the CFUG executive 
committee. Membership of the CFUG is the prime requirement through which 
the identified users have the exclusive rights of using the community forest. Any 
user who is eligible to be a member of the community forest has to pay Nepalese 
Rupees (NRs) 100/- as an entry fee, and NRs. 30/- as an annual fee. Those who 
become members have entry rights to the forest and to extract the forest products 
according to local rules. The Hile Jaljale constitution classifies users into three 
categories  based  on  the  nature  of  use  and  their  contributions  in  forest 
management.  
 
General Member:  
  Traditional users who are living near the forest and are active in forest 
conservation and utilization. 
  Local Range Post and District Forest Office staff
104; (without rights to 
nominate for office or vote during the election of the CFUG executive 
committee). 
                                                 
104 The reason of providing membership to District Forest Office and Range Post staff is to allow them to 
enter  the  forest  at  any  time  while  pursuing  their  professional  duties  as  stipulated  by  the  law.  As  the 
community forestry is a co-management arrangement between forest users and the Department of Forest 
(DoF), both parties have equal rights to enter the forest. However, forestry staff does not have rights to use 
forest products and NTFPs, and they are not allowed to participate and interfere in the decision-making 
process of the CFUG. 
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Secondary Member: 
  These users who lives in the outer periphery of the forest and use only 
specific  forest  products  occasionally  (once  or  twice  a  year),  but  for 
reasons  of  geographical  location  cannot  contribute  regularly  in  the 
conservation and management of forest. 
Special members (tertiary member): 
  These users are either general members or secondary members who are 
using specific forest products to support their livelihood. 
 
According to  the CFUG constitution, only the  household  head is  the official 
member of the CFUG. However, the name of the spouse is mentioned on the 
membership list. Although both spouses can attend the CFUG general assembly 
meeting, only the household head can vote in elections. A forest user can be a 
member of more than one community forest; in such cases a separate list has to 
be  prepared,  mentioning  those  members  who  are  users  in  more  than  one 
community  forest.  The  membership  of  the  CFUG  will  be  terminated  if  any 
member migrates from the village. Moreover, the membership will be cancelled 
automatically if any member violates the existing rules and regulation or the 
constitution  more  than  three  times.  The  CFUG  general  assembly  can  also 
suspend  membership  if  a  member  commits  any  acts  against  the  CFUG 
constitution repeatedly (more than two times), acts against the interests of other 
users or against the principle of community forestry, does not pay penalties, does 
not perform assigned duties, or is involved in corruption.  
 
6.3.1. Regulatory Instruments of Hile Jaljale (Ka) CFUG 
 
Based on the CFUG constitution and Operational Plan, local communities in 
Hile  Jaljale  (Ka)  have  prepared  rules  for  the  effective  governance  and 
sustainable management of their community forest. The CFUG has a general 
assembly consisting of all members and an executive committee, selected by the 
general assembly either by consensus or through formal election. The committee 
is  responsible  for  the  implementation  of  the  decisions  made  by  the  general 
assembly and performing day to day CF operations. The CFUG has an executive 
committee composed of eleven members: Chairman, Vice Chairman, Treasurer, 203 
 
Secretary,  Joint  Secretary  and  six  members.  The  constitution  has  adopted  a 
policy of representation in CFUG executive committee from every hamlet, caste, 
gender and class. Out of eleven members in the committee, there is a mandatory 
provision requiring nomination of four women members, and one member from 
disadvantaged  groups.  Moreover,  there  is  provision  for  constituting  a  three-
member advisory committee, one coordinator and two members. The advisory 
members  are  selected  from  the  general  members,  especially  from  elders  and 
respected  village  leaders,  who  have  extensive  knowledge  of  the  forest  and 
influence over the community. The operational plan of the CFUG contains a 
detailed  inventory  of  the  forest,  forest  status,  and  a  program  of  forest 
management, protection and utilization. It also describes in detail the resource 
mobilization plan, community development plan and benefit sharing mechanism.  
The Hile Jaljale (Ka) CFUG operational plan, lists the following penalties in 
case of infraction of operational rules, as follows:  
 
Table 6.6: Fines and Penalties for Violation of Rules at Hile Jaljale (Ka) CFUG 
Type of damage  Fine in Nepali Rupees
105 
First time  Second Time  Third time 
Damage to seedlings/saplings     5  10  20 
Timber extraction/cu.ft.  100  200  300 
Fodder, leaf litter extraction  50  100  200 
Green firewood  25  50  100 
Grazing:       
    Goats  5  10  15 
   Cattle  10  20  30 
Hunting and setting fire  As per the 1993  Forest Act  
Coal making  500  1,000  1,500 
Peeling bark of trees  50  100  150 
Cutting of Ningalo 
(Dendrocalamus spp) 
5  10  15 
Extraction of medicinal plants  50  100  150 
Encroachment
106 of forest ( per 
ropani) 
1,000  2,000  3,000 
Source: Hile Jaljale (Ka) Operational Plan, 2001 
 
In cases of violation of CFUG rules, the Hile Jaljale constitution has delegated 
power to the Chairman of the executive committee to fine the offender up to the 
amount of NRs. 999/- on the spot, following a simple procedure based on the 
Chairman‘s judgment. However the imposition of penalties above NRs 1,000/- 
                                                 
105 If anybody violates the rules more than three times, their membership will be suspended for a period of 3 
months. 
106 The encroacher has to reforest the encroached area  at their expense. In addition, they have to pay the 
specified penalties and will be suspended from CFUG membership for the duration of 3 months,  204 
 
and up to 50,000/- requires a detailed investigation, and is subject to approval by 
the full meeting of the CFUG executive committee. If anybody collects forest 
products  illegally,  the  products  will  be  confiscated  and  the  person  will  be 
prosecuted as per the CFUG rule. Moreover, any person who assists in catching 
offenders  will  receive  a  reward.  Likewise,  the  Hile  Jaljale  (Ka)  CFUG 
operational plan prohibits the following activities in the forest (Rule 31(1). 
  Destruction  of  forest,  mortgage  of  the  area  covered  by  the  forest,  or 
transfer of ownership;
107  
  Setting fire to forest, or encouraging others to do so; 
  Building a house inside the community forest; 
  Destroying trees for agricultural proposes; 
  Hunting inside the CF; 
  Any actions that could cause erosion; and 
  Extracting stone, gravel, sand, or soil. 
 
Under  existing  forest  legislation  the  Hile  Jaljale  CFUG  is  an  autonomous 
institution in perpetuity and has a separate bank account in its name. The income 
from the sale of forest products, money received as donations, grants, fees, and 
fines,  and  from  other  sources  is  deposited  in  its  account.  The  CFUG  has 
authority to invest the CFUG funds in any activities that provide benefit to its 
members.  However,  according  to  the  community  forestry  guidelines,  at  least 
25%  of  the  CFUG  income  has  to  be  invested  in  the  development  and 
management of the CF as per the section 30(a) of the amended Forest Act 1993. 
 
6.4. Community-based  Forest  Governance Outcomes  at Hile Jaljale (Ka) 
CFUG  
 
6.4.1.  Community  Forest  Governance  in  Hile  Jaljale  (Ka)  CFUG  during 
Pre/Early and Late Conflict Periods 
 
The Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) launched the armed conflict in February 
1996 in the remote mid-western hill region of Nepal. According to local people 
in Kavrepalanchok they did not felt any impact of the conflict on community 
forest  governance  arrangements  until  1999.  However,  the  situation  changed 
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dramatically after 2000. The armed conflict reached an intense stage in 2001, 
especially  after  the  Maoists  launched  a  large-scale  assault  on  the  military 
installation at Ghorahi, Dang district on 23
rd November 2001. Subsequently a 
state of emergency was declared by the government on 26
th November 2001 (see 
chapter three for a detailed account of the political conflict). An assessment of 
the  damage  caused  by  the  conflict  in  Kavrepalanchok  district  (DDC,  2008) 
shows that out of a total of 87 Village Development Committees (VDCs) and 3 
municipalities,  40  VDC  office  buildings  holding  official  documents  were 
destroyed, and furniture and documents of 13 other VDCs were destroyed by the 
Maoists during the period between August 2002 and October 2003, with a total 
loss of NRs 12,114,728 (US$163,712).
108 Forestry department infrastructure was 
also largely destroyed during this period of armed conflict.  Out of eight Range 
Posts in the Kavrepalanchok district, seven were destroyed with a total loss 
equating to 1.815 million Nepali rupees (approx. US$24,527), mainly of office 
documents, buildings, furniture and equipment. The only forestry infrastructure 
that was not destroyed during that time was the District Forest Office at the 
district headquarters and the Janagal Range Post at Banepa.  
 
An interview was conducted with the District Forest officer and officer in charge 
of  Janagal  Range  Post  during  fieldwork,  regarding  the  status  of  forest 
governance in Kavrepalanchok district. It was reported that the main reason 
behind the destruction of forestry infrastructure by Maoist rebels was to displace 
government  employees  from  the  villages,  in  order  to  establish  Maoist 
administration and control over the countryside. After the destruction of the 
Range Post Offices, a small room was rented in the house of local forestry staff 
to carry out day to day administrative activities. However, due to the lack of 
minimum logistical facilities and more importantly personal security, most of the 
forest rangers were removed from the villages. Those  who remained in the 
village were the forest guards, who in most cases were local residents. Displaced 
forestry  staffs from the range posts were   then stationed in the district forest 
office and the annual plan was implemented with the help of local support  staff. 
The  annual  programs  like  forest  management  training,  operational  plan 
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preparation and workshops were conducted in relatively safe places, i.e. in the 
town  or  district  headquarters,  in  order  to  minimize  risk.  Because  of  the 
displacement of forestry staff from the field station and lack of monitoring and 
follow  up,  the  coverage  and  quality  of  community  forest  programs  and  the 
participation of people was somewhat compromised. As training was organized 
in  the  district  headquarters,  the  participation  of  women  and  disadvantaged 
sections  of  the  community  decreased.  The  statistics  show  that  before  the 
insurgency was felt in the Kavrepalanchok District, the number of forests handed 
over to CFUGs was high. However, after 2001, the number of forests handed 
over to the community declined. From interviews with forestry officials, it was 
apparent that the destruction of forestry infrastructure and displacement of local 
level forestry technicians from the field had adversely affected the community 
forest hand-over process.  
 
On July 17, 2000, the government declared an army training zone under the 
Nepal Army School, Nagarkot, covering an area of 485hectares; including the 
forest area used by the Hile Jaljale (Ka) CFUG. The area declared for the army 
training  zone  falls  under  5  VDCs  (Baluwapati  Deupur,  Tukucha  Nala, 
Ugrachandi, Devitar  and Nayagaon) in Kavrepalanchok district, and 3 VDCs 
(Nagarkot, Sundal and Bageswori) in Bhaktapur district. This decision of the 
government was strongly opposed by local leaders and CFUGs, who protested 
against the decision. In the face of resistance from the CFUGs, the Nepal Army 
School, Nagarkot convened several meetings in the presence of Chief District 
Officers,  VDCs  Chairmen,  local  politicians  and  representatives  of  CFUGs  in 
order to resolve the conflict. Many rounds of discussions were held but failed to 
reach agreement. When the talks failed, CFUG representatives were treated by 
the security forces as supporters of terrorists. The allocation of the CF area to the 
army  training  zone  was  against  the  existing  forest  law.  The  voices  of  the 
community  were  not  heard  during  that  time,  during  which  security  agendas 
dominated in the country. When the army did not listen to the viewpoint of the 
CFUGs,  the  latter  submitted  a  joint  memorandum  to  the  Prime  Minister 
requesting the government to withdraw the decision. There was no response or 
action from the Prime Minister. Then CFUGs who were affected by the decision 
requested the Federation of Community Forestry Users of Nepal (FECOFUN), 207 
 
the umbrella organization representing all CFUGs in Nepal, to raise this issue 
with  government.  FECOFUN  organized  a  series  of  meetings  with  the  army, 
advocating the rights of CFUGs to manage the CF without any obstruction. After 
several rounds of meetings and discussions, there was an understanding reached 
between the army and FECOFUN. The main point of understanding was that the 
CFUGs could manage and use the forest products from the community forest. 
However,  CFUGs  were  required  to  give  advance  notice  to  the  Nepal  Army 
School, Nagarkot about their activities in the forest and similarly, the army also 
agreed to give notice to CFUGs when conducting firing exercises in the forest, in 
order to avoid casualties and undesirable incidents. 
 
Despite  all  these  disturbances,  the  Hile  Jaljale  CFUG  prepared  its  second 
operational plan (2000-2005) with the assistance of the District Forest Office 
(DFO)  and  Nepal  Australian  Community  Resources  Management  and 
Livelihood  Project  (NACRMLP)  which  was  approved  by  the  District  Forest 
Officer (DFO) in 2001. The first operational plan (OP) did not have a proper 
inventory  of  the  forest,  and  as  was  generally  the  case,  focused  more  on 
protection  rather  than  sustained  use.  Local  livelihood  needs,  community 
development, institutional development and pro-poor intervention were not part 
of the first operational plan. During the process of preparing second OP, local 
facilitators  were  trained  who  conducted  consultations  in  every  hamlet  with 
people from different socio-economic groups, in order to identify and address the 
issues  of  gender  and  ethnicity  as  well  as  the  needs  of  socio-economically 
disadvantaged people. The second operational plan prepared a social inventory 
and resource maps of the village and emphasized scientific forest management 
based  on  annual  increments,
109  and undertook thinning operations. A wealth 
ranking
110 of the CFUG members was carried out to generate data on the socio -
economic status of users.  
 
In April 3, 2002 government made another cabinet decision and handed over 
67.5 ha of community forest area occupied by several CFUGs (including 17.12 
hectares from Hile Jaljale (Ka)), to the  Geodetic Observatory Office based on 
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Nagarkot,  without  any  discussions  or  consultations  with  the  Department  of 
Forest and concerned CFUGs. Some informants hypothesised that in the face of 
strong opposition from CFUGs and local leaders to the declaration of CFUG 
areas as an Army Training Zone, the government might have taken an indirect 
approach by handing over the area through a civilian office, believing that there 
would  be  no  resistance  from  the  local  community.  Indeed,  after  the  formal 
handover  of  the  CF  area  to  the  Geodetic  Observatory  office,  this  area  was 
unofficially used by security forces.   
 
According to the operational plan of Hile Jaljale (Ka) CFUG, a total of 802 pine 
trees needed to be thinned. However, when the forest area belonging to  Hile 
Jaljale was handed over to the Geodetic Survey office, they could not harvest 
100 of the trees; which were located inside the forest area which was handed 
over to the Observatory. Requests by the CFUG to allow thinning operations 
were ignored, and CFUG representatives were threatened to be considered as 
terrorists if they tried to enter the forest area. Such threats prevented the CFUGs 
from carrying out any activities in that particular block of forest. According to 
personal accounts, those CFUG committee members who lead the protest against 
the government‘s decisions found themselves under the scrutiny of the security 
forces, which put their lives at risk. 
 
The Hile Jaljale CFUG prepared the second generation operational plan with the 
help of NACRLMP and Department of Forest technicians. During the process of 
preparing  the  OP,  a  pilot  study  in  20  CFUGS,  covering  Kavrepalancok  and 
Sindhupalchok to prepare a ―pine forest management plan‖ was carried out. A 
technical team was formed to train local facilitators. Numerous meetings and 
discussions  were  conducted  in  every  hamlet  in  each  CFUG.  A  number  of 
development plans were prepared including livelihood improvement, business 
development  and  women‘s  empowerment  plans.  Three  major  elements  were 
considered  as  the  fundamental  basis  for  formulating  the  second  generation 
operational plan: sustainable forest management; livelihood improvement; and 
good governance. Hile Jaljale was one of the first CFUGs in Nepal to prepare 
such  a  comprehensive  plan,  which  was  approved  in  June  2005.  The  second 
generation  OP  incorporates  a  number  of  activities  such  as  thinning  of  pine 209 
 
plantations, and spatial zoning of the forest into blocks, sub-blocks and working 
circles
111.  
 
CFUG members reported that during the period of armed conflict, the villagers 
did not face any unnecessary pressure or atrocities from the Maoist rebels. 
However, the rebels did demand ‗donations‘, food and shelter on an occasional 
basis. As this forest area was adjoining the Nepal Army School, the area was 
under  the  close  scrutiny  of  the  security  forces.  During  the  intense  period  of 
conflict, many governmental and non-governmental agencies could not continue 
their  program  in  the  village;  however,  the  Hile  Jaljale  CFUG  continued  to 
function. According to the villagers, it was possible to maintain regular contact 
and coordination with security forces, especially with the Nepal Army School, 
Nagarkot. Surprisingly, most of its major works were completed by Hile Jaljale 
(Ka) CFUG during the period of conflict. The First Operation Plan was renewed 
in 2001, and the second generation operational plan was prepared in 2005. In 
addition,  the  Hile  Jaljale  (Ka)  CFUG  carried  out  silivicultural  operations  in 
blocks no. 1, 2 and 4 of the community forest. Moreover, in the same period Hile 
Jaljale (Ka) CFUG sold 14,000 cu. ft. of log timber outside the community and 
6000 cu. ft to its members. 
  
6.4.2. Resilience of Hile Jaljale (Ka) CFUG during Armed Conflict 
 
Hile Jaljale CFUG members reported that after the escalation of armed conflict, 
every section of the community in Hile Jaljale (Ka) felt some impact on their 
livelihoods.  However,  in  comparison  to  other  sectors  of  society,  forest 
governance encountered relatively low impacts. The main reason is the fact that 
the CFUG had become a commonly accepted institution throughout the area, 
whose main objective was to fulfil the basic needs of forest products for all the 
members of the community. More than 90% of the people in Hile Jaljale directly 
depend on agriculture to fulfil their livelihoods needs. People from all walks of 
life, irrespective of political ideology, profession, socio-economic and cultural 
                                                 
111 To make the forest inventory and management plan more effective, the forest has been divided into 
permanent blocks (using permanent landscape features) and semi-permanent sub-blocks (with homogenous 
forest types and conditions). A working circle consists of several sub-blocks in order to meet the specific 
objectives assigned for the particular sub-blocks. 210 
 
differences, directly depend on the CF for household energy, as there is no other 
cheap source of fuel wood available. In the changed context, the contribution of 
the  community  forest  to  household  income  in  direct  monetary  terms  is  not 
substantial; however the community forest still occupies an important role in 
providing livelihood security through support to the farming system. According 
to Hile Jaljale CFUG executive committee members, they had maintained close 
contact and dialogue with both security forces as well as with Maoist rebels, in 
order to facilitate their activities. By maintaining such communication between 
the two contending parties, Hile Jaljale community was able to continue most of 
its activities. During the insurgency period the CFUG maintained a very neutral 
role and did not incline politically toward either of the opposing forces. During 
preparation of the second generation operational plan, the CFUG informed and 
briefed both government and Maoist parties separately about their activities so 
that there would not be any misunderstanding and undesired incidents could be 
prevented. Finally, without any interference and obstruction, the CFUG was able 
to complete its second generation operational plan, which was considered a great 
achievement for the CFUG. 
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6.4.3. Community Participation in the Decision Making Process 
 
Data collected during fieldwork show that the representation of women on the 
CFUG Executive Committee was negligible until 2006. However, this increased 
significantly  after  2006.  The  data  indicate  that  forest  governance  is  largely 
controlled by men and people from higher castes.  
 
Table  6.7:  Representation  in  Hile  Jaljale  (Ka)  CFUG  Executive  Committee  by 
Gender, Class and Caste (%) 
    Gender  Income category  Caste 
Year  Total 
member 
Men 
(%) 
Women 
(%) 
Upper-
income 
(%) 
Middle-
income 
(%) 
Lower-
income 
(%) 
Higher 
Caste 
(%) 
Lower 
caste 
(%) 
1990 - 1992  14  93  7  14  50  36  86  14 
1992- 1993  9  89  11  -  56  44  89  11 
1993-1995  9  64  36  11  67  22  100  - 
1995-1996  9  100  -  33  56  11  100  - 
1996-1999  11  91  9  27  45  27  91  9 
1999-2001  11  91  9  27  45  27  100  - 
2001-2006  11  91  9  27  64  9  100  - 
2006 
onwards 
11  63  36  27  45  27  9  91 
Total  85  85  15  21  53  26  84  16 
Source: Compiled from Hile Jaljalle (ka) CFUG Records 
 
The  records  of  the  CFUG  executive  committee  show  that  some  people 
repeatedly  occupied  CFUG  executive  committee  positions.  For  instance,  BR 
occupied the position of Chairman 5 times, SP occupied the position of Secretary 
6 times, BP occupied the position of Vice-Chairman 2 times, and KP occupied 
the position of Treasurer four times. After the adoption of the second generation 
operational plan by Hile Jaljale (Ka) in 2005, there was a mandatory policy of 
nominating  four  women  representatives  (36%)  to  the  CFUG  executive 
committee, which made the representation of women higher after 2006.  
 
The Hile Jaljale (KA) records show that there was no representation of women at 
the  CFUG  General  Assembly  meetings  from  1994  to  1996.  However, 
participation of women in the GA started from 1997, ranging from 1 % to 15%. 212 
 
In 2006 the participation of women increased sharply to 38%, which is mainly 
attributed to the changes in CFUG policy
112.  
 
Table 6.8: Participation in General Assembly Meetings by Gender 
Year  Total 
participants 
Women  Men 
Number  %  Number  % 
1994  51                 -                    -                   51               100  
1995  55                 -                    -                   55               100  
1996  239                 -                    -                 239               100  
1997  321                48                 15               273                 85  
1998  303                18                   6               285                 94  
1999  168                  2                   1               166                 99  
2000  188                  4                   2               184                 98  
2001  200                27                 14               173                 87  
2002  -                 -      -                  -      -  
2003  -                 -      -                  -      -  
2004  181                18                 10               163                 90  
2005  182                18                 10               164                 90  
2006  294              112                 38               182                 62  
Total  2182              247                 11            1,935                 89  
Source: Compiled from Hile Jaljale (Ka) CFUG Record 
 
6.4.3.1.  Frequency  of  CFUGs  General  Assembly  (GA)  Executive  Committee 
(EC) Meetings   
 
The General Assembly (GA) is an important decision making forum which has a 
mandate to devise policy and prepare an annual program and budget.  It also 
prepares  policy  on  benefit  sharing  mechanisms,  and  reviews  past  policy  and 
programs. The CFUG executive committee has an important role to play in day-
to-day community forest governance. Generally the GA meeting convenes once 
a year and the EC meets on a monthly basis; however, both meetings can be 
convened  as  needed.  The  data  collected  during  fieldwork  indicate  that  the 
frequency of GA and EC meetings of Hile Jaljale (KA) was somewhat affected 
during the conflict. The general assembly meeting could not be held in 2002 and 
2003,  mainly  due  to  the  prohibition  order  issued  by  District  Administration 
Office  (DAO)  on  mass  gatherings.  One  of  the  informants  said  that  before 
conducting any meeting of the CFUG, they had to obtain permission from the 
security forces, which was not an easy matter. Because of the worsening law and 
order situation and displacement of committee members from the village, the 
                                                 
112 Due to the worsening law and order situation, and prohibition on mass gathering issued by the District 
Administration Office (DAO), Kavrapalanchok, and the CFUG could not organize the GA meeting in 2002 
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frequency of EC meetings was seriously affected during 2001-2004; however, 
after 2004 there was increase in the number of EC meetings (see Figure 6.2). 
  
Figure 6.2: Frequency of CFUG GA and EC Meetings during Pre/Early and late 
Conflict Periods  
 
Source: Compiled from Hile Jaljale (Ka) CFUG record 
 
6.4.4. Equity, Access and Benefit Sharing Mechanisms 
 
The Hile Jaljale (Ka) CFUG has adopted a policy of positive discrimination in 
distributing forest products to its members. The provision of special members 
has been made in the CFUG constitution to identify those households whose 
profession is directly related to the forest. Without access to forest products and 
NTFPs  those  households  who  are  directly  dependent  on  the  forest  cannot 
continue  their  traditional  professions,  such  as  making  charcoal  for 
blacksmithing, collecting grass and fodder by the landless, and collecting timber 
and other forest products by those involved in forest-based small enterprises. 
 
The Hile Jaljale (Ka) CFUG made some provisions in its constitution and OP to 
address  these  issues.  For  instance,  those  belonging  to  poor,  landless  and 
disadvantaged groups receive special concessions in the distribution of forest 
products. These users receive up to 100 cubic feet of timber free of cost for 
building a house, while they pay a discounted rate of NRs 30/- per cubic feet if 
they want to obtain timber beyond this limit. Other users have to pay NRs 105/- 214 
 
per cu ft for the timber. Some of the equity provisions adopted by Hile Jaljale 
(Ka) CFUG are listed in the following Table: 
 
Table 6.9: Forest Products Distribution Policy of Hile Jaljale (Ka) CFUG 
Forest product  Quantity  User category 
  Poor, landless and 
disadvantaged 
Other Users 
Fuel wood (green)  As available  NRs. 1 per cu. ft  NRs. 3 per cu. ft 
Fuel wood (dead wood)  As available  free  free 
Leaf litter  As available  free  free 
Timber for house construction  100 cu ft  Free of cost  NRs. 105 per cu ft 
Tree branches for agricultural tools  As required  Free of cost  Free of cost 
Fire wood and tree stumps for charcoal making  As required  Free for blacksmith  - 
Timber for public construction work  As required  -  - 
Wood for funeral  As required  Free of cost  Free of cost 
Rituals       
Fuel wood for marriage ceremony  10 bhari  Free of cost  Free of cost 
Fuel wood for Saptaha (7 Day religious ritual)  30 bhari  Free of cost  Free of cost 
Natural disaster       
Timber for construction of house completely 
destroyed by fire 
100 cu. ft 
 
Free of cost  Free of cost 
Timber for construction of house partially 
destroyed by fire 
50 cu. ft  Free of cost  Free of cost 
Timber for construction of house completely 
destroyed by landslide/earthquake 
100 cu. ft 
 
Free of cost  Free of cost 
Timber for construction of house partially 
destroyed by landslide/earthquake 
25 cu. ft  Free of cost  Free of cost 
Source; Hile Jaljale (Ka) CF Operational Plan, 2006 
 
In  Hile  Jaljale  (Ka)  CFUG,  there  are  five  households  that  are  landless,  13 
blacksmith households, 14 households depend on tailoring, and 60 households 
with low income. The Hile Jaljale CFUG has allocated some land inside the 
community forest to those households that belong to the landless category, for 
planting income-generating cash crops. For this purpose, a forest nursery has 
been established to produce seedlings. Empowerment training has been provided 
to women from poor, landless, and disadvantaged social groups. Women who 
have  received  training  are  now  manufacturing  briquettes
113  for  sale  to  the 
market, which has increased their income. Further, the Hile Jaljale (Ka) CFUG 
coordinated with the Micro Enterprise Development Program (MEDEP) fund ed 
by UNDP, and helped to establish an improved furnace to the blacksmiths. The 
blacksmiths were organized in a group and provided with essential training and 
modern machinery and equipment to produce agricultural tools on a cooperative 
                                                 
113 Briquette making has become popular among the CFUG members as a source of additional income for 
low-income households, especially among women. The Hile Jalajle (Ka) CFUG has provided fuel wood 
free of cost to prepare charcoal. The CFUG has also provided a simple kit to users to make briquette. 
Biomass briquettes are considered a renewable source of energy. 
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basis. The profit generated from the sale of the agricultural tools is now divided 
among the people involved in running the business. During the fieldwork for this 
research, the author visited the industry, and blacksmiths reported that as a result 
of the program promoted and supported by the CFUG, they are now able to earn 
sufficient cash income through the sale of tools. The CFUG has also constructed 
drinking  water  taps  in  the  damai  (tailor,  which  belongs  to  the  lower  caste) 
hamlet. The CFUG has also provided employment opportunities to low income 
groups during the forest thinning operation. The Hile Jaljale CFUG has actively 
targeted programs to low-income and disadvantaged groups, although it has not 
been able to implement all its planned pro-poor programs, due to the lack of 
sufficient  funds.  To  date,  most  of  the  CFUG  income  has  been  invested  in 
community infrastructure. These investments have been good for the community 
as a whole, but it is difficult to estimate whether the poor and disadvantaged are 
equally able to reap the benefits of such investments.  
 
6.4.5.  Access  to  and  Distribution  of  Forest  Products  during  Pre/Early  the 
Emergence of Armed Conflict 
 
According to the operational plan of Hile Jaljale (Ka) CFUG, the forest is open 
for three months in a year for collecting firewood, from October to December. 
However, some forest products such as deadwood and leaf litter can be collected 
free of cost  throughout  the  year. While collecting leaf litter, dead wood and 
grass,  users  have  to  enter  the  community  forest  without  any  weapons  or 
equipment.  
 
During  fieldwork  the  author  attended  various  CFUG  meetings  and  also 
interacted individually with a number of forest users to observe and discuss the 
distributional  aspects  of  forest  management.  It  was  found  that  there  is  no 
discrimination in the distribution of forest products, as every CFUG member is 
allowed to collect forest products, especially fuel-wood, fodder, and leaf litter, 
according  to  their  needs.  At  present,  the  need  for  forest  products  for  every 
household  is  satisfied  and  the  availability  of  forest  products  outweighs  local 
demand.  
 216 
 
Table 6.10: Mean Annual Forest Product Collection per Household in Hile Jaljale 
(Ka) CFUG (all income categories) 
Product type  Quantity 
 
Timber (cu ft)  16 
Fuel-wood (Bhari)
20  66 
Fodder (Bhari)  1 
Grass (Bhari)  29 
Leaf litter (Doko)  85 
Source: Fieldwork by author, 2008 
 
When  the  data  on  forest  product  collection  is  further  segregated  by  income 
category, it was found that the lower-income households have collected more 
fuel-wood and timber than middle-income and upper-income households. This is 
in recognition of the fact that the poor have limited land holdings and few trees 
on their private land, and thus are heavily dependent on community forest for the 
fuel-wood and timber. The rich and middle class households, on the other hand, 
have larger land holdings and private forests, and can more readily satisfy their 
needs for forest products from their own land; particularly during the time of 
conflict, when there was risk in going to the forest.   
 
                                                 
 
 217 
 
Figure  6.3:  Average  Annual Forest Product  Collection  by Wealth  Category  (in 
bhari or head load*) 
 
* 1 bhari of green fuel wood is approximately equivalent to 50 kg; 1 bhari of fodder or grass is 
equivalent to 25 kg; and 1 doko of leaf litter is equivalent to 20 kg. 
 
In  contrast,  high  and  middle-income  households  do  collect  more  leaf  litter 
compared to the poor. This is mainly due to the fact that these groups have more 
cattle, especially milking buffaloes and cows, than low-income households (see 
Table 6.2).  
 
6.4.6. Access to Forest Products during the Late Period of Armed Conflict 
 
The survey of 45 households conducted in Hile Jaljale (Ka) CFUG indicates that 
there was a marked decline in the collection of all types of forest products during 
the late conflict periods. The lowest decline (25%) was in grass collection, and 
the highest  decline (57%) was in  fodder collection. Villagers mentioned that 
during the intense period of conflict after 2001, users were very cautious while 
entering the forest. Besides firing exercises by security forces, villagers feared 
meeting  either  rebels  or  the  security  forces  in  the  forest.  As  a  precaution, 
villagers  entered  the  forest  in  small  groups,  and  avoided  doing  so  unless 
necessary.  Before  entering  the  forest,  the  CFUG  executive  committee  would 
inform security forces, to avoid unintended incidents and casualties. The armed 
conflict inevitably affected the frequency of visits to the forest, and reduced the 
amount  of  forest  products  collected  besides  the  timber.  The  timber  from 218 
 
community forest is used mainly for the construction of houses, thus the demand 
and use of timber entirely depended on the number of houses constructed by the 
members of CFUG.  It was learned from interviews with FUG members that 
local  people  adopted  a  strategy  of  ―wise  use  and  minimum  use‖  in  order  to 
maximize safety and make the best use of forest products whenever they were 
able to collect them. However, people who had plenty of trees on their own land 
tended to use forest products from there rather than from the CF. 
 
Table 6.11: Mean Annual Forest Product Collection during Pre/Early and Late 
Conflict periods, Hile Jaljale (Ka) - All categories 
Forest products  Pre/Early conflict  Late conflict  Change (%) 
 
Timber(cu. ft)  14  16  +19 
Fuel wood (Bhari)  87  66  - 24 
Fodder (Bhari)  3  1  - 57 
Grass( Doko)  38  29  -24 
Leaf litter (Bhari)  113  85   - 25 
Source: Fieldwork, 2008 
 
Predictably,  the  data  indicate  that  the  collection  of  firewood  by  low-income 
groups is higher than that of upper-income and middle-income groups. However, 
the total amount collected is less than they collected during pre/early conflict 
period. Upper-income and middle-income groups collected more leaf-litter from 
the  CF  than  lower-income  groups,  because  of  their  involvement  in  dairy 
enterprises. 
Table  6.12:  Mean  Annual  Forest  Products  Collection  in  Pre/early  and  Late 
Conflict Periods by Income Category 
Income group  Timber 
(cu ft) 
Fuel wood 
 (Bhari) 
Fodder 
(Bhari) 
Grass 
(Doko) 
Leaf litter 
(Bhari) 
Low-income                
Pre/Early conflict  16  136  3  46  55 
Late conflict  25  96  1  35  43 
Change (%)  +55  -30  -62  -24  -21 
Middle-income                
Pre/Early conflict  11  57  5  48  136 
Late conflict  9  47  3  36  100 
Change (%)  -23  -18  -29  -26  -27 
Upper-income                
Pre/Early conflict  14  69  3  20  148 
Late conflict  15  57  0  16  112 
Change (%)  +12  -18  -100  -21  -24 
Source: Fieldwork by author, 2008 
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6.4.7. Income and Expenditure of Hile Jaljale (Ka) CFUG during Pre/Early and 
late Conflict Periods 
 
Since the introduction of a thinning regime in 1998, the CFUG has been carrying 
out thinning operations regularly based on its guidelines. The Hile Jaljale (Ka) 
CFUG  earned  NRs  3,722,899  (US$50,309.00)  from  various  sources  between 
1998/99 and 2006/07; of which 97% of the income was obtained from the sale of 
log timber from these thinning operations (see Table 6.13).  
 
Table 6.13: Income of Hile Jaljale (Ka) CF (1998/99 – 2007/08) 
Source of income  Amount(NRS)  % of total income 
Sale of timber  3,628,243  97.5 
Sale of fuel wood  39,600  1.1 
Application fee  2,200  0.1 
Prize  3,000  0.1 
Membership fee  34,380  0.9 
Entry fee  1,000  - 
Interest  10,743  0.3 
Others  3,733  - 
Total income(NRS)  3,722,899  100 
Total US$ equivalent  50,309    
Source: Fieldwork, 2008(Compiled from the records of Hile Jaljale (Ka) CF) 
An  assessment  of  CFUG  income  for  the  three  years  before  and  after  the 
intensification of conflict in 2001 shows that 57% of income was earned in the 
prior  three  year  period,  dropping  to  43%  in  the  three  years  following 
intensification  of  conflict,  although  the  CFUG  was  able  to  perform  forest 
management activities throughout the conflict.  
 
Table 6.14: Income of Hile Jaljale (Ka) CFUG during Pre/Early and Late Conflict 
Periods 
Source of income 
  
Pre/Early conflict 
1998/99 – 2000/01 
Late conflict 
2001/02 – 2003/04 
Amount  % of total  Amount  % of total 
 Sale of timber   374,798  54     293,930   42 
 Sale of fuel wood   10,903  2          5,775   1 
 Application fee   200  0          1,000   0 
 Prize   3,000  0                 -     0 
 Membership fees   200  0          1,000   0 
 Entry fees                   -     0                 -     0 
 Interest   7,003  1          1,337   0 
Others                  -     0                 -     0 
Total  396,104  57     303,042   43 
Source: Compiled from the records of Hile Jaljale (Ka) CFUG 220 
 
 
6.4.8. Expenditure and Community Development Activities Conducted by Hile 
Jaljale (Ka) CFUG during Pre/Early and during Late Conflict Periods 
 
The  Hile  Jaljale  (Ka)  CFUG  implemented  various  programs  to  improve  the 
status of the forest, and improve access to basic development infrastructure like 
education, drinking water and roads. The programs implemented by Hile Jaljale 
(Ka) CFUG can be categorized into three main areas: forest management
114 and 
community development
115 and administration (See Table 6.15).  
 
Table 6.15: Expenditure of Hile Jaljale (Ka) CF (1998/99 to 2007/08) 
Description  Expenditure (1998/99 – 2007/08) (NRs) 
Amount  % of total 
1. Forest Management     
1.1 Forest protection (watchman)  162,700  4.6 
1.2 Forest management  725,135  20.7 
1.3 Revision of  CFUG operational Plan  41,000  1.2 
1.4 Forest Management Training/ Study tour  39,200  1.1 
1.5 Nursery construction/ Seedling production  168,000  4.8 
1.6 Forest road construction  476,789  13.6 
1.7 Establishment of research plot  32,890  0.9 
Sub-total  1,645,714  46.9 
2. Community development     
2.1 School construction  998,476  28.4 
2.2 Drinking water construction  70,000  2.0 
2.3 Rural road construction  410,000  11.7 
2.4 Landslide control  100,000  2.9 
2.5 Temple construction  5,000  0.1 
2.6 Assistance to local club  3,100  0.1 
Sub-total  1,586,576  45.2 
3. Administrative cost     
Administrative cost  279,810  8.0 
Grand total  3,512,100  100.0 
Source: Compiled from the office records of Hile Jaljale (Ka) CFUG 
 
The official records of Hile Jaljale (Ka) show that out of total expenditure, 47%, 
45% and 8% respectively has been invested in community forest management, 
community development and administration, between 1998/99 and 2007/08. It 
appears that the volume of work carried out during late conflict periods was 
                                                 
114Forest management refers to activities such as thinning, pruning, singling, logging, log transportation, 
forest  road  construction,  fire  line  construction,  nursery  establishment,  and  forest  protection  activities 
including providing salaries for forest watchmen. 
115 Community development refers to various community infrastructure-related activities conducted for the 
benefit of the community as a whole, such as construction of school buildings, drinking water facilities, 
rural road construction, landslide control and temple construction.  221 
 
substantially greater than the pre/early-conflict period, as 30% and 70% of the 
expenditure was made during pre/early and late conflict periods respectively (see 
Table 6.16). It is apparent from the statistics that the major activities carried out 
by  Hile  Jaljale  (Ka)  CFUG,  i.e.  forest  management  and  community 
development, were not negatively affected by the conflict, but rather increased 
substantially  during  late  conflict  periods.  There  was  slight  reduction  in  the 
income of Hile Jaljale (Ka) CFUG during the late conflict period; however, the 
CFUG continued its work from their earnings as well as from their savings (see 
Table  6.16).  The  main  reason  according  to  the  forest  users  for  the  smooth 
functioning of CFUG activities is that there was no opposition either from the 
contending parties or from within the CFUG about implementing community 
development  activities,  as  such  programmes  supported  the  needs  of  the 
community and thus had popular support (for example investment in the local 
school). 
 
Table 6.16: CFUG Expenditure and Community Development Activities during 
Pre/Early and Late Conflict Periods 
Activities  Pre/Early conflict  Late conflict 
1998/99 – 200/01  2001/02 – 2003/04 
  Amount 
 (NRs) 
% of 
total 
Amount 
(NRs) 
% of total 
Salary of forest watchman  26,450  4  26,350  4 
Forest management  62,800  9  45,500  6 
Revision of  operational plan  0  0  12,000  2 
Forest Management Training/ Study tour  0  0  -  - 
Nursery construction/ seedling production  0  0  -  - 
Forest road construction  0  0  250,000  34 
Establishment of Pate Salla Research Plot  0  0  -  - 
Rural road construction  0  0  -  - 
Assistance to school  30,000  4  101,000  14 
Drinking water scheme  40,000  5  30,000  4 
Landslide control  0  0  -  - 
Temple construction  0  0  -  - 
Donation  0  0  -  - 
Assistance to club  0  0  3,000  0 
Administrative cost  61,308  8  42,183  6 
Total  220,558  30  510,033  70 
Source: Compiled from Hile Jaljale (Ka) CFUG Record 
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6.4.8.1. Community Forest and Access to Education 
 
There was one primary school in ward No. 7 of Ghimire Gaon. For secondary 
education, children were required to travel to the neighbouring village. In order 
to  increase  access  to  education,  the  Hile  Jaljale  CFUG  invested  substantial 
amounts  of  money  to  construct  the  building  of  ―Shree  Swet  Baraha  Lower 
Secondary  School‖.  From  2000/01  to  2006/07,  Hile  Jaljale  contributed  NRs 
989,476/- to the local school, 97% during the late period of intensified conflict.  
 
6.5. Livelihood Outcomes 
 
Rural households are heavily dependent on natural resources to diversify their 
livelihood  portfolio,  and  the  choice  of  such  strategies  is  dependent  upon  the 
natural  resources  endowment  and  the  level  of  risk  and  uncertainty  (Scoones 
1998, 11). People cope and adapt as a survival response to crisis or disaster (Ellis 
2000, 61). Social resilience is an important element under which individuals, 
societies and communities adapt to changes in the systems (Adger 2000, 347). 
Livelihood  strategies  are dynamic and  change  over time depending upon the 
opportunities  available  (Ellis  2000,  40).  Coping  strategies  differ  between 
households, as every household differs in terms of assets, mediated by social 
factors and external shocks and trends (Ellis 2000, 40). In the context of this 
research I examine the different strategies adopted by case study households to 
secure their income, and focus on the role of community forest and resource 
governing institutions (CFUG in this case) in  mediating and coping with the 
effects of conflict at local level. 
 
6.5.1. Household Income in Hile Jaljale (Ka) CFUG  
 
Seasonal migration in search of jobs to supplement the household income has 
become  a  regular  phenomenon  in  the  hills  of  Nepal,  especially  among  low-
income  households.  In  the  Ghimire  Gaon  of  the  Hile  Jaljale  (KA),  most 
households  were  engaged  in  commercial  vegetable  farming  and  dairying, 
although during late conflict periods there was reduction in the opportunities of 
wage  labouring  in  the  villages.  The  major  sources  of  household  income  are 223 
 
vegetable farming; cereal crops and dairying (see Table 6.17). Most households 
are engaged in commercial vegetable farming and rearing buffalo and cows for 
producing milk. When the consumptive value of forest products is calculated it 
shows that community forestry provides 9% of the total household income. 
 
Table  6.17:  Mean  Annual  Household  Income  in  Hile  Jaljale  (Ka)  CFUG  (all 
category) 
Source of income  Income(NRs)  % of total income 
 
Vegetable farming  23,133  20.8 
Cereal crops  19,089  17.2 
Dairying  18,578  16.7 
Salaries/waged work 
(permanent) 
12,444  11.2 
Forest products  9,695  8.7 
Overseas employment  6,444  5.8 
Small animals (goal/sheep)  6,393  5.8 
Off-farm wages (casual)  6,056  5.5 
Self employment  5,800  5.2 
On-farm wages (casual)  2,949  2.7 
Swine/pig  422  0.4 
Poultry  78  0.1 
Total income  111,081  100.0 
Source: Field survey by author, 2008 
 
When the data are further analysed, they show a distinct picture of household 
income  among  different  income  categories.  The  major  sources  of  household 
income  for  the  low-income  households  surveyed  are  off-farm  wages,  forest 
products  and  vegetable  farming.  For  middle-income  households,  vegetable 
farming, dairying and agriculture seems to be the three major sources of cash 
income,  while  upper-income  households‘  major  three  sources  of  income  are 
vegetables, agriculture and salaried employment (see Table 6.18).  224 
 
Table  6.18:  Mean  Household  Income  (NRs)  by  Income  Category,  Hile  Jaljale 
CFUG  
Source of income  Low-income  Middle-income  Upper-income 
   Amount  %  Amount  %  Amount  % 
Cereal crops  4,600  8  17,800  19.6  34,867  19.1 
Vegetable farming  6,933  11.6  21,267  23.4  41,200  22.5 
Dairying  4,133  6.9  20,733  22.9  30,867  16.9 
Small animals (goat/sheep)  3,680  6.2  4,933  5.4  10,567  5.8 
Swine/pig  1,267  2.1  0  0.0  0  0.0 
Poultry  133  0.2  0  0.0  100  0.1 
Salaries/waged work 
(permanent)) 
4,533  7.6  0  0.0  32,800  17.9 
Overseas employment  0  0.0  9,333  10.3  10,000  5.5 
Self Employment  5,000  8.4  0  0.0  12,400  6.8 
On-farm wages (casual)  4,947  8.3  3,000  3.3  900  0.5 
Off-farm wages (casual)  13,367  22.4  4,133  4.6  667  0.4 
Forest products  10,998  18.5  9,492  10.5  8,594  4.7 
Total  59,592  100.0  90,692  100  182,960  100 
Source: Field Survey by author, 2008 
 
The  above  statistics  clearly  show  that  forests  products  occupy  a  significant 
source of income for low-income households (14.4%). The table indicates that as 
household income increases, forest dependence decreases.   
 
The  seasonal  migration  from  the  village  to  the  capital  city  and  to  overseas 
employment  increased  sharply  during  the  intensified  late  conflict  periods. 
Moreover, as  young people were attracted towards the rebel  groups, security 
forces also recruited numbers of youths into national army and police forces, 
which  provided  additional  income  to  households.  Some  people  migrated  to 
capital cities and started small shops, and many other worked in restaurants, 
hotels and brick kilns as a strategy to keep away from the violence. Data indicate 
that during the late conflict periods, seasonal migration increased by 105%, and 
overseas employment by 700%. Moreover, 21 youths from the community were 
recruited into the security forces, and 2 people joined the rebel forces during this 
period. 
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Figure  6.4:  Employment  and  Seasonal  Migration  in  Hile  Jaljale  (Ka)  CFUG, 
Kavrepalanchok 
 
Source: Fieldwork by author 2008 
 
6.5.1.1. Household Income during Pre/Early and late Conflict Periods  
 
Data were also collected to compare household income during pre/early and late 
conflict  periods.  The  data  show  that  the  overall  household  income  of  low-
income, middle-income and upper-income households increased by 3.16%, 2.3% 
and 6.6% respectively during  late  conflict  periods.  There was  a reduction in 
income from the agriculture sector, especially from the sale of vegetables and 
milk among middle and upper-income households. During interviews, farmers 
said  that  due  to  the  frequent  strikes  and  blockades  organized  by  the  Maoist 
rebels, it was difficult to send agricultural produce to market. Farmers especially 
from  middle  and  upper-income  categories  who  had  invested  in  commercial 
vegetable  farming  and  milking  cows  and  buffalo  lost  income  from  these 
perishable  products  during  the  late  conflict  periods.  Overseas  employment 
emerged as a new source of income for middle and upper-income households, 
which contributed substantially to the increase in household income.  226 
 
The data also confirm that all categories of people became more engaged in off-
farm activities during the late conflict periods. 
 
Table  6.19:  Mean  Annual  Household  Income  in  Hile  Jaljale  (Ka)  CFUG, 
Kavrepalanchok 
Income source  Low income  Middle income  High income 
 
   Pre/Earl
y 
conflict 
Late 
conflic
t  
Chang
e (%) 
Pre/Earl
y 
conflict 
Late 
conflict  
Chang
e (%) 
Pre/Early 
conflict 
Late 
conflict  
Chang
e (%) 
Cereal crops  5,040  4,600  -8.7  17,913  17,800  -0.6  34,933  34,867  -0.2 
Vegetable 
farming 
8,833  6,933  -21.5  27,400  21,267  -22.4  44,467  41,200  -7.4 
Dairying  2,467  4,133  +67.6  22,200  20,733  -6.6  36,400  30,867  -15.2 
Small animals 
(sheep/goat) 
3,500  3,680  +5.1  5,233  4,933  -5.7  11,267  10,567  -6.2 
Pig  0  1,267  1,260.
7 
0  0  -  0  0  - 
Poultry  233  133  -42.9  0  0  -  133  100  -25.0 
Salaries/waged 
work 
(permanent) 
0  4,533  -  0  0  -  18,800  32,800  +74.5 
Overseas 
employment  
0  0  -  0  9,333  +9,33
3 
6,667  10,000  +50.0 
Self 
Employment 
8,333  5,000  -40.0  0  0  -  9,533  12,400  +30.1 
On-farm wages 
(casual) 
5,500  4,947  -10.1  3,233  3,000  -7.2  1,033  900  -12.9 
Off-farm 
(casual) 
13,200  13,367  +1.3  3,433  4,133  +20.4  333  667  +100 
Total  47,107  48,593  +3.2  79,413  81,200  +2.3  163,567  174,367  +6.6 
Source: Field survey by author, 2008 
 
6.5.2. Contribution of Community Forest to Household Income 
 
Community forest not only provides much needed fire-wood, fodder, timber and 
a range of other environmental services to the local community, it also generates 
employment at the local level. At present however, most CFUGs lack sufficient 
scientific forest management to be able to maximize benefits. A recent study 
suggests that the conservative thinning practices adopted by most of the CFUGs 
in Sindhupalchok and Kavrepalanchok districts resulted in overstocking and 
reduction in volume growth of the forests, which may have resulted in the loss in 
potential income of US$ 200 per hectare per annum (Hunt, Dangal, and Shrestha 
2001,  11).  Although,  Hile  Jaljale  (Ka)  CF  had  been  carrying  out  shrub 
management,
116 scientific forest management was lacking. Encouraged by the 
                                                 
116 Shrub management practice refers to the removal of unproductive and economically invaluable plants 
from community forest, in order to promote the growth and productivity of the forest and to enhance the 
growth of broadleaf species.   227 
 
forest management practices applied in Chaubas since the establishment of the 
community saw-mill, the Hile Jaljale (Ka) CF carried out thinning practices for 
the first time in 1998, and the log timber generated from thinning was sold in the 
market.  
 
6.5.2.1. Community Forest Based Employment at Hile Jaljale (Ka) CFUG 
 
Before the inception of the community forestry program in the village, people of 
Hile  Jaljale  had  to  go  outside  of  the  village,  particularly  to  Banepa  or 
Kathmandu, in search of additional employment; as little was available in the 
village.  However,  after  the  implementation  of  silvicultural  practices  in  1998, 
many villagers were able to get ‗seasonal work as paid a laborer‘, which has 
improved local employment opportunities and household income. From 1998/99 
to  2007/08,  the total  employment  generated from  community forestry related 
work  in  the  Hile  Jaljale  (Ka)  CFUG  was  found  to  be  15,832  man-days,  an 
average of 1,583 person-days annually (see table 6.21)
117. 
 
Table 6.20: Employment Opportunity Generated by Hile Jaljale CF (1998/99 – 
2007/08) 
Activities  Employment 
 (Person-days) 
Mean annual 
employment 
% of total 
Forest management  11,788                        1,179   74 
Forest based enterprise  1,200                           120   8 
Community development  2,844                           284   18 
Total  15,832                        1,583   100 
Source: Field data 2008 by author   
 
It is interesting to note that although the investment in forest management and 
community  development  activities  is  almost  equal  (45%),  the  employment 
opportunities generated by the two sectors is completely different (refer Table 
6.21). With the investment of almost the same amount of money, the forest 
management activities and forest-based enterprises generated 82% of the total 
employment opportunities, while community development activities generated 
                                                 
117 The employment generated from Hile Jaljale (Ka) CFUG has been calculated on the basis of money that 
the  CFUG  paid  to  forest  users  during  implementation  of  various  forest  management  and  community 
development activities. The ‗man‘ days are calculated based on the total amount paid directly to forest users 
divided by the daily wage rate of that particular year. However, the employment generated indirectly from 
forest-based activities, mainly agriculture, livestock, and other livelihoods related work, is beyond the scope 
of this research.  228 
 
only 18 per cent.  This  is  mainly due to  the fact  that the forest  management 
activity involves labor-intensive work that does not require purchase of materials 
from  the  market.  Community  development  work  is  mainly  infrastructure, 
requiring at least half of the investment for purchase of construction materials 
and  leaving  only  about  25%  of  funds  to  hire  local  workers.  These  statistics 
suggest that poorer people will benefit more through an investment in  forest 
management activities rather than in infrastructure, at least in the short term. 
 
6.5.2.2. Employment Opportunity from Community Forest during Pre/Early and 
late Conflict Periods  
 
Data show that the Hile Jaljale CFUG created 1,713 mean annual person-days of 
employment before the intensified conflict, while during late conflict periods the 
mean annual employment rose to 7,282 person-days, which is three times more 
than the pre/early conflict period. These statistics demonstrate that community 
based forest governance in Hile Jaljale (Ka) CFUG was functional and able to 
carry out forest management as well as community development activities even 
during late conflict periods. Indeed, there was an increase in employment in all 
three sectors (see table 6.21). 
 
Table 6.21: Employment Opportunities Generated from CF at Hile Jaljale (Ka) 
during Pre/ Early and Late Conflict Periods 
Activities  Pre/Early conflict  
(1998/99-2000/01) 
Late conflict periods 
 (2001/02 – 2003/04) 
  Total 
employment 
(person-
days) 
Mean annual 
employment 
(person-
days) 
Total 
employment 
(person-days) 
Mean annual 
employment 
(person-days) 
Forest management  2,210  737  9,578           3,281  
Forest based 
enterprise
118 
360  120  720 
             360  
Community 
development 
2,570  857  2,494 
         3,641  
Total  5,140  1,713  12,792           7,282  
Source:  Compiled and calculated from Hile Jaljale (Ka) CFUG record 
 
The economic value of community forest resources have never been estimated in 
the formal sector, nevertheless,  they directly contribute to  the support of the 
                                                 
118 Forest based enterprise refers to employment generated from CF based employment such as the small 
scale furniture factory in the village, briquette making and blacksmithing. 229 
 
farming system and play an important role in the livelihoods of local people. 
During  the  course  of  this  study,  consumptive  value  of  community  forest 
resources have been calculated in economic terms based on the quantity of forest 
products used by each household annually from CF and the local market value of 
such products.  
 
Table 6.22: Consumptive Value of Forest Products (NRs) by Income Category 
during Pre/Early and Late Conflict Periods at Hile Jaljale (Ka) CFUG 
119 
Forest 
Products 
Low-income  Middle-income  Upper-income 
   Pre/Early 
(1998/99-
2000/01) 
Late 
conflict  
(2001/02-
2003/04) 
   Pre/Early 
(1998/99-
2000/01)) 
Late 
conflict  
(2001/02-
2003/04) 
   Pre/Early 
(1998/99-
2000/01) 
Late 
conflict 
(2001/02-
2003/04)  
  
  Amount  Amount  Dif 
(%) 
Amount  Amount  Dif 
(%) 
Amount  Amount  Dif 
(%) 
Timber  1,715  2,660  +55  1,187  910  -23  -  -  - 
Fuel 
wood 
6,800  4,784  -30  2,834  2,327  -18  3,467  2,834   -18 
Fodder  120  45  -62  210  150  -29  150  -  -100 
Grass  2,070  1,575  -24  2,160  1,605  -26  915  720  -21 
Leaf litter  2,460  1,935  -21  6,135  4,500  -27  6,660  5,040  -24 
Total  13,165  10,998  -16  12,525  9,492  -24  11,191  8,594  -23 
Source: Fieldwork by Author 2008 
The statistics above show that the gross value of forest products collected from 
CF is slightly higher among middle-income and upper-income households as 
compared  to  low-income  households.  However,  the  percentage  of  the 
contribution of CF to household income is higher among low-income households 
as  compared  to  middle  and  upper-income  households  (see  Table  5.18).  Data 
indicate  that  the  household  consumption  value  of  forest  products  decreased 
among  all income  groups  during  the late  conflict periods,  except  for timber. 
However, respondents claimed that the decrease in the amount of forest products 
collection during late conflict periods did not have serious negative impacts on 
their households. 
 
                                                 
119 The income from forest products was calculated based on the work of Gregerson et al. (1995) and 
Murthy et al. (2005), where consumptive value of forest products in each CFUG was calculated based on 
per unit current local price of the particular forest products multiplied by the amount of forests products 
used by the households. The consumptive value of forest products used by households in Hile Jaljale (Ka) 
CFUG was calculated based on the local value of the particular forest products. Based on discussions with 
CFUG general and committee members, the price of the forest products was fixed at the rate of NRs 105/- 
per  cu  ft  of  timber  and  NRs.  50/-  for  a  bhari  of  fuel-wood  and  NRs.  45/-  for  fodder  and  leaf-litter 
respectively. 230 
 
6.6. Environmental Sustainability Outcomes of Hile-Jaljale (Ka) CFUG 
 
Historically, development models ignored the effect of economic activity on the 
environment, which produces serious environmental problems (Weaver, Rock, 
and Kusterer 1997, 237). As environmental resources are fundamental for human 
survival and well-being, the main aim of promoting environmental sustainability 
is  to  sustain  the  life-support  system.  In  simplest  terms,  environmental 
sustainability is defined as the ―maintenance of natural capital‖ (Goodland 1995, 
10). An attempt was made to assess the environmental sustainability outcomes 
associated with community forestry programs, including the condition of forests, 
water regimes, wildlife, and a range of other benefits from these environmental 
resources. Villagers said that after the introduction of the community forestry 
program  in  Hile  Jaljale  (Ka)  CFUG  there  was  marked  improvement  in  the 
quality  of  the  forest.  The  local  environment,  watershed  condition,  and 
biodiversity  were  also  reported  by  villagers  to  have  improved.  After  the 
improvement in the status of the forest, the incidence of floods and landslides 
was  largely  reduced.  There  has  also  been  an  improvement  in  environmental 
services  such  as  water  for  drinking  and  irrigation;  availability  of  medicinal 
plants; and fuel-wood for cooking and construction timber. The forest, which 
was degraded 30 years ago, is now in a very good condition. Improvement in 
forest condition is also supported by the recent inventory prepared under the 
joint collaboration of the Hile Jaljale community, Nepal-Australia Community 
Resource Management and Livelihoods Project (NACRMLP) and Department of 
Forest staff.  231 
 
The inventory, undertaken as part of the preparation of the new Operational Plan 
in 2006, shows the status of trees in the community forest to be as follows: 
 
Table  6.23:  Number  of  Trees  per  hectare  in  the  Hile  Jaljale  (Ka)  Community 
Forest  
Name of species  10-20 
cm 
diameter 
20-30 cm 
diameter 
above 30 
cm 
diameter 
Total 
trees 
Annual 
increment 
(cu feet) 
Pinus patula  139  105  48  292  95 
Others  
Chilaune-Schima wallichii, 
Kafal- Myrica esculanta  
Mauwa- Engelhardtia 
spicata 
Aangeri- Lyonia ovalifolia 
221  30  23  274  138 
Total  360  135  71  566  233 
Source: Hile Jaljale (Ka) CFUG Operational Plan, 2006 
 
 
Moreover, according to the villagers, the regeneration of broadleaf species has 
improved  soil  condition  and  the  micro-climate  of  the  forests.  The  CFUG 
committee members said that they plan to replace the existing pine forest with 
broadleaf species within the next 15-20 years, by adopting a gradual thinning 
regime. The regeneration status of the forest is as follows: 
 
Table 6.24: Status of Regeneration in Hile Jaljale (Ka) CFUG 
Local name  Botanical name  No  of  young  and  mature 
saplings /ha 
Young  Mature 
Paiyu  Prunus cerasoides  300  300 
Katus (Musure)  Castanopsis tribuloids  166  66 
Kafal  Myrica esculenta   700  733 
Setikath  Myrsine capitellata   5,100  1,000 
Kalikath  Myrsine semiserrata   1,667  - 
Chilaune  Schima wallichii   233  200 
Hinwa  Eurya cerasifolia  966  800 
Gurans  Rhododendron arboreum  466  166 
Others  -  7,550  8,600 
Total    17,148  11,865 
Source: (Hile Jaljale (Ka) CFUG 2001) 
 
Community-based co-management of the forest not only improved the forest 
condition  but  also  brought  marked  changes  in  wildlife  conservation.  Local 
residents in  Hile Jaljale reported that after initiation of the CF program and 232 
 
conservation of forest, many species of wild animals and birds have migrated 
into the community forest. Wildlife sightings may reflect the improvement in the 
wildlife habitat (see table 6.25).  
 
Table 6.25: List of Wild life Sighted by Informants at Hile Jaljale (Ka) CFUG 
Vernacular name  English name  Scientific name 
Wild animals     
Bandel  Wild boar  Sus scrofa 
Pate Bagh  Tiger  Panthera tigris tigris 
Chituwa  Leopard  Panthera pardus 
Dumsi  Porcupine  Hystrix indica 
Salak  Chinese pangolin  Manis pantadactyla 
Kharayo  Hispid hare  Caprolagus hispidus 
Shyal  Jackal  Canis aurevs 
Chittal  Spotted dear  Axix axis 
Ratuwa mirga  Barking Deer  Muntiacus muntaijak 
Lokharke  Squirrels  Funambulus spp. 
Malsapro  Yellow-throated Marten  Mortes flarigula 
Banmuso  -  - 
Sun Gohoro  Golden Monitor Lizard  Varanus favescens 
Sarpa  Snake  - 
Birds     
kalij  kalij pheasant  L. l. Leucomelanos 
Titra  Hill-partridge  Arborophila torqueola 
Lampuchree  Yellow billed Blue 
Magpie 
Urocissa flavirostris 
Dhukur  Oriental Turtle Dove  Streptoplia orentalis 
Jureli  Red vented bubbul  Pycnonotus jocosus 
Suga  Red Breasted Parakeet  Psittacula alexandri 
Dhobichara  Oriental Magpie Robin  Copsychus saularis 
Chyakhura  Chukur Patridge  Alectoris graeca 
Baj  Falcon  Falcon peregrines 
Baudai chari  -  - 
Gauthali  House Swift  Apus affinis 
Kalchaude  -  - 
Malichara  -  - 
Source: Fieldwork by author, 2008 
 
Beside these reported benefits, some negative consequences of armed conflict 
for the local environment have been observed by villagers during late conflict 
periods. A number of trees were removed from the watershed by the security 
forces.  Regular  firing  exercises  and  testing  of  explosives  carried  out  by  the 
Nepalese army may have had a negative effect on some wildlife. Small localized 
landslides  were  reported  due  to  the  vibration  resulting  from  firing  and 
explosives. Water sources inside the forest, a prime source of drinking water for 233 
 
the villagers, were polluted by debris from explosives and bullets resulting from 
military exercises, although scientific assessment of this pollution is lacking.  
 
6.7 Conclusion 
 
The Hile Jaljale (Ka) forest has undergone three management regimes. In the 
beginning,  when  the  forest  was  granted  as  birta,  management  was  local,  as 
descendants of birta holders applied the traditional forest management system. 
The forest was in good condition during that time. However, the status of the 
forest became severely degraded, partly due to natural disasters and to changes 
in the land tenure policy of the government, particularly after the abolition of 
birta tenure. The sudden institutional vacuum created by the abolition of birta 
tenure  induced  the  absence  of  local  property  rights  and  breakdown  of  the 
traditional management and authority system. From that point, the forest was 
converted to open access, without proper management. Due to unregulated use 
and over  exploitation,  eventually  the  forest  became seriously degraded. As a 
consequence there was a severe shortage of essential forest products, especially 
fuel-wood, fodder and timber; and villagers were required to walk for hours to 
collect fuel-wood and fodder. The crisis of forest degradation was addressed by 
the  Nepalese  government  initiating  an  afforestation  program  with  assistance 
from  the  World  Bank  and  the  Australian  government  and  with  active 
participation by the local community in Hile Jaljale. 
 
After replanting, villagers were actively involved in the collective management 
of  forest  resources  under  their  own  local  rules  and  regulations.  With  the 
formulation of the community forest policy and regulations by the government, 
the Hile Jaljale (Ka) forest was formally handed over to the Hile Jaljale (Ka) 
community on January 1991 for community-based co-management.  
 
There was a general  consensus among Hile Jaljale respondents that after the 
introduction  of  community  based  forest  management,  the  bio-physical 
environment  of  the  forest  improved  enormously.  The  forest  had  become 
successful in satisfying basic needs for forest products while conserving wildlife 
and environmental services from the forest. Community harvesting and selling of 234 
 
timber, based on the CFUG operational plan, generated a substantial amount of 
money.  This  indicates  that  community  based  forest  management  has  proved 
viable and successful for the sustainable management of forest resources in Hile 
Jaljale. However, there remains a concern over the participation of women and 
other  socio-economically  disadvantaged  sections  of  the  community  in  the 
decision making process and benefit sharing. The research indicates that to date, 
the management of Hile Jaljale (Ka) CFUG is still in the hands of local elites and 
socio-economically advantaged people. In line with the recently prepared second 
generation operational plan, four women representatives have been included in 
the CFUG executive committee since 2006; however, their active participation 
and influence on the decision making process remains to be seen.  
 
The  Hile  Jalajle  CFUG  has  invested  a  substantial  amount  of  money  in 
development of community infrastructure, mainly in education, drinking water 
facilities, and rural road construction. The benefit of these investments to socio-
economically  disadvantaged  sections  of  the  community  is  open  to  question. 
Because of low socio-economic status and education, and limited capital at their 
disposal, these groups are less able to reap the benefits of such development 
interventions on a par with socio-economically privileged members. Unless the 
socio-economic  condition  of  disadvantaged  people  is  enhanced  through 
investment in pro-poor programs and capacity building, their real participation, 
control over decision making, and access to natural resources cannot be secured. 
Some positive initiatives have been undertaken by the Hile Jalajle (Ka) CFUG. It 
has adopted a policy of positive discrimination in distributing forest products 
targeted to poor, landless and disadvantaged groups. However, it is clear that 
such  arrangements  are  insufficient  to  enhance  the  economic  condition  of  the 
people from lower socio-economic strata. There is a need to invest more income 
in programs that could substantially raise the socio-economic condition of the 
rural poor.  
 
This study suggests that the Hile Jaljale (Ka) CFUG has significant potential for 
generating income from the sale of timber; however, the CFUG does not have 
the  technical  and  managerial  capability  to  do  so  on  a  sustainable  basis.  The 
limited marketing experience of the CFUG has meant that the benefit of the 235 
 
timber business is reaped mostly by contractors and businessmen from outside. 
The  community  will  increase  the  benefits  from  such  activities  if  community 
members  are  trained  in  semi-processing  of  forest  products  before  going  to 
market,  and  also  through  better  promotion  of  forest-based  enterprises.  It  is 
possible to enhance the local development and poverty alleviation capacities of 
the  Hile  Jalajle  (Ka)  community  through  the  scientific  management  of 
community  forest  resources.  However,  the  sustainability  of  such  initiatives 
entirely depends on the practice of good forest governance.   
 
With  the  emergence  of  armed  conflict  in  Nepal,  the  law  and  order  situation 
deteriorated  and  there  was  a  crisis  of  governance.  The  community  forestry 
program witnessed several impacts during this period. The forestry infrastructure 
of  the  District  Forest  Office,  Kavrepalanchok  was  largely  destroyed  and  the 
forestry technicians working at the village level were displaced from local Range 
Posts. Part of the Hile Jaljale (Ka) Community Forest was declared an army 
training zone by the government, affecting planned forest management activities 
and access to forest products. However, through mediation from FECOFUN, the 
CFUG was able to carry out its forest management activities more or less as 
outlined  in  the  operational  plan,  developing  working  arrangements  through 
regular contact and coordination with security forces.  
 
During late conflict periods, the frequency of visits to the forest and the amount 
of forest products collected were reduced. However, the CFUG members were 
able to fulfill their basic needs for forest products by the strategy they adopted of 
―wise use and minimum use‖. The Hile Jalajle (Ka) CFUG was actually able to 
increase forest management and community development activities during the 
late  conflict  periods,  accompanied  by  an  increase  in  employment  generated. 
Even during such difficult times, Hile Jaljale (Ka) CFUG maintained control 
over their forest and there was no encroachment or illegal activity from outsiders 
(other than combatants).  
 
The most interesting thing that came out of this study is that during the period of 
the Maoist insurgency, although governmental and non-governmental agencies 
were  paralyzed,  the  Hile  Jaljale  (Ka)  CFUG  continued  its  activities.  Perhaps 236 
 
surprisingly, government intervention and Maoist pressure did not change basic 
CFUG  governance  arrangements.  Although  the  Department  of  Forest  was 
largely destroyed and could not function effectively during late conflict periods, 
community-based forest governance in Hile Jaljale (Ka) remained stable. Due to 
the  participatory  and  heterarchical  structure  of  the  community-based  co-
management model adopted by the Hile Jalajle CFUG, they were successful in 
carrying  out  forest  management  activities  despite  difficulties  created  by  the 
conflict. The Hile Jalajle (Ka) case study illustrates the community resilience and 
bargaining power which can be fostered by the experience of a community-based 
co-management approach.  
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Chapter 7 
 
Case Study Three: Lakuri Rukh Bhulbhule Community 
Forest User Group (CFUG) 
 
7.1. Introduction 
 
Among the three case studies selected for this study, the first case study site i.e. 
Sharada  Devi  CFUG  was  not  seriously  affected  by  either  of  the  contending 
parties; the Hile Jaljale (Ka) CFUG was under the influence of Nepalese security 
forces, while the Lakuri Rukh CFUG, the subject of this case study, came under 
the influence of the Maoist insurgents during the late conflict periods. Among 
the three case study sites, Lakuri Rukh is located farthest from the district capital 
and is considered the most remote.  
 
The Lakuri Rukh Community Forest User Group (CFUG) is located in Chaubas 
Village Development Committee (VDC) ward numbers 1, 3, and 5. According to 
the census of 2001, the Chaubas VDC has a total population of 1690, dominated 
by  the  Chhetri  caste  (33.18%),  and  Tamang  (27.  38%)  and  Pahari  (26.97%) 
ethnic minority groups
120. The Chaubas Village Development Committee (VDC) 
is situated across the Sun Koshi River, about 75 kilometers from Kathmandu, 
along the northern-most part of Kavrepalanchok district. It is situated at an 
altitude of 2,100 meters above sea level. Until 1995, people walked 6 hours 
uphill from the Kodari Highway at Dolalghat to reach Chaubas. In 1995, an 18 
kilometer fair weather road was built from across Sun Koshi River to Chaubas. 
There is a bus service from Kathmandu and Banepa (the business centre of 
Kavrepalanchok);  however,  the  service  is  frequently  interrupted  during  the 
monsoon season. Most of the area of Chaubas is sloping terrain. It occupies 
1,035 ha of land, of which 60% is cultivated. The Chaubas  Danda  (ridge) 
divides the village into two halves on a north-south axis (Malla and Griffin, 
1999). Cereal crops and animal husbandry are the main sources of livelihood for 
                                                 
120  According  to  the  prevailing  Nepalese  caste  system  practiced  in  the  society,  Bramhan  and  Chhetri 
belongs to higher caste, Damai, Kami, Sarki belongs to lower caste and Tamang, Gurung, Newar, Pahari, 
Magar belongs to ethnic groups. 238 
 
more than 90% of the residents. Other sources of livelihood include wage labor, 
small business, overseas employment, and the salaries/waged work (permanent). 
In 1995 at least one member from each family of low-income (poorer) groups in 
Chaubas was working in Kathmandu as wage laborer (Jackson, et al, 1995: 6). 
There are 15 CFUGs in total under this Village Development Committee (VDC). 
   
Map  7.1:  Participatory  Map  of  Lakuri  Rukh  Community  Forest,  Chaubas, 
Kavrepalanchok 
Source: Map prepared by author with the help of CFUG Members 
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7.1.1. Bio-physical Characteristics of Lakuri Rukh Devi Community Forest  
 
The Lakuri Rukh community forest is situated above 2100 meter above sea level. 
The forest is mainly composed of pine species, and the age of the forest is 23 
years with a total area of 63 ha.  
 
Table 7.1: Bio-physical Characteristics of Lakuri Rukh CFUG at Chaubas 
Description  Number 
Location of forest  Chaubas  V.  D.C.  Ward  No.  1,  2,  5 
Kavrepalanchok 
Total area of community forest (ha.)  63 ha 
Community forest blocks   5 blocks 
Aspect  North – East and South - West 
Slope (degrees)  10 – 45 
Age of forest (years)  23 years 
Crown cover  30-35% 
Average altitude (meters) above sea level  2100 
Major forest species  Pinus  patula,  Pinus  walichiana,  Alnus 
nepalensis,  Michelia champaca             
Source: (Lakuri Rukh CFUG 2006) 
 
7.2. Socio-economic Profile of the Lakuri Rukh Bhulbhule CFUG 
 
A total of 73 households from four major settlements – Okhre, Chaubas Bazar, 
Aekya and Kaule – comprise the Lakuri Rukh Community Forest User Group 
(CFUG). Membership is composed of four major ethno-caste groups, of which 
68% belong to ethnic groups, 24% belongs to higher castes and 7% belongs to a 
lower caste.   
 
Table 7.2: Major Caste and Ethnic Composition of Lakuri Rukh CFUG, Chaubas 
Caste  Number of 
households 
Population  % of total 
population 
Higher castes       
Brahman/Chhetri  16  107  25 
Ethnic groups          
Pahari  34  189  43 
Tamang  14  111  25 
Lower caste          
Sarki/Kami  9  31  7 
Total  73  438  100 
Source: Field Survey by author, 2008 
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The result of the participatory wealth ranking in Lakuri Rukh CFUG indicates 
that more than half of the total households fall into the low-income group, and 
only one-fifth of households belong to upper-income groups. 88% of households 
from  the lower caste and 62% from  the ethnic  groups  are classified as low-
income, and only 7% of high caste households fall into the low-income category; 
indicating a high correlation between traditional social status groups and income. 
 
Figure 7.1: Wealth Ranking of Lakuri Rukh CFUG at Chaubas 
 
Source: Fieldwork by author, 2008 
 
7.2.1. Land Holding 
 
Land is a precious resource for the livelihoods of people in the hills of Nepal. 
The  size  of  the  land  holding  is  continuously  diminishing  due  to  ever  rising 
population  growth  and  subdivision  through  inheritance  among  sons
121.  The 
household survey indicates that land holdings in Lakuri Rukh CFUG are very 
small, especially of khet (irrigated land).  
 
                                                 
121 Previously, according to the civil code, fathers were legally obligated to leave equal portions of land to 
each son. Daughters do not inherit paternal property unless they remain unmarried past the age of thirty-
five. Although ideally sons manage their father's land together as part of a joint family, familial land tends 
to be divided, with holdings diminishing in every generation. However, after the 11th amendment of 1963 
civil code, which came into effect from September 27, 2002, women now can claim their parental property 
by birth. The amendment provides equal rights for a married woman to her husband‘s property immediately 
after marriage. There is no age restriction, whereas previously a woman could claim her husband‘s property 
only after 15 years of marriage. 241 
 
Table  7.3:  Mean  Land  Holding  per  Household  in  Lakuri  Rukh  CFUG  (all 
categories) 
 
Category of land  Area(ropani) 
 
Irrigated Khet  0.8 
Barvi(upland)  12.4 
Kharbari
122  7.6 
Source: Field Survey author, 2008 
 
The mean land holding per household for low-income groups is 9.87 ropani
123, 
while  it  is  16.07  and  37.27  ropanis  for  middle-income  and  upper-income 
households respectively. Low-income households do not possess irrigated land 
and  have  limited  areas  of  kharbari,  while  middle  and  upper  income  groups 
possess good fertile land with larger areas of kharbari. 
 
Table 7.4: Mean Land Holding by Income Category in Lakuri Rukh Bhulbhule 
CFUG (sample survey) 
Land holding (ropani)  Low-income  Middle-income  Upper-income 
 
Mean land holdings  9.9  16.1  37.3 
Irrigated land (Khet)  -  0.5  1.8 
Rain-fed agricultural land  -  -  0.9 
Upland (Bari)  7.0  10.5  19.8 
Kharbari   2.9  5.1  14.8 
Source: Author field survey, 2008 
 
7.2.2. Basic Household Characteristics 
 
The survey also shows that household size, age of household head, literacy and 
basic  facilities  are  directly  related  to  household  income.  There  is  a  sharp 
difference in the total household income between groups. The annual income of 
low-income households is US$ 352, which is 37% and 21% of that of middle-
income and upper-income households respectively.  
 
                                                 
122 Kharbari is private forest land designated to supplement household needs for grass,  fuel-wood and 
timber. 
123 A traditional unit of land area in South Asia, one ropani equals 500 square meters, or .05 hectare. 242 
 
Table 7.5: Household Characteristics by Income-wealth Category in Lakuri Rukh 
CFUG 
 Household characteristics  
(mean values from sample) 
Low-income  Middle-
income 
Upper-income 
Household size (no.)                   5                    6                     7  
Annual household income (NRs)          26,061           68,793          121,707  
Annual  household  income 
(US$)
124 
             352                930              1,645  
Age of household head (yrs)                 39                  43                   59  
Education of household head          
Overall literacy rate (%)               33                73                  67  
Primary education (%)               33                67                  40  
Secondary education (%)    -                    7                  13  
Higher  secondary  education 
(%) 
  -      -                   13  
Livestock holding (mean no.)          
Buffalo                0.4                 0.7                  0.8  
Cow                0.5                 0.5                  0.6  
Ox                0.4                 0.4                  0.1  
Goat/Sheep                4.3                 4.8                  6.7  
Pig                0.2                 0.8    -  
Chicken                6.9               10.1                11.5  
Household with:       
Electricity (%)  -  13(solar)  27(solar) 
Piped water (%)  100  87  100 
Telephone (%)  20  20  47 
Audiovisual owned (%)       
Radio (%)  87  100  100 
Television (%)  -  13  40 
Source of household energy (%)       
Fuel-wood  100  100  93 
LPG Gas  -  -  7 
Source: Author, Field survey, 2008  
 
7.3. Historical Background of Lakuri Rukh Community Forest 
 
It is known from the oldest person in the village, Mr. Man Bahadur Thapa (102 
years) that the southern aspect of the Chaubas hill was completely denuded and 
there were forests in the northern aspect for as long as he can remember. He 
estimates  that  the  southern  belt  of  the  Chaubas  Danda  forest  was  deforested 
probably 100-150 years ago. It can be speculated that the Chaubas hill might 
have been deforested due to shifting cultivation, grazing and felling for timber. 
The degraded forest area of Chaubas Danda was heavily used for grazing until 
1978.  However,  on  the  northern  aspect  of  Chaubas  the  forest  was  in  good 
                                                 
124 1 US$ equivalent to Nepali Rupees(NRS) 74 243 
 
condition. When the government enacted the 1957 Private Forest Nationalization 
Act, the forests fell entirely under the control of the state, and access to the forest 
was severely restricted. After promulgation of the 1961 Forest Act, state control 
over forest was further strengthened. Under state control, villagers were afraid to 
enter  the  forest  because  if  they  were  caught  by  the  forest  guard  they  faced 
penalties and legal action. It was even difficult to construct a new house without 
obtaining permission from the Department of Forests. If the forest guard found 
any house under construction without permission from the forest department, the 
person  faced  legal  action  in  the  form  of  fines  or  imprisonment.  In  many 
instances, forest guards threatened villagers and bargained for bribes, and if such 
benefits were not provided, villagers could face legal consequences. Fearful of 
possible  legal  action,  villagers  compromised  with  the  forest  guards,  often 
providing them with some form of financial or material benefit.  
 
The status of the forest worsened gradually in the area, due to lack of local 
control.  As  the  people  did  not  feel  a  sense  of  ownership,  the  forest  was 
indiscriminately harvested whenever it was possible to escape of the notice of 
forest guards. As forest staff and infrastructure were limited, the Department of 
Forest  could  not  control  the  tree  felling,  and  the  forest  in  Chaubas  became 
severely degraded. One of the informants said that he was born in 1960, and 
reported that by 1970 he was going to the forest to collect firewood, as were 
most  village  children  to  assist  their  parents.  During  those  days,  people  used 
maize stalks, dung cakes and khoya (maize cob) as fuel for cooking, or would 
visit the degraded forest at dawn to dig up the roots of trees  as a source of 
firewood,  as  there  was  no  standing  tree  left  in  the  forest.  Also  branches  of 
different  shrubs  like  Chutro  (Berbers  aristata),  Ghangaru  (Cotoneaster 
microphyllus),  Banmara  (Chromolaena  odorata),  and  Rudilo  (Pogostemon 
benghalensis) were taken for fuel. As fuel wood was such a scarce commodity in 
the  village  until  1985,  people  from  Chaubas  village  would  go  to  Bangthali, 
Simthali, Bagdev Ko Chautaro and Sano Soti forests in the neighboring village 
to collect forest products. These forests were also under severe pressure from the 
surrounding villages, and soon also became degraded. To collect a head load of 
firewood, people would leave the village about seven in the morning and return 
with a head load of firewood at 3-4 in the afternoon, which was sufficient for a 244 
 
week for a household with average 5-6 members. The crisis of fuel-wood and 
fodder  deficit  experienced  by  the  people  of  Chaubas  reflected  the  wider 
degradation of the Nepalese mountains, brought to international attention with 
the publication of Eric Eckholm‘s influential article ―Tragedy in Shangri-La” 
(1975: 764-765) in the journal Science. 
 
7.4. Community-based Forest Governance (CBFG) Arrangements in Lakuri 
Rukh CFUG 
 
Since the 1970s, significant attention in the international arena has been drawn to 
the  importance  of  local  people‘s  involvement  in  local  forest  management 
(Hobley 1996, 2). According to the villagers, there was a barren hill slope in the 
north of the Chaubas called Jamune, which lies in Sindhupalchok district, and 
which was  clearly visible from  their village as it was  covered with  red soil. 
When the villagers saw the red hill turn to green, the then  Pradhan Pancha 
(Village leader) of Chaubas, Dan Bahadur Kunwar, along with other villagers 
from Chaubas, went to  visit the place. During their visit they learnt that the 
reforestation programme in Thokarpa, Sindhupalchok district, had been carried 
out in 1973 with the assistance of Nepal Australia Community Forestry Project 
(NAFP),  and  that  the  plantation  campaign  was  led  by  a  popular  local 
conservation leader, Nil Prasad Bhandari. At the time of their visit, Tej Bahadur 
Mahat was the Divisional Forest Officer in Chautara Division, who also had the 
mandate and jurisdiction to look after the Kavrepanchok district. The delegation 
from the village requested the Divisional Forest Officer to help them with the 
reforestation of the barren hill slopes in Chaubas. The DFO informed them that 
this would be possible after consultations with officials in the Nepal-Australia 
Forestry  Project  (NAFP).  In  1978,  after  several  rounds  of  discussions  with 
villagers, a forest nursery was established in Dharapani of the Chaubas Village 
Development  Committee (VDC) with  the help  of NAFP, under the Chautara 
Forest  Division.  The  villagers  provided  the  land  for  the  establishment  of  a 
nursery, and participated in carrying sand downhill from the Sunkoshi River as 
their voluntary contribution. After the seedlings were grown in the nursery, the 
reforestation programme in Chaubas was carried out from 1979. Within a few 
years, nearly 400 hectares of barren land were planted, mainly with three species 245 
 
of pines (Pinus patula, Pinus radiate, Pinus rexburghii), as these species were 
considered  good  at  tolerating  poor  soil  condition  and  moisture  stress  (Van 
Eijnaten, Acharya, and Shrestha 2001, 1). The conservation effort undertaken by 
the villagers was an example  of local people‘s concern to deal with existing 
resource  degradation  in  their  villages.  Since  1973,  more  than  19,000  ha  of 
plantation have been established in Kavrepalanchok and Sindhupalchok districts 
under the auspices of the Nepal – Australia Community Forestry Project.  
 
Conservation efforts in Chaubas coincided with national forestry policy reforms 
introduced with  the enactment  of the 1978 Panchayat  Forest  (PF) Rules  and 
Panchayat Protected Forest (PPF) Rules, which formed the basis for handing 
over of government controlled forests to villagers. On July 12, 1988, Pandey 
Gaon Forest in Kavrepalanchok district became the first forest in Nepal to be 
officially handed over to local community management. The forests in Chaubas 
VDC were also being managed under Panchayat Protected Forest provisions. 
However,  the  official  handing  over  of  forest  in  Chaubas  began  in  the  early 
1990s,  with  the  formation  of  a  number  of  community  forest  user  groups 
(CFUGs),  among  which  responsibilities  for  large  sections  of  forest  were 
allocated.  
 
As noted previously, the 1993 Forest Act, the 1995 Forest Rules, Community 
Forest  Directives  1996,  and  the  1995  Community  Forestry  Operational 
Guidelines  were  considered  progressive  forest  policies  in  Nepal,  which 
mandated the CFUGs as self-governing autonomous bodies with authority and 
responsibility to protect, manage and utilize forests, based on their constitution 
and  operational  plan  and  according  to  resolutions  of  the  CFUG  general 
assembly. For the first time in the history of forest policy in Nepal, the Forest 
User Groups (FUG) were entitled to prepare and implement their own rules of 
forest  management  (constitution,  and  operation  plan)  within  the  general 
framework of community forestry, as stipulated in the 1993 Forest Act and the 
1995  Forest  Regulations.  The  1995  Forest  Regulations  provided  explicit 
authority to user groups to plant short-term cash crops like non-timber forest 
products (NTFPs), such as medicinal herbs; fix prices of forest products for their 
own  use;  transport  forest  products  under  their  jurisdiction  anywhere  in  the 246 
 
country;  and  punish  their  members  according  to  their  constitution  and 
operational plan in case of breach of rules. The legislation gave authority to local 
communities  to  manage  the  forests  and  reap  benefits  from  the  forests.  The 
community holds full rights to manage the forest except for the sale of the total 
stock of trees and the land on which the biomass stands.  
 
The Lakuri Rukh forest was officially handed over to the community on July 8, 
1996, after which the conservation and management responsibilities of Lakuri 
Rukh CFUG legally came under the jurisdiction of the community. According to 
the  Lakuri  Rukh  CFUG,  before  the  handover  of  forest  they  prepared  two 
required principle documents, the CFUG constitution and the operational plan 
(OP), which were finalized and approved by the CFUG general assembly (GA) 
meeting. Then the document was forwarded to the District Forest Officer. The 
Lakuri Rukh CFUG operational plan sets out the following objectives: 
 
  To  be  self-reliant  on  forest  products  through  the  conservation, 
management of forest; 
  To  fulfil  the  day  to  day  forest  products  (grass,  leaf-litter,  fuel-wood, 
fodder and leaf) needs of the forest user group (FUG), without having 
adverse impact to the forest; 
  To maintain and balance the local environment through erosion control 
and protection of flora and fauna; 
  To conserve the water source; 
  To improve the economic status of its members by implementing forest 
based income generating activities; and 
  To establish a saw-mill in collaboration with other adjoining CFUGs for 
the  effective  utilization  of  log  timber  obtained  from  forest  thinning 
operation. 
 
Migrants  to  the  settlement  who  wish  to  become  members  of  the  CFUG  are 
required to apply to the general assembly. Membership is cancelled if anyone 
resigns  from  the  CFUG  or  migrates  from  the  village  permanently.  Likewise, 
membership is cancelled if any member of the CFUG is found guilty of acting 
against the CFUG constitution or operational plan.  247 
 
 
CFUG composition, processes and authorities 
 
The  Lakuri  Rukh  CFUG  has  an  executive  committee  that  consists  of  nine 
members,  i.e.  chairman,  vice-chairman,  treasurer,  secretary,  and  five  other 
members. The general assembly of CFUG elects the EC, and priority is meant to 
be given to women in the nomination process.  
 
To date, the CFUG executive committee has been elected by consensus at the 
GA meeting. Decisions of the GA and EC are typically also by consensus. At EC 
meetings,  every  member  in  the  committee  presents  their  agenda,  which  is 
discussed thoroughly before a decision is made. Important issues which emerge 
out of informal discussions in various village settings are also put on the CFUG 
executive committee agenda for discussion. If there are any disagreements, a 
final decision is determined through majority vote.  
 
CFUG members stated  that they review CFUG objectives  periodically  at  the 
general assembly meeting. Generally, the assembly meeting is scheduled once a 
year. However, it can be called whenever necessary by the CFUG  executive 
committee.  Two-thirds  of  the  members  must  attend  the  assembly  meeting  to 
make it official. The CFUG general assembly meeting can make amendments to 
the constitution by a two-thirds majority vote. Any issues which are not included 
in the constitution shall follow 1993 Forest Act and 1995 Forest Rules. Every 
member of the CFUG executive committee takes an oath of office. The CFUG 
shall has its own official seal and can sue or be sued in its own name. Annexes to 
the OP contain the membership list, list of executive committee members, and 
financial transaction forms. 
 
The Lakuri Rukh CFUG has a separate fund collected from various sources such 
as donations, prizes, membership fees, fines, and income through the sale of 
forest products. A bank account has been opened with joint signatures of the 
CFUG Chairman and Treasurer. For the operation of daily activities, the CFUG 
executive committee can spend NRs 500 at a time and not more than NRs 2500 248 
 
in a year, which should be approved through the general assembly. There is a 
provision for annual financial audits through an approved auditor.  
 
7.4.1. Lakuri Rukh CFUG Forest Management  
 
The 1993 Forest Act and 1995 Forest Regulations provide for local authority to 
devise  and  to  carry  out  forest  management  activities  and  control  of 
encroachment  and  illegal  activities  in  the  community  forest.  The  CFUG  has 
programs  to  construct  breaks  and  roads  for  fire  control,  and  conservation 
education  programs  and  workshops  train  CFUG  members  in  methods  of  fire 
protection and conservation of non-timber forest products in the forest. Detailed 
measures to control illegal logging and encroachment are set out in the Lakuri 
Rukh constitution and operational plan. Provisions for fines and penalties in case 
of  breach  of  CFUG  rules  have  been  incorporated  in  the  CFUG  OP.  Every 
member of the CFUG is involved in forest monitoring, patrolling the forest by 
roster.  
 
The CFUG carries out preventive measures to discourage forest-related offences, 
and also conducts investigations into cases of suspected offences. Any CFUG 
member  who  provides  information  or  helps  in  identifying  the  person  who 
committed damage to the forest will receive 25% of the total penalty incurred by 
the offender. Likewise, a prize of NRs 5,000 is offered for those members who 
make  exemplary  contributions  in  the  management  and  conservation  of 
community  forest.  These  awards  are  made  by  the  CFUG  General  assembly 
(GA). The following fines and penalties have been mandated according to the 
Lakuri Rukh operational plan: 
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Table 7.6: Fines and Penalties for Violation of CFUG Rules at Lakuri Rukh  
Type of damage    Fine in Nepali Rupees   
First time  Second 
Time 
Third 
time 
Fourth time 
Damage to seedlings/saplings  5  10  20  Expelled from 
membership 
Timber extraction/cu.ft.  50  100  200  as above 
Fodder, leaf litter extraction  50  100  200  as above 
Green firewood  5  10  100  as above 
Grazing:        as above 
Goats  25  50  100  as above 
Cattle  100  150  200  as above 
Setting fire         
Intentional  1,000  2,000  4,000  as above 
Unintentional  100  200  400  as above 
Encroachment
125 of forest  25,000  50,000  100,000   Encroached land 
shall be taken back 
Hunting  1,000  2,000  4,000  Weapons Confiscated 
Extraction of stone and soil  500  1,000  2,000  Expelled from 
membership 
Misuse of CFUG funds  5,000  10,000  20,000  Expulsion from CF 
membership 
Source: (Lakuri Rukh CFUG 2006, 16)  
 
7.5. Community-based Forest Governance Outcomes 
 
7.5.1. Community Forest Governance during Late Conflict Periods 
 
From  the  interviews  with  CFUG  members  at  Lakuri  Rukh,  it  was  clear  that 
people lived constantly in a state of fear during the intense period of conflict. 
There were  risks  from  both  the government forces  and the insurgents  of the 
Communist Party of Nepal – Maoist (CPN-M). The law and order situation in 
many areas was out of government control. During the late period of conflict, the 
Lakuri Rukh community was under the influence and control of the Maoists. The 
police post in the village was destroyed by the rebels, and security forces came 
to the village on patrol every 2-3 months and stayed for few days searching for 
Maoists.  Whenever  security  forces  came  to  the  village  there  were  numerous 
incidents of violence and torture reported. Security forces tended to gather all the 
villagers  and  asked  them  to  provide  names  of  Maoists,  their  supporters  and 
sympathizers.  They  accused  the  villagers  of  supporting  and  nurturing  the 
Maoists and providing them with money, food and shelter. On such occasions, 
                                                 
125 The encroached area is taken back at first offence. The encroacher has to reforest the area at his expense, 
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CFUG members were threatened, and on some occasions reportedly physically 
tortured by the security forces. When the security forces left the village, rebels in 
turn warned the villagers not to cooperate with the security forces by providing 
information or spying against them. The rebels told them that if they cooperated 
with the security forces they would bear grave consequences. Villagers say that 
it was even difficult to breathe during those days. Youths were the ones who 
suffered most during the intense period of conflict, as they were targeted by both 
sides. During the insurgency, as reported by villagers, three people were killed, 
more than 250 were tortured, and a large amount of property was destroyed in 
Chaubas.  About  25  hectares  of  CF  in  Chaubas  was  also  destroyed  by  fire 
between 2004 and 2006. People believed that the fires were deliberately set by 
security forces to destroy the rebels‘ hide-outs. When villagers tried to put out 
the fires, they were threatened with being killed. The situation was compounded 
by the threat the forest fires posed to their lives. The reported loss of life and 
property at Chaubas is as follows: 
 
Table 7.7: Damage to Life and Property during Late Conflict Periods at Chaubas  
Type of damage  Quantity  Location  Estimated loss (NRs) 
 
People killed by rebels  2  Chaubas Ward No. 9  
Chaubas Ward No. 2 
Gufa 
- 
People killed by security 
forces 
1  Chaubas  Ward no. 5  - 
Range post building 
destroyed by rebels  
1  Ward No. 5 - Chaubas        3,000,000  
Police Post building 
destroyed by rebels 
1  Ward No. 5 - Chaubas        5,000,000  
Post Office destroyed by 
rebels 
1  Ward No. 5 - Chaubas  50,000 cash and 
documents destroyed 
Telecommunication 
infrastructure destroyed by 
rebels 
1  Ward No. 5 - Chaubas        7,000,000  
Health Post Building 
destroyed by rebels 
1  Ward No. 5 - Chaubas   15,000,00  
       
Forest fire  20 ha  Chapani CF, Ward No. 
5 - Chaubas 
Estimated in millions 
of rupees 
Forest fire  2 ha  Lakuri Rukh CF, Ward 
No. 5 - Chaubas 
-do- 
Forest fire  3 ha  Dharapani CF, Ward 
No. 7, Chaubas 
-do- 
Source: Fieldwork by author, 2008    
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According  to  the  villagers,  every  section  of  the  community  was  affected  by 
security forces and rebels in some way. The rebels forced the villagers to provide 
‗donations‘ on a monthly basis, especially those who were involved in business 
or any form of income earning enterprises. In addition, villagers had to provide 
food and shelter to the rebels. These demands were mainly made on wealthy 
families, which made the food security of even those households vulnerable. The 
villagers could not deny the requests from rebels, as there was no security of 
their life and property if they ignored their demands. The Maoists forced the 
poor  and  socio-economically  marginalized  section  of  the  community  to 
participate in their mass meetings and rallies and also recruited them to their 
organization. The villagers during the armed conflict were sandwiched between 
the two forces, threatened by the Maoists if they did not provide donations, and 
by the security forces when they did. The villagers said that those who had an 
income and were relatively richer provided donations to the Maoists and hence 
felt safe in some respect. Those who could not provide donations, food or shelter 
always felt unsafe.  
 
The  armed  conflict  also  had  impacts  on  community  forest  management 
activities. The Maoists had established a policy to control the community forest 
through their local government. In 2001, the Maoists called a mass meeting in 
the  village  and  told  villagers  that  they  had  nationalized  all  the  forests  from 
Sailung
126 to Chaubas region, meaning that villagers had to ask permission from 
the Maoist Jan Sarkar (people‘s  government) before implementing any forest 
management  activities  in  the  community  forests.  The  CFUG  executive 
committee held  meetings  with  local  Maoist  rebels  to  obtain permission  from 
them to carry out forest management activities as required by their operational 
plan. According to the Lakuri Rukh CFUG executive members, they tried to 
convince local Maoist leaders that if the forest management was not carried out 
on a regular basis, the community might lose millions of rupees and it may have 
negative  impacts  of  people‘s  livelihoods.  In  response  to  CFUG  requests,  the 
Maoist leaders reportedly responded that during war, life itself is uncertain, so 
no  one  really  cares  about  forests.  If  the  CFUG  wanted  to  continue  forest 
                                                 
126 Sailung is situated in Dolakha district, north-east of Kavrepalanchok district, at an altitude of 3150m, 
southwest from Charikot at Saya Thumka Hill. From this viewpoint Mt. Everest, Machhapuchhre, Ganesh 
Himal, Kathmandu Valley and the Tarai region are clearly visible.  252 
 
management activities, they would have to do so under Maoist guidance and 
processes.  The  Maoists  indicated  they  would  allow  the  CFUG  to  carry  out 
thinning  operations  on  the  condition  that  they  obtained  permission  from  the 
Maoist Jan Sarkar (People‘s government) before conducting any activities in the 
forest,  and  they  were  also  required  to  pay  tax  to  their  Jan  Sarkar.  As  a 
consequence  the  CFUG  bore  a  dual  tax  burden.  Under  national  forest 
regulations, the CFUG had to pay a 15% royalty on any forest products sold 
outside the community, and an equal amount was now demanded by the Maoists. 
In addition to timber harvesting royalties, the CFUG sawmill was required to pay 
tax  to  the  government  and  to  the  Maoist  Jansarkar  if  they  wanted  to  sell 
processed timber outside the community. In such an environment, the CFUGs in 
Chaubas found that it was not profitable to carry out any timber business, unless 
it  was  absolutely  necessary  to  raise  money  for  community  development 
purposes. Thus the interest in and emphasis on forest management was markedly 
reduced. During the course of interviews with the sawmill management team, it 
was  asserted  that  Maoists  had  taken  NRs  225,000  as  a  ‗donation‘  from  the 
sawmill fund on a condition that they would return the money when their war 
with the government ended. According to CFUG executive members, when the 
peace  agreement  was  signed  between  the  government  and  Maoists,  they  had 
returned NRs 125,000 to the sawmill management.  
 
7.5.2.  Community  Participation  in  Community-based  Forest  Governance  in 
Lakuri Rukh CFUG during the Pre/early and Late Conflict Periods 
 
After a series of discussions between the local community, forest department 
staff and staff of the Nepal Australia Community Forest Project, a decision was 
made to  launch a plantation program  to  avert  the problem of fuel-wood and 
fodder  crisis.  Local  communities  in  Chaubas  actively  participated  in  the 
establishment  of  a  nursery,  providing  land  and  voluntary  labor  for  its 
establishment.  When  the  plantation  was  completed,  people  were  initially 
restricted  from  cutting  the  branches  of  the  trees  for  firewood  and  grazing. 
Stringent protection measures were put in place for seven years, in order to allow 
the growth of the planted saplings. When planting was completed, villagers took 
responsibility for conserving the forest. In order to control the illegal harvesting 
and encroachment, a forest watchman was recruited from the local people and 253 
 
the salary of watchman was paid by the project. The department of forest staff 
also played a significant role as a facilitator between NAFP and local villagers. 
When grazing was prohibited, there was some resistance from local people, as 
the  villagers  had  traditionally  used  this  land  for  grazing.  On  more  than  one 
occasion, the forest watchman was scolded and beaten for attempting to prevent 
the cattle from entering the plantation area. Despite some resistance however, the 
conservation  efforts  were  largely  successful  due  to  the  cooperation  of  the 
majority of the villagers. During the initial phase of plantation, whenever there 
was any problem of encroachment and dispute, people in the village organized 
meetings  and  the  dispute  was  solved  in  a  consensual  manner.  Although  the 
plantation area was officially under the control of government, villagers formed 
an information committee and protected the plantation based on the local rules 
prepared by them.  
 
After one year of plantation, people were allowed to cut the grass under the 
supervision  of  the  forest  guard  and  committee  members.  Due  to  restricted 
grazing,  the  amount  of  grass  had  increased  beyond  the  requirement  of  local 
communities,  which  encouraged  the  villagers  to  participate  more  actively 
towards the conservation of forests. After 7 years of strict protection, the first 
pruning operation was carried out in 1989. One third of the branches were cut 
and  two  thirds  were  allowed  to  remain.  Large  quantities  of  fuel-wood  were 
obtained from the pruning of trees, which were sold to villagers at a nominal 
price of 50 paisa
127 per bhari (head load), and the money earned was deposited 
in  the  CFUG  fund.  Within  a  decade,  the  status  of  the  degraded  forest  had 
improved significantly. A study conducted by the Nepal Australia Community 
Forestry  Project  (NACFP)  and  Department  of  Forest  to  assess  the  status  of 
plantation in Kavrepalanchok and Sindhupalchok districts found that of the total 
8713 ha of pine plantation in Kavrepalanchok district, 6,988 hectares were in 
average or better condition, indicating the success of the plantation program, 
which was possible only through the participation and cooperation of the local 
communities (NACFP, 1995). 
 
                                                 
127 A paisa is a monetary unit currently equivalent to 
1⁄100 of a Nepali rupee. 254 
 
7.5.2.1. Representation of CFUG Members in Decision Making in the Lakuri 
Rukh CFUG 
 
This  section  analyses  procedural  fairness  in  the  decision  making  processes 
within  Lakuri  Rukh  CFUG.  Knowledge  of  which  groups  are  and  are  not 
represented in the CFUG decision making bodies is important for understanding 
the extent of improvement in participation of different socio-economic groups in 
CFUG  governance  arrangements.  The data  collected during fieldwork  on the 
representation  of  different  socio-economic  groups  in  the  decision-making 
process  of the CFUG in  Lakuri Rukh show that  key positions  in  the  CFUG 
executive  committee,  like  chairman  and  secretary,  were  mostly  occupied  by 
people from the higher caste and upper-income group, and by men. Data show 
that generally people from lower socio-economic groups occupied only the lower 
executive positions in the committee, which may not influence the decisions of 
the CFUG. 
 
From 1995 to 2009 the average representation of upper-income, middle-income 
and lower-income households in CFUG executive committee was 30%, 19% and 
51% respectively. It seems that people from middle-income and lower-income 
are underrepresented in relation to the proportion of membership, while people 
from upper-income groups are overrepresented according to the wealth ranking 
of the population. Similarly, 33%, 22% and 44% of people from higher-caste, 
lower-caste  and  ethnic  groups  are  represented  on  the  CFUG  executive 
committee. These statistics show that although Chhetri (higher caste) occupied 
only 25% of the total population, they occupied 43% of the positions on the 
CFUG committee. Ethnic groups accounted for 68% of the total population but 
occupied  only  43%  of  the  positions  on  the  CFUG  executive  committee. 
However, representation of the lower-caste is roughly proportionate.  
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Table 7. 8: Representation in CFUG Executive Committee by Gender, Class and 
Class 
Year  Total 
members 
Gender  Income category  Caste 
    Men 
(%) 
Women 
(%) 
Upper-
income 
(%) 
Middle-
income 
(%) 
Lower-
income 
(%) 
Higher 
Caste 
Lower 
caste 
(%) 
Ethnic 
group 
1995 – 
2001 
9  78  22  22  22  56  44  11  44 
2002- 
2004 
9  78  22  22  22  56  33  22  44 
2005-
2007 
9  60  40  30  20  50  40  10  50 
2007-
2009 
10  67  33  44  11  44  56  11  33 
Total  37  71  29  30  19  51  43  14  43 
Source: Data compiled by author from Lakuri Rukh CFUG records, 2008 
 
Recently  the  Lakuri  Rukh  CFUG  has  adopted  a  policy  to  reconstitute  the 
committee every two to three years, in order to give opportunities to all the 
members to be elected to the CFUG executive committee. However, in practice, 
it was observed that the socio-economically advantaged and influential village 
elites continue to hold the key positions of the CFUG by turn, which indicates 
that the interests and concerns of poor, women and  Dalits (lower caste), who 
depend more on community forests for their livelihood, may not be adequately 
considered.  
 
Disaggregated data show that the  Pahari and  Tamang (ethnic groups) which 
comprise the largest proportion of the population (68%), occupy only 43% of 
positions in the CFUG committee. The Chhetri (higher caste), who are relatively 
well educated and traditionally dominated the village, have a major influence on 
Lakuri Rukh CFUG business. They are 25% of the total population, however, 
from  1995  to  2009  they  occupied  43%  of  positions  on  the  CFUG  executive 
committee.  
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Figure 7.2: Representation in CFUG Executive Committee by Caste and Ethnic 
Groups at Lakuri Rukh CFUG  
        
 
7.5.2.2. Participation of Women in Decision Making   
 
People admitted that in the early phases of the community forestry program, the 
women who attended the GA meeting did not speak publicly and were only 
silent spectators. Until the 1980s, socio-cultural barriers meant that women were 
represented  (and  to  varying  degrees  controlled)  by  male  relatives.  When  an 
outsider wanted to interview a woman, they were required to seek permission 
from  her  husband,  father  or  father  in  law.  In  the  present  day,  women  now 
participate  freely  in  CFUG activities and other village affairs.  In discussions 
with  women,  they  convey  the  impression  that  the  socio-economic  status  of 
women has been gradually improving over the last 2 decades. The community 
forestry program has played a significant role in the empowerment of women 
and  improvement  in  their  circumstances,  as  a  result  of  training  programs, 
workshops,  observation  tours  and  adult  literacy  classes,  which  have  been 
organized with the help of Nepal Australia Community Forestry Project. With 
the coordination of CFUG, the Gao Bikask Karyakram (Village Development 
Program)  has  been  implemented  in  Chaubas.  Under  this  program,  various 
women‘s  savings  and credit groups have been formed in  the village  and are 
operating successfully. At present there are more than 22 such groups, which 
have  acted  as  a  vehicle  for  the  socio-economic  transformation  of  women‘s 
positions. Aside from providing loans for various income generating schemes, 257 
 
the savings and credit groups have contributed to the empowerment of women, 
alongside other programs aimed at social justice and conflict resolution, mainly 
targeted to address family violence and discrimination against women. The data 
show  that  women‘s  representation  on  the  Lakuri  Rukh  CFUG  executive 
committee, which was 11% during the inception phase of community forestry, 
slowly  increased  to  22  %  and  is  33  %  at  present.  Data  show  that  women‘s 
representation on the executive committee also increased during the late conflict 
period. It is believed that the pressure exerted by the Maoists for socio-economic 
reform influenced policies in favor of women. It is also interesting to note that 
only  women  from  middle-income  and  low-income  households  have  been 
represented  on  the  committee.  It  seems  that  women  from  upper-income 
households are either reluctant to serve on the committee or have less freedom 
than women from other income groups. 
 
Figure 7.3: Representation of Women on the Executive Committee in Lakuri Rukh 
CFUG at Chaubas 
 
Source: Data compiled from CFUG records, 2008 
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Participation of women and men in annual General Assembly meetings from 
1995 to 2008 was 28% and 72% respectively. There has been some progress in 
the  participation  of  women  over  time.  During  the  late  conflict  period  their 
participation declined, but it has increased since the peace agreement in 2006. 
 
Table 7.9: Participation in General Assembly by Gender  
Fiscal year  Total  Men (%)  Women (%) 
 
1995  61  75  25 
1996  55  73  27 
1997  57  79  21 
1998  54  78  22 
1999  54  72  28 
2000  49  61  39 
2001  46  70  30 
2002  48  85  15 
2003  52  77  23 
2004  45  80  20 
2005  -  -  - 
2006  47  68  32 
2007  51  57  43 
2008  48  58  42 
Total  667  72  28 
Source: Compiled from CFUG Records, 2008 
 
7.5.2.3. Frequency of CFUG General Assembly (GA) and Executive Committee 
(EC) Meetings 
 
Regular  meetings  of  the  general  assembly  and  executive  committee  are 
important for the effective governance of community forest related issues, and 
indicate how dynamic the CFUG is. Data compiled from CFUG office records 
indicate  that  the  Lakuri  Rukh  CFUG  has  conducted  GA  and  EC  meetings 
regularly  since  1995,  with  the  exception  of  2005  due  to  the  severity  of  the 
conflict during that year. The main cause of the disturbance at that time was the 
uncertainty that came after the forest policy was announced by the Maoists in 
2001, which required CFUGs to obtain permission from the Maoist Jan Sarkar 
before conducting any meetings or forest management activities. As the CFUGs 
in Chaubas, including the Lakuri Rukh, did not agree with the Maoist agenda, 
this policy directly impacted on the CFUG. According to committee members, it 
was  difficult  to  convene the CFUG meeting publicly during the late  conflict 
period, because of the fear of Maoist intervention as well as prohibitions from 
the security forces against mass public meetings.  259 
 
 
Table 7.10: CFUG General Assembly and Committee Meeting at Lakuri Pakha CF 
at Chaubas  
Fiscal Year  No. of General Assembly 
Meeting held 
No. of Executive 
Committee 
Meeting 
1995  3  10 
1996  1  12 
1997  1  12 
1998  1  12 
1999  1  12 
2000  1  12 
2001  1  12 
2002  1  12 
2003  1  - 
2004  1  6 
2005  -  4 
2006  1  22 
2007  1  13 
2008  1  5 
Source: Lakuri Rukh CFUG record 
 
It was also difficult to convene the full committee meeting on a regular basis, as 
members had been displaced from the village. To cope with this situation, the 
committee  formed  a  3  member  sub-committee  among  the  members  of  the 
executive committee, with a mandate to carry out day to day administrative and 
forest management activities for the CFUG. The main objective of forming the 3 
member committee was to address immediate issues raised by CFUG members, 
particularly decisions regarding the demand for timber. As there were plenty of 
forest products available, and the access to forest was unrestricted throughout the 
year, forest users did not have to obtain approval from the committee to collect 
forests products other than timber. For practical reasons, if any member of the 
CFUG submitted an application requesting timber, the three-member committee 
would visit the houses of applicants  and verify the need for timber, prior to 
granting permission. 
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7.5.3. Equity, Access and Benefit Sharing Mechanisms in Lakuri Rukh CFUG 
 
It is clear from interviews with CFUG members in Lakuri Rukh CFUG that once 
the forest in Chaubas came under community management, the villagers‘ access 
to forest products was significantly improved, and the acute shortage of firewood 
was  reversed.  After  seven  years  of  complete  protection,  local  communities 
started  thinning  operations  that  provided  abundant  fire-wood.  Every  year 
thinning  operations  continue  to  be  carried  out  from  November  to  February, 
under  the  supervision  of  CFUG  committee  members  and  ccording  to  the 
provisions set in the CFUG operational plan. The forest products generated from 
thinning,  especially  the  log  timber,  are  sold  to  the  community  sawmill,  and 
remaining branches and other byproducts are distributed to CFUG members. At 
present,  the need for forest  products  by the CFUG households is  completely 
satisfied.  As  the  supply  of  forest  products  is  far  more  than  the  demand,  the 
collection of fuel-wood, fodder, grass and leaf-litter is not regulated by CFUG 
rules.  Forest  user  group members are free to  collect  fallen branches  and dry 
firewood  free  of  cost  anytime  throughout  the  year.  CFUG  members  asserted 
there is no discrimination in access to the forest.  
 
7.5.3.1. Equity in Distribution of Forest Products in Lakuri Rukh CFUG  
 
According to the CFUG members, the community forest is open all year round 
to collect firewood, especially dead wood and fallen branches. As the supply of 
firewood is in excess of demand, there is no need to regulate the collection of 
firewood.  However,  strict  controls  for  acquiring  timber  are  stipulated  in  the 
CFUG constitution, which permits cutting mainly for building a new house and 
maintenance  of  existing  houses.  The  CFUG  members  who  want  to  acquire 
timber  for  construction  have  to  submit  an  application  to  the  CFUG  office 
explaining the purpose and quantity of timber required. After the application is 
received,  the  CFUG  executive  committee  inspects  the  applicant‘s  house  and 
investigates whether the demand is genuine. If the demand for timber is found 
satisfactory, then the person has to pay a fee at the rate of NRs 10/- for pine 
timber (pine species) and NRs 20/- for Chilaune (Schima wallichii) timber after 
which  he/she  is  granted  permission  to  cut  trees  in  the  area  allocated  by  the 261 
 
committee. Lakuri Rukh CFUG has adopted a policy of positive discrimination 
concerning the distribution of forest products, and has also embraced a policy of 
social  justice.  There  is  a  provision  providing  concessions  for  certain  forest 
products  to  those  CFUG  members  that  belong  to  poor,  landless  and 
disadvantaged  groups.  Moreover,  certain  forest  products  are provided  free of 
cost during any time of natural disaster, and for socio-cultural and religious ritual 
observance. The Lakuri Rukh CFUG has adopted a policy of providing 100 cu ft 
of timber free of cost to lower-income households for the construction of new 
and repair of existing houses. These initiatives were made by the community 
themselves,  based  on  the  age-old  tradition  of  social  justice  towards  the 
underprivileged and social responsibility during periods of crisis. According the 
Lakuri Rukh CFUG OP, the leaf-litter and fodder of Banmara (Chromolaena 
odorata)  can  be  collected  free  of  charge  throughout  the  year  without  any 
restriction,  but  grass  can  be  collected  only  during  the  months  of  July  to 
September.  Furthermore,  green  fuel-wood  which  is  a  byproduct  of  thinning 
operations can be accessed in the months of September, November, January and 
February, and dry and dead fuel-wood can be collected free of charge throughout 
the year. The policies adopted by the CFUG for distribution of forest products 
are as follows:  
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Table 7.11: Forest Products Distribution Policy of Lakuri Rukh (Ka) CFUG at 
Chaubas 
Forest product  Quantity  User category 
Poor, landless 
and 
disadvantaged
128 
Other Users 
Leaf litter, and fodder of 
Banmara (Chromolaena  
odorata) 
As per 
availability 
Free of cost  Free of cost 
Grass (permitted to collect 
only in the month of October) 
As per 
availability 
Free of cost  Free of cost 
Fuel wood (green) – 
distributed equally to all 
members from October to 
March 
As per 
availability 
NRs. 1 per cu. 
ft 
NRs. 1 per cu. Ft 
Fuel wood(dead wood) – 
permitted to collect 
throughout the year 
As per 
availability 
Free of cost  Free of cost 
Timber for house construction  100 cu ft 
Maximum 
limit is 150 cu. 
Ft 
Free of cost 
 
NRS. 20 per cu ft for 
chilaune (Schima 
wallichii) and NRs 10 
for other species. 
Wood for agricultural tools  As required  Free of cost  Free of cost 
Timber for public construction 
work 
100 cu ft 
(free of cost) 
-  - 
Wood for funeral  As required  Free of cost  Free of cost 
Fuel wood for religious 
ceremony 
As required  Free of cost  Free of cost 
Timber during natural disaster  100 cu ft  Free of cost  Free of cost 
Source: Compiled from Laluri Rukh Operational Plan, 2006 
 
Lakuri Rukh CFUG has also  adopted  a number of other innovative policies. 
Male goats
129 have been purchased from CFUG funds and made available for 
breeding purposes. The Lakuri Rukh CFUG has also adopted a policy to provide 
NRs 1000/- as a grant to construct a permanent toilet to those households that 
belong to lower socio-economic strata. Members that adopt family planning after 
having either one daughter or son will be provided with NRs 1,000/ -  as a 
measure to control population. The CFUG wil l provide Rs. 2500/ -  to those 
couples who take up family planning after having two daughters.  
 
                                                 
128 Disadvantaged or marginalized people in Nepal refers to those who are deprived of some of the basic 
necessities of life such as proper housing, health care facilities, education, income earning opportunity, or 
social equity. These people are generally from specific ethnic castes or minority groups, particularly those 
of the dalits (lower caste) and janajatis (indigenous peoples) and women. 
129 Many farmers in the village are reluctant to keep male animals (bulls, goats, rams), as they are costly and 
difficult to keep, and do not produce milk or offspring. The farmers prefer to sell or slaughter the male 
animals, and keep only the females, which make s it difficult to find male animals for breeding. Providing 
male animals for the purpose of breeding is considered a useful initiative especially in rural areas where 
household income is partly supported by animal husbandry. 263 
 
7.5.3.2. Access to and Distribution of Forest Products during the Late Conflict 
Period 
 
The data collected during fieldwork suggest that the collection of forest products 
declined significantly (21- 42%) among all income groups during the late period 
of  armed  conflict,  as  compared  to  pre/early  conflict  situation.  However,  the 
collection of some non-timber forest products (NTFPs) increased in this period. 
Villagers said that due to the worsening law and order situation, it was risky to 
enter the forest to collect forest products. They feared having encounters with 
Maoist rebels and they also feared coming across explosive devices. Moreover, 
the forest was being used as a training site and a hideout by Maoists and hence 
was targeted frequently by security forces. In such a situation, villagers went to 
the forests cautiously in small groups, only to collect those forest products which 
were  absolutely  necessary,  and  depending  upon  the  security  situation  in  the 
village. When there was patrolling from government forces, Maoist rebels would 
hide in the forest to avoid attack. It was dangerous to enter the forest in large 
groups because there was constant aerial surveillance by helicopters from the 
security forces, thus there was a high risk of aerial bombardment and firing. 
When  there  was  not  a  security  presence  in  the  village,  villagers  found  it 
relatively safe to enter the forests. According to forest users, the Maoists did not 
impose any specific restrictions on accessing the forest. Although the frequency 
of visits to the forest and the quantity of forest products collected was reduced, 
villagers  reported  that  this  did  not  have  severe  impact  on  their  livelihoods. 
Surprisingly, the amount of NTFPs collected increased during the late period of 
conflict.  The  reason  for  the  increase  in  the  amount  of  the  non-timber  forest 
products (NTFPs)
130 collected in the late conflict periods was due mainly to the 
increase in the availabilit y of NTFPs in the community forest, as there was 
relatively little disturbance compared to the pre/early conflict situation, and also 
greater demand for such products in the market. 
 
                                                 
130 There is great variation about the definitions of NTFPs; however, in Nepal fuel wood, fodder and timber 
are not regarded as NTFPs. In literature the terms like minor forest products (MFPs), non-timber forest 
products (NTFPs), and medicinal and aromatic plants (MAPs) are used interchangeably. For the purpose of 
this study, when using the term ‗NTFPs‘ I refer to plants which have medicinal value, as opposed to those 
used for timber, fuel wood or fodder. 264 
 
Table  7.12:  Mean  Annual  Forest  Product  Collection  per  Household  during 
Pre/early and Late Conflict Periods, Lakuri Rukh - All categories* 
Forest products  Pre/early conflict  Late conflict  Change (%) 
Timber(cu. ft)  11.89  7.78  - 34.57 
Fuel wood (Bhari)  97.22  76.00  - 21.83 
Fodder (Bhari)  58.89  36.11  - 38.68 
Grass (Doko)  87.78  51.22  - 41.65 
Leaf litter (Bhari)  103.11  69.11  - 32.97 
Other NTFP (kg)*  0.80  3.04  + 280.00 
Source: Fieldwork by author, 2008 * 1 bhari of green fuel wood is approximately equivalent to 
50 kg; 1 bhari of fodder or grass is equivalent to 25 kg; and 1 doko of leaf litter is equivalent to 20 kg. 
 
When the data on forest products collection are further analyzed and segregated 
among the different income groups, they show that the quantity of fodder, grass 
and  leaf-litter  collected  by  middle-income  and  upper-income  households  was 
more than that of lower-income households. However, the amount of fire-wood 
collected by low-income households was  greater than that collected by other 
income groups (see Table 7.13).  
 
Similarly, data indicate that the forest products (fuel-wood, fodder, grass, leaf-
litter)  collected  by  middle  and  upper-income  households  decreased  sharply 
during  the  late  conflict  period,  as  compared  to  lower-income  households. 
However, the collection of NTFP sharply increased among the lower-income 
households compared to other groups. The main reason for the decline in the 
amount of forest products collected by middle and upper-income households is 
that, compared to low-income households, these two groups have more kharbari 
land holdings from which they can obtain such products during times when it 
may be considered dangerous to enter the community forest. In contrast, low-
income  households  have  limited  areas  of  kharbari  and  are  more  heavily 
dependent on the community forest for, fuel-wood, fodder, and timber. The main 
reason  for  the  increase  in  the  collection  of  NTFPs  during  the  later  conflict 
period,  especially  among  low-income  households,  is  attributed  to  the  heavy 
reliance  of  these  people  on  community  forest  for  their  income,  as  NTFPs 
generally have a good market price. At the same time these groups of people 
were prepared to take the oppurtunity as they believed that they did not have a 
conflict of interest or threat from the Maoists. 265 
 
Table  7.13:  Mean  Annual  Forest  Products  Collection  per  Household  during 
Pre/early and Late Conflict Periods by Income Category, Lakuri Rukh CFUG 
Income group  Timber 
(cu ft) 
Fuel wood 
(Bhari) 
Fodder 
(Bhari) 
Grass 
(Doko) 
Leaf litter 
(Bhari) 
NTFP 
(Kg) 
Low-income                   
Pre/early conflict  5.33  111  52.67  85.33  91.33  0 
Late conflict  8.33  93.33  37.33  56  63.33  4.67 
Change (%)  +56.29  - 15.92  - 29.12  - 34.37  -30.66  +467 
Middle-income                   
Pre/early conflict  9.33  110  54.66  90  102  1.33 
Late conflict  9.33  81.33  32.67  55.33  69.67  3.67 
Change (%)  0  -26.06  -40.23  -38.52  -31.7  +175.94 
Upper-income                   
Pre/early conflict  21  70.67  62.67  88  114.67  1.07 
Late conflict  5.67  53.33  38.33  42.33  75.67  0.8 
Change (%)  - 73  - 24.54  - 38.84  - 51.9  - 34.01  - 25.23 
Source: Fieldwork, 2008 
 
7.5.4. Income and Expenditure of Lakuri Rukh Community Forest User Group 
(CFUG) 
 
Data show that 98% of the CFUG income comes from the sale of log timber, and 
the remaining income comes from membership fees, interest and miscellaneous 
sources. From 1997/98 to 2007/08, the Lakuri Rukh CFUG was able to earn 
about 1.21 million Nepali Rupees (equivalent to US$ 16,452).  
 
Table 7.14: Income of Lakuri Rukh CFUG (1997/98 - 2007/08) 
Source of income  Amount(NRS)  % of total income 
Sale of timber  1,227,779  98.1 
Membership fee  2,545  0.2 
Interest  17,292  1.4 
Others (prize)  4,300  0.3 
Total income(NRs)  1,251,916  100.0 
Total US$ equivalent  16,452  - 
Source: Compiled from CFUG records 
 
Lakuri Rukh CFUG record shows that 66% of income was earned during the 
pre/early conflict period and 34% of income was earned during the late conflict 
period. These data indicate that although the CFUG had to face many difficulties 
to implement their planned forest management activities, the Lakuri Rukh CFUG 266 
 
was still able to carry out forest management activities and earn income, even 
during the late period of intensified armed insurgency. 
 
Table 7.15: Income of Lakuri Rukh CFUG during Pre/early and Late Conflict 
Periods 
Activities  Pre/early conflict  Late conflict 
 
1997/98 – 2000/01  2001/02 – 2004/05 
  Amount  % of total  Amount  % of total 
Sale of timber  704,180  65  363,612  34 
Sale of fuel wood  -  -  -  - 
Membership fees  1,285  0  1,260  0 
Prize  4,300  0  -  - 
Interest  4,788  0  5,604  1 
Total  714,552  66  370,476  34 
Source: Compiled from Lakuri Rukh CFUG records 
 
7.5.4.1. CFUG Expenditure and Community Development Activities in Lakuri 
Rukh CFUG 
 
During the formation of the Lakuri Rukh CFUG, it was explicitly mentioned in 
the constitution that the income of the  Lakuri  Rukh shall  be invested  in  the 
development  of  Seti  Devi  School  at  Chaubas.  The  Lakuri  Rukh  has  made  a 
commendable effort by investing CFUG income in upgrading the status of the 
village school, which has significantly helped to increase local children‘s access 
to education. Despite the difficulties faced by Lakuri Rukh since the outbreak of 
violent conflict, they continued investment in community development activities. 
Data collected during field work show that of the total expenditure from CFUG 
fund (1997/98 – 2001/05), 51% and 44% of investments were directed towards 
forest management and community development activities respectively.  
 
Data show that of the total expenditure of the CFUG between 1997 and 2005, 
47% of its investments were made during the pre/early conflict and 53% during 
the late conflict periods respectively (see Table 7.16). Investment in community 
development activities was even higher in the late conflict period, compared to 
the pre/early conflict situation, which enabled the CFUG to compensate to some 
extent for the economic disruption of that period. Out of total 45% expenditure 
in community development activities, 44% alone was invested in upgrading the 
Seti Devi lower secondary school into a full secondary school. The CFUG has 267 
 
also made investments in road improvements, to help the transportation of log 
timber.  
 
Table 7.16: Expenditure of Lakuri Rukh during Pre/early and Late Conflict Period  
Description  Pre/early conflict (1997/98 – 
2000/01) 
Late conflict (2001/02 – 
2004/05) 
Amount  % of total  Amount  % of total 
1. Forest Management         
1.1 Thinning operations  332,618  33  173,042  17 
1.2 Forest road construction  -  -  15,000  1 
2. Community development         
2.1 Donation to school  124,000  12  327,250  32 
2.2 Improved goat purchase  -  -  10,000  1 
3. Administrative cost  16,554  2  23,910  2 
Total  473,172  47  650,563  53 
Source: Compiled from Lakuri Rukh CFUG record   
 
7.5.4.2.  Contribution  of  CF  in  improving  the  Educational  Opportunities  in 
Chaubas Village 
 
One of the informants recalled that before the 1970s, all school age children in 
Chaubas  used  to  spend  most  of  their  time  grazing  cattle  and  helping  with 
household  chores.  During  that  time,  there  was  only  one  school  in  Chaubas 
village,  which  provided  lower-secondary  education.  To  receive  upper 
secondary
131 education, the children from Chaubas had to walk hours to a school 
in the next village. After the implementation of forest management activities and 
the operation of the community sawmill, the CFUGs in Chaubas were able to 
increase their income, and directed most of their investment towards improving 
the status of the Seti  Devi School. As the Seti Devi school did not have 
government permission to operate secondary education, due to a lack of financial 
resources and physical infrastructure, the Lakuri Rukh CFUG deposited Nepali 
rupees 125,000/-  in two installments as collateral to gain approval from the 
Department of Education to upgrade the Seti Devi school to secondary level. In 
addition, Lakuri Rukh CFUG provided financial assistance to pay salaries for 
two teachers at the secondary level, providing them with NRs 3,000 and 5,000 as 
a monthly salary from 1998 to 2000. Financial assistance to the local school has 
continued since 2001, although the income of CFUG decreased during the period 
                                                 
131 Education in Nepal is structured as school education and higher education. School education includes 
primary level of grades 1-5, lower secondary and secondary levels of grades 6-8 and 9-10 respectively. 
Higher education is college and university level education, which start after completing 10+2 education. 268 
 
of insurgency. After upgrading and improvement of the facility in Shree Seti 
Devi School in Chaubas, there was a marked improvement in the literacy rate of 
school-age children. A study (van Eijnatten and Shrestha 2001, 16) shows that in 
1995, 61% of the male and 72% of the female population of 7 years and above 
were illiterate. By 2000, the illiteracy rate decreased to 27% and 60% among 
boys and girls respectively. Another finding of the study was that in 1995/96 the 
ratio  of  boys  and  girls  attending  school  in  Chaubas  was  3:1,  however,  by 
1999/00, the number of boys and girls attending school was equal.  
 
Another  assessment  was  carried  out  by  Lakuri  Rukh  CFUG  to  assess  the 
enrolment of school age children, which showed that a total of 138 households 
were sending their children to school, while 38 households that belong to Sarki, 
Kami and Pahari lower caste and ethnic groups either did not send their children 
to school, or had children who were enrolled but did not have regular attendance. 
The  CFUG  executive  committee  members  visited  these  households  and 
discussed  the  situation  with  the  parents.  The  major  reason  reported  for  not 
sending their children to school was that the children were needed to help with 
household activities, as they were engaged in working as wage labor to support 
their  family.  After  this  finding,  the  Lakuri  Rukh  CFUG  made  a  decision  to 
provide scholarships to children from lower caste and poor families, in order to 
increase their attendance at school. The scholarships were provided in the form 
of  notebooks,  pencils  and  a  school  bag.  Since  the  scholarships  have  been 
available  the  number  of  children  attending  school  has  increased,  however 
attendance for these minority groups is still not satisfactory.  
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Access to Education during the Late Conflict Period 
 
During the late conflict period, schools in Nepal were frequently closed; mainly 
because of the bandha (strikes) organized by the Maoist rebels. School children 
were  pressured  to  attend  the  rallies,  mass  meetings  and  cultural  programs 
organized by the rebels. The frequent bandha organized by the rebels affected 
the quality of education. For example in June 2004, schools all over Nepal were 
closed  for  over  two  weeks,  due  to  a  strike  declared  by  the  Maoist  student 
association.  Despite  these  problems,  Shree  Seti  Devi  Secondary  School  in 
Chaubas continued to function well, with continued financial support from the 
CFUG. The data collected during fieldwork show that of total expenditure (of 
NRs 451,250/-) made by Lakuri Rukh CFUG to Seti Devi Secondary School, 
28% of that investment was made during the pre/early conflict period and 71 % 
during  the  late  conflict  period.  From  1998  to  2007,  the  Lakuri  Rukh  CFUG 
donated about 40% of its income to Seti Devi secondary school. 
 
Figure 7.4: Donations to Shree Seti Devi Secondary School by Lakuri Rukh CFUG 
at Chaubas 
           
Source: Compiled from CFUG record 
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7.6. Livelihoods Outcomes 
 
7.6.1. Seasonal Migration as  a Source of Household  Income in  Lakuri  Rukh 
CFUG 
 
In  the  past,  cereal  crops  were  the  main  source  of  household  income  and 
livelihood support in the hills of Nepal. However over the past 2-3 decades, the 
role  of  off-farm  income  has  become  increasingly  important  for  supporting 
livelihoods. A study conducted in 1992 found that that annual household income 
in Chaubas village was NRs. 19,892 (Malla 1992), out of which 46.46% and 
53.54% was derived from farm income and off-farm income respectively. These 
data  indicate  that  the  majority  of  families  no  longer  depend  primarily  upon 
subsistence agriculture, but rather that a significant amount was earned from off-
farm activities (Collett et al. 1996, 51). Seasonal migration from the village for 
employment has been a major feature of livelihood strategies in rural Nepal, 
resulting from the ―push‖ (high levels of poverty and food insecurity) and ―pull 
―factors (seasonal employment opportunities elsewhere). The worsening law and 
order situation resulting from the armed conflict was among the factors causing 
more  people  to  leave  the  village  in  search  of  jobs  (Gill  2003,  1).  The 
economically active family members in Chaubas village temporarily migrate to 
Kathmandu and other parts of Nepal, and some even go overseas in search of 
jobs.  Permanent  migration  from  the  village  to  other  parts  of  the  country 
especially to the terai region of Nepal is also on the rise in recent years.  
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Figure 7.5: Temporary Migration from Lakuri Rukh CFUG during Pre/early and 
Late Conflict Period   
 
Source: Fieldwork by author, 2008   
 
According to an estimate by the villagers in Chaubas, about one-third of their 
income comes from the off-farm wages (casual), especially for the middle and 
lower-income households. Moreover, it is  estimated that about 5% of youths 
from Lakuri Rukh CFUG households left the village for overseas employment. 
The practice of seasonal labor migration in Chaubas emerged over the last 2- 3 
decades, mainly because of the lack of employment opportunities and persistent 
poverty. However, the proportion of the economically active population that has 
left the village has increased drastically since the onset of the Maoist insurgency. 
The worsening law and order situation and insecurity of life and property further 
stimulated youth migration from the village. 
 
People reported that 50-60% of youths above the age of 18 had left the Chaubas 
villages during the period of conflict. In Tamang hamlet almost all the youth had 
left  the  village.  Most  of  them  went  to  district  centers  and  the  capital  city 
Kathmandu in search of jobs. The data collected regarding the status of seasonal 
migration from Lakuri Rukh CFUG households suggest that there has been a 
220% increase in seasonal migration within the country and 100% increase in 
overseas employment. Those youths who left the Chaubas village mostly worked 
in the brick kiln, restaurant, hotel, and transportation sectors, mainly as driver 
and laborers. Parents were forced to send their children to the capital city or 
overseas to avoid being conscripted by either of the contending forces. Due to 272 
 
such massive out-migration of youths from the villages, there was a shortage of 
workforce  in  the  farming  sector,  and  much  arable  land  was  left  fallow.  The 
shortage of fertilizer and rising costs of agricultural inputs resulted in further 
declines in agriculture production. During group discussions with villagers, they 
said that there is little chance that those who left the village will return to live 
permanently  in  the  village.  Once  displaced  people  find  some  kind  of 
employment in the city, they have been less motivated to return to village, except 
for occasional visits during festivities. Even during the historic general election 
of 2008, very few youths turned up in the village to cast their votes.  
 
7.6.2. Household Income in Lakuri Rukh CFUG at Chaubas 
 
During this research a household survey was conducted to assess the household 
income and livelihoods strategies of the households of Lakuri Rukh CFUG in 
Chaubas. The data indicate that the major sources of income for the Lakuri Rukh 
CFUG  are  overseas  employment,  cereal  crop  production,  salary/waged 
(permanent) work within Nepal, and forest products; in that order (see Table 
7.17).   
 
Table 7.17: Mean Annual Household Income in Lakuri Rukh CFUG, Chaubas (all 
categories) 
Source of income  Income(NRs)  % of total income 
 
 
Overseas employment   22,048  27 
Cereal crops  16,125  20 
Salaries/waged work 
(permanent) 
9,314  12 
Forest products/NTFPs  8,833  11 
Self Employment  7,897  10 
Off-farm wages (casual)  5,260  7 
Small animals (goat, 
sheep) 
4,978  6 
Poultry  2,143  3 
Dairying  2,044  3 
On-farm wages (casual)  1,400  2 
Swine/pig  644  1 
Total income  80,687  100 
Source: Field survey by author, 2008 
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When  the  data  are  disaggregated,  they  suggest  that  there  is  a  significant 
difference in household income among different income categories. The income 
of middle-income and upper-income groups is almost three times and four times 
higher,  respectively,  than  that  of  lower-income  households.  The  two  major 
sources  of  income  for  the  upper-income  and  middle-income  household  are 
overseas employment and cereal crops respectively, while cereal crops and off-
farm  wages  (casual)  are  the  two  major  sources  of  income  for  low-income 
households.  Data  collected  through  the  household  survey  suggest  that  the 
community  forest  plays  a  significant  role  in  the  household  income  and 
livelihoods of low-income households, as compared to middle and upper-income 
households.  Of  total  household  income,  28  %  of  income  comes  from  the 
community forest for low-income households, while it is only 12% and 6% for 
middle and upper-income households.  
 
Table 7.18: Mean Household Income (NRs) by Income Category, at Lakuri Rukh 
CFUG 
 Source of income 
  
Low-income  Middle-income  Upper-income 
Amount  %  Amount  %  Amount  % 
Cereal crops  7,893  22  15,627  20  24,854  19 
Dairying  700  2  900  1  4,533  4 
Small animals 
(goat/sheep) 
5,100  14  3,767  5  6,067  5 
Swine/pig  600  2  1,333  2  0  0 
Poultry  1,500  4  2,300  3  2,629  2 
Salaries/waged work 
(permanent) 
1,067  3  6,733  9  20,143  16 
Overseas employment   0  0  24,000  31  42,143  33 
Self employment  667  2  7,667  10  15,357  12 
On-farm wages 
(casual) 
2,967  8  1,233  2  0  0 
Off-farm wages* 
(casual) 
5,200  15  4,867  6  5,714  4 
Forest products and 
NTFPs 
9,783  28  9,308  12  7,408  6 
Total  35,477  100  77,734  100  128,849  100 
Source: Fieldwork by author, 2008* includes sawmill workers 
 
Growing cereal crops still seems to be one of the important sources of household 
income for all income categories; however, the crops are mainly utilized for 
household consumption rather than sales among lower-income and middle class 
households, while rich households occasionally sell grain. Almost one third of 274 
 
total  household  income  for  the  low-income  households  is  obtained  from 
labouring. Similarly, animal husbandry (small animal) and poultry has been the 
second largest source of income for low-income households. In recent years, 
overseas  employment  has  evolved  as  a  major  source  of  income  for  middle-
income  and  upper-income  households;  however,  the  poorer  sections  of  the 
community  cannot  invest  in  pursuing  overseas  employment  because  of  the 
capital investment.  
 
Similarly, data were compared on the income of households during the pre/early 
and late conflict period. The data suggest that the overall household income of 
low-income, middle-income and upper-income household increased by 1%, 48% 
and 44% respectively during the late conflict period as compared to pre/early 
conflict situation. Overseas employment has emerged as a new source of income 
for middle and upper-income households, which has largely contributed to the 
increase in their household income. The data also confirm that the incomes of 
low-income households increased during the late conflict period, mainly through 
NTFP, on-farm wages and outside employment. As many youth left the village 
during the period of insurgency there was a shortage of labour in the agricultural 
sector. Thus those who remained in the village, especially those from lower-
income groups, had increased opportunities for work as casual wage labourers.  
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Table 7.19: Mean Household Income (NRs) during Pre/early and Late Conflict 
Period  
Source of 
income 
Income category 
 
Low income  Middle income  Upper income 
 
   Pre/early 
conflict 
Late 
conflict 
Change 
(%) 
Pre/early 
conflict 
Late 
conflict 
Change 
(%) 
Pre/early 
conflict 
Late 
conflict 
Change 
(%) 
Cereal crops  7,893  7,893  -  15,027  15,627  +4  25,319  24,854  -2 
Dairying  733  700  -5  1,333  900  -33  4,833  4,533  -6 
Small animals 
(goat/sheep) 
4,400  5,100  +16  3,033  3,767  +24  6,167  6,067  -2 
Swine/pig  600  600  -  0  1,333  +1,333  -  -  - 
Poultry  1,173  1,500  +28  1,900  2,300  +21  2,253  2,629  -17 
Salaries/waged 
work 
(permanent) 
400  1,067  +167  4,267  6,733  +58  19,429  20,143  +4 
Foreign 
Employment  
-  -  -  0  24,000  +24,000  0  42,143  +42,143 
Self 
Employment 
1,333  667  -50  7,000  7,667  +10  13,000  15,357  +18 
On-farm wages 
(casual) 
1,000  2,967  +197  733  1,233  +68  2,286  0  -100 
Off-farm wages 
(casual) 
5,600  5,200  -7  6,333  4,867  -23  3,571  5,714  +60 
Forest products 
and NTFPs 
11,850  9,783  +17  12,733  9,308  -27  12,600  7,408  -41 
Total  34,983  35,477  +1  52,360  77,734  +48  89,459  128,849  +44 
 
Source: Fieldwork by author, 2008 
 
7.6.3. Contribution of Community Forest (CF) on Household Income and Livelihoods in 
Lakuri Rukh CFUG 
 
During the 1970s, local communities in Chaubas planted more than 400 ha of 
completely deforested lands with pine trees, with the assistance of the Nepal-
Australia  Community  Forestry  Project  (Van  Eijnaten,  Acharya,  and  Shrestha 
2001, 1). Since 1989, the government has handed over the plantation forest to a 
number of CFUGs in Chaubas for management and use. Villagers in Chaubas 
reported  that  after  20  years  of  protection  the  status  of  the  forest  improved 
significantly, and that fuel wood and timbe,r which were scarce commodities 
before, are now in excess of local community demand. The villagers expressed 
the fact that without the forest, it would be impossible for them to rear livestock 
and  apply  compost  in  their  farms.  Besides  income  from  forest  products  and 
employment in forest-based enterprises, people who are active and innovative 
are involved in collection of non-timber forest products (NTFPs) such as forest 
seeds,  broom  grass,  timur
132  (Zanthoxylum  armatum)  and  medicinal  and 
aromatic plants, which are sold in the market for supplementary income. Data 
                                                 
132 timur is a shrub or small tree, 6 m or more tall, which occurs naturally as an understory. 276 
 
collected during fieldwork suggest that about 1.5% of low-income household 
income comes through the sale of NTFPs collected from community forest.  
 
The  status  of  the  forest  is  now  very  much  improved  in  Lakuri  Rukh.  The 
regeneration of broadleaf species has increased to 82% of the regenerated stock. 
However, since scientific thinning operations were not carried out, the forests 
became overstocked, which affected the growth and quality of timber. Hence 
there was a need to reduce the number of trees, in order to improve the health of 
the forest as well as to allow the broadleaf species to grow (Jackson et al. 1995, 
4). There was a desire for a sustainable forest management practice that would 
boost  household  income  and  employment  opportunities  of  the  local 
communities, as well as improve the condition and quality of the forest (Ladley 
1995, 32). In this context, CFUGs in Chaubas requested the Nepal Australia 
Community  Forestry  Project  (NACFP)  and  District  Forest  Office  (DFO), 
Kavrepalanchok to conduct a feasibility study for the establishment of a sawmill. 
The  Project  Coordinating  Committee  (PCC)  meeting  of  the  NACFP  in 
September 1994 decided to undertake a feasibility study (Jackson, Vaidya, and 
Hunt 1995, 2). The study recommended the NACFP to proceed to establish a 
community sawmill  at  Chaubas.  The  general  assembly (GA) of four  CFUGs  
(Chapani Kuwa, Dharapani Hile, and Fagarkhola CFUGs from Chaubas, plus 
Rachhma  CFUG  from  the  Salle-Bhumlu  Village  Development  Committee 
[VDC]) on 26 September 1994 jointly made a decision to request the NACFP to 
help establish a community owned sawmill at Chaubas. A sawmill management 
plan was prepared with the assistance of NACFP, and it was registered as an 
enterprise at District Cottage Industries Office, Kavrepalanchok. The NACFP 
had provided NRs 550,000.00 as a loan to the CFUGs for the establishment of a 
new  sawmill,  which  was  mainly  used  for  buying  machinery  and  equipment. 
After registration, the Chaubas- Bhumlu Community Sawmill was established in 
1996 with an agreement between the four CFUGs, and was the first sawmill in 
Nepal ever owned by community forest user groups (Van Eijnaten, Acharya, and 
Shrestha 2001, 1). Local people also made voluntary labor contributions during 
the construction of the sawmill. According to the agreement between the sawmill 
and CFUGs, each CFUG had to provide 400 cu ft of log timber annually to the 
sawmill at the rate of Rs. 50/- per cu ft, including transportation of log timber up 277 
 
to the premises of the sawmill. The income earned from the sawmill would be 
divided equally among the four CFUGs which owned the mill. Although the 
Lakuri  Rukh  CFUG  was  not  an  owner  of  the  community  sawmill,  it  also 
negotiated with the sawmill to provide log timber. From 1996/97 to 2004/05, the 
sawmill processed about 67,151cu. ft of log timber and earned a total income of 
NRs 9,217,160 (US$ 124,556). 
 
According to the villagers, the establishment of the sawmill totally changed the 
face of the Chaubas village, creating a new avenue of employment and income 
earning opportunities to local people. Out of the total 9.2 million Rupees earned 
by the sawmill between 1996/97 and 2004/05, about 1.84 million Nepali rupees 
were  spent  on  wages,  which  represented  about  28,000  person  days  of 
employment.  
 
Table 7.20: Income and Employment Generated by the Community Sawmill at 
Chaubas, Kavrepalanchok 
Year  Total log timber 
processed (Cu. Ft) 
Total income 
(NRs) 
% of total 
income 
Employment  
(man days) 
1996/97  1,863  233,904  3  936 
1997/98  16,908  1,560,341  17  6,241 
1998/99  13,981  1,853,476  20  7,414 
1999/00  4,745  959,879  10  2,743 
2000/01  10,685  1,539,213  17  4,398 
2001/02  2,177  137,385  1  393 
2002/03  9,540  1,120,770  12  2,242 
2003/04  5,143  855,879  9  1,712 
2004/05  2,110  956,313  10  1,913 
2005/06  0  -  -  - 
Total  67,152  9,217,160  100  27,990 
Total 
(US$) 
   124,556       
Source: Compiled from the sawmill records  
 
 Before the establishment of the sawmill in Chaubas, most of the houses in the 
village  were  thatched  roof.  Now,  most  of  these  have  been  converted  into 
corrugated tin, made possible by the income earned from working in the sawmill 
as well as in community forest management activities. Previously, most of the 
households in Chaubas did not have furniture such as tables, beds, shelves or 
benches  in  their  home;  however,  after  the  establishment  of  sawmill,  most 
households constructed  new houses,  repaired existing homes, made furniture, 278 
 
animal sheds and other household furniture needs from the sawn timber obtained 
from the sawmill.  
 
7.6.3.1. Contribution of Community Sawmill to Livelihoods during Pre/early and 
Late Conflict Period 
 
The community sawmill in Chaubas was operational from 1996 onwards, and 
provided numerous benefits to local people, as well as to people in neighboring 
villages.    When  the  sawmill  was  in  operation,  7  persons  had  full  time 
employment and about 18 persons in each CFUG obtained casual employment. 
An additional 4 people were employed for the transportation of log timber to the 
sawmill. The community sawmill in Chaubas was an example of community 
owned forest-based enterprise, benefitting the local users directly. However, the 
sawmill closed in September 2005, directly affecting income and employment at 
Chaubas.  
 
Reasons for Closure of sawmill 
 
In the first few years of operation, the sawmill was functioning smoothly and 
repaying the loan of NRs. 400,000 to NACFP. From discussions with CFUG 
executive committee and ordinary members and district forest office officials, 
and from studies of sawmill records, a number of issues have been identified as 
likely reasons for the closure of sawmill. The sawmill management team is made 
up  of  two  representatives  from  each  participating  CFUG.  While  nominating 
representatives, CFUGs did not pay much attention to the professional capacity 
or leadership qualities of representatives. As a result, those who represented the 
CFUGs  on  the  sawmill  committee  could  not  play  an  active  role  in  sawmill 
management, and consequently the monitoring mechanisms as well as financial 
management and business plans were poor.  The key positions on the sawmill 
management team were occupied by a few members of the elite. General CFUG 
members were critical towards sawmill leadership, mainly because of lack of 
transparency, poor management and mismanagement of funds. Moreover, the 
sawn  timber  was  sold  on  credit  without  maintaining  a  proper  inventory  of 
transactions, and no financial statement was prepared on a regular basis. Thus, 279 
 
the participating CFUGs did not have a clear picture of business plans and the 
profit  and  loss  scenario  of  the  mill.  There  was  also  a  lack  of  coordination 
between  the  sawmill  management  team  and  the  CFUGs,  and  an  absence  of 
proper  monitoring  mechanisms.  When  the  sawmill  was  facing  those  internal 
problems,  the  Maoists  intervened  in  the  sawmill  management.  The  Maoists 
instructed that the mill must operate under their supervision and should provide 
tax and donations to their local Jan Sarkar, if the CFUGs wanted to operate the 
mill. As the financial discipline of the sawmill was not satisfactory in the eyes of 
the general public, the Maoists used the situation to convince ordinary people 
that there was a lack of transparency in the mill operations. They also accused 
some  members  of  the  sawmill  management  team  of  taking  undue  financial 
advantage from the mill. The sawmill management team failed to provide up to 
date financial statements, which made the Maoists even more suspicious of the 
management team. The mill officials said that the Maoists forced the sawmill 
management to provide NRs 225,000 to the Maoist Jan Sarkar, to be returned 
once the war is over. When the Maoists intervened and also took large sums in 
donations, the mill management became unable to make payments to the CFUGs 
that  were  its  shareholders.  When  the  CFUGs  could  not  get  payment  for  the 
timber  supplied,  they  stopped  providing  timber  to  the  mill,  which  ultimately 
forced the sawmill to cease operating. 
 
In  the  face  of  the  Maoists‘  tough  approach  towards  the  sawmill,  CFUGs  in 
Chaubas  adopted  a  strategy  to  completely  stop  or  minimize  the  thinning 
practices in the community forests, as a measure to avoid the double tax burden. 
Nevertheless,  after  the  closure  of  the  sawmill,  Lakuri  Rukh  did  continue  its 
forest thinning practices, with an informal understanding with the Maoists which 
allowed them to sell the log timber to the outside market. The data show that 
72%  of  the  total  timber  processed  was  carried  out  during  pre/early  conflict 
period (1996 – 2001) and 28 % during the late conflict period respectively (2002 
– 2006), which indicates that sawmill operation was significantly impacted by 
the  conflict.  From  all  the  available  information  and  discussions  with 
stakeholders, it can be concluded that the main reasons for closure of the sawmill 
were  elite  domination,  weak  control  and  mismanagement  of  funds,  lack  of 
monitoring, and lack of transparency.  280 
 
 
7.6.3.2. Community Forestry Based Employment at Lakuri Rukh CFUG 
 
Between 1995/96 and 2004/05, Lakuri Rukh CFUG created about 9,892 person-
days of work for local people. Out of total employment generated, 69% of the 
employment  was  created  during  the  pre/early  conflict  period,  while  31%  of 
employment was generated during late conflict period (see Table 7.21).  
 
Table 7.21: Employment Generated by Lakuri Rukh CFUG during Pre/early and 
Late Conflict Periods  
Activities  Total 
employment 
generated 
Pre/early conflict  Late conflict 
(1997/98 -2000/01)  (2001-2004/05) 
   Person days  Person day  % of 
total 
Person 
day 
% of total 
Forest management  6,972  5,336  54  1,636  17 
Community 
development 
2,920  1,460  15  1,460  15 
Total  9,892  6,796  69  3,096  31 
Source: Calculated from Lakuri Rukh CFUG records 
 
Economic Valuation of Forest Products 
 
The contribution of the community forest to the farming system and livelihoods 
of local people has been discussed in earlier case study  chapters. This study 
suggests  that  dependency  of  households  on  community  forest  increased  with 
remoteness and distance from the market. The households in Lakuri Rukh are 
more dependent on community forest than those in the other case study sites, as 
more than 90% of Lakuri Rukh households depend on CF for household energy 
needs. Similarly, out of the total household income in Lakuri Rukh CFUG, 33 % 
of household income comes from the combined agriculture and livestock sector, 
which is largely supported by community forests. The consumptive value
133 of 
forest  products  and  NTFPs  have  been  calculated  based  on  the  work  of 
(Gregersen et al. 1995; Murthy et al. 2005, 1577) , using  the per unit current 
local price of the particular forest products multiplied by the am ount of forests 
products used by each household surveyed.   The survey data suggest that on 
average,  11%  of  household  income  is  supported  by  CF  (see  Table  7.17). 
                                                 
133 The ―consumptive value‖ is defined as the quantity of forest products directly obtained and used by 
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However,  as  in  the  other  case  studies,  the  contribution  of  CF  to  household 
income  is  greater  among  lower-income  households  than  middle  and  upper-
income  households  (see  Table  7.18).  As  the  lower-income  households  have 
smaller land holdings and less area allocated for kharbari, their dependence on 
the  community  forest  is  high,  whereas  households  from  middle  and  upper-
income groups fulfil some of their demand for forest products from the trees on 
their private land. 
 
Table 7.22: Mean Consumptive Value of Forest Products (NRs) in Lakuri Rukh 
CFUG 
Source of 
income 
 
Low-income  Middle-income  Upper -income 
Amount 
(NRs) 
Amount (NRs)  Amount (NRs) 
Timber  833  933  567 
Fuel wood  4,667  4,067  2,667 
Fodder  933  817  958 
Grass  1,400  1,383  1,058 
Leaf litter  1,583  1,742  1,892 
NTFPs  367  367  267 
Total  9,783  9,308  7,408 
Source: Fieldwork by author, 2008 
 
Data further indicate that there was a reduction in the consumptive use value of 
community forest products during the late conflict period to all socio-economic 
categories,  as  compared  to  the  pre/early  conflict  situation.  However,  the 
reduction  in  the  consumptive  value  of  forest  is  lower  for  lower-income 
households as compared to other categories of income groups. 282 
 
Table 7.23: Consumptive Value of Forest Products (NRs) by Income Category 
during Pre/early and Late Conflict Periods in Lakuri Rukh CFUG
134 
Products  Low income  Middle income  Upper income 
 
  Pre/early 
conflict 
Late 
conflict 
  Pre/early 
conflict 
Late 
conflict 
  Pre/early 
conflict 
Late 
conflict 
 
  Amount 
(NRs) 
Amount 
(NRs) 
Change 
(%) 
Amount 
(NRs) 
Amount 
(NRs) 
Change 
(%) 
Amount 
(NRs) 
Amount 
(NRs) 
Change 
(%) 
Timber  533  833  +56  933  933  -  2,100  567  -73 
Fuel wood  5,550  4,667  -16  5,500  4,067  -26  3,534  2,667  -25 
Fodder  1,317  933  -29  1,367  817  -40  1,567  958  -39 
Grass  2,133  1,400  -34  2,250  1,383  -39  2,200  1,058  -52 
Leaf litter  2,283  1,583  -31  2,550  1,742  -32  2,867  1,892  -34 
NTFP  33  367  -1,000  133  367  -175  333  267  -20 
Total  11,850  9,783  -17  12,733  9,308  -27  12,600  7,408  -41 
Source: Fieldwork by author, 2008 
 
7.7. Environmental Sustainability of Lakuri Rukh Devi CFUG 
 
The majority of the households that belong to Lakuri Rukh CFUG admit that 
after the establishment of the community forests, the local environment has been 
improved.  Besides  household  benefits,  community  forests  are  providing 
environmental services such as greenery, biodiversity conservation, erosion and 
landslide  control,  which  are  vital  for  their  livelihoods.  During  the  course  of 
interviews with CFUG members, most of the respondents said that the number of 
wildlife  species  has  increased  substantially  inside  the  community  forest. 
According to informants they encountered following wildlife during their visits 
to community forests. 
 
                                                 
134 The consumption value of forest products used by households in Lakuri Rukh CFUG at Chaubas was 
calculated based on the local value of the particular forest products as assessed by villagers. . After the 
discussion with general members and CFUG committee members, the price of the forest products was fixed 
at the rate of NRs 50/- per cu ft of timber and a bhari of fuel-wood respectively and NRs 25/- for a bhari of 
fodder, leaf-litter, and grass. 283 
 
Table 7.24: Table: 7.24: List of Wild life Sighted by Informants at Lakuri Rukh 
CFUG 
Local name  English name  Scientific name 
 
Birds     
Kalij  kalij pheasant  L. l. leucomelanos 
Jureli  Red vented bubbul  Pycnonotus jocosus 
Lampuchree  Yellow billed Bule Magpie  Urocissa flavirostris 
Dhukur  Oriental Turtle Dove  Streptoplia orentalis 
Mammals     
Bandel  Wild boar  Sus scrofa 
Bagh  Tiger  Panthera tigris 
Chituwa  Leopard  Panthera pardus 
Ratuwa Mriga  Barking Deer  Muntiacus muntjac 
Zimmermann 
Shyal  Jackal  Canis aurevs 
Source: Source: Information compiled by author, 2008  
 
During  focus  group  discussions  and  interviews  in  Lakuri  Rukh  CFUG,  all 
respondents said that after the establishment of community forest, the watershed 
condition significantly improved, and that the incidence of landslides, mudflow, 
and erosion has been largely averted. One of the informants recalled from his 
childhood that during every monsoon rain there used to be numerous landslides, 
floods and erosion around the village. Now, even in the monsoon season, there is 
clear water running in the rivulets, which is mainly due to improvements in the 
watershed condition. Moreover, the local environment has become pleasant due 
to greenery and the improved status of the forests. The size of trees, density, and 
species composition has been significantly increased after the establishment of 
community forests. All CFUGs in Chaubas, including the Lakuri Rukh CFUG, 
have been involved in timber sale to the local community sawmill and outside 
communities, and have been able to earn substantial incomes. If proper scientific 
management  of  the  forests  is  carried  out,  there  is  a  strong  prospect  that  the 
CFUG  can  improve  the  livelihoods  of  its  members,  carry  out  community 
development activities, and enhance local employment opportunities. It seems 
that  community  forests  would  be  able  to  provide  economic  benefits  and 
environmental services at the same time, if the CF is managed is a sustainable 
way  through  the  active  involvement  and  participation  of  local  people  in 
community-based forest co-management processes. A forest inventory carried 
out by Lakuri Rukh CFUG and District Forest Office (DFO) staff had found the 
status of trees in the community forest as follows: 284 
 
Table 7.25: Status of Trees per ha in the Lakuri Rukh Community Forest  
Name of species  Total no of 
trees/ ha 
Total volume  
(cu. feet) 
Annual increment  
(cu. feet) 
Pinus patula  330  7169  353 
Pinus wallichiana  261  2119  71 
Others( Alnus 
nepalensis, Schima 
wallichii, Michelia 
champaca,and 
Jhigane) 
67  1342  14 
Total  658  10,630  438 
Source: Lakuri Rukh CFUG operational plan, 2006 
 
I have visited the Lakuri Rukh community forest and found that the regeneration 
of broadleaf species is very promising. The improved regeneration is mainly due 
to proper conservation, improved soil condition and improvement in the micro-
climate  of  the  forests.  The  CFUG  committee  members  said  that  they  have 
planned to  replace the  existing pine forest with broadleaf species within the 
coming  15-20  years  by  adopting  a  gradual  thinning  regime.  An  assessment 
carried  out  by  the  CFUG with  technical  assistance  from  forestry  technicians 
from District Forest Office, Kavrepalanchok found the status of regeneration 
inside the community forest as follows: 
 
Table 26: Status of Regeneration in Lakuri Rukh CF, Chaubas 
Local name  Botanical name  No of trees /ha 
Young  Mature 
Pate salla  Pinus patula  834  - 
Paiyu  Prunus cerasoides  415  - 
Chhap  Michelia champaca  1,419  168 
Lankuree  Fraxinus floribunda  332  - 
Chilaune  Schima wallichii chois  192  51 
Others 
(Jhigane, Aangeri) 
Eurya cerasifolia  83  - 
Total    3,275  219 
Source: (Lakuri Rukh CFUG 2006, 4) 
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7.8. Conclusion 
 
The  southern  aspect  of  the  Chaubas  Danda  (hill)  was  without  forests  for 
decades, although the northern aspect was still reportedly good forest. Following 
the nationalization of private forest in 1957, local ownership of the forest was 
disturbed and within a decade most of the productive forests in Chaubas were 
destroyed by overuse and illegal harvesting. By the 1980s there was a severe 
scarcity of forest products in Chaubas, and the livelihoods of rural people were 
on the verge of collapse. People were forced to spend a whole day searching for 
a head load of fuel wood. The Nepal Australia Forestry Project (NAFP) launched 
an afforestation programme in the Chaubas region in 1979, and local people 
actively  participated  in  conservation  efforts.  After  the  completion  of  the 
plantation  program,  local  people  continued  conserving  forest  under  informal 
arrangements, until legislative reforms resulted in hand-over of the Lakuri Rukh 
forest to the local community in 1995. Within a few years of the establishment of 
the community forest, the scarcity of forest products was completely resolved. 
Forest products now exceed community demands. During the field survey, focus 
group discussions and interviews were held with villagers representing different 
socio-economic  groups,  which  indicated  that  CFUG  members  believed  the 
distribution  of  forest  products  was  fairly  managed.  Data  on  forest  product 
collection suggest that the frequency of visits to the community forests were 
reduced  during  the  late  conflict  period,  and  also  that  the  amount  of  forest 
products collected declined, although there was no restriction from either of the 
contending parties against entering the community forests.  
 
After the establishment of the community sawmill and implementation of forest 
management  activities  (thinning,  pruning,  felling,  and  transportation), 
employment opportunities were generated within the village and local people 
were able to enhance their household income. According to local people, the 
contribution of the community-owned sawmill played a major role in increasing 
household income and living conditions. Between 1995/96 and 2006/07, Lakuri 
Rukh  CFUG  created  about  10,458  additional  person-days  of  employment 
opportunities for local people. The money generated from the sale of timber has 
been  invested  in  forest  management  and  community  development  activities. 286 
 
Community  development  activities  sponsored  through  the  CFUG  fund  have 
made a substantial contribution to education and rural road construction in the 
village. The support that the CFUG provided to the local school at Chaubas has 
greatly improved children‘s access to education.  
 
The benefits that villagers receive through the use of forest resources, which 
have not been valued until now, were found to be higher than expected. The 
study shows that the consumptive value of forest products is higher among low-
income households than for other income groups. Other benefits from CF are 
also  emerging,  such  as  NTFP  collection,  charcoal  making  and  cardamom 
plantation, all as a result of community forest management. 
 
Although the governance arrangement of the Lakuri Rukh CFUG is operating 
under democratic principles, a few weaknesses have been noticed in the process 
of  community  forest  governance.  Key  positions  in  the  CFUG  committee, 
including chairman and secretary, have to date been monopolised by local elites 
and people from higher socio-economic groups. There is under-representation of 
women  and  socio-economically  marginalized  sections  of  the  community  in 
decision making bodies, especially in higher executive posts. Recently Lakuri 
Rukh CFUG has adopted a policy of broadening the scope of inclusion of socio-
economically marginalized people in the CFUG executive committee; however, 
its impact has not been dramatic. In practice, there is some representation of 
occupational  and  ethnic  castes  on  the  CFUG  executive  committee;  but  they 
occupy only the lower executive positions. It was found that socio-economically 
advantaged and influential village elites were holding the key positions on a 
rotational basis among themselves. Those that belong to so called higher caste 
are continuing to occupy the key positions, although they represent a minority of 
the population.  
 
Participation  of  women  is  gradually  increasing  in  CFUG  activities,  which  is 
mainly due to the empowerment of women through various workshops, training 
and awareness programs supported by the Nepal Australia Community forestry 
project.  There  was  also  pressure  from  the  Maoists  for  the  socio-economic 
transformation  of  the  disadvantaged  rural  population  during  the  insurgency 287 
 
period.  During  the  late  period  of  conflict,  forestry  department  and  donor 
agencies also revised their policies and emphasized the participation of women 
and  disadvantaged  sections  of  the  community  in  decision-making  forums. 
Women‘s active roles in decision making are yet to materialize fully, as they 
occupy only lower positions in the CFUG committee at present. Nevertheless, 
women in Chaubas are increasingly active in all spheres of village life, and a 
number of saving and credit groups have been formed and run by women which 
are boosting their social status in the community. Donor-supported NGOs are 
also working with women‘s  groups to assist them in increasing their income 
earning capacity by launching various income generating activities. 
 
After the escalation of violent conflict, the management of community forests 
were under threat due to the worsening law and order situation in the village. 
Forest users had to live in an environment of constant fear, from both warring 
parties. The Chaubas area was mostly under the control of Maoists during the 
insurgency period; although the people were also affected by the acts of security 
forces.  During  the  insurgency  period,  activities  of  the  District  Forest  Office, 
Kavrepalanchok  in  Chaubas  was  almost  paralysed.  Most  of  the  CFUGs  in 
Chaubas, including Lakuri Rukh, conducted their general assembly once a year 
and  committee  meetings  once  a  month  before  the  emergence  of  conflict. 
However,  in  2005  when  the  armed  conflict  was  at  its  peak,  they  could  not 
convene general assembly. The numbers of monthly CFUG executive committee 
meetings were also reduced. Maoists issued a notice that all CFUG has to work 
under  their  guidance  and  pay  tax  and  donations  to  the  Maoist  Jan  Sarkar 
(People‘s  government).  Despite  these  hardships,  the  Lakuri  Rukh  CFUG 
continued their forest management activities. They maintained a dialogue with 
the Maoists and negotiated with them by providing donations which allowed 
them to continue their work. The operation of the cooperatively owned sawmill 
was stopped during the period of conflict. Problems with sawmill management, 
and financial burdens imposed by the Maoists, ‗lead to its closure‘.   
 
In the later stage of conflict, when the timber business was not profitable, most 
of the CFUGs in Chaubas including Lakuri Rukh reduced timber harvesting in 
order to avoid the double tax burden. During these difficult times, the Lakuri 288 
 
Rukh CFUG had held several informal meetings with Maoist local leaders and 
tried to convince them to allow the CFUG to continue their forest management 
activities. In some cases they were successful and managed to operate thinning 
operations on the basis of informal agreements with the Maoists.  
 
As  the  forest  thinning  operations  slowed  down  during  late  conflict  period, 
income was reduced. However, investment in community development projects 
was higher during the late conflict periods compared to the pre/early conflict 
situation. Data collected for this study show that although there was reduction in 
community  forest  employment  during  the  late  conflict  period,  CFUGs  at 
Chaubas  were  able  to  continue  their  forest  management,  maintain  some 
employment for local people, and contribute to community development projects 
even in such a difficult time. 
 
For the last 2-3 decades, off-farm employment, especially working in the capital 
city and other parts of Nepal, has become the dominant source of livelihood 
strategy for the majority of people in Chaubas. Agriculture is now barely able to 
provide subsistence and no longer provides adequate income to support local 
livelihoods in Lakuri Rukh CFUG. However, the contribution of the community 
forest to the overall farming system is still significant, as the survey found that 
33  %  of  total  household  income  comes  from  the  combined  agriculture  and 
animal husbandry sector, which is largely supported by community forestry. The 
community forest itself provides 11% of total household income. In recent years, 
especially after the emergence of armed conflict  in  1996, seasonal migration 
within the country and overseas employment has increased rapidly. During the 
late conflict period, overseas employment emerged as a major source of income 
for middle and upper-income households; whereas labouring (primarily local and 
casual) and animal husbandry became major sources of income for low-income 
households. Generally, it has been believed that the armed conflict negatively 
affected the income earning opportunities of households. However, this study 
found that there were increases of 1%, 48%, and 44% in the incomes of lower, 
middle and upper-income households respectively during the period of conflict. 
The major factor in the increase in household income for middle and upper-289 
 
income  households  was  overseas  employment
135. This was not the case for 
people from lower-income households. Since lower-income households cannot 
easily  invest  in  overseas  employment,  their  main  sources  of  income  were 
labouring and animal husbandry, especially small animals and poultry. This 
study found that opportunities for working as wage labourers increased during 
the late conflict period, as there wa s a shortage of manpower due to labour 
migration and population displacement as a consequence of the conflict.  
 
It is evident that the local environment has significantly improved since the 
inception of community forestry program in Lakuri Rukh CFUG, whic h is 
demonstrated  through  the  improvement  in  biodiversity,  greenery,  watershed 
protection and the supply of forest and non -timber forest products to local 
people. People reported increased numbers of wildlife, and species that were not 
present  before.  With   the  exception  of  a  few  localized  incidents  of  fire, 
community-based forest governance was functioning smoothly even during the 
late conflict period.  
 
The Lakuri Rukh case study demonstrates that a completely degraded forest can 
be converted back to a green and healthy forest within a span of three decades. 
This  also  demonstrates  that  community -based  forest  management,  with 
supportive national legal instruments providing authority of forest governance 
and management to local communities, and involvement of   government and 
donor agencies in partnership arrangements with local people, can produce the 
desired outcome of sustainable forest management and use.  
 
The most interesting thing that came from this study was that during the period 
of the Maoist insurgency, while various planned activities of the government 
could not be implemented in the villages, the Lakuri Rukh CFUG was able to 
                                                 
135 Migration is not a new concept and practices in Nepal, however, within last few decades, especially after 
1990s; there is a sharp rise in the overseas employment. It is estimated that about a half million people at 
the  moment  are  working  in  third  countries  in  different  capacities  excluding  about  one  million  people 
working in India. The number of people going to overseas employment has been increased after the onset of 
Maoist insurgency. As many people displaced from the village and those who want to escape from the 
impact  of  civil  conflict  went  to  overseas  employment.  The  main  pushing  factors  for  the  overseas 
employment are lack of employment opportunities in the country, declining agricultural productivity, low 
economic growth, conflict and desire for a better life. During the period of armed insurgency (1996 – 2006) 
there was rise in the number of people from the rural areas going for overseas employment mainly due to 
the reason of avoiding the conflict as well as in the hope of earning additional income for the family. 
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continue with forest management and resource governance. The other interesting 
thing to note is that the Maoist insurgency did not substantively change actual 
CFUG  governance  arrangements.  The  forest  governance  structure  of  the 
Nepalese  Department  of  Forest  was  almost  dysfunctional  during  the  conflict 
period. The Lakuri Rukh CFUG at Chaubas was totally under the control of 
insurgents. However, the governance structures of the CFUG were largely stable. 
The Lakuri Rukh CFUG demonstrated their resilience by maintaining dialogue 
and bargaining with the Maoists. It was observed that community-based forest 
governance  is  deeply  rooted  in  the  minds  of  the  community  because  of  its 
participatory  and  bottom-up  approach,  which  makes  it  more  adaptive  and 
resilient  to  coping  with  disturbances.  Maoists  could  not  dismantle  the 
governance  structure  of  CFUG  in  Lakuru  Rukh  because  the  governance 
processes  and  practices  adopted  by  the  community  forest  program  at  Lakuri 
Rukh were effective, and because the program had a deep connection with local 
livelihoods.  This  case  study  reinforces  the  line  of  argument  that  institutions 
which  are  based  at  grass  roots  level  and  which  function  on  participatory 
democratic principles have more bargaining power as well as adaptive capacity 
to cope, even under the pressures of armed conflict, than centralized institutions 
that lack these features.  291 
 
 
Chapter 8 
 
Comparative Case Studies of Three Community Forest 
User Groups (CFUGs) in the Middle Hills of Nepal 
 
The three Community Forest User Groups (CFUGs) case studies discussed in the 
foregoing  chapters  are  considered  here  for  comparative  analysis  of  resource 
governance, livelihood security and environmental sustainability outcomes of the 
community forestry program. The three CFUGs chosen for study have different 
attributes,  which  makes  comparison  among  the  cases  interesting.  Among  the 
three CFUGs, Sharada Devi is least affected by the political conflict, since it did 
not experience direct control by either the Maoist insurgents or Nepalese security 
forces. Sharada Devi is located near the district centre and has easy access to the 
market, and therefore its dependence on the community forest is less compared 
to the other case studies. The second case study, Hile Jalajle (Ka), was mostly 
under the dominance of Nepalese security forces; it is located at a moderate 
distance  from  the  district  centre  and  market  and  has  relatively  greater 
dependence on the forest. The third case study, Lakuri Rukh Bhulbhule, was 
under the control of the Maoists, and is located farthest from the district capital 
with limited access to the market.  
 
This chapter will analyze and compare: the effectiveness of community forestry 
related  governance  processes  and  practices;  the  contribution  of  community 
forests  to  fulfilling  demands  for  forest  products  and  improvement  in  the 
livelihoods  of  rural  households;  and  the  impact  on  environmental  services 
provided  by  community  forests.  This  analysis  of  community-based  forest 
governance processes and outcomes during the pre/early and late conflict periods 
takes place in the context of the decade long Maoist insurgency, and provides an 
indication of the degree of resilience of local forest governance institutions.  292 
 
8.1. Introduction 
 
The case study district of Kavrepalanchok has been the pioneering district with 
respect to early implementation of the community forestry program in Nepal. As 
such, community-based forest  governance is relatively mature in this district. 
The three CFUGs selected for the study provide the opportunity to compare the 
effectiveness of forest management reforms, and particularly the role of CFUGs 
under three different political scenarios during the Maoist insurgency. 
 
The Sharada Devi CFUG was least affected by the armed conflict. There was no 
marked influence or domination by either of the conflicting parties. Compared to 
the  other  two  case  study  sites,  Sharada  Devi  CFUG  is  located  closer  to  the 
district centre and is relatively accessible to the market. Based on the sample 
survey carried out for this research, the majority of the households in Sharada 
Devi belong to the middle income group (54%) with the percentage of people 
belonging  to  high-income  and  low-income  groups  is  26  %  and  20  % 
respectively. The per capita forest area is about 0.20 hectare, which is lower than 
for  the  other  case  study  sites.  The  forest  is  mainly  composed  of  broadleaf 
species,  while  in  the  other  two  sites  pine  species  dominate.  The  household 
dependency on forest for fuel-wood is 69%, which is lower compared to the 
other two sites. Beside fuel-wood, CFUG members in Sharada Devi use LPG 
gas, bio-gas and sawdust as a source of household energy. Most of the land in 
Sharada  Devi  CFUG  is  productive.  Salaried/waged  employment,  self-
employment and dairy farming are the three major sources of household income 
in Sharada Devi CFUG according to the survey. However, farming (including 
agriculture, animal husbandry and poultry) provides 38.59% of total household 
income.  The  direct  dependence  of  households  on  the  forest  in  Sharada  Devi 
CFUG is low when compared to the other two study sites discussed earlier. 
 
The second case study Hile Jaljale CFUG is connected by a dirt road to Banepa, 
a commercial town of Kavrepalanchok district. Although most of the area is 
sloping  terrain,  about  14  sq.  km  (70%)  of  the  area  is  under  cultivation. 
Agriculture and animal husbandry are the main sources of livelihood for more 
than  90%  of  the  residents.  Other  income  sources  include  wage  labor,  public 293 
 
service,  overseas  employment,  and  small  business.  The  bulk  of  household 
income is obtained through the sale of milk, potato and vegetables. During the 
period of the Maoist insurgency, this CFUG was dominated by the Nepalese 
security  forces  and  part  of  the  CF  was  declared  as  a  training  zone  by  the 
government. 
 
The third case study, Lakuri Rukh CFUG is relatively remote and has the least 
access to the market. During the period of armed insurgency the Lakuri Rukh 
CFUG was under the influence of the Maoists. The literacy rate of the household 
head in Lakuri Rukh CFUG is low compared to Hile Jaljale (Ka) and Sharada 
Devi CFUG. More than 90% of the households in Hile Jaljale (Ka) and Sharada 
Devi  use  electricity,  while  Lakuri  Rukh  CFUG  does  not  have  access  to 
electricity as this village is not connected with the national electricity grid. Fuel-
wood is the major source of energy for cooking in Lakuri Rukh, as 98% of the 
households  still  use  fire-wood  as  a  principle  source  of  energy  for  cooking 
compared  to  69%  (Sharada  Devi)  and  96%  (Hile  Jaljale)  in  the  other  two 
villages.  Among  the  case  study  sites,  Hile  Jaljale  (Ka)  and  Lakuri  Rukh 
community forests contain pine species, while Sharada Devi community forest is 
dominated by broadleaf species, and biodiversity is higher than in the other two 
CFUGs.  
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The age of the forest in all three sites is almost the same, varying from 20- 25 
years. The per capita community forest area is 0.05, and 0.140.08 ropani
136 in 
Sharada Devi, Hile  Jaljale (Ka) and Lakuri Rukh CFUGs respectively. The 
regeneration of the broad leaf forest is quite encouraging in all three case study 
CFUGs. 
 
Table 8.1: Bio-physical Characteristics of Case Study CFUGs 
Description  Sharada Devi  Hile Jaljale (Ka)  Lakuri Rukh 
 
Forest handover date  July 3, 1995  January 1991  July 8, 1996 
Distance from District 
Capital 
5  12  45 
Total forest area (ha.)  44.25  118.14  63 
Forest area/household  0.26  0.49  0.86 
Per capita forest area/ha  0.05  0.08  0.14 
Number of forest blocks  5  7 Blocks  
(27 Sub-blocks;  
7 Working Circles
137) 
5 
Aspect  North-east  South – West and 
North-East 
North – East and 
South - West 
Slope (degrees)  20 - 40  10-25  10 - 45 
Canopy coverage (%)  60  65  35-40 
Age of forest (years)  25 years  20  23 years 
Average altitude 
(meters) above sea level 
1500   2020  2100 
Major forest  species   Castanopsis 
indica (Roxb.), 
Schima wallichii, 
Pinus spp., 
Myrica esculenta, 
Myrsine 
semiserrata wall 
Pinus patula, Pinus 
walichiana, Schima 
wallichii,rhododendron, 
Castanopsis indica, 
Aangeri, Kafal 
Pinus patula, 
Pinus 
walichiana, 
Alnus nepalensis,  
Michelia 
champaca            
Source: Lakuri Rukh CFUG (2006); Sharada Devi CFUG (2008); Hile Jaljale 
(Ka) CFUG (2001)  
 
Table  8.2  presents  the  socio-economic  status  of  households  comprising  the 
sample survey in the three CFUGs. It appears that the overall indicators of socio-
economic well-being of Lakuri Rukh CFUG are lower compared to the other two 
                                                 
136 1 ropani is equivalent to 500 square meters, making 20 ropani to the hectare. 
 
 
137 A Working Circle is a unit of forest within community forest and include s blocks and sub-blocks, 
divided according to different management objectives. Community forest has been divided into permanent 
blocks using permanent landscape features, and semi-permanent sub-blocks with homogenous forest types 
and conditions. A working circle consists of several sub-blocks in order to meet specific objectives assigned 
for the particular sub-blocks. 
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case study CFUGs. Also, the dependency of households on community forest is 
high  in  Lakuri  Rukh  CFUG  as  compared  to  the  other  two  sites.  It  can  be 
concluded from the data that those CFUGs which are located in remote areas and 
with  less  access  to  the  market  are  more  dependent  on  community  forest  for 
household  energy  needs  (primarily  firewood)  than  CFUGs  that  are 
comparatively less remote and have easy access to markets.   
 
Table 8.2:  Household Characteristics at Case Study Villages (mean values from 
samples)  
Attributes  Sharada 
Devi 
Hile Jaljale  Lakuri Rukh 
Household size (no.)  6  7  6 
Annual household income (NRs)  151,915  111,081  72,187 
Annual household income (US$)
138  2,053  1,501  975 
Average age of household head 
(yrs) 
55  48  47 
Literacy rate of household head (%)  71.1  71.0  57.8 
Livestock holdings (no.)       
Buffalo  0.8  1.1  0.6 
Cow  1.0  1.1  0.5 
Ox  0.1  -  0.3 
Goat/Sheep  3.3  3.8  5.3 
Pig  0.1  0.1  0.3 
Chicken  18.1  0.8  9.5 
Household with:       
Electricity (%)  98  93  13 (solar 
lamp) 
Piped water (%)  82  96  96 
Telephone (%)  82  69  29 
Audiovisual owned (%)       
Radio (%)  73  93  96 
Television (%)  89  82  18 
Source of household energy (%)       
Fuel-wood  69  96  98 
LPG Gas  31  2  2 
Briquette  -  2  - 
Source: Author, Field survey, 2008 
 
                                                 
138 1 US$ equivalent to Nepali Rupees(NRs) 74 
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8.2. Socio-economic Profile of the Study Sites 
 
A caste-based social system still prevails in many parts of South Asia, including 
Nepal.  Discrimination  on  the  basis  of  caste,  gender  and  ethnicity  presents  a 
serious  impediment  to  the  socio-economic  development  of  rural  areas.  Most 
economic  resources  are  controlled  by  the  upper  castes,  which  makes 
marginalized  ethnic/caste  groups  vulnerable  and  disillusioned  (Pradhan  and 
Shrestha 2005, 1-6).. The 1962 Constitution and the 1963 new Civil Code legally 
abolished discrimination based on caste, ethnicity, religion and gender (Pradhan 
and Shrestha 2005, 6);  however, discrimination continues  to  exist to  varying 
degrees (Adhikari and Di Falco 2009, 182). The caste/ethnic composition of the 
case study communities is presented on Table 8.3. In this study, I have attempted 
to  investigate the participation  and representation of disadvantaged caste and 
other socio-economic groups in community forest governance, to be discussed 
later in this chapter. 
 
Table 8.3: Caste Composition in Case Study CFUGs (%)              
Location  Higher-caste  Occupational caste 
(lower caste) 
Ethnic minorities  
Sharada Devi 
CFUG 
88  2  10 
Hile Jaljale (Ka)  92  7  1 
Lakuri Rukh  24  7  69 
Source: Compiled from CFUGs records 
 
A  wealth  ranking  of  households  shows  that  54%  in  Sharada  Devi  belong  to 
middle-income  groups,  while  20  %  and  26%  of  households  belong  to  low-
income and high-income groups respectively (see Table 8.4). In Hile Jaljale (Ka) 
58% of households belong to middle income, 12 % to high income and 30 % of 
households  to  low-income  groups.  In  Lakuri  Rukh,  52%  of  the  households 
belong  to  the  low-income  group  and  the  remaining  48%  are  roughly  evenly 
divided between high and middle income groups. These statistics indicate that 
those CFUGs which are in close proximity to the district centre and have easy 
access to market, are economically in a better position relative to those CFUGs 
which are remote and have limited access to the market. Wealth ranking shows 297 
 
that Sharada Devi has the lowest proportion of low income households, with 
Hile  Jaljale  in  an  intermediate  position,  and  Lakuri  Rukh  having  twice  the 
proportion of low income households of the other two CFUGs combined. 
 
Table 8.4: Wealth Ranking of CFUGs 
Name of CFUG  Upper-income (%)  Middle-income (%)  Low-income (%) 
Sharada Devi  26  54  20 
Hile Jaljale (Ka)  12  58  30 
Lakuri Rukh  23  25  52 
Source: Compiled from CFUG record   
 
Data show that CFUGs which are situated relatively further from local markets 
have  larger  upland  and  kharbari  holdings
139  compared to CFUGs which are 
nearer to the district centre. However, the most remote CFUG has the least 
irrigated land (see table 8.5).  
 
Table 8.5: Mean Land Holding per Household in three CFUGs 
Land Category  Mean land holding/household (ropani)
140 
Sharada Devi  Hile Jaljale (Ka)  Lakuri Rukh 
Irrigated land (Khet)  2.1  3.3  0.8 
Unirrigated land  0.3  0.1  - 
Bari (upland)  4.5  4.8  12.4 
Kharbari  0.3  0.9  7.6 
Total  7.1  9.1  20.0 
Source: Author‘s field survey 2008 
 
In 1969, planting was carried out in the degraded forest area presently occupied 
by Hile Jaljale (Ka). In Chaubas (Lakuri Rukh) and Sharada Devi, the Nepal 
Australia Community Forestry Project launched plantations in 1979 and 1989 
respectively.  Among  these,  the  Sharada  Devi  forest  is  mainly  a  regenerated 
forest. Local people in all three case studies actively participated in reforestation 
and became informally involved in forest conservation and management based 
on  local  management  systems.  However,  they  did  not  initially  have  formal 
                                                 
139 Kharbari is a private land assigned for growing thatch grass and trees. Farmers use grass, fuel-wood and 
timber produced from the kharbari when such products are not available from the communal forests lands, 
especially during the period of shortage. 
140 A traditional unit of land area in South Asia, one ropani is as 500 square meters, making 20 ropani to the 
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authority over what was still officially state forest. Finally, after the introduction 
of community forestry policy by the state, the Sharada Devi, Hile Jaljle (Ka) and 
Lakuri Rukh forests were handed over as community forests in 1991, 1995 and 
1996  respectively.  After  the  handover  of  forests,  the  authority  over  forest 
management legally came under the practical management of the CFUGs. In all 
of the three case study sites CFUGs have developed their own local rules of 
forest management, following the general principles and guidelines developed by 
the Department of Forest.  
 
During  three  decades  since  community  forestry  was  initiated  in  Nepal,  local 
communities, the forest department and donor agencies have been working hand 
in hand to strengthen the community forestry program. The community forestry 
program adopted a community based co-management approach between the state 
forest department and community forest user groups, in which government has 
devolved substantial authority over forest governance – including rule making 
on management and use of forest resources, enforcement and conflict resolution 
– to community user groups. Government in this case acts as the provider of a 
conducive  policy  environment,  as  a  provider  of  technical  and  financial 
assistance, and as a facilitator of capacity-development for the CFUGs. In this 
respect the management approach adopted by community forestry in Nepal can 
be  termed  community-based  forest  co-management.  The  following  sections 
present a comparative examination of the community forestry program at the 
three case study sites with respect to governance, livelihoods and environment, 
based on qualitative as well as quantitative information collected during field 
research.    
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8.3. Resource Governance Outcomes 
 
Good  forest  governance  has  been  a  great  concern  among  resource  planners, 
environmentalists,  foresters,  social  analysts  and  political  scientists.  As 
communities are heterogeneous, the important concern in decentralized forest 
governance is who participates in decision-making, and who benefits 
141 (Larson 
and  Soto  2008,  214) .  It  is  argued  that  participation  does  not  necessarily 
guarantee  sharing  power  (Mulder  1971,  31;  Potter  2008,  23) ,  but  for 
participation to be meaningful, there should be open dialogue, active voice and 
participation of people  in the decision making process  (Stiglitz 2002, 165; 
Shackleton et al. 2002, 5-6; White 1996, 7; Pateman 1970, 43) . Studies show 
that to ensure sustainable management of forest resources as well as community 
development, a high level of community participation and fair distribution of 
accrued  benefit  over  time  is  necessary  (Frasera  et  al.  2006,  126) .  During 
fieldwork, data were collected using household surveys, focus group discussions, 
interviews, and secondary data collection. Significant indicators of decentralized 
forest governance, including participation of CFUG members in decision making 
processes, frequency of CFUG General Assembly and Execu tive Committee 
meetings,  access  and  benefit  sharing  policies,  and  CFUG  income  and 
expenditure,  have  been  analyzed  and  compared  below.  The  outcomes  of 
community-based forest co-management for the three sites are summarized in 
Table 8.6.  
 
                                                 
141 Participation is defined by (Stiglitz 2002, : 165) as ―participation in the broadest sense, to encompass 
transparency, openness, and voice in both public and corporate settings‖. 300 
 
Table 8.6: Comparison of Resource Governance Outcomes in Case Study CFUGs 
between Pre/Early and Late Conflict Periods 
Resource Governance Outcomes  
  Sharada Devi  Hile Jaljale 
(Ka) 
Lakuri Rukh 
 
 
1.Participation in Decision Making  
     
1.1. Representation of women in CFUG   
Executive Committee 
Increases  Same  Increases 
1.2.Representation of lower castes in CFUG 
Executive Committee (EC) 
Same  Same (increase 
after 2006) 
Decreases 
1.3.Representation of higher caste in CFUG 
Executive Committee (EC) 
Same  Same  Increase 
1.4.Participation of women in CFUG General 
Assembly (GA) 
Increases  Same (increase 
after 2006) 
Same 
1.5. Frequency of GA meetings  Same  Slight decrease  Decreases 
1.6. Frequency of EC meeting  Decreases  Decreases  Decreases 
2.Governace Processes, Equity, Access 
and Benefit Sharing Mechanisms 
     
2.1. Frequency of GA meeting  Same  Same (could not 
convene in 
2002/3 and 
2003/04) 
Same (could not 
convene only in 
the year 2005) 
2.2. Frequency of EC meeting  Decreases  Decrease 
(increase after 
2006) 
Decreases 
2.3. Quantity of forest products collected 
 
Increases  Decrease  Decreases (but 
NTFP increases) 
2.4. General impact of insurgency on CFUG 
institutional arrangements  
Same/stable  Same/stable  Same/stable 
2.5. CFUG rule enforcement capability   Same  Same  Same 
2.6. Status of CFUG income  Slight decrease*  Slight decrease  Decrease 
2.7. Expenditure and community development 
activities 
Increase  Increase  Increase 
  1.    2.    3.   
*In real terms Sharada Devi CFUG incomes remained the same. The reduction in income is only 
through the discontinuation of household contribution for the salary of forest watchman. 
 
On the basis of focus group discussions and interviews with CFUG members in 
the three case study sites, it was found that the participation of local people in 
CFUG activities was regarded as satisfactory from the outset of the community 
forestry program to date. According to CFUG members, the reason for sustained 
participation is because of the important role that the community forests play in 
supporting the farming system, the livelihoods of local people, and as a provider 
of environmental services. From the 1960s until the mid-1980s, there had been a 
severe shortage of fuel-wood, fodder, and timber in the Middle hills of Nepal 
(AusAID  2006,  1).  The  national  forest  inventory  indicates  that  the  forest 
declined drastically from 6.4 million hectares (45%) in 1964 to about 4.1 million 
hectares in 1975, a drop of over one-third in just a decade (cited in Wallace, 301 
 
1983, 221). After the popularization of the theory of Himalayan Environmental 
Degradation,  a  reafforestation  program  was  initiated  in  Kavrepalanchok  and 
Sindhu Palchok districts, with support from Nepal Australia Forestry Project. 
This study revealed that after the plantation program, local people in all three 
case  studies  actively  participated  in  forest  protection  through  an  informal 
understanding with  the Department  of Forest.  When the forest  was  officially 
handed over, each CFUG prepared the constitution and operation plan through 
the users‘ assembly. These communities devised local rules of forest governance, 
adapting forest department guidelines to local conditions. They prepared benefit 
sharing mechanisms and implemented a range of community development and 
forest management activities.  
 
8.3.1.  Election  of  Executive  Committee  and  Representation  of  Women  and 
socio-economically marginalized groups in Decision Making Process 
 
The decision making processes of the CFUGs are guided by two documents, the 
CFUG Constitution and Operational Plan (OP). The study found that CFUGs in 
all  case  study  sites  have  adopted  democratic  principles.  CFUG  executive 
committee members were elected by consensus through the meeting of the GA. 
However, in one instance, voting was conducted to elect the Chairman in the 
Lakuri  Rukh  CFUG.  In  most  cases,  there  is  no  competition  to  serve  on  the 
CFUG executive committee, as this is a voluntary position. However, local elites 
and socio-economically advantaged are better positioned and more interested to 
serve in the higher positions of the CFUG like Chairman and Secretary, as these 
positions confer social status in society. Generally, it was found that people are 
more  interested  to  serve  on  the  committee  in  those  CFUGs  which  have 
substantial forest resources and greater income. There is a barrier for women and 
people from lower socio-economic strata to take on leadership positions in the 
CFUG committee, mainly due to time constraints, low level of education, and 
low social status. This suggests that until the economic status of women and 
other  disadvantaged  groups  is  enhanced  through  various  income-generating 
activities,  and  until  they  are  provided  with  economic  and  educational 
opportunities,  their  active  participation  and  involvement  in  CFUG  leadership 
roles will be difficult to achieve. 
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Women‘s participation in the general assembly (GA) meetings was found to be 
much lower than that of their male counterparts in all three case study sites. 
From 1994 to 2006, the average participation of women in the GA meeting of 
Sharada Devi and Hile Jal Jale (Ka) and Lakuri Rukh CFUGs was 9%, 11% and 
28%  respectively.  However,  since  2000  onwards,  some  reform  has  been 
undertaken by allocating a quota to women and lower caste on CFUG executive 
committees,  and provision for nominating representatives from  every hamlet. 
The Nepal Australia Community Resource Management and Livelihoods Project 
(NACRMLP) has played an important role in fostering the ‗second generation‘ 
issues of equity and progressive governance practices in community forest user 
groups in the case study CFUGs. Recently, all CFUGs have adopted a policy of 
nominating at least 33% women representatives and 10% from disadvantaged 
groups. Moreover, CFUGs at all three sites have made a decision to replace the 
committee membership in 2 to 3 year cycles, and barring those who are office 
bearers in the present executive committee from becoming candidates in the new 
committee. However, in the past, local elites and influential individuals have 
tended to take leadership positions in CFUG committee by turn. The impact of 
the changed policy remains to be seen. Data collected from the CFUG records 
show that in comparison to the pre/early conflict period, overall participation of 
women  in  CFUG  Executive  Committee  (EC)  and  General  Assembly  (GA) 
meetings  increased  during  the  intense  late  conflict  period.  However, 
representation of lower caste and ethnic groups is not encouraging, except in 
Lakuri Rukh. It is clear from the CFUG data that representation of lower caste 
and ethnic groups in CFUG, EC and GA has seen greater involvement especially 
in Maoist stronghold areas like in Lakuri Rukh in comparision with other case 
study CFUGs. The patron-client relationship which existed in Nepalese society 
for  centuries  has  not  changed  much  in  the  case  of  community  forestry 
programme as focus of the Maoists during the conflict period was mainly on the 
political movement rather than on reform in community forestry in a systematic 
manner.    Nonetheless,  social  norms  and  relationships  among  different  socio-
economic groups have seen dramatic changes over this period, especially in the 
Maoist stronghold area. 
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Table 8.7: Participation in CFUG Decision Making Forums by Gender and Class 
(%)  
Description  Sharada Devi  Hile Jaljale (Ka)  Lakuri Rukh 
 
Pre/early 
conflict 
Late 
conflict 
Pre/early 
conflict 
Late 
conflict 
Pre/early 
conflict 
Late 
conflict 
Women‘s 
representation in 
EC 
13  29  12  24  22  31 
Women‘s 
participation in GA 
8  10  3  12  27  22 
Representation of 
lower caste in EC 
-  -  6  5  11  16 
Representation of 
ethnic group in EC 
1  -  -  -  44  47 
Source: Compiled from Sharada Devi, Hile Jaljale and Lakuri Ruh CFUG record 
 
It is found that women‘s participation in decision making forum is low; however 
they have influence on CFUG activities behind the scenes. One woman remarked 
that  ―we  have  more  concerns  about  community  forest  than  men.  Although 
women‘s  participation on the committee is  less, we are always  watching the 
decision of the committee closely and if we find decisions are not relevant we 
put pressure to change it‖. Evidence suggests that women‘s roles and status in 
these communities has been improving rapidly, mainly due to training programs 
and literacy classes. Women are now involved in operating saving and credit 
groups. 
 
Across the three case studies, it was found that those CFUGs which had more 
support from the Forest Department and donor projects have been more efficient 
in  conducting  meetings,  record  keeping,  financial  transactions  and  overall 
management than those CFUGs which had limited support from either the Forest 
Department or Nepal Australia Community Resource and Livelihoods Project. 
At the same time, it also shows that those CFUGs which have relatively good 
income were found to be more active as in the case of Hile Jaljale (Ka) and 
Lakuri Rukh in terms of investment. But one thing ths is clear from the case 
studies is that CFUGs still need a great deal of capacity building in the areas of 
governance  and  community  mobilization  and  social  reform.  This  study  also 
shows that CFUG executive committees were mainly occupied by men from 
upper-income  groups  and  higher  castes.  Traditional  elites  have  substantial 
control over the governance processes of the CFUGs. However, pressure from 304 
 
the Maoists for overall socio-economic transformation, combined with second 
generation issues highlighted through research, led the government as well as 
donor agencies to shift their policies to increase the representation of women and 
marginalized  people  on  CFUG  committees.  Generally,  since  2006  the 
participation of women, lower caste and ethnic groups has been increasing. 
 
8.3.2.  Frequency  of  CFUG  Executive  Committee  and  General  Assembly 
Meeting 
 
The CFUG General Assembly (GA) and CFUG executive committee (EC) are 
the decision-making and program implementing bodies, whose functioning and 
frequency of meeting are important indicators of sustainability of community-
based  forest  governance  mechanisms  established  as  part  of  the  community 
forestry  (CF)  program.  Data  collected  during  fieldwork  show  that  the  GA 
meetings  of  the  Sharada  Devi  CFUG  convened  regularly  from  1993–  2006, 
while there was a slight reduction in the number of meetings of the EC during 
the late conflict period. Despite being adjacent to the Army Training School and 
controlled by the Nepalese security forces, the Hile Jalajle (Ka) CFUG was able 
to carry out GA meetings except in 2002 and 2003. There was also a reduction in 
the number of EC meetings in those two years. The Lakuri Rukh CFUG, which 
was under the influence the Maoists, did manage to carry out the GA and EC 
meetings regularly throughout the conflict period, with the exception of 2005. A 
slight  reduction  in  the  number  of  meetings  of  the  executive  committee  was 
observed during the late conflict period. CFUGs could not convene the GA in 
some  years,  due  mainly  to  a  prohibition  order  issued  by  the  District 
Administration Office (DAO) requiring that permission be obtained to organize 
mass meetings, rather than due to pressure from the Maoists. Despite all these 
difficulties, CFUGs  continued to carry out community forest  governance and 
forest management activities more or less as usual.  CFUGs in all three case 
studies managed to convene the meetings of GA and EC by negotiating with 
government security forces as well as with the Maoists. These data suggest that 
community-based resource governing institutions had become resilient and were 
able to cope and adapt during the time of external shocks, in this case the armed 
insurgency. 305 
 
 
8.3.3. Equity, Access and Benefit Sharing Mechanisms  
 
The issues of equity, access to community forest resources and benefit sharing 
mechanisms are comprehensively addressed in the CFUGs‘ Operational Plans 
(OP). CFUGs formulated various policies addressing access, equity, governance 
and benefit sharing mechanisms based on local circumstances and condition of 
the community forest. All three CFUGs formulated detailed rules of governance, 
enforcement, and distributional rules as well as plans and programs for forest 
management  and  community  development  activities.  All  CFUGs  in  the  case 
study  sites  have  adopted  a  policy  of  positive  discrimination  toward 
disadvantaged groups in distributing forest products. Households that belong to 
lower socio-economic strata, especially the poor, landless, and the blacksmith 
groups, receive a certain amount of timber and fuel wood free of cost. Besides 
that, households received free timber for the construction of houses damaged by 
natural disasters like earthquakes, fire and other calamities. The Hile Jaljale (Ka) 
CFUG also adopted a policy to assign subsidized rates for selling forest products 
to those households that belong to disadvantaged groups. Similarly, the Sharada 
Devi CFUG has a policy that those households that belong to lower economic 
strata do not have to pay annual membership fees. The Lakuri Rukh CFUG has a 
policy  to  provide  100  cubic  feet  of  timber  free  of  cost  for  community 
development works and wood required for making agricultural implements. The 
Hile Jalajle (Ka) CFUG has come up with some interesting programs to increase 
the status and income of women and lower castes by providing raw material 
(fuel-wood) and training to prepare briquettes. Many women are now involved 
in briquette making and earning an income through the sale of briquettes. With 
the assistance of a Micro Enterprise Development Programme (MEDEP) funded 
by  UNDP,  the  Hile  Jaljale  (Ka)  CFUG  has  helped  to  establish  an  improved 
furnace to manufacture agricultural tools. Blacksmiths are now benefiting from 
running  this  business.  The  Lakuri  Rukh  and  Hile  Jaljale  (Ka)  CFUGs  have 
adopted  a  positive  discrimination  policy  and  assigned  certain  areas  of 
community  forest  land  to  cultivate  income  generating  cash  crops  such  as 
cardamom, broom grass, bamboo and other medicinal plants in order to increase 
the income status of CFUG members. These policies have been aimed especially 306 
 
at marginalized groups from lower socio-economic strata. Distribution of forest 
products is found to be equitable regardless of class, caste and gender. Those 
CFUGs  which  have  larger  land  holdings  are  benefitting  greatly  from  the 
environmental services received from community forestry, mainly in supporting 
farming and animal husbandry; however, beside direct access to forest products 
and  a  small  amount  of  income  from  NTFPs,  households  from  lower  socio-
economic  strata  arguably  did  not  share  all  the  flow-on  benefits  to  the  same 
extent.. 
 
All the CFUGs in the case study sites have developed a set of comprehensive 
rules and procedures outlining when and how to access the forest and procedures 
for  forest  products  distribution  among  members.  CFUGs  have  prepared  a 
timetable for forest management activities, and notify its members in advance. In 
order to control illegal activities like burning, hunting, and illegal cutting of trees 
during  thinning  operations,  such  operations  are  supervised  by  the  CFUG 
committee members. All CFUGs in the three case study sites have been regularly 
carrying out thinning operations annually with the aim of maintaining a healthy 
stand and promoting regeneration of desired broad leaf species. During thinning 
operations,  CFUG  members  are  hired  on  a  paid  basis  that  provides 
supplementary employment opportunities for them. When the thinning operation 
is completed, the forest products generated from thinning are distributed equally 
among all CFUG members.  
 
Of the three case studies, Lakuri Rukh and Hile Jaljale (Ka) have good forests 
and the supply of forest products exceeds local demand. CFUG members do not 
have  to  pay  a  fee  for  accessing  forest  products,  except  for  timber.  CFUG 
members are allowed to collect dry wood, fodder, grass and leaf-litter throughout 
the year. However, Sharada Devi forest is still young and the stock of forest is 
also lower as compared to the other cases. Per capita forest area is also lower in 
Sharada Devi, thus the forest product demands of its members are not fully met 
by the CF. Access to the forest is more regulated in the Sharada Devi CFUG as 
compared  to  the  other  two  cases,  mainly  due  to  lower  supply  than  demand. 
CFUG members in Sharada Devi have to pay fees for the firewood they take; 
however,  grass  and  leaf-litter  can  be  collected  free  of  cost.  This  differential 307 
 
capacity to provide forest benefits from CF is directly related to the status of the 
resource base and income of the CFUG. It was found predictably that people 
from low-income groups are more dependent on community forest than those 
from  higher  socio-economic  strata.  The  high-income  households  fulfil  their 
demands for forest products from their private forests as well as from alternative 
power sources, as they have enough income to afford other options such as LPG 
gas, electricity and solar. Lower-income households are unable to substitute with 
alternative energy sources. This reality suggests that although the distribution of 
forest products is strictly equal, this may not be sufficient to satisfy the needs for 
forest products of those who are totally dependent on community forest and have 
no other alternative. This reality suggests that in the long run, the success of the 
community forestry programme depends heavily upon whether the livelihood 
needs,  opportunities  and  demands  of  the  people  from  lower  socio-economic 
strata and disadvantaged groups have been addressed. In order to avoid conflict 
and non-cooperation among CFUG members it is advisable that CFUGs should 
devise a mechanism through which the issues of good governance in CF and 
livelihoods security of people dependent on community forest resources can be 
addressed. 
 
8.3.4. Access to and Distribution of Forest Products during the Late Conflict 
Periods 
 
Neither of the contending parties restricted CFUG members‘ access to the forest, 
however, data show that there was a decline in the amount of forest products 
collected during the period of conflict, especially in the more remote Hile Jaljale 
(Ka)  and  Lakuri  Rukh  CFUGs.  Lakuri  Rukh  and  Hile  Jaljale  (Ka)  CFUG 
members  said  that  the  decline  in  forest  products  collection  did  not  have  a 
significant impact on their livelihoods. CFUG members said that they adopted a 
practical strategy of ―wise and minimum use‖. Besides that, middle and upper 
socio-economic groups also used forest products from  their kharbari (private 
land assigned for growing tree and grass), when it was risky entering to the 
forest  (see  Table  8.5).  Increased  forest  management  and  community 
development expenditure in the late conflict period by CFUGs seems to have 
compensated  for  some  of  the  economic  impacts  of  reduced  forest  product 308 
 
collection  for  lower  socio-economic  groups.  It  seems  that  governance 
mechanisms  and  overall  forest  management  activities  did  not  experience 
significant set backs during the intense period of conflict. The main enabling 
factors for increased forest management in the case study CFUGs, even in the 
conflict  period,  can  be  attributed  to  the  community  driven  approach,  local 
control  over  governance  regimes,  sense  of  ownership  and  benefit  sharing 
mechanisms  adopted  by  these  CFUGs  through  the  community  forestry 
programme. 
 
8.3.5.  Status  of  CFUGs  Income  and  Expenditure  during  Pre/Early  and  Late 
Conflict Periods 
 
CFUG  records  of  income  and  expenditure  were  examined  to  assess  the 
functioning of CFUGs during pre/early and late conflict periods. Data show that 
during pre/early conflict periods, income of CFUGs declined by 5% to 32%; 
however, expenditure on community development activities increased by 5% to 
40% (see Table 8.8). Faced with a dual tax burden during the late conflict period, 
there  was  a  decline  in  income.  Nonetheless,  CFUGs  increased  community 
development  activities  during  the  late  conflict  period  from  their  savings.  As 
community development activities increased employment opportunities, CFUGs 
in all three case study villages were actively implementing various programmes 
from their savings.  
 
Although the external environment was not favourable for CFUGs for activities 
like harvesting and selling timber, CFUGs did not have to face resistance from 
either of the contending parties to carry out their planned activities from CFUGs 
funds within the villages. This clearly indicates that CFUGs  governance was 
intact  and  functioning  effectively  during  the  late  conflict  period  despite 
uncertainties and difficulties created by armed conflict. 
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Table  8.8:  CFUG  Income  and  Expenditure  during  Pre/early  and  Late  Conflict 
Periods (% of total) 
Name of CFUG  Income (% of total)  Expenditure (% of total) 
 
  Pre/early 
conflict 
Late Conflict  Pre/early 
conflict 
Late conflict 
Sharada Devi  52.8  47.2  47.6  52.4 
Hile Jaljale (Ka)  57  43  30  70 
Lakuri Rukh  66  34  47  53 
Source: Compiled from Sharada Devi, Hile Jaljale (ka) and Lakuri Rukh CFUG 
records 
 
8.3.5.1. Community Development and Forest Management Activities by CFUGs 
 
Beyond supply of forest products and NTFPs, the community forestry program 
has been able to become a vehicle for community development and conservation, 
delivering  employment,  land  improvement,  small  forest-based  business 
opportunities,  skill  development  training  and  improvements  in  the  local 
environment (Mcdermott and Schreckenberg 2009b, 166). A substantial amount 
of the income of the CFUGs in case study villages has been directed to key 
infrastructure  development  in  the  communities,  such  as  the  construction  of 
school buildings, public toilets, community buildings, rural roads, repair of rural 
bridges, maintenance work at the local school and monastery, drinking water 
facilities, and the development of forest-based enterprises such as community 
sawmills. CFUGs have made investments in human capital through women‘s 
literacy  classes,  salaries  for  school  teachers,  local  health  facilities,  and 
subsidized loans to carry out income generating activities for the marginalized 
sections of the community. However, due to insufficient funds, CFUGs have 
been  unable  to  implement  community  infrastructure  activities  to  the  extent 
required by these communities. 
 
According to the 1993 Forest Act (amended in 1999), CFUGs are mandated to 
invest  at  least  25%  of  CF  income  in  forest  management  activities,  and  the 
remaining amount can be invested in other community development activities. 
Data show that the CFUGs in all three case study sites have invested more than 
46% of their income in various forest management activities like, tree plantation, 
plantation  of  cash  crops,  forest  thinning  and  pruning  for  better  regeneration, 310 
 
forest  inventory  preparation,  establishment  of  research  plots,  and  the 
organization of training sessions and study tours. The Sharada Devi, Hile Jaljale 
(Ka),  and  Lakuri  Rukh  CFUGs  have  invested  76%,  47%,  and  55%  of  total 
CFUG income on  forest management  activities and 11%, 45% and 41% on 
community development activities respectively. 
 
Table  8.9:    Proportion  of  CFUGs  Expenditure  on  Forest  Management  and 
Community Development Activities (%) 
Activities  Sharada Devi  
(1995-2007) 
Hile Jaljale (Ka) 
(1998-2007) 
Lakuri Rukh 
 (1997- 2007) 
Forest management           76            47            55  
Community development           11            45            41  
Administration           13              8              4  
Total         100          100          100  
Source: Fieldwork by author, 2008 
 
The  Hile  Jaljale  (Ka)  and  Lakuri  Rukh  CFUGs  have  made  substantial 
contributions to local schools, which significantly improved children‘s access to 
education. Out of total expenditure on community development activities, Lakuri 
Rukh CFUG invested 40% alone in upgrading the capacity of Seti Devi Lower 
Secondary School to a full secondary school. Similarly 28% of the total income 
of  the  Hile  Jaljale  (Ka)  CFUG  was  invested  in  Shree  Swet  Baraha  Lower 
Secondary School.  
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It  is  apparent  that  the  major  activities  carried  out  by  CFUGs  were  not 
significantly  affected  by  the  conflict,  but  actually  increased,  substantially  in 
many cases (see Table 8.10). It can be concluded that despite the worsening law 
and  order  situation  and  difficulties  created  by  conflict,  community  forestry 
activities  was  maintained  in  all  three  case  studies  sites,  and  there  was  little 
negative impact on forest management and community development activities.  
 
Table  8.10:  Proportion  of  CFUG  Expenditure  in  Forest  Management  and 
Community Development Activities during Pre/Early and Late Conflict Periods 
(%)  
Activities 
  
Sharada Devi  Hile Jaljale (Ka)  Lakuri Rukh 
Pre/early 
conflict 
Late 
conflict 
Pre/early 
conflict 
Late 
conflict 
Pre/early 
conflict 
Late 
conflict 
Forest management  31  44  3  36  30  25 
Community 
development 
9  2  2  49  11  30 
Administrative  7  6  2  7  1  2 
Total  48  52  7  93  42  58 
Source: Field data collected by the author, 2008 
 
Expenditure at the three sites shows that community development activities have 
not received the highest priority, especially in the early conflict period. As the 
CFUG leadership is dominated by the local elites and people from higher socio-
economic strata, pro-poor programs have not received as much attention as may 
be required. An increased focus on income-generation may remedy this situation 
in the future. 
 
8.4. Livelihood Outcomes 
 
Wild  resources  from  the  forests  are  vital  for  rural  people‘s  livelihoods 
(Shackleton et al. 2007, 573; Jodha 1986, 1169; Sunderlin et al. 2005, 1391). 
Villagers in the study sites derived part or most of their livelihood needs from 
local forests. Although the %age of household income derived from the forest is 
declining as the rural economy of Nepal is transformed, smallholders still rely on 
the  forest  for  their  livelihood  security  and  for  a  diverse  range  of  inputs.  As 
forests directly support agriculture and animal husbandry, estimating the value of 
the  forest  for  household  income  is  important  in  understanding  the  role  that 
forestry plays in supporting rural livelihoods (Campbell and Luckert 2002, 3). 312 
 
Natural resource management policies often failed to consider the full economic 
services and benefits of the forest to the farming system and rural livelihoods. 
These  remained  hidden,  mainly  due  to  the  lack  of  proper  methodologies  for 
economic  assessment  (IIED,  1997:  5).  The  following  section  examines  the 
overall household income during pre/early and late conflict periods and also the 
contribution of community forest on household income and livelihoods. 
 
8.4.1  Status  of  Household  Income  in  the  Three  Case  Studies  CFUGs  during 
Pre/Early and Late Conflict Periods 
 
Community  Forests  (CF)  in  all  three  villages  make  a  crucial  contribution  to 
household  income,  livelihood  security  and  conservation  of  the  local 
environment. Agriculture and animal husbandry receive various inputs from the 
community forest, although it is not easy to estimate the flow of services from 
community forest to the farming system and calculate direct benefits in simple 
monetary terms (Babulo et al. 2009, 109). Household surveys show that the three 
major sources of household income in Sharada Devi and Hile Jaljale (Ka) are 
dairying,  cereal  crops  and  vegetable  farming.  In  Lakuri  Rukh,  overseas 
employment, cereal crops and forest products seem to be the three major source 
of household income.  
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The contribution of forest products to household income in Sharada Devi, Hile 
Jaljale  (Ka)  and  Lakuri  Rukh  is  5%,  9%  and  11%  respectively.  These  data 
clearly indicates that those CFUGs which have relatively good access to markets 
earn more through off-season vegetable farming and dairying , while those away 
from market (like Lakuri Rukh) mostly rely on off-farm activities, overseas and 
service employment, and their dependence on community forest is also more 
than others (see table 8.11). 
 
Table 8.11: Mean Annual Household Income in Lakuri Rukh CFUG (all income 
categories combined) 
Income source  Mean annual income (NRs) 
Sharada Devi  Hile Jaljale (Ka)  Lakuri Rukh 
  Income  % of total 
income 
Income  % of total 
income 
Income  % of 
total 
income 
Cereal crops  17,226  18  19,089  17  16,125  20 
Vegetable farming  16,251  17  23,133  21  -  - 
Fruit  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Dairying  27,122  28  18,578  17  2,044  3 
Small  animals 
(goat/sheep) 
4,911  5  6,393  6  4,978  6 
Pig/swine  -  -  422  0  2,143  1 
Poultry  2,756  3  78  0  2,143  3 
Salaries/waged 
work (permanent) 
11,000  11  12,444  11  9,314  12 
Overseas 
employment 
-  -  6,444  6  22,048  27 
Self employment  7,200  7  5,800  5  7,897  10 
Pension  667  1  -  -  -  - 
On-farm  wages 
(casual 
4,078  4  2,949  3  1,400  2 
Off-farm  wages 
(casual) 
2,144  2  6,056  5  5,260  7 
Forest products  4,938  5  9,695  9  8,833  11 
Total  98,293  100  111,081  100  82,185  100 
Source: Field survey by author, 2008 
 
From  the  analysis  of  household  income  data  the  following  evidence  has 
emerged. First, access to markets has a crucial role in contributing to household 
income irrespective of income category. Better access to the markets opened 
avenues for off-season vegetable farming and dairying (as in Sharada Devi and 
Hile Jalajle) that helped to boost income according to a household‘s capacity for 
capital investment. Second, the direct consumptive value of forest products for 314 
 
lower-income  households  is  greater  than  for  other  income  groups,  however, 
middle-  and  upper-income  households  are  disproportionately  able  to  harness 
community  forest  benefits  because  of  their  greater  land  holdings  and  larger 
number of dairy cattle (see Table 8.11). When data are further segregated among 
different income categories they show that the contribution of different sources 
on  household  income  varies  within  income  categories  and  also  across 
geographical  locations.  The three major source of household  income for low 
income  households  in  Sharada  Devi  are  dairying,  salaries/waged  work,  and 
vegetable farming, while for middle-income and upper-income households they 
are  salaries/waged  work,  dairying  and  self-employment.  In  Hile  Jalajle  (Ka) 
CFUG, low-income households‘ three major income sources are off-farm wages, 
forest  products  and  vegetable  farming,  while  for  middle-income  households 
these  are  dairying,  forest  products  and  cereal  crops,  and  for  upper-income 
householders  they  are  vegetable  farming,  cereal  crops  and  salaries/waged 
employment. In Lakuri Rukh, low-income households‘ major income is through 
forest products, cereal crops and off-farm employment, while for middle-income 
earners  it  is  overseas  employment,  cereal  crops  and  forest  products.  Upper-
income  households  in  Lakuri  Rukh  depend  on  overseas  employment,  cereal 
crops and salaries/waged work.  
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Table 8.12: Proportion of Household Income (%) in Three Case Studies by 
Income Sources and Categories  
Income 
source 
Sharada Devi  Hije Jaljale (ka)  Lakuri Rukh 
Low-
income 
Middle-
income 
Upper-
income 
Low-
income 
Middle-
income 
Upper-
income 
Low-
incom
e 
Middle-
income 
Upper-
income 
Cereal crops  14  14  9  8  20  19  22  20  19 
Vegetable 
farming 
16  10  10  12  23  23  0  0  0 
Fruit  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Dairying  17  27  14  7  23  17  2  1  3 
Small  animals 
(goat/sheep) 
4  4  2  6  5  6  14  5  5 
Pig/swine  -  -  -  2  0  0  2  2  0 
Poultry  0  -  3  0  0  0  4  3  2 
Salaries/waged 
work 
(permanent) 
17  20  36  8  0  18  3  9  16 
Overseas 
employment 
-  5  7  0  10  5  0  31  33 
Self 
employment 
11  10  14  8  0  7  2  10  12 
Pension  -  2  -  0  0  0  0  0  0 
On-farm wages 
(casual 
3  5  1  8  3  0  8  1  0 
Off-farm 
wages (casual) 
9  0  0  22  5  0  15  6  4 
Forest products  7  4  2  18  11  5  28  12  6 
Total  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100 
Source: Field survey by author, 2008 
 
The  above  statistics  clearly  show  that  lower-income  households  are  more 
dependent on community forest for their household income, irrespective of the 
access to market and remoteness, however, the proportion of contribution of CF 
on household income increases with the increasing distance from the market and 
increasing degree of remoteness.  
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CFUG members in the three case study sites have diversified their household 
strategies to secure income by capturing the opportunities created by conflict. 
Data show that household income in Sharada Devi, Hile Jaljale (Ka), and Lakuri 
Rukh CFUGs during the late conflict periods increased by 2%, 23% and 44%, 
respectively (see Table 8.12).  
 
Table  8.13:  Mean  Household  Income  (NRs),  all  categories  (for  all  sample 
households) 
CFUGs 
  
Mean annual household income (NRs), all income categories 
combined 
Pre/early conflict  Late conflict  Change (%) 
Sharada Devi  103,135  148,154  +44 
Hile Jaljale (Ka)  108,989  111,081  +2 
Lakuri Rukh  58,934  72,242  +23 
Source: Field survey by author, 2008   
 
Specifically in Sharada Devi CFUG, household income among high, middle and 
low-income  households  was  increased  by  56%,  28%  and  30%  respectively. 
Among three case studies, the increase of household income in Sharada Devi 
CFUG during the late conflict period was remarkable. Households during this 
period were able to augment their income through various means like vegetable 
farming,  dairying,  small  animals,  service  employment,  self  employment  and 
overseas  employment.  Households  in  Shrarada  Devi  were  in  a  more 
advantageous position than other CFUGs in terms of their easy access to market 
and better communication facilities. Because of easy access to market they were 
able to sell their products for better prices, as there was less competition due to 
road blockades induced by the Maoists. 
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Table  8.14:  Mean  Household  income  (NRs)  during  Pre/early  and  late  Conflict 
Periods by Income Category (for all sample households)   
 Income group  Community Forest User Groups 
Sharada Devi  Hile Jaljale (Ka)  Lakuri Rukh 
Low-income          
Before conflict  49,322  60,271  34,983 
Late conflict  63,897  59,592  35,477 
Change (%)  +30  -1  +1 
Middle-income          
Before conflict  102,974  91,938  52,360 
Late conflict  131,516  90,692  77,734 
Change (%)  +28  -1  +49 
High-income          
Before conflict  167,525  174,758  89,459 
Late conflict  260,332  182,960  128,849 
Change (%)  +56  +5  +44 
Source: Field work by author, 2008 
 
High-income households in Hile Jaljale (Ka) CFUG increased their incomes by 
5%, while there was a minor reduction in household income (1%), among low 
and middle income households. During the period of insurgency, low-income 
households  in  Hile  Jaljale  (Ka)  augmented  their  income  through  piggeries, 
dairying and wage labour. This study indicates that the conflict did not have a 
significant negative impact on household income in any of the three CFUGs. The 
study shows that Nepal accomplished remarkable overall economic and human 
development between 1995/96 and 2003/04, a period of political instability and 
armed insurgency. Interestingly, during this period the incidence of poverty fell 
from 42 to 31 %
142. 
 
                                                 
142 The World Bank study (2006) shows that the main reason for improvement in overall economic and 
human development during the period of insurgency is due to the improved connectivity, better penetration 
of communication facilities (telephone, radio, electricity), improvement in education, primary health care, 
rural road  networks,and social mobilization, and especially thanks to the  development of community forest 
user groups. There was sharp rise in remittances from migrant workers to $794 million in 2003/04 up from 
$203 million in 1995/96. 318 
 
8.4.2. Contribution of Community Forests (CF) to Household Income 
 
The livelihoods of rural households in most developing countries are directly or 
indirectly dependent on surrounding natural resources, and among these forests 
play a crucial role (Babulo et al. 2009, 110). For these communities in Nepal, the 
most important direct economic benefits received from the forest are fuel-wood 
for cooking and heating, timber for the construction of houses, and fodder and 
leaf  litter  for  livestock  rearing.  As  community  forests  directly  support 
livelihoods of rural communities, estimating the value of forests for household 
income is important in  understanding the role that forest plays in supporting 
rural  livelihoods  (Campbell  and  Luckert  2002,  3).  Equally  important  is  to 
understand who depends most on forest resources and how forest resources used 
affect  other  socio-political  and  economic  dimensions  of  forest  users‘  welfare 
(Cavendish 2002, 17). Table 8.15 presents the share of consumptive value of 
community forest to overall household income in all three case study sites. This 
is calculated in terms of consumptive use-value
143 of forest products and NTFPs. 
Survey data indicate that the contribution of community forest to household 
income in Sharada Devi, Hile Jaljale (Ka) and Lakuri Rukh CFUGs was 3%, 9% 
and 11% respectively. 
 
Table  8.15:  Consumptive  Value  of  Forest  Products  and  NTFPs  for  Household 
Income, all categories 
Name of CFUG  Annual  household income 
(NRs) from CF 
Share of CF contribution to total 
household income (%) 
Sharada Devi           4,938                   3  
Hile Jaljale (Ka)           9,695                   9  
Lakuri Rukh           8,833                 11  
Source: Field survey by author, 2008  
 
The analysis again indicates that the share of community forest in household 
income is directly related to the degree of remoteness and access to markets. 
Lakuri Rukh which is located farthest from the district centre and market, relied 
                                                 
143 The consumptive value of community forest resources have been calculated in economic terms based on 
the quantity of forest products used by each household annually from CF and the local market value of such 
products. Where consumptive value of forest products in each CFUG was calculated based on per unit 
current local price of the particular forest products multiplied by the amount of forests products used by the 
households based on the work of (Gregersen et al. 1995; Murthy et al. 2005, 1577) 
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more on community forest followed by Hile Jaljale (ka) (relatively less remote 
and at a moderate distance from the market) and Sharada Devi (least remote and 
closest to market).  
 
When  data  are  disaggregated  across  income  categories,  they  give  a  striking 
picture. Table 8.15 shows that the share of forest products and NTFPs in the total 
income of low-income households surveyed in Sharada Devi is 6.67%, in Hile 
Jaljale (Ka) it is 14.39% and in Lakuri Rukh is 27.57% (more than twice that of 
middle income and nearly 5 times that of high income households in this most 
remote  CFUG).  This  indicates  that  CF  plays  a  significant  role  in  household 
income  and  livelihood  support  for  low-income  households  as  compared  to 
middle and higher-income households. However, this does include the in-kind 
value of indirect benefits such as inputs to agriculture activities.  
 
Table 8.16: Share of Forest Products on Household Income (consumptive value) by 
Income categories (%)* 
CFUGs  Annual income 
(NRs) 
Average Share of CF 
contribution to household 
income (%) ** 
Sharada Devi     
Low-income  4,264  7 
Middle-income  5,336  4 
High-income  5,215  2 
Hile Jaljale (Ka)     
Low-income  10,998  14 
Middle-income  9,492  10 
High-income  8,594  5 
Lakuri Rukh     
Low-income  9,783  28 
Middle-income  9,308  12 
High-income  7,408  6 
Source: Field survey by author, 2008 **the calculation was based on the consumptive value of 
forest products and NTFPs in each CFUG among three income categories. 
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8.4.3. Employment Opportunities Created by Community Forest 
 
Community-based forest governance can open up new livelihood opportunities 
for local households. But a clear policy focus on benefit distribution as mediated 
by the local CFUGs is  crucial  (Thoms 2008, 1461) to achieve this end. The 
CFUGs are able to expand access to employment opportunities for rural poor, 
especially during the annual thinning operation, which employs a large number 
of  people.  In  addition,  local  people  are  employed  as  ban  heralu  (forest 
watchman), nursery foremen and in forest-based enterprises like furniture works 
and the community saw mill. Among the three case study sites, households from 
Lakuri  Rukh  CFUG  had  the  opportunity  to  work  in  the  Chaubas-Bhumlu 
Community Sawmill which was being operated through the collaboration of four 
CFUGs. During the sawmill operation hundreds of local people were employed 
in sawmill related works, which positively affected the economic status of local 
people. Out of the total  92.17 million  Nepali rupees  earned by the saw mill 
between the period 1996/97 and 2004/05, about 1.84 million Nepali rupees were 
spent on hiring wage laborers,  creating about 28,000 man days of employment 
(for details refer to case study Chapter 7 on Lakuri Rukh). Beside that, each 
CFUG in Chaubas has employed local people in thinning operations, which also 
created employment.  
 
Table 8.17: Employment Opportunities Generated by Three Case Study CFUGs 
(person-days) 
Activities  Sharada Devi  
(1995 -2007) 
Hile Jaljale (Ka)  
(1998-2007) 
Lakuri Rukh 
( 1997 - 2007) 
Forest management        6,456         12,868          7,538  
Community development          193          2,844          2,920  
Total        6,648         15,712         10,458  
Source: Calculated from CFUGs record by author, 2008 
 
Table  8.17  shows  that  Sharada  Devi,  Hile  Jaljalke  (Ka),  and  Lakuri  Rukh 
CFUGs,  generated  6,648,  15,712,  and  10,458  person-days  of  employment 
respectively for the local community. Every year, CFUGs implement a forest 
management as well as community development activities in the village, thus, 
CFUG members have an opportunity to work as paid laborers. During the course 321 
 
of interviews and daily interactions with CFUG members, it was found that the 
opportunities for employment  created by community forests have contributed 
significantly to livelihood improvement. For example in Lakuri Rukh, CFUG 
members were able to convert thatched rooves into corrugated tin rooves through 
the money earned by working in the community sawmill and forest management 
activities launched by the CFUG. The overall employment created by the CFUG 
in  the  Sharada  Devi  and  Hile  Jaljale  (Ka)  CFUGs  increased  during  the  late 
conflict periods, as opposed to the reduction in the Lakuri Rukh CFUG, mainly 
attributed  to  the  closure  of  the  community  sawmill.  However,  beside  the 
reduction in forest management activities, the Sharada Devi CFUG continued its 
support of community development activities and there was no impact on these 
activities during the late conflict period. 
 
Table 8.18: Proportion of Total Employment Created by CF during Pre/Early and 
Late Conflict Periods (%) 
Activities 
  
Sharada Devi  Hile Jaljale (Ka)  Lakuri Rukh 
Pre/early 
 conflict 
Late 
conflict  
Pre/early 
 Conflict 
Late 
conflict  
 
Pre/early 
 conflict 
Late 
conflict 
Forest 
management 
48  49  16  66  51  21 
Community 
development 
2  1  2  16  14  14 
Total  49  51  19  81  65  35 
Source: Calculated by author based on CFUG records, 2008 
 
It can be concluded that community forestry institutions have created a number 
of seasonal employment opportunities for their members. Given the nature of the 
work, which is mostly casual wage labor, people from lower-socio-economic 
strata are the ones who are most likely to benefit, as people from higher socio-
economic strata are involved in permanent salaried/waged employment, business 
and  farming.  The  CFUGs  were  capable  of  maintaining  these  activities  even 
during the period of armed insurgency. 
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8. 5. Environmental Outcomes 
 
The environment provides the essential life support systems and basic means of 
production  for  human  settlements  (Freebairn  2009,  13).  In  recent  decades, 
governments  in  many  countries  have  reformed  their  environment  policy  and 
devolved power over natural resource management to local people, largely due 
to resource scarcity and increased community need for environmental services 
(Korten 1987, 3; Agrawal 2008, 46). Community forests provide an array of 
environmental  services  including  the  conservation  of  biodiversity,  watershed 
protection  (including  water  quality  and  quantity),  carbon  sequestration,  and 
countless  other  benefits  including  food,  medicine  and  amenities,  which  are 
fundamental  to  the  livelihoods  and  well-being  of  forest  dependent  rural 
communities in the hills of Nepal.  
 
During the course of the studies,  detailed discussions  were held  with  CFUG 
members  to  assess  the  environmental  outcomes  since  the  inception  of  the 
community forestry program. It is evident from the case studies that the present 
forest area occupied by the Sharada Devi, Hile Jaljale (Ka) and Lakuri Rukh had 
been completely degraded and the forest was in no condition to provide forest 
products  and  NTFPs,  or  other  environmental  services.  When  the  forest 
governance  authority  officially  came  under  the  control  of  local  community, 
CFUGs in all three case study sites committed to protect the forest completely 
for  two  to  three  years  in  order  to  allow  the  growth  of  planted  trees  and  to 
promote natural regeneration. After the third year of protection, CFUG members 
were allowed to access the community forest for collecting grass and twigs. As a 
consequence of protection, the forest regrowth was remarkable and the condition 
of the community forest had significantly improved. This has provided a wide 
range of environmental services and benefits to the local communities. Before 
the establishment of the community forests, people had to walk many hours from 
their  villages  in  search  of  firewood,  fodder  and  timber.  People  also  faced 
difficulties in rearing livestock and farming due to the lack of fodder, grass, 
compost and water for irrigation as well as for drinking. Since the improvement 
in forest condition, household demands for forest products have been completely 323 
 
met from community forest in Hile Jalajle (Ka) and Lakuri Rukh, and partially 
met in Sharada Devi CFUG.  
 
Table 8.19: Mean Annual Forest Products and NTFPs Collected per Household* 
Forest products 
  
Community Forest User Groups (CFUGs) 
 
Sharada Devi  Hile Jalkjale (Ka)  Lakuri Rukh 
Timber (cu. ft)   -                 16                   8  
Fuel-wood (bhari)                17                 66                 76  
Fodder (bhari)                  9                   1                 36  
Grass (doko)                  2                 29                 51  
Leaf-litter (bhari)                22                 85                 70  
NTFPs (kg)   -    -                   3  
Source: Fieldwork by author, 2008 * 1 bhari of green fuel wood is approximately equivalent to 
50 kg; 1 bhari of fodder or grass is equivalent to 25 kg; and 1 doko of leaf litter is equivalent to 20 kg. 
 
Respondents in all three case study sites reported that after the establishment and 
conservation of the community forests, there was a significant improvement in 
local watershed condition. A noticeable environmental outcome achieved by the 
Sharada Devi and Hile Jalajle (Ka) CFUGs is the significant increase in off-
season  vegetable  farming,  mainly  because  of  the  increase  in  water  supply 
coming from the forest watershed. Another environmental outcome according to 
the  people  interviewed  in  both  Sharada  Devi  and  Hile  Jalajle  (Ka)  is  the 
improvement in the drinking water quality and supply for the local community, 
because of the increased water volume from the forested watershed. Due to the 
improvement in water yield from the forest watershed, many additional drinking 
water facilities have been installed in the community. Moreover, as reported by 
people in all three cases, the incidence of mudflow, erosion, landslide, flood 
hazard and downstream siltation has greatly reduced. Nonetheless, during the 
initial stage of the CF, mainly in the Hile Jaljale (Ka) and Lakuri Rukh CFUGs, 
communities experienced dryness and reduction in water source, believed to be 
mainly due to the initial plantation of pine species. However, in the later years of 
the CF establishment, when the forest became mature and the regeneration of 
understorey and broadleaf species was good, the quantity of water coming out of 
the forest watershed has increased.  
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8.5.1. Condition of Wildlife 
 
People in all three CFUGs reported a marked increase in the number of wildlife 
species present in the forest. Before the initiation of the CF, the forests were 
completely  degraded;  and  there  were  reportedly  only  a  few  wildlife  species 
present,  mainly  rabbit,  jackal,  and  a  few  bird  species.  After  decades  of 
conservation through the community forest program, many species of wildlife 
have migrated into the forest and their populations have increased significantly, 
due to the improvement in habitat. In interviews, people in all three CFUGs told 
us  that  they  have  frequently  encountered  wild  mammals  and  birds  in  the 
community forests. CFUG members are facing some problems as a consequence, 
including  damage  to  crops  from  deer,  wild  boar  and  birds,  and  in  a  few 
instances, local people were injured and killed by tigers and leopards. Table 8.19 
shows the list of wild mammals and birds encountered by CFUG members while 
in their community forests. It is reported from CFUG members that during the 
late  periods  of  armed  insurgency,  there  was  no  marked  negative  impact  on 
wildlife. As the frequency of visits to the forest decreased during the late conflict 
period, there are likely to have been some positive effects for wildlife and their 
movements and population levels. In Hile Jalajle (Ka), it could be surmised that 
there may have been some localized declines due to the regular firing exercises 
conducted by the Nepalese army inside the community forest area, which may 
have caused temporary migration to other areas. 
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Table 8.20: List of Wild Life Sighted by Informants in the Three Case Study Sites 
Vernacular 
name 
English name  Scientific name  Sharada 
Devi 
Hile Jaljale 
(Ka) 
Lakuri 
Rukh 
Wild 
animals 
            
Bandel  Wild boar  Sus scrofa   ×  ×   × 
Pate Bagh  Tiger  Panthera tigris tigris   ×  -   × 
Chituwa  Leopard  Panthera pardus   ×   ×   × 
Dumsi  Porcupine  Hystrix indica   ×  ×  - 
Salak  Chinese pangolin   Manis pantadactyla   ×  ×  - 
Kharayo   Hispid hare   Caprolagus hispidus   ×  ×  - 
Shyal  Jackal  Canis aurevs   ×  ×  × 
Ban Biralo  Wild cat  Telis chans   ×  -  - 
Chittal  Spotted dear  Axix axis   ×  -  - 
Ratuwa mirga  Barking deer  Muntiacus muntaijak   ×   ×   × 
Lokharke  squirrels  Funambulus spp.   ×     
Malsapro  Yellow-throated 
Marten 
Mortes flarigula  -  ×  - 
Banmuso  -  -  -  ×  - 
Sun Gohoro  Golden Monitor Lizard  Varanus favescens  -  ×  - 
Sarpa  Snake  -  -  ×  - 
Birds             
kalij   kalij pheasant  L. l. leucomelanos   ×   ×   × 
Battai  Quail  Coturnix coturnix   ×  -  - 
Titra   Hill-partridge  Arborophila torqueola   ×   ×  - 
Fiste   -   -   ×  -  - 
Lampuchree  Yellow billed Blue 
Magpie 
Urocissa flavirostris   ×   ×   × 
Dhukur  Oriental Turtle Dove  Streptoplia orentalis   ×   ×   × 
Jureli  Red vented bubbul  Pycnonotus jocosus  -   ×   × 
Suga  Red Breasted Parakeet  Psittacula alexandri  -   ×  - 
Dhobichara  -  -  -   ×  - 
Chyakhura  Chukur Patridge  Alectoris graeca  -   ×  - 
Baj  Falcon  Falcon peregrinus  -   ×  - 
Baudai chari  -  -  -   ×  - 
Gauthali  House Swift  Apus affinis  -  ×  - 
Kalchaude  -  -  -  ×  - 
Malichara  -  -  -  ×  - 
Source: Information compiled by author during fieldwork based on interview 
with informants and CFUG operational Plans, 2008 
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8.5.2.  Status  of  Forest  Stocks  and  Regeneration  of  the  Three  Case  Studies 
CFUGs 
 
In Sharada Devi, regeneration of broadleaf species inside the community forest 
is  promising.  There  is  a  complete  transformation  of  the  landscape.  Once  a 
denuded hill, the area has now been converted to a green and healthy forest. The 
Hile Jaljale (Ka) and Lakuri Rukh CFUGs have adopted a policy to develop a 
healthy forest
144 by removing overstocked stands and promoting the growth of 
broadleaf species through gradual thinning of pine species. As the number of 
plants  per  hectare  is  too  high,  every  year  communities  undertake  thinning 
operations. The author made a number of visits to the community forest during 
the fieldwork and found that the forests in all three sites are in very good 
condition.  
 
Table 8.21: Status of Regeneration of Broad-leaf Tree Species in Three 
CFUGs 
CFUGs  Saplings  
( no. of trees /ha) 
Pole size tree  
(no. of trees /ha) 
Sharada Devi  17,375  5,417 
Hile Jaljale (Ka)  17,148  11,805 
Lakuri Rukh  3,275  219 
Source: Compiled from Sharada Devi, Hile Jaljale (Ka) and Lakuri Rukh CFUG 
Operational Plans  
 
                                                 
144  A healthy forest refers to the improvement in both ecological and social aspects. Ecologically, a healthy 
forest maintains its unique species and processes, while maintaining its basic structure, composition and 
function. In social terms, healthy forests have the ability to accommodate current and future needs of people 
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Besides natural regeneration, the growth of mature forest stock is also promising. 
Forest inventories prepared by the CFUGs with the technical help of forestry 
technicians shows that the annual increment of forest stock in Sharada Devi, Hile 
Jaljale (Ka) and Lakuri Rukh is 2,806, 233, and 439 cubic feet respectively.   
 
Table 8.22: Status of Forest Tree Stock in Three Case Studies CFUGs 
 CFUGs   No. of trees/ha 
(10-30 cm 
diameter) 
No. of trees per ha 
(> 30 cm diameter) 
Total 
trees/ha 
Annual 
increment 
(cubic feet) 
Sharada Devi  1,028  17  1,055  2,806 
Hile Jaljale (ka)  495  71  566  233 
Lakuri Rukh  441  217  658  439 
Source: Compiled from CFUGs record 
 
Medicinal plants derived from the forest play a critical role in the livelihood 
security of the rural poor. Due to a lack of modern medicine and health facilities 
in  the  rural  areas,  medicinal  plants  are  frequently  used  by  people  for  the 
treatment  of  various  ailments.  In  Lakuri  Rukh  CFUG,  households  collect 
medicinal plants  from  the community  forest  and sell these for extra income, 
while in other CFUGs; medicinal plants are used solely for household needs. 
Because rural people‘s access to health facilities is poor in the mountains and 
hills of Nepal, community forests provide important medicinal products to local 
people to deal with sickness. The community forest  also serves  as a site for 
spiritual needs, as well as a recreational place. The Hile Jaljale (Ka), Sharada 
Devi  and  Lakuri  Rukh  CFUGs  have  prepared  a  policy  to  develop  their 
community forest areas as tourist destinations. As these CFUGs are situated at 
the  peak  of  the  mountains,  after  a  few  hours  of  trekking,  tourists  can  see 
panoramic  landscapes.  These  places  are  also  ideal  camping  site  for  tourists. 
Community forest user groups have planned to develop this area as ecotourism 
destinations from which CFUGs can earn income, and the money generated from 
such  activities  can  also  be  used  for  conservation  of  community  forest  and 
various other community development activities.  
 
On the whole, it was found that after the establishment of the community forests, 
there  was  a  marked  improvement  in  wildlife  numbers,  forest  stock,  and 328 
 
watershed condition. People in all the case studies sites agreed that they have 
experienced  a  diverse  range  of  direct  benefits  and  indirect  environmental 
services from the community forests. There was no marked negative impact from 
the insurgency on environmental aspects of the CF. 
 
8. 6. Conclusions 
 
In this chapter, three major outcomes associated with the community forestry 
program  were  assessed,  in  the  spheres  of  governance,  livelihood  and 
environmental  outcomes,  and  a  comparative  analysis  was  undertaken  to 
understand the impact of armed conflict (i.e. pre/early and during the late periods 
of armed insurgency) at these three sites. A number of lessons could be drawn 
from the research.   
 
The  case  studies‘  findings  show  that  the  community  forestry  program  has 
empowered local communities, providing access to and substantial control over 
forest resources, and has also embraced certain principles of equity in benefit 
sharing.  In  this  regard,  community-based  forest  management  represents  a 
paradigm shift in forest management. It opened an avenue for recognition of 
local  people‘s  rights  over  forest  resources.  Beside  the  positive  aspects  of 
community-based  forest  management,  some  deficiencies  have  been  observed. 
Data show that the involvement of women and socio-economically marginalized 
sections  of  the  community  in  decision  making  bodies,  especially  in  higher 
executive  posts  such  as  chairman,  secretary,  treasurer,  is  not  satisfactory.  In 
many cases, key leadership positions are monopolized by local elites. There is a 
policy of ascribing CFUG membership to the household head only, which in the 
majority of cases is a man. Such policies have systematically sidelined women‘s 
roles in the business of the CFUG. Since 2000, CFUGs have adopted a policy of 
allocating  a  certain  percentage  of  the  CFUG  executive  committee  posts  to 
women and people from lower socio-economic strata. This more inclusive policy 
emerged  in  response  to  the  Maoist  pressure  and  the  recognition  of  second 
generation issues in community forestry research. Donor agencies also advocated 
in favor of this policy shift and revised their program strategies in favor of poor 
and marginalized segments of society. Since 2000, there has been a rise in the 329 
 
representation of women and marginalized sections of the community on the 
community  forest  executive  committee  and  general  assembly  meetings.  This 
suggests  that  the  armed  conflict  has  forced  government,  donor  agencies  and 
communities to make some positive changes in the community forestry program, 
especially to allocate quotas in CFUG executive committee for the previously 
excluded sections of the community. Finally, CFUG policies and programs are 
prepared, endorsed and implemented by the CFUG executive committee, in close 
consultation with CFUG members.  
 
The  community  management  of  forest  resources  through  the  CFUGs  has 
provided an effective model of resource management that gives tangible benefits 
to  rural  people.  CFUGs  have  undertaken  various  community  infrastructure 
development activities in order to improve basic infrastructure and services for 
the overall welfare of the community. Although a substantial amount of CFUG 
income has been invested in forest management and community infrastructure 
development activities, investment in pro-poor activities is still not adequate. 
The  investment  made  by  CFUGs  in  education,  rural  roads,  drinking  water 
schemes, and community buildings has certainly helped communities as a whole. 
However,  it  was  also  apparent  that  the  investment  of  CFUG  funds  in 
infrastructure development activities tends to benefit the upper-income groups 
disproportionately  because  of  their  structural  advantages.  Only  3%  of  total 
expenditure  had  been  invested  in  pro-poor  programs  (Kanel  2004,  11).  For 
instance, investments have been made to improve school facilities through CF 
initiatives. But this sort of investment benefitted mostly richer households, as 
poor  people  could  not  afford  to  take  the  same  advantage  of  educational 
opportunities (Timsina 2003; Dev et al. 2003, 72) since the children of lower-
income groups are engaged in income earning or domestic activities to assist 
their  parents.  Lakuri  Rukh  CFUG  made  investments  to  increase  access  to 
drinking water. However, there were complaints from lower caste people that the 
water tap was only constructed in the vicinity of the higher caste and influential 
households, and that the poorest were not able to use the drinking water facility. 
In  summary,  this  study  provides  compelling  evidence  that  improvement  in 
physical capital alone at the community level is not enough to improve the living 
conditions of the rural poor. This has to be integrated with wider community 330 
 
development  programs  that  facilitate  the  socio-economic  advancement  of 
disadvantaged people. 
 
The community forest in Nepal renders essential inputs to the farming system 
and is well integrated into the farming system (Dev and Adhikari, 2007: 148). 
These  studies  show  that  community  forests  directly  supported  the  farming 
system,  which  helped  to  improve  household  incomes  and  the  livelihoods  of 
forest dependent local communities. The CFUGs in these case studies sites have 
experienced a number of positive outcomes following the initiation of the CF 
programme. There was a significant increase in the supply of forest products and 
other environmental benefits. Due to enhanced watershed protection, the most 
noticeable  outcomes  were  improved  irrigation  and  drinking  water  facilities, 
which enabled an expansion of off-season vegetable farming and dairying. Out 
of the total household income in the three communities, 71%, 61% and 33% 
comes from the combined agriculture and livestock sector in Sharada Devi, Hile 
Jaljale (Ka) and Lakuri Rukh CFUGs respectively (see Table 8.11), which is 
largely supported by community forests. The resources from community forests 
form  an  extremely  important  input  to  community  livelihoods.  Ccommunity 
forests  provided  timber  for  construction,  fuel-wood  for  household  energy, 
fodder, grass and leaf-litter to livestock and compost for agriculture.  
  
In  recent  years  the  natural  regeneration  of  community  forest  has  been  very 
promising, and greenery and forest stands have significantly improved. There 
has been a marked increase in the quantity and quality of water in streams and 
rivers due to the improvement in forest watershed. The problems of erosion, 
sedimentation and landslides have now significantly decreased. Many species of 
wildlife have reportedly migrated into these regenerating forests, and villagers 
claim that their numbers have increased enormously after the community forest 
intervention. This suggests that greater local control over forest can contribute to 
healthier and ecologically sustainable forest management and use. However, it 
has  to  be  recognized  that  community-based  forest  management  in  all  three 
CFUGs does not operate unilaterally, as there has been substantial support from 
outside  mainly  from  the  Department  of  Forest  and  the  Nepal  Australia 
Community Forestry Project. 331 
 
 
The governing mechanisms of the state agencies, including the Department of 
Forest, were dysfunctional and ineffective during the late period of the Maoist 
insurgency.  Many  field  offices  of  the  District  Forest  Office  (DFO)  in 
Kavrepalanchok district were destroyed, and the outreach activities of the DFO 
were confined to near the district headquarters. The quality of such activities as 
were undertaken was greatly compromised, due to the lack of regular monitoring 
and  assessment.  Moreover,  forestry  staff  of  the  Range  Posts  were  evacuated 
from the field and stationed in the district office due to lack of security. There 
were restrictions from the district administration office on mass meetings, and 
restriction from security forces on going to the forest in groups; also there was a 
tax burden from both the state and the insurgents. Despite all these challenges, 
the governance structures of the local CFUGs were stable and they were able to 
carry out forest management and governance activities more or less as usual. 
These  institutions  were  found  to  be  more  resilient  than  other  government 
sponsored and controlled agencies. The Maoist insurgency did not substantively 
impact upon CFUG governance arrangements in practice, as CFUGs were able 
to have discussions and develop understanding with the Maoists, and also with 
government  security  forces.  Whether  the  CFUG  was  under  the  influence  of 
insurgents or security forces, this research did not find much difference in the 
actual governance arrangements of these community forests. 
 
This study suggests that the new modes of governance of Common Property 
Resources  (CPRs)  –  especially  the  evolving  practices  of  nested,  community-
based  forest  co-governance  –  in  general  helped  to  accommodate  the  local 
interests and needs of communities as well as the conservation policy goals of 
state  and  international  donor  agencies.  In  addition,  these  case  studies 
demonstrate  that  CFUGs  were  able  to  overcome  external  threats  and  shocks 
caused by armed conflict. In the Nepalese case, this was possible because the 
central  government  devolved  power  of  decision-making,  rights  and 
responsibilities  over  natural  resource  use  and  management  to  local  people, 
within  social  and  environmental  parameters  established  by  legislation  and 
supported  initially  by  technical  support  provided  by  government  and  donor 
agencies.  This  new  approach  of  decentralized/devolved  forest  governance 332 
 
arrangements  was  found  viable  and  successful  in  sustaining  local  ecological 
conditions as well as enhancing livelihoods of the forest dependent communities. 
All  three  case  study  CFUGs  are  members  of  the  Federation  of  Community 
Forestry Users' Nepal (FECOFUN) network, which has significantly helped to 
voice their interests and agendas in the national and international arenas. Due to 
their  collective  strength  and  enhanced  social  capital,  the  CFUGs  had  more 
bargaining  power  and  resilient  capacity  to  deal  with  and  even  minimize  the 
effects of the conflict on local people‘s livelihoods. This study supports the line 
of argument that the community-based co-management approach can be more 
adaptive  and  effective  in  enhancing  the  capacity  of  local  resource  governing 
institutions,  through  the  expansion  of  networks  and  building  spaces  of 
engagement  with  wider  communities  and  institutions  (Tompkins  and  Adger 
2004).  Community-based  forest  co-management,  as  a  flexible  and  adaptive 
resource management system, has  the  capacity to  respond,  adapt  and  change 
according to the situation and context, building social capital through networks 
across levels and scales (Olsson, Folke, and Berkes 2004, 75). 
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Chapter 9 
 
Conclusion and Policy Recommendations 
 
This research project examines the impact of the decade-long political conflict 
(commonly known as the Maoist insurgency) on resource governance, livelihood 
security, and environmental sustainability in three case study communities in 
Nepal.  More  specifically,  the  case  studies  are  designed  to  assess  the 
effectiveness and sustainability of the community-based forest co-management 
initiatives prior to and during the prolonged armed conflict.  
 
The first part of the thesis examines how community forest (CF) policy emerged 
in response to declining environmental services from Nepal‘s forests and the 
political context that gave rise to forest degradation. It provides an overview of 
the successes and limitations of early experiments with community forestry and 
the  extent  to  which  the  changing  policy  framework  and  political  context 
contributed to the objectives of the CF program in terms of local participation in 
governance, improved livelihoods and restoration of the forest ecosystem. The 
second part of the thesis examines in greater depth the implementation of the 
program in three communities in the Kavrepalanchok District in the Middle Hills 
of Nepal. It traces the extent to which the prolonged armed conflict affected 
access to and sustainable use of community forest resources, and the overall 
impact of the conflict on community forest governance in the case study sites.  
 
The introductory chapter provides the background and context of the research 
and identified the research questions, methodology, selection of study sites, and 
sampling  techniques.  The  second  chapter  dealt  with  existing  literature  and 
theoretical insights on common-pool resource governance, collective action, and 
decentralized forest governance, specifically examining approaches to resource 
governance, and focusing on arguments surrounding community-based resource 
management    and  co-management  approaches.  Chapter  three  examines  the 
political processes and struggle for democracy in Nepal, with a particular focus 334 
 
on the evolution of the communist movement and emergence of armed conflict 
in Nepal. This chapter further examines the socio-economic differences among 
classes, castes, and geographical regions that contributed to the emergence of the 
armed conflict. Chapter four analyzes forest policy and governance in Nepal, and 
the impact of policies adopted by different political regimes on local resource 
governing institutions and the sustainability of the forest commons.  
 
Chapter  five,  six  and  seven  presents  case  studies  of  three  different  CFUGs. 
These chapters critically examine the effectiveness of community-based forest 
co-management  initiatives,  particularly  resource  governance  outcomes 
(participation,  decision  making,  benefit  sharing),  livelihood  support  and 
environmental services associated with community forestry programs. They also 
look at how the prolonged armed conflict affected access to decision making, 
equity and governance processes, and the adaptation and resilience of CFUGs in 
addressing the adverse impacts of conflict.  
 
The case studies presented three different geographic and conflict settings.  In 
the first case study, nearest the district capital, there was little direct influence 
from either of the contending armed parties; the second case study site was under 
the influence of government security forces; and the last most remote site was 
under  the  influence  of  the  Maoists.  Chapter  eight  undertakes  a  comparative 
analysis of the three case studies, and this final chapter presents the conclusions 
and policy recommendations to be drawn from the research, and identifies areas 
requiring further research.  
 
Before 1957, forests in Nepal were under the control of feudal states.  These 
tended to give permission to exploit forest resources and expand agriculture as a 
strategy to increase the tax base and strengthen the power of the state. During 
104 years of autocratic rule under the Rana regime, the productive forests of the 
Terai  region  were  heavily  exploited.  With  the  advent  of  democracy,  the 
government nationalized all private forests in 1957, in order to confiscate the 
huge  tracts  of  forest  under  the  control  of  powerful  families.  However,  this 
legislation  enforced  by  the  state  disrupted  the  indigenous  systems  of  forest 
management.  To  prevent  the  private  forests  from  being  nationalized,  people 335 
 
quickly destroyed the forests on their farms as well as the forest land adjoining 
their  farmland,  leading  to  severe  deforestation  in  the  Middle  Hills  of  Nepal. 
Centralized control of forests was further strengthened by the enactment of the 
1961 Forest Act, which conferred absolute authority over forest management and 
administration on the forest department. Within two decades most of the forests 
in the Middle Hills of Nepal were degraded; the forests in the Terai region also 
disappeared,  mainly  due  to  the  government‘s  resettlement  policy  and  illegal 
logging.  With  international  attention  drawn  to  the  problem  of  ‗Himalayan 
environmental  degradation‘  and  the  promotion  of  participatory  forest 
management  policies  by  the  FAO  in  the  late  1970s,  financial  and  technical 
assistance poured in from donor agencies. These developments encouraged the 
government of Nepal to initiate various conservation projects, which included 
reforming forest policy and the introduction of community forestry programs. 
 
Following  the  enactment  of  the  1993  Forest  Act  and  the  1995  Forest 
Regulations,  and  introduction  of  community  forestry  programs  in  1978, 
thousands of Community Forest User Groups were formed at the village level, 
which created an institutional platform for broader social changes. Community-
based  forest  co-management  innovations  gave  communities  the  power  and 
authority to control more directly those who had access to forest resources and 
how they were used. When the community forestry programs first started, a key 
challenge  was  building  trust  between  local  communities  and  forestry  staff. 
Through  the  strong  technical  and  financial  support  provided  by  international 
donors  and  the  commitment  of  influential  and  progressive  foresters  in  the 
Ministry of Forest, forestry extension measures including training, observation 
tours, meetings, literacy classes and documentary screenings were introduced, 
which  significantly  improved  the  confidence  of  local  people  in  forest 
management and narrowed the gap that had previously existed between foresters 
and the local people.  
 
Over the last several decades, CFUG members have been successful in building 
the capacity of these institutions. They determine their own priorities, represent 
their  community‘s  interests  in  wider  social  and  political  spheres,  enhance 
technical capabilities in forest management, and implement various community 336 
 
level development activities. As of July 2009, out of the 3.5 million hectares of 
potential  CF  in  the  country  (which  is  65%  of  the  total  forest  area),  the 
government  of Nepal  has  handed over 1,230,000 hectares  (35.14%) of state-
owned  forests  to  14,440  CFUGs,  involving  1,660,000  households  and 
representing  about  35%  of  Nepal‘s  total  population  (Kandel,  2010)
145.  The 
CFUGs are now one of the biggest and most powerful local organizations in the 
rural  areas  of  Nepal.  The  present  community  forestry  program  in  Nepal 
flourished mainly through the support of the government (which undertook 
favourable policy reform), technical and financial as sistance from international 
donors agencies (the Nepal Australia Community Forestry Project, in this case), 
and importantly, the active participation of the local people. The rich experiences 
of  local  people  in  indigenous  forest  management  greatly  helped  t o  restore 
previous forest management practices  and led to the incorporation of such 
experience in the newly enacted forest policies. Communities hired  ban heralu 
(forest watchmen) to maintain rotational patrolling of the forests to stop illegal 
harvesting and encroachment. The salaries of these forest watchmen were paid 
from grain collected from all forest users. This initiative was supported by the 
Forest  Department  and  the  Nepal-Australia  Community  Forestry  Project. 
Effective collaboration developed between the Department of Forest and local 
forest users. CFUGs were provided with extensive powers of rule making and 
enforcement,  most  importantly  affecting  rights  over  access  and  use,  and 
responsibilities for management of community forests. At the same time, the 
CFUGs are required to abide by the agreed principles of community forestry as 
stipulated in their constitution and operational plan, prepared under the broader 
national forestry legislation and guidelines.  
 
In my case study district, Kavrepalanchok, out of a total of 39,565 hectares of 
forest, 19,229.53 hectares have already been handed over to 436 CFUGs; which 
is 48.6% of the total forest area in the district, involving 37,026 households and 
benefitting 188,998 people (49% of the total population of the district) (DFO 
2007, 12). These newly evolved community-based forest governance initiatives 
open up opportunities for collaboration between citizens and the government to 
                                                 
145 Pers. comm. Balaram Kandel, Forest Officer at the Department of Forest, Community Forestry Division, 
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further  their  respective  interests  in  promoting  sustainable  livelihoods  and  the 
protection of environmental services (Brunner and Steelman 2005, 19).  
 
This study shows that the inception of the CF program in the case study sites has 
largely brought positive contributions in meeting local needs for forest products, 
as well as improving the livelihoods of people and the local environment. This 
thesis  argues  that  the  devolution  of  forest  governance  authority  from  state 
agencies to local communities created a distinct space for public participation in 
the governance of community forests. In accordance with a substantial body of 
literature on the subject (Ribot 2004; Gauld 2000, 229; The World Bank 2008, 
159; Ribot 2002b; Borrini-Feyerabend and Tarnowski 2005, 82; Ribot 2002a, 5; 
Cox 1998, 2; Mcdermott and Schreckenberg 2009b, 168), these communities 
were empowered with greater community control over local resources, which 
had positive outcomes in social and ecological spheres (Charnley and Poe 2007, 
325). There were improvements in users‘ access to decision-making processes, 
which led to a more equitable distribution of benefits. The status of community 
forests has also significantly improved since the authority of forest management 
came under the control of local communities. Despite conflicting interests within 
the  communities,  community-based  forest  co-management  has  provided  a 
significant space for collective action. Evidence from the field suggests that as 
the members of the communities involved themselves in the community forestry 
programs, they began to feel some control over this space, which encouraged 
them to further engage in local resource management initiatives in a virtuous 
circle that proved resilient in the face of the decade long political conflict.  
 
Previously, it would have been hard to imagine that local people without direct 
political  ties  to  power  holders  would  have  been  in  a  position  to  engage  in 
dialogue and negotiate favourable outcomes with state forest agencies and other 
related organizations. Today, CFUGs are empowered to develop networks and 
working  relationships  with  other  civil  society  organizations,  and  to  make 
agreements  as  quasi-independent,  self-governed  institutions.  They  are  nested 
within  the  government  regulatory  framework,  and  influenced  by  wider 
international equity and sustainability protocols of donor programs. CFUGs have 
formed their own federation, which integrates the networks of CFUGs at the 338 
 
village, district and national levels (Poffenberger 2006, 64; Agrawal and Ostrom 
2001,  508).  The  formation  of  the  Federation  of  Community  Forestry  Users' 
Nepal  (FECOFUN)  at  the  centre,  representing  organizations  at  the  regional, 
district and local levels, was a significant step in safeguarding CFUG rights and 
interests. It also maintains communication and counterbalances power relations 
between  the  Ministry  of  Forests  and  Soil  Conservation  and  CFUGs.  The 
FECOFUN has played an active role in promoting and protecting the rights of 
community forest users through lobbying, advocacy, capacity building, technical 
support and networking within as well as outside Nepal. During the period of 
armed  insurgency,  FECOFUN  played  an  active  role  negotiating  with  the 
Nepalese security agency to safeguard the rights of forest users. Similarly, as a 
pioneering village level institution, CFUGs have been innovative in providing 
assistance in the formation and promotion of other village level institutions and 
developing  working  relationships  with  other  community  organizations  in  the 
villages such as women‘s groups, youth clubs, saving and credit groups, Village 
Development  Committees  and  non-governmental  organizations  (NGOs).  A 
significant achievement of the community-based resource management program 
is that it has reconfigured relations between the different actors involved in forest 
management.  CFUGs  are  now  regarded  by  the  Forest  Department  as  equal 
partners  in  community  forest  management.  Although  larger  political  and 
economic  forces  have  had  significant  influence  on  local  forest  management 
initiatives, user groups also have considerable influence on national forest policy 
formulation through the federation of CFUGs. 
 
Community forest management is a significant  improvement on past practice 
where  government  forest  agencies  made  decisions  about  the  exploitation  of 
forest resources without consulting local people or allowing their participation. 
CF  institutions  at  the  village  level  have  recognized  rights  to  organize,  make 
decisions over the use and management of the forests, modify rules, exclude 
non-members and enforce penalties upon those who violate the rules. They have 
also  implemented  conflict-resolution  mechanisms,  which  are  considered 
important  for  the  success  of  common  property  resource  institutions  (Ostrom 
1990, 90).  
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The CFUGs  have implemented various programs  - both  technical  and socio-
economic -  such as landslide control, saving and credit schemes, community 
development activities, social mobilization, micro-enterprise development, and 
plantation programs in collaboration with different government line agencies and 
international non-governmental organizations (INGOs). The present study shows 
that CF programs in study sites have been successful in gaining the collective 
participation of local people, reversing the trend of forest degradation, improving 
the  status  of  forests  and  the  supply  of  forest  products  and  conserving 
biodiversity, while generating employment, empowering CFUG members and 
contributing to their socio-economic security. This study also found that after the 
introduction of the community forestry program, a number of best practices have 
been introduced which led to positive discrimination in favour of lower socio-
economic groups, including a gradual increase in the participation of women and 
disadvantaged groups in forest resource management and the decision-making 
process,  and a more equitable distribution of community forest benefits. The 
findings  of  this  study  are  also  supported  by  other  analysts  (Acharya  2005; 
Dangal 2002; Agrawal 2001, 505; Dev et al. 2003; Bhattarai and Khanal 2005, 
65; Charnley and Poe 2007, 324; Harrison 2004, 298; Adhikari, Nagata, and 
Adhikari  2004;  Schreckenberg  and  Luttrell  2009,  207;  Acharya  2002,  152; 
Acharya  et  al.  2006;  Agrawal  and  Ostrom  2001;  Kanel,  Poudyal,  and  Baral 
2005;  Adhikari,  Williams,  and  Lovett  2007,  477),  who  have  argued  for  the 
benefits of decentralized and devolved community forestry programs.  
 
The CFUGs in these case study sites have experienced a number of positive 
outcomes following the initiation of the CF program. It is evident that significant 
inputs for primary production are derived from the community forests. Of the 
total  household  income  in  the  three  communities,  26-60%  comes  from  the 
combined  agriculture  and  livestock  sector  in  all  three  sites,  which  is  largely 
supported by the environmental services provided by community forests. The 
community  forests  provide  timber  for  construction,  fuel-wood  for  household 
energy, fodder, grass and leaf-litter for livestock, and compost for agriculture. 
Off-season  vegetable  farming  and  dairying  have  become  some  of  the  more 
important sources of cash income for households, especially in CFUGs that are 340 
 
close to the market. Enhanced watershed protection has also occurred over the 
period of community forest development.  
 
Moreover,  it  is  apparent  that  community  forestry  has  provided  an  effective 
model of resource management which provides tangible benefits to rural people. 
It has enhanced local welfare as villagers have invested a significant proportion 
of  their  income  in  various  community  development  activities,  such  as  the 
construction of schools, rural roads and community halls, paying basic salaries to 
school  teachers,  and  supporting  drinking  water  schemes.  This  has  not  only 
improved  infrastructure  in  the  villages,  but  equally  importantly  has  created 
seasonal  employment  opportunities  at  the  local  level.  CF  has  provided 
employment  opportunities  during  forest  thinning  operations,  small  scale 
furniture enterprises, community sawmill operations and log transportation. The 
local benefits of the community forestry program in Nepal are also supported by 
other studies (Adhikari, Williams, and Lovett 2007, 477; Dongol, Hughey, and 
Bigsby  2002,  77;  Acharya  2002,  154).  Community-based  forest  governance 
(CBFG) has led to enhanced ecological restoration, with dramatic improvements 
in forest cover and the water regime. Two decades ago, the forests in all three 
case  study  villages  were  badly  degraded  and  people  were  facing  an  acute 
shortage of fire-wood, fodder and timber. Since the introduction of community 
forestry,  natural  regeneration  has  been  very  promising,  and  the  quality  and 
amount  of  green  cover  and  forest  stands  have  significantly  improved.  A 
substantial  increase in  the supply of  forest  products  and other environmental 
benefits was observed. Recent forest inventories in the three case studies showed 
that the canopy coverage of the forests ranged from 35-60% and the number of 
trees per ha ranged from 600-1,000, indicating the healthy status of the forests. 
More specifically, the program has caused improvement in watershed conditions 
and biodiversity conservation. There was a marked increase in the quantity and 
quality of water in the streams and springs due to improved forest watershed 
conditions.  The  most  noticeable  outcomes  were  better  drinking  water  and 
increased irrigation water, which enabled an expansion of off-season vegetable 
farming and dairying.  
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In  the  recent  past,  villagers  were  also  facing  severe  problems  of  erosion, 
sedimentation, and landslides during rainy seasons. These problems have now 
significantly decreased due to community forest conservation efforts. Since the 
handover of forests to  CFUGs,  there is  evidence that populations  of wildlife 
species  have  increased.  Many  species  of  wildlife  (mammals  and  birds)  are 
reported by local people to have migrated to these regenerating forests, and their 
numbers  have  reportedly  increased  dramatically  after  the  community  forest 
intervention. These findings support the argument that greater local control over 
forestry can contribute to forest health, which in turn feeds back to improve 
community livelihoods (Dev et al. 2003, 75-76; Mcdermott and Schreckenberg 
2009b,  165).  The  study  confirms  that  after  the  handover  of  state-controlled 
degraded  forest  to  the  local  communities,  the  CFUGs  were  successful  in 
improving the status of forests from a degraded state to a productive one. At 
present,  communities  in  all  three  study  CFUGs  are  regularly  carrying  out 
thinning operations as stipulated in their operational plans, in order to maintain 
healthy  tree  stock.  Various  studies  that  combine  the  interpretation  of  aerial 
photographs,  remote  sensing  and  geographical  information  systems  (GIS) 
suggests that the status of these forests has been significantly improved, both in 
formally managed community forests as well as informally managed forests by 
local people in the Middle Hills of Nepal (Awasthi et al. 2002, 503; Tachibana 
and Adhikari 2009, 127; Jackson et al. 1998, 210; Gautam, Webb, and Eiumnoh 
2002, 63; Gautam and Shivakoti 2008, 159).  
 
Although Nepal has been at the forefront of experiments with community-based 
forest management, the sustainability of the CF program came under question 
after the onset of the Maoist insurgency in 1996 and continuing armed conflict 
over the following decade. In the case study district of Kavrepalanchok, out of 
eight  Range Post  Offices,  seven Range Posts were destroyed  by the Maoists 
during an intense period of armed insurgency. After the destruction of Range 
Posts in rural areas, most of the forest administration and support to community 
forest user groups (CFUGs) through the Department of Forest shifted to District 
Forest Offices (DFO). This seriously restricted service delivery and technical 
support to CFUGs. However, this study found that CFUGs in all three case study 
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period, despite considerable difficulty and disturbances.  Interestingly, CFUGs 
implemented even more community development activities during the conflict 
period. In general, the community forestry program in the village is the only 
official  program  where  people  have  direct  control  over  resources  and  have 
authority of decision making over the use and management of the forest. This is 
the only programme in the village where people can generate money from CF 
and have a mandate to invest in forest management as well as in community 
development activities. The collective management approach adopted by the CF 
programme and also the relatively fair distribution of benefits as compared to 
other village development programmes, meant there was little resistance to the 
community forestry programme even during the conflict period from either of 
the  contending  parties  as  well  as  within  community  forest  user  groups 
themselves.  This  situation  empowered  the  CFUGs  to  carry  out  even  more 
programmes in the difficult time of conflict. 
 
Households diversified their income sources, and surprisingly, in the three case 
study locations, mean incomes in surveyed households increased by 11%, 26% 
and 35% among the lower, middle and upper–income households respectively 
during the period of conflict. Overseas employment has emerged as a new source 
of household income during the period of conflict, especially among middle and 
upper-income households. However, low-income households could not secure 
income from overseas employment as they lacked the initial capital investment 
required for such opportunities, including the payment of recruitment fees for 
overseas placements. Improvement in living standards for these households was 
to a larger extent dependent upon improved forest conditions. 
 
This study confirms that the governing mechanisms of state agencies, including 
the Department of Forests, became dysfunctional during the period of armed 
insurgency,  as  the  majority  of  rural  areas  beyond  district  headquarters  were 
under  the  control  of  the  Maoists.  Nevertheless,  this  study  did  not  find  a 
significant  negative  impact  from  the  intense  armed  conflict  on  CFUG 
governance. Despite all the difficulties and challenges, the governance structures 
of the local CFUGs were largely stable and forest management activities were 
carried  out  more  or  less  normally.  CFUGs  were  in  fact  in  a  very  difficult 343 
 
situation as they were targeted by both of the conflicting parties if they did not 
cooperate with them. Nonetheless the CFUGs have survived as a vibrant self-
governing institution and have maintained reasonable access to forest resources 
to satisfy the subsistence needs of local people within these communities.  
 
This  research  did  not  find  significant  differences  in  the  actual  governance 
arrangements of community forests, regardless of whether the CFUG was under 
the direct influence of insurgents, security forces, or neither of these contending 
parties. Instead it was found that the community-based forest resource governing 
institutions had the ability to overcome the pressures arising from the armed 
conflict, because of the resilience and adaptive capacities of the CFUGs. The 
community forest program is deeply rooted in the minds of the local people and 
has  their  popular  support.  Moreover,  the  governance  structure  of  CBFM  is 
widely regarded as transparent, and locally directed. It was found that whenever 
there was interference in community forest governance matters, either from the 
state agencies or the Maoist rebels, CFUGs resisted the pressure, adapted to the 
changing situation, and carried out dialogue with government agencies as well as 
with the Maoist insurgents, convincing them that CF activities should continue 
regardless of the conflict. As insurgents also needed shelter and support from 
villagers  in  their  struggle  against  the  government,  they  could  not  force  the 
CFUGs to dismantle community forest management practices in these villages. 
Similarly, the government was also responsive because they wanted to win the 
support of the people in  their fight  against the insurgency  and minimize the 
Maoist influence over the CFUGs.   
 
As a broad based community organization, CFUGs were able to bargain and 
maintain dialogue with both of the struggling parties as they sought support from 
the  local  people.  Networking  carried  out  by  the  federation  of  CFUGs 
(FECOFUN) helped them to communicate their viewpoints and bargain with the 
contending parties during the conflict, including at the national and international 
levels.  
 
This  dissertation  supports  the  argument  that  community-based  management 
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national, and international) that facilitate cross-scale communication. This helps 
in building capacity for self-organization and learning, and ultimately enhances 
the resilience of the social-ecological system (Berkes and Jolly 2001; Tompkins 
and  Adger  2004;  Fabricius  et  al.  2007).  Such  spaces  of  engagement  create 
different networks, which typically provide access to power and representation 
and augment the resilience capacity of these communities (Tompkins and Adger 
2004). Further, this study‘s findings reinforce the argument that in comparison to 
centralized institutions, those institutions which are based at the grassroots level, 
and  which  are  able  to  build  popular  support,  participation  and  a  sense  of 
ownership among local people and function on democratic principles, are more 
resilient, have more bargaining power, and have an adaptive capacity to cope; 
even during a period of political upheaval (Tompkins and Adger 2004; Fabricius 
et  al.  2007;  Berkes  and  Jolly  2001).  Scholars  argue  that  the  resilience  of 
communities can be increased through policies and incentives which empower 
them  to  strengthen  collaboration  and  networks  to  adapt  and  cope  with  the 
challenges created by conflicts and other socio-ecological challenges (Fabricius 
et al. 2007). This study suggests that if resources are managed by self-governing 
institutions  with  extensive  authority  over  decision  making  and  resource  use 
delegated by the state, it is more likely that these institutions will be able to cope, 
adapt, change and absorb shocks created by external forces.  
 
This  study  concludes  that  the  new  decentralized  mode  of  community-based 
forest  co-  governance  was  instrumental  in  creating  a  sustainable  resource 
management regime in the Middle Hills of Nepal. It supports other empirical 
studies  indicating  that  common  pool  resources  (CPR)  can  be  managed 
sustainably  and  efficiently  through  local  self-governing  institutions,  given 
supportive policies within a nested governance regime (Sneath 1998; Ostrom 
and Gardner 1993, 102; Ostrom 1994, 1990; Berkes and Farvar 1989;  Jodha 
1986, 1169; Ostrom 1992, 10; Bromley and Cernea 1989, 9; Feeny et al. 1990, 
61; Bray and Klepeis 2005, 214-15; Ostrom 2005, 257; Mckean 2000, 50). It is 
evident  that  neither  market  mechanisms  nor  the  centralized  command  and 
control bureaucratic administration were able to halt the degradation of natural 
resources  in  Nepal‘s  case,  where  massive  deforestation  occurred  after  the 
nationalization of forests (Lockwood et al. 2009, 3; Dietz et al. 2002, 25; Korten 345 
 
1987, 1; Dietz, Ostrom, and Stern 2003, 1910). It is also now clear that local 
users of degraded resources are not always trapped in a situation from which 
they cannot return (Ostrom 1999, 530). Evidence indicates that a wide variety of 
adaptive governance practices involving multiple actors at diverse levels around 
the  world  have  been  successful  in  the  sustainable  management  of  natural 
resources (Dietz, Ostrom, and Stern 2003, 1910; Ostrom 1999, 530).  
 
The present  case studies  demonstrate that these Nepalese forest  communities 
proved able to overcome external threats to local institutions and resources. The 
new  approach  to  forest  governance  has  been  found  viable  and  successful  in 
sustaining local ecological conditions, as well as enhancing livelihoods of the 
forest dependent communities. There has been debate and skepticism regarding 
the mutuality between social and environmental outcomes of community-based 
natural  resource  management  regimes  (Kusters  et  al.  2006;  Agrawal    and 
Redford 2006, 32; Naughton-Treves, Holland, and Brandon 2005, 219; Koontz 
and  Thomas  2006,  113).  However,  this  study  suggests  that  if  the  central 
government  devolves  powers  of  decision  making,  rights  and  responsibilities 
regarding natural resource use and management to local people with appropriate 
support and within fair and accountable governance parameters, as seen in the 
community  forestry  program  in  Nepal,  they  can  improve  social  and 
environmental outcomes together, rather than regarding one as a trade off against 
the  other.  Nonetheless,  practitioners  and  scholars  need  to  be  careful  in 
generalizing any simple model of governance as a one size fits all panaceas. In 
the  context  of  complex  human-environment  interactions,  outcomes  entirely 
depend  on  the  dynamic  between  the  knowledge,  interests  and  organizational 
capacities  of  resource  users,  the  legitimacy  and  effectiveness  of  articulations 
within the governance system, and the nature of the resource (Ostrom, Janssen, 
and Anderies 2007, 15176; Meinzen-Dick 2007, 15205; Ostrom 1992, 256).  
 
Various studies conducted in the past on community forestry indicate that the 
success or failure of these programs is largely a site specific phenomenon which 
depends on a range of factors, including the ecological, social, and economic 
context of the particular community or user group, and the extent to which the 
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capability of its members to respond to changes. Certain factors influence the 
success  of  community  based  resource  governance  outcomes  (Agrawal  and 
Chhhatre  2006,  164).  Ostrom  proposes  eight  design  principles  as  essential 
elements  or  conditions  that  enable  resource  governing  institutions  to  achieve 
sustainable management of CPRs (Ostrom 1990, 90)
146. The design principles 
proposed by Ostrom should not be understood as a blueprint for the successful 
performance  of  the  self -organized  CPR  institutions.  However,  a  system  of 
governance that follows these principles is like ly to be more successful; given 
the ability to adapt, learn and change according to changes and disturbances in 
the social, economic and ecological system over time  (Ostrom 2005, 257). 
Researchers in this field have concluded that community-based co-management 
of natural resources may not be successful in the absence of the following 
conditions: effective democratic structures and secure and clearly defined tenure 
and access rights and responsibilities of forest users (WRI 2005, 55-57; Bromley 
and Cernea 1989, 22; Wade 1988, 217) ; supportive laws and regulations and 
participatory decision making systems  (Fiszbein 1997, 1040; The World Bank 
2008, 162; WRI 2005, 55 -77; Blair 2000, 35; Ginther 1995, 157; Tolentino 
1995, 141; Mayers, Bass, and Macqueen 2002, 3) ; accountability of decision 
makers to resource users and to wider authorities  (Ribot 2002a, 1; Agrawal and 
Ribot 1999, 2); adequate financial resources  (Fabricius and Collins 2007, 83; 
Fiszbein 1997, 1040); and effective monitoring, fair enforcement arrangements, 
and institutional and capacity development at local, regional and national level 
(Agrawal, Chhatre, and Hardin 2008b, 1462; Shimizu 2006, 31; Ribot 2002a, 6; 
Bowling and Maginnis 2003, 1) . In addition, forest governance systems that 
address the issues of equity, power sharing and empowerment of different socio-
economic  groups,  and  the  participation  of  disadvantaged  sections  of  the 
community  in  decision  making  processes,  have  greater  chances  of  success 
(Tucker 2010, 700).  
 
                                                 
146 Ostrom‘s work mainly focused on how communities and societies interact with surrounding natural 
resources systems by  developing  a  diverse  range  of  self  governing  institutions. She  has argued  in  her 
famous book ―Governing the Commons‖ that certain ―design principles‖ are essential for the success of 
CPR  management.  Throughout  her  research  she  has  emphasized  that  neither  state  control  nor  market 
mechanisms alone are sufficient for the sustainable management of common pool resources (CPRs), rather 
it is communities and societies which have the solutions to the problems of managing collective resources ( 
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These  case  studies  support  the  argument  that  decentralization  and  nested 
devolution  of  resource  management  authority  and  responsibility  to  local 
communities may be one of the most viable approaches to sustainable natural 
resource management. 
 
Policy Recommendations 
 
Despite the notable success of CF programs in Nepal, there is still concern about 
the extent to which decentralization and devolution of power and authority will 
ensure equitable distribution (Potter 2008, 23; Larson and Soto 2008, 231; Kanel 
and Niraula 2004, 11). The present study found that the involvement of women 
and  socio-economically  marginalized  sections  of  the  community  in  decision 
making bodies (particularly in higher-level executive posts of CFUG such as the 
chairman, secretary or treasurer) is not yet satisfactory, although some progress 
has  been  made  on  this  front.  In  many  cases,  key  leadership  positions  were 
captured by people from higher castes and local elites. Scholars argue that the 
socio-economic profile of forest users affects participation in CFUG activities 
(Adhikari,  Di  Falco,  and  Lovett  2004,  254-55)  with  levels  of  participation 
largely determined by the amount of benefit received from community forest by 
disadvantaged groups (Maskey, Gebremedhin, and Dalton 2006, 261). Evidence 
from these case studies suggests that it should be possible to build a virtuous 
circle  by  expanding  participation  and  benefits  for  disadvantaged  groups.  If 
community-based  forest  management  is  to  be  seen  as  an  alternative  to  the 
centralized control and management of forest resources on the one hand, and 
privatization  on  the  other,  CFUG  institutions  have  to  work  toward  greater 
fairness with respect to representation in decision making forums and fairness in 
benefit distribution. In terms of gender representation in decision making bodies, 
in recent years (since 2000), some CFUGs have adopted a policy of allocating a 
certain percentage of the CFUG executive committee posts to women and people 
from  lower  socio-economic  strata.  Since  then,  there  has  been  a  rise  in  the 
representation  of  women  and  marginalized  sections  of  the  community  in 
community forest executive committees. The major stimuli for the changes in 
policy can be attributed to pressure from the Maoists for radical political and 
social  reform,  the  focus  on  second  generation  issues  in  community  forestry 348 
 
highlighted from research, and the realization on the part of government and 
donor agencies of the need to address these issues urgently. Despite the success 
of  CF  programs  in  restoring  forest  cover  and  improving  the  bio-physical 
environment, the human development needs of disadvantaged CFUG members 
are not yet satisfied (Kanel 2008, 273). In the initial phase of the CF program, 
CFUGs placed more emphasis on the protection of forests; now those CFUGs 
whose forests are in a suitable condition to provide timber are engaged in timber 
sales. Income generated from timber enterprises has been invested primarily in 
infrastructure development.  
 
The community forest has great potential to generated income and employment 
opportunities at the local level, through sustainable management of community 
forest resources. Community-based forest management may be most effective 
when  it  is  seen  as  a  means  of  poverty  alleviation  and  overall  livelihood 
improvement for the rural poor. To date neither state forest policy nor CFUGs 
have paid sufficient attention to devising and implementing pro-poor programs. 
One  of  the  challenges  in  the  future,  therefore,  is  to  determine  how  benefits 
derived from the management of CF can be used to address rural poverty and 
enhance sustainable livelihoods for the poor (Gilmour, Malla, and Nurse 2004). 
The  mechanisms  of  benefit  sharing,  and  the  development  of  policies  and 
programs that best suit and address the underlying inequities in decision making 
and livelihood options, must be analyzed and programs formulated accordingly. 
Efforts to ensure fair access to forest products have not solved the problem of a 
widening gap between haves and have nots within forest communities in Nepal. 
Therefore,  there  is  a  need  to  devise  special  programs  to  improve  the  socio-
economic conditions for those people who have least benefited from programs to 
date. Deeply entrenched social and economic differences need to be addressed in 
order to make the CBFM more inclusive and equitable.  
 
Skill- and capacity-building have been  found to be  critical  to  the success  of 
community based co-management initiatives. CFUGs have to carry out various 
activities  such  as  forest  management  (annual  plan  preparation  and 
implementation,  forest  inventory  preparation,  thinning,  pruning,  singling,  and 
fire control) and governance activities (community mobilization, forest products 349 
 
distribution,  networking,  record  keeping,  financial  management,  monitoring, 
reporting, and imposition of fines and penalties). Moreover, transparency and 
accountability in implementing programs remains a challenging task, particularly 
as  income-generating  programs  are  implemented.  Local  CFUGs  have  human 
resources, traditional skills and knowledge. However, their capacities may not be 
sufficient  to  address  the  existing  challenges  and  future  development  of 
community  forestry. Technical  and capacity-building training for CFUGs has 
been implemented in districts such as Kavrepalanchok, which possess donor-
assisted projects. However, districts without projects have very minimal budgets 
to carry out such activities. All CFUGs in the case study sites  felt that they 
require the continuation of capacity-building programs from government as well 
as from donor agencies, in order to improve their capability to implement pro-
poor  oriented  forest  management  policies  in  these  villages.    It  should  be 
understood  that  improving  and  strengthening  governance  mechanisms  of  the 
CFUGs for better livelihood security is a long term process where government 
and donor agencies can play a catalytic role in supporting CFUGs through policy 
and legal backing as well as providing them with needed technical and financial 
help. The dependency of the CFUGs upon outside organizations may gradually 
decrease  when  they  are  able  to  earn  enough  income  through  the  proper 
management  of  community  forest  resources  and  also  through  enhanced 
governance processes. 
 
The  1993  Forest  Act  and  1995  Forest  Regulations  have  provided  extensive 
authority  of  self-governance  to  local  CFUGs.  Community  forestry  programs 
have become popular among forest users, mainly because of the legal framework 
and policy support provided by the government to local communities to govern 
and  enforce  their  local  rules  of  forest  resource  management.  However,  the 
government‘s  commitment  towards  community  forestry  has  not  been 
unequivocal or stable. For example, government decisions to change taxation 
policies  on  community  forest  products,  especially  during  the  late  periods  of 
conflict, were challenged by FECOFUN. In 2000, when the insurgency was at its 
peak, the government of Nepal formulated new Forest Sector Policies, with a 
provision that 40% of the income earned from the sale of surplus timber from CF 350 
 
in Terai
147, Siwalik and  Innner Terai
148 would be taxed as a royalty (this wa s 
formerly 10%). In addition, the government no longer hands over large blocks of 
forest in the Terai region to community forest user groups. Rather, these forests 
are now intended to be managed through the joint collaboration of local users, 
local  political  bodies,  and  government;  75%  of  the  income  from  this 
collaborative forest management will go to the government treasury, with the 
remaining 25% to be shared between users and local bodies. These new policies 
prepared by the government were motivated by t wo considerations. Firstly, 
commercially valuable natural forest in the Terai region which had already been 
handed over to communities, or was in the process of being handed over as a CF, 
and which had significant potential to generate cash income, could b e exploited 
by the community for financial benefits without the government receiving any 
substantial royalties from the sale of timber. As the local community did not 
devote considerable time and energy to improving the condition of the forest 
(unlike in the case of the Middle Hills communities), the government view was 
that the money generated from the sale of timber should not be given solely to 
the forest community. Secondly, as most of the countryside was under the 
control of the Maoists at the time of the decision, the money generated from the 
sale of timber in the Terai region was likely to go to the rebels and may be used 
to fund the insurgency. Many argue that this change in the taxation policy was 
not justified, because there was no consultation or  discussion with the CFUGs 
and  their  representatives  before  its  adoption.  The  government‘s  unilateral 
decision gave communities the impression that the government still wanted to 
assert control over the governance activities of the community forest, despite 
almost  three  decades  of  successful  community-based  forest  co-management 
experiments. FECOFUN challenged the government decision in the courts, and 
the Supreme Court of Nepal nullified the decision (Kanel, Poudyal, and Baral 
2005, 72; Kanel and Acharya 2008). Although the government failed in its bid to 
impose the 40% tax on community forest, , so it proceeded to collect the tax 
though amendments to the finance ordinance. However, with increasing protests 
from FECOFUN and CFUGs in 2003, the government revised the Finance Act 
                                                 
147 The southern edge of the Siwalik range, below 700 meters MSL, and also known as the lowest range of 
the Himalayan foothills, is classified as the Terai region. 
148 The low valleys in between Churia hills to the north of the southern plains(Terai) and Mahabharat range 
are called ―Duns‖ or Inner Terai 
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with a provision for collecting only 15% tax on the sale of surplus timber from 
CFUGs, and only for two valuable commercial tress species in the Terai (Kanel, 
Poudyal, and Baral 2005, 72).  
 
The  above  account  suggests  that  if  the  government  of  Nepal  wants  the 
community  forestry  program  to  flourish  and  improve  the  socio-economic 
condition  of  rural  people,  it  must  show  its  commitment  through  systematic 
requirements  for  extensive  consultation  with  forest  users  before  changes  in 
community forestry policy and legislation are introduced.  
 
Although the community forests in the villages in this study have reached a stage 
where commercial exploitation is viable, CFUGs are still lacking with regards to 
maximizing  benefits  and  creating  employment  opportunities  to  local  people. 
Expanded  opportunities  for  commercial  development  of  forest  resources, 
however, include the threat of renewed over-exploitation. CFUGs lack the skill, 
capacity  and  capital  required  for  the  scientific  management  of  community 
forests, particularly if put under the stresses of engaging with external markets in 
order  to  expand  employment.  CFUG  members  admit  that  the  employment 
opportunities generated by CF activities are still not sufficient, and that wages 
are insufficient to raise CFUGs members of lower socio-economic strata out of 
poverty. If scientific and sustainable forest management practices are adopted, 
there is a greater possibility that CF can act as a vehicle for poverty alleviation 
and socio-economic transformation of forest dependent communities in Nepal. 
In this regard, government – especially the Department of Forest – can play a 
facilitating and supportive role in strengthening CFUG capabilities in sustainable 
forest management and forest-based industry development. The Department of 
Forest will be most effective when it devises a simple and clear-cut policy on the 
commercial  exploitation  of  community  forest  resources,  based  on  scientific 
research and forest surveys.  
 
This study suggests that CFUGs have played a significant role in conserving 
natural  resources  and  continued  their  governance  role  more  or  less  as  usual 
throughout the conflict period, which is surprising to outside organizations. The 
lesson learned from this study suggests that local level governance structures led 352 
 
by the local community can prove viable institutions and could have a greater 
role in sustainable natural resource management initiatives. Taking advantage of 
such governance mechanisms and structures present at local level, government 
should encourage, facilitate and provide support to CFUGs in the post-conflict 
situation  in  order  to  strengthen  the  community-based  forest  management 
initiatives as a viable option for sustaining institutional innovation as well as 
mainstreaming  such  governance  models  in  overall  government  development 
endeavours. It can be concluded that such governance mechanisms can minimize 
the impacts of conflict at the village level, an insight that highlights the feedback 
effects of good governance practices in natural resource management. 
 
It can be concluded from this study that the Community Forest program has not 
been  able  to  address  the  issues  of  equity,  poverty  alleviation  and  livelihood 
improvement for the poorest sections of the community to the extent possible. 
The  utilization  of  community  forests  to  bring  sustainable  socio-economic 
benefits  to  the  rural  poor  is  still  a  challenge.  However,  in  comparison  to 
centralized  systems  of  forest  management,  the  community-based  forest  co-
management approach appears more progressive. In Nepal, CFUGs have proved 
themselves to be resilient institutions over a decade of political conflict, and are 
continuing  to  evolve  and  address  emerging  issues  in  community  forest 
management.  
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Appendix A 
 
Questionnaire for Household Survey 
Kavrepalanchok District, Mid Hills Region, Nepal 
 
Name of Village Development Committee (VDC):       
Name of Village:            Name of CFUG: 
Household number:            Date: 
PART A 
I.  About Household 
(Please circle the answer where applicable) 
1. Age of respondent (household head) -…………………………………………. 
2. Sex:  Male           Female   
3. Household size: ……………………………………………………………………. 
4. Education status of household head: ……………………………………………. 
5. What is your primary source of income? ………………………………………….. 
6. Do you own a house(s)? 
     Yes                            No  
7. If yes, types of house (or other dwelling)? 
……………………………………………………………… 
If more than one house specify the type and place:…………………. 
8. Do you own agricultural land?   
                                
9. If yes, total land area (in Ropani? 
Irrigated land (khet)…………………………………………………………………. 
Rain fed land (Tari) ………………………………………………………………… 
Upland (Bari)…………… …………………………………………………………… 
Private forest (kharbari)……………………………………………………………… 
Share ……………………………………………………………………………… 
10.  If you do not own land, do you rent/share crop land? 
 
   
   
    Yes  No 
    Yes  No 355 
 
11. What is the source of drinking water for your household? 
 
12. Do you have electricity? 
 
13. Do you have a telephone? 
 
14. Do you own any of the following means of transportation? 
 
 
15. Do you have?        
 
  
16. Do you have enough farm equipment
149? 
 
 
17. Did you experience food
150 shortage in the past 10 years? 
 
 
18. If yes, how frequently compared to the previous decade and how many months do 
you have shortage of food on average in a year? 
…………………………………………………………………. 
 
19. How do you cope in times of food shortage? 
20. Did you borrow money in the last 5 years? 
 
 
21. If yes, where did you borrow money from? 
 
 
                                                 
149 Farm implements refer to tools for agriculture, tools of trade  
150 Food refers to staple foods like rice, corn, wheat, millet grown in farmland and used for 
household consumption 
    Yes  No 
    Yes  No 
    Radio  Television 
    Yes  No 
    Yes  No 
    Bank  CFUG Fund  Money lender   
Relative  Friend     
    Bicycle  Motorbike  Jeep   
    Yes  No 
Piped water        Spring  Well  Stream   356 
 
 
 
22. What was the reason for borrowing money? ------------------------------------------------ 
23. Number of livestock/poultry owned by household? 
Buffalo ……………………………………………. 
Cow ………………………………………………. 
Ox ………………………………………………… 
Goat/sheep ……………………………………… 
Pig ……………………………………………….. 
Chicken …………………………………………. 
24. What is your major source of household energy (cooking, heating)? 
 
  
 
PART B 
I. Community forestry and livelihood strategies  
1. Are you a member of a CFUG? 
 
 
2. If yes, do you have to pay an annual fee for being member of CFUG? 
 
 
3. If yes, how much money do you have to pay annually to become CFUG member? 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
4. Do you regularly participate in CFUG assembly meetings? 
 
 
 
5. What are your reasons for involvement in community forestry? 
……………………………………………………………………………….. 
6. Did you or any member of your household serve on a CFUG committee? 
 
 
7. If yes, in what position? What period? 
……………………………………………………………………………….. 
8. Have you ever experienced being disadvantaged by institutional arrangements of CF? 
 
    Fuelwood  Gas  Electricity   
    Yes  No 
    Yes  No 
    Yes  No 
    Yes  No 
    Yes  No 357 
 
 
9. If yes, how and what are the shortcomings? 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
10. How does CF contribute to your family‘s livelihoods and household income? Give 
examples 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
II. Forest Products collection by households before conflict
151 and during 
conflict
152 (annually)
153 
1.  Forest Products 
collection and use 
  Quantity 
collected/annum 
 
  Forest product type  Unit  Before 
conflict 
During 
conflict 
Remarks 
i.  Timber   Cu.ft.       
ii.  Fuel wood   Bhari       
iii.  Tree  fodder   Bhari       
iv.  Grass   Bhari*       
v.  Leaf litter   Bhari       
  Leaf for making plate  Mutha*       
vi.  Binding material   Bhari       
viii.  Medicinal plants   Kg.       
ix.  Thatch grass   Bhari       
x.  Wild fruits  Kg.       
X1.  Wild vegetables  Kg       
xii.  Others          
 
III. Forest Products used by households before conflict
154 and during 
conflict
155 (annually)
156 
2.  Forest Products collection 
and use 
  Quantity use/annum  Remarks 
                                                 
151 Before conflict refers to the period before the onset of Maoist insurgency i.e. 1996 
152 During conflict in the context of this research refers to the period between 1996 - 2006 
153 Recall method will be used to collect information 
*Bhari= Head load   *Mutha= Bundle 
 
154 Before conflict refers to the period before the onset of Maoist insurgency i.e. 1996 
155 During conflict in the context of this research refers to the period between 1996 - 2006 
156 Recall method will be used to collect information 
*Bhari= Head load   *Mutha= Bundle 
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  Forest product type  Unit  Before 
conflict 
During 
conflict 
 
i.  Timber   Cu.ft.       
ii.  Fuel wood   Bhari       
iii.  Tree  fodder   Bhari       
iv.  Grass   Bhari*       
v.  Leaf litter   Bhari       
  Leaf for making plate  Muth*       
vi.  Binding material   Bhari       
viii.  Medicinal plants   Kg.       
ix.  Thatch grass   Bhari       
x.  Wild fruits  Kg.       
X1.  Wild vegetables  Kg       
xii.  Others          
 
3. Do you sell forest products (FP) or non-timber forest products (NTFP) collected from 
community forest? 
 
 
4. If yes, what is the annual income from the sale of FP and NTFP? 
Forest products………………………../annum 
Non-timber forest products …………………/annum 
III. Livelihood strategies and on farm household income/annum
157 
1.  Livelihood portfolio 
 
Before conflict  During conflict 
Annual income
158(Rs.)  Annual income(Rs.) 
i.  Staple Crops     
  a. Rice     
  b. Maize     
  c. Wheat     
  d. Millet       
ii.  Vegetables       
iii.  Fruits     
iv  Milk/milk products     
v.  Goat/Sheep     
                                                 
157 Recall method will be used to collect information 
158 Income refers to cash income derived from the sale of farm production excluding domestic consumption. 
    Yes  No 359 
 
vi  Chicken     
vii.  Egg     
vii.  Pig     
viii.    Non timber forest 
products(NTFPs)
159 
Specify………………… 
   
x.    Sale of fuel wood/timber     
xvi.  Others     
 
IV. Source of non-farm household income (Please tick the appropriate box) 
S.No.   Livelihood portfolio 
 
Before conflict 
Annual income 
(Rs.) 
During Conflict 
Annual  Income 
(Rs) 
       
i.    Salaried Services
160 within Nepal  
Specify where?.......... 
   
ii.  Remittance(outside Nepal) 
Specify where?.......... 
   
iii.  Self employment 
(Contracting/Business/trading) 
   
iv.  Pension     
v.  Farm wages (labouring)     
vi.  Non-farm wages     
vi.  Others(specify)     
 
PART C 
I. Livelihoods Impact Assessment  
1. To what extent was community forestry (CF) sustainable and effective in providing 
livelihood support prior to 1996? And what overall impact did the political instability 
and  governance  crisis  had  on  CF  and  on  your  livelihoods  during  the  period 
between1996 and 2006. 
                                                 
159 Non-timber forest products(NTFPs) refers to medicinal and aromatic plants, wild fruits, 
vegetables(roots/shoots), honey, binding material, roofing material etc 
 
160 Services in Nepal refer to employment in either government, non-government, private or other 
business firms. 360 
 
PART D 
I. Coping strategies by households between 1996 and 2006 
1. Did you or your family experience any impact on your livelihoods as a result of the 
conflict? Did this result in loss of income?  
 
 
2. If yes, explain, what were the key problems/constraints and challenges you 
encountered due to the political situation?   
…………………………………………………………………… 
3. Explain briefly how you coped with shocks and what were the strategies you adopted 
and activities pursued to manage shocks during the time of conflict?  
……………………………………………………………………………………… 
4. What were the livelihood strategies and portfolio you adopted in response to these 
stresses? 
……………………………………………………………………………………….. 
5. Did any agency/institutions/individual played a significant role in mediating and 
providing livelihoods support/rehabilitation during the time of conflict? 
 
 
6. If yes, which institutions (local, district, national, international) and who played an 
important role during the time of conflict, making the livelihoods functional? And what 
were these supports? 
…………………………………………………………………………………….. 
7. Did CF play a role in assisting households in this community to cope with the shocks 
and stresses resulting from political conflict and crisis of governance? 
 
 
8. If yes, what role did it play? Please explain in detail with examples? 
8. What suggestion do you want to make to the outside community for improving 
livelihood security and improving sustainable management of CF? 
"Thank you for your support"  
    Yes  No 
    Yes  No 
    Yes  No 361 
 
PART E -   
 
I.  Semi-structured  questionnaire  for  Community  Forestry  User  Group  (CFUG) 
Committee  Chairman,  executive  members,  village  leaders,  NGOs  Workers,  Political 
Representatives, District Forest Officials 
1.  What role does community forest (CF) play in the livelihoods of the people in 
rural areas? Are there any significant changes in the quality and quantity of 
forest  after  implementation  of  CF  programme?  Can  you  provide  some 
examples? 
2.  How fair is the access to forest products and benefit sharing among CFUG 
members?  Does this vary significantly between communities?  How secure are 
they?  How  does  this  differ  from  the  period  before the  Community  Forestry 
program was initiated? 
3.  What  are  the  priorities  (primary  uses??)  of  different  socio-economic  groups 
(poor, middle class, rich, and women) in relation to CF? 
4.  Is  there  any  conflict  among  different  social  groups  over  the  access  to,  and 
benefit sharing of community forest resources? If yes, what are major issues? 
5.  What have been the effects of political conflict over the last ten years on the 
management  of  CF  (forest  governance)
161? How has this affected access to 
forest products, benefit sharing and sustainable management of CF? 
6.  How  has  the  conflict  affected  the  livelihoods  of  different  social  groups  of 
people in the community? Who is affected most by conflict and in what ways? 
7.  Explain how the management structure of CFUG works at local level? How are 
CFUGs formed? How are the leaders selected? 
8.   How  are  decisions  taken  in  the  CFUG  meeting?  And  who  decides  the 
management  of  CF  and  benefit  sharing?    [[Can  you  give  a  more  explicit 
example of benefits shared that you could get some hard data on??]] 
9.  How did you find the role of the CFUG in the empowerment of women and 
disadvantaged  groups?  Is  there  any  substantial  difference  in  empowering 
women and disadvantaged group of people before 1996 and were there any 
changes during the period between 1996 and 2006? 
10. Are there any programs especially designed for poor and marginalised people as 
part of the CF program? If so, what are these programmes and how are they are 
benefiting these target groups? 
                                                 
161 CF governance refers to sustainable use, management, community control over CF resources 
(ownership), right to exclude non-members, wise and equitable use of CF resources and right of decision 
making, networking with similar interest groups, and implementation of various activities according to 
community forest operational plan. 
 362 
 
11. What were the main constraints on the management of CF, access and benefit 
sharing encountered by local communities during the period of conflict?   
12. How did CFUGs manage to overcome shocks and stresses which resulted from 
conflict? 
13. What outside assistance and support was available to enhance livelihoods of 
rural people in time of conflict? How effective was this? 
14. What was the impact of the conflict on the operation of community forestry user 
groups? And how did the CF programme operate before and during the conflict 
- eg:- what rules apply to community forest access and use? What groups set 
these rules and who administered these before and during the conflict? What 
sanctions apply to breaking rules on forest access or use?  Are all households 
involved in the decision making processes? Are there any special provisions for 
access/  use  by  women  and  disadvantaged  (poor)?  To  what  extent  are  they 
involved in decision-making?  
15. What is the level of participation of women and disadvantaged groups in CF 
activities and what could be done in order to increase the participation of poor 
and disadvantaged groups (DAGs) in CF activities? 
16. Do you think the poor, women and disadvantaged groups benefited from CF 
programme?  If  yes,  How?  If  not,  what is  lacking  and  what  can  be  done to 
improve their participation and benefit sharing? 
17. What  are  the  household  and  community  benefits  obtained  so  far  from  CF? 
Provide some examples. 
18. Was the CFUG able to act as a local resource management institution and have 
power of bargaining with outside agencies? If yes, describe the role it played 
before 1996 and between 1996 and 2006? 
19. What was the role of government (both local and national) in supporting the 
community forestry activities during conflict? Was the government support to 
CF activities as active as it was before the onset of conflict? 
20. Were there any environmental NGOs and CBOs in your villages working before 
the onset of political instability? If yes, were they working in the same area 
during the period between 1996 and 2006? What was their role? Were there 
direct benefits to the community in terms of expanded livelihood opportunities 
either forest- based or non-forest based or of better forest management? 
21. How was the access to market for selling FP/NTFPs, buying agricultural inputs, 
consumer  products  and  market  for  agricultural  products  before  1996  and 
between 1996 and 2006? 363 
 
22. What  was  the  overall  impact  of  the  conflict  on  local  infrastructure,  service 
delivery, security and livelihoods? 
 
II. Semi-structured questionnaire for senior forestry officials working in the 
Department  of Forest  (DOF)  and Ministry of Forest  and  Soil  Conservation 
(MFSC), Community forestry experts at national level 
 
1.  Can  you  briefly  elaborate  on  the  contribution  of  community  forestry  to  the 
livelihoods of people, environment conservation and over all socio-economic 
development at local and national level? 
2.  Are  there  any  significant  changes  in  the  livelihoods  of  rural  people  after 
launching of the CF programmes? 
3.  What  was  the  impact  of  the  decade  long  political  instability  on  the  CF 
programme  at  national  and  local  level?  Would  you  please  provide  some 
documentary evidence on these impacts? 
4.  What  kind  of  strategy  especially  from  the  Ministry  of  Forest  and  Soil 
Conservation  (MOFS)  and  Department  of  Forest  (DOF)  were  adopted  in 
connection with CF programme during the period of insurgency? Was there any 
significant change in the policy and programmes operating during this period? 
If yes, what are they? 
5.  In your opinion what kind of policy, programme and strategy should be adopted 
to  strengthen  and  improve  the  community  forestry  programme  in  the  post 
conflict situation?  
6.  Various studies indicated that some section of the community especially the 
poor, women and marginalised group of people are not benefiting much from 
CF as compared to wealthier and well-connected people. Does government have 
any policy and programmes to address these issues? If yes, what are they? 
 
 
"Thank you for your support‖  
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